Nour Eddine Mouktabis

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
In re
Nour Eddine Mouktabis,
Debtor.
Case No. 25-31941-dwh7
MEMORANDUM DECISION
GRANTING TRUSTEE’S
TURNOVER MOTION AND
GRANTING IN PART
TRUSTEE’S MOTION TO
COMPEL1
I. 	Introduction
Jeanne Huffman, the chapter 7 trustee, has moved to require debtor,
Nour Mouktabis, to turn over certain documents2 and to answer questions
she asked, through her lawyer, at the meeting of creditors.3 Mouktabis
1 This disposition is specific to this contested matter. It may be cited for
whatever persuasive value it may have.
2 ECF No. 34.
3 ECF No. 70.
Below is an opinion of the court.
_______________________________________
DAVID W. HERCHER
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
DISTRICT OF OREGON
F I L E D
September 30, 2026
Clerk, U.S. Bankruptcy Court
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opposes both motions, in part by invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.
I will order Mouktabis to turn over the requested documents. I will
sustain his privilege claim as to 29 of the meeting-of-creditors questions,
overrule it with respect to one, and allow him 30 days to supplement his
claims with respect to the remaining 66 questions.
II. 	Procedural history
Mouktabis filed his petition on June 8, 2025.
At the first setting of the meeting of creditors on July 16, 2025,
Mouktabis, under oath and without invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege,
answered questions by Huffman and creditors related to information he had
disclosed in his schedules and SoFA4 That information includes his scheduled
assets and liabilities, his employment, bank accounts, 3270 NW Susbauer
Rd., Cornelius, Oregon, 4345 Summerlin Drive, West Linn, Oregon, which
the parties refer to as the condo, Amana Ranch LLC, and funds garnished
from a bank account at Thread Bank.5
Mouktabis invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege in an email he sent
Huffman and her lawyer, Holly Hayman, on July 29, 2025.6
On October 31, 2025, Huffman moved to require Mouktabis to turn
over to her six categories of recorded information: (1) proof of his Social
4 ECF No. 70 at 4–5 ¶ 11.
5 ECF No. 71-1 at 2 ¶ (5).
6 ECF No. 92 at 1 ¶ 3.
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Security number, (2) articles of incorporation of the LLC and any
amendments, (3) operating agreement for the LLC and any amendments,
(4) names and contact information for members of the LLC and
documentation regarding transfer or acquisition of interests in the LLC,
(5) the LLC’s Chase Bank and Thread Bank statements from June 2023 and
July 2025, and (6) documents relating to “Debtor’s transfer of 3720 [sic, 3270]
NW Susbauer Rd., Cornelius, Oregon] to Kaoutar Mouktabis in June of 2021
. . . .7
On November 21, 2025, Mouktabis filed his objection to the turnover
motion.8
Mouktabis appeared and testified at a continued meeting of creditors
on December 18, 2025, when he answered some questions and invoked the
Fifth Amendment privilege in response to others.
On January 5, 2026, Huffman filed her motion to compel,9 in which she
requests that the court (1) compel Mouktabis’s testimony and production of
documents, overruling his invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege,
(2) compel him to answer questions asked at the continued meeting of
creditors, and (3) find that he has waived any Fifth Amendment privilege
that may be available due to his failure to timely invoke the privilege and his
7 ECF No. 34; see also ECF No. 70 at 6 ¶ 15, final bullet point.
8 ECF No. 35.
9 ECF No. 70.
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prior disclosures.10 A transcript of the continued meeting is attached to
Hayman’s declaration in support of the motion to compel.11
On January 26, 2026, Mouktabis filed his response to the motion to
compel,12 in which he does not contest the facts alleged in the motion or the
accompanying declaration of Hayman, including the accuracy of the
transcript. He asks for a stay pending appeal should I overrule his privilege
invocation.13
On February 2, 2026, Huffman filed her reply in support of the motion
to compel.14
On February 4, 2026, Mouktabis filed his declaration in support of his
response to the motion to compel.15
III. 	Facts
The following facts are alleged by the parties in support of their
positions on the motions and appear to be conceded or at least not to be
contested.
On June 3, 2021, Mouktabis transferred the Susbauer property to
Kaoutar Mouktabis.16
10 ECF No. 70 at 2, 13.
11 ECF No. 70 at 4–5 ¶ 11.
12 ECF No. 85.
13 ECF No. 86 at 7.
14 ECF No. 89.
15 ECF No. 92 at 3 ¶ 12.
16 ECF No. 70 at 3 ¶ 2; ECF No. 85 at 5.
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On January 31, 2023, a general judgment of contempt was entered
against Mouktabis in the “contempt matter”17—the term the parties use for
the remedial contempt action commenced on February 17, 2022, by Malika
Amarou, Mouktabis’s former spouse, against him in Washington County,
Oregon, Circuit Court.
On March 15, 2023, the judgment was vacated and re-entered as an
order of contempt.18 In the order, the court found him in contempt for
willfully failing in several respects comply with the judgment entered in his
divorce from Amarou,19 despite having the ability to comply.20 The court
found that he had drained a financial account that had been awarded to her
and that he failed to reveal this information “in subsequent supersedes [sic]
undertaking proceedings and the garnishment proceeding,” and his
concealment of those actions demonstrates he was aware that he was not
permitted to drain the account.21 The court also found that he “is receiving
TANF [and] there has been no judicial review of the decision to award
Husband [Mouktabis] TANF. Husband has ample means to support himself
and his 18 year old daughter in a comfortable lifestyle without TANF.”22 The
court struck from the draft order language that would have ordered
17 ECF No. 70 at 3 ¶ 5.
18 ECF No. 71-1 Ex. BBB.
19 ECF No. 71-1 Ex. BBB at 2 ¶¶ 1.a.–1.c., at 3 ¶ 9.
20 ECF No. 71-1 Ex. BBB at 2 ¶ 3.
21 ECF No. 71-1 Ex. BBB at 2–3 ¶ 7.
22 ECF No. 71-1 Ex. BBB at 5 ¶ 11.j.
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Mouktabis to be confined,23 saying instead, “Court to address remedial
sanctions at sentencing hearing when Defendant [Mouktabis] reappears for
court as ordered.”24
Mouktabis alleges that the contempt matter is “pending sentencing.”25
And he claims to be “subject to a remedial contempt proceeding for
nonpayment of child and spousal support where confinement is contemplated
against Debtor as a remedial sanction.”26 At some unspecified time in 2025,
he spent three weeks incarcerated by the Washington County Sheriff in
connection with the contempt matter.27 Since petitioning for dissolution of his
marriage to Amarou in 2018, he has been the subject of criminal and quasi-
criminal proceedings and investigations28 for domestic violence, child abuse,
financial fraud, and contempt related to financial obligations.29 The state of
Oregon has asked Mouktabis to sign an agreement acknowledging that
information he provides may be used in enforcement actions, including
contempt actions.30 He is also “subject to an ongoing federal criminal
investigation pertaining to his finances,” separate from the contempt
matter.31 An investigator has informed him that he is being investigated for
23 ECF No. 71-1 Ex. BBB at 6 ¶ 2.e.
24 ECF No. 71-1 Ex. BBB at 6.
25 ECF No. 92 at 2 ¶ 11.
26 ECF No. 35 at 2 ¶ 7.
27 ECF No. 35 at 2 ¶ 8.
28 ECF No. 92 at 2 ¶ 6.
29 ECF No. 92 at 2 ¶ 8.
30 ECF No. 92 at 3 ¶ 13.
31 ECF No. 35 at 2 ¶ 9.
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fraud concerning some of his finances.32 He has documentation of the
investigation but should not be required to disclose it other than in camera.33
On May 19, 2023, Amarou initiated an action against Mouktabis and
Kaoutar Mouktabis to avoid his transfer of the Susbauer property as a
fraudulent transfer.34
From December 31, 2015, through January 1, 2024, Mouktabis lived at
3270 N.E. Susbauer Rd.35
On April 24, 2024, Mouktabis conveyed the condo to Soumia El
Massaoudi, his spouse.36
Mouktabis alleges that, at the petition date, he held a 5-percent
interest in the LLC, and he claims that the LLC is insolvent. That
membership interest was not scheduled, but he referred to it and its lack of
value in his objection to the turnover motion.37
On June 30, 2025, after the petition date, Mouktabis filed a complaint
against Maria Clemens in Clackamas County, Oregon, Circuit Court to
recover money. That court entered judgment in favor of Mouktabis and
against Clemens on July 10, 2025. Mouktabis did not schedule any claim
against Clemens.38
32 ECF No. 92 at 3 ¶ 14.
33 ECF No. 92 at 3 ¶ 15.
34 ECF No. 70 at 3–4 ¶ 6.
35 ECF No. 2 SoFA at 1 item 2.
36 ECF No. 1, SoFA at 9–10, item 18.
37 ECF No. 35 at 2 ¶¶ 3, 4.
38 ECF No. 70 at 5 ¶ 13.
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IV. 	Arguments
A. 	Arguments by Huffman
Huffman argues that Mouktabis has no reasonable cause to
“apprehend a real danger of incarceration resulting from his testimony.”39
His only argument for a risk of prosecution is that “he may have had assets
and did not pay his debt or obligations,”40 which is an impermissible blanket
invocation of the Fifth Amendment.41 He “was already found in contempt and
the Contempt Order was entered in 2023.”42 Thus, there is “no present
reasonable cause for Debtor to apprehend a real danger of incrimination”43
and “no risk of further criminal prosecution” in the contempt matter.44 He
does not identify or describe any possible incrimination other than in the
contempt matter.45
Mouktabis has waived his right to assert the privilege by his
“extensive prior disclosures” and his “fail[ure] to timely invoke any
privilege.”46 He voluntarily disclosed his opinion of the value of the condo and
his interest in the LLC in his objection to the turnover motion and his
response to the motion to compel, thereby waiving the privilege as to the
39 ECF No. 70 at 11.
40 ECF No. 89 at 3:1–5.
41 ECF No. 89 at 3:6–8.
42 ECF No. 89 at 2:2–4.
43 ECF No. 89 at 2:1–2.
44 ECF No. 89 at 2:3–6.
45 ECF No. 89 at 4:2–4.
46 ECF No. 70 at 2.
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existence of those assets and their value.47 Disclosure of further details about
the nature and value of those assets and his transfer of them cannot further
incriminate him.48
The act-of-production privilege does not apply to LLC records that
Mouktabis possesses in a representative capacity, and production of his
personal records is privileged only if he demonstrates that the act of
production would incriminate him. He waived any privilege not to disclose his
membership interest in the LLC and his transfer of the Susbauer property by
voluntarily disclosing those facts.49
B. 	Arguments by Mouktabis
1. 	Arguments in briefing
In briefing, Mouktabis argues that the documents Huffman seeks are
statutorily excepted from turnover, and he invokes the privilege against self-
incrimination. He alleges that “prior courts have already determined [that
the LLC] is of inconsequential value . . . .”50 He argues that he is not required
by 11 U.S.C. §§ 521 or 542 to produce documents relating to the LLC because
it is not estate property and the estate’s membership interest is of
inconsequential value to the estate.51 (Except as otherwise noted, section
references are to sections of title 11, the Bankruptcy Code.)
47 ECF No. 89 at 5:7–12.
48 Id.
49 ECF No. 70 at 12.
50 ECF No. 86 at 6.
51 ECF No. 35 at 2.
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In his opposition to the turnover motion, he acknowledges Huffman’s
reference to the Susbauer property sale,52 and he refers to “a piece of real
property sold by the Debtor over four years ago,”53 so I take the “piece of real
property” to mean the Susbauer property. He argues that he need not
produce documents regarding that sale because the property is not estate
property. He also argues that any claim to avoid the sale under Oregon
Revised Statutes § 95.280(3) would be untimely. The same, he says, “applies
to the Condo.”54 And if the condo transfer is void or voidable, it is “valued at
or less than $300,000” and thus is entirely exempt under Oregon Revised
Statutes § 18.395(1)(a).55
Mouktabis invokes the privilege against self-incrimination in the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, section 12, of the Oregon
Constitution “in light of the pending and/or anticipated criminal
investigations and prosecutions targeting” him.56 He alleges that he is
“subject to a remedial contempt proceeding for nonpayment of child and
spousal support where confinement is contemplated” against him as a
remedial sanction; he has been incarcerated more than three weeks by the
Washington County, Oregon, Sheriff as a result of the same contempt
52 ECF No. 35 at 2 ¶ 5.
53 ECF No. 35 at 3.
54 ECF No. 85 at 5.
55 ECF No. 86 at 6.
56 ECF No. 35 at 3.
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proceeding.57 Amarou has instigated investigations against him about
domestic violence, child abuse, financial fraud, and “contempt related to
various financial obligations,”58 and the contempt matter is the fourth such
proceeding.59 Although the contempt matter is currently “pending sentencing,
it is far from over . . . .”60 “Any financial information” he now provides would
be used against him to increase his sentence and could also be “grounds for a
new contempt proceeding altogether.”61
He is subject to “an ongoing federal criminal investigation pertaining
to his finances which is separate from the contempt proceeding.”62 He was
recently contacted by an investigator informing him that he was being
investigated for fraud concerning some of his finances.63 He would provide
documentation regarding that investigation “for the court’s eyes only (i.e. in-
camera) . . . .”64
None of his prior voluntary disclosures has been incriminating.65 He
relies on the act-of-production privilege to excuse his production of requested
documents.66
57 ECF No. 35 at 2 ¶¶ 7, 8.
58 ECF No. 92 at 2 ¶ 8.
59 ECF No. 92 at 2 ¶ 9.
60 ECF No. 92 at 2–3 ¶ 11.
61 ECF No. 92 at 3 ¶ 12.
62 ECF No. 35 at 2 ¶ 9.
63 ECF No. 92 at 3 ¶ 14.
64 ECF No. 92 at 3 ¶ 15.
65 ECF No. 85 at 4.
66 ECF No. 85 at 6.
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2. 	Arguments at meeting of creditors
The December 18, 2025, continued meeting of creditors occurred after
Mouktabis filed his opposition to the turnover motion and before the motion
to compel was filed. At the meeting, and while being examined under oath, he
made several combined factual and legal arguments why the privilege
against self-incrimination excuses him from answering certain questions,
among which are several that he does not appear to have specifically
repeated in his later filings.
Mouktabis said that whatever he says in the meeting-of-creditors
examination or in the bankruptcy case about his finances could be used
against him to, among other things, support a claim for criminal contempt for
nonpayment of child and spousal support and other financial obligations
imposed by the divorce decree.67 A pending investigation into his finances has
resulted in an indictment.68 When he was asked to describe any criminal
prosecution against him, he referred to having “made use of certain benefits
in the past.” Whatever information is revealed about his finances, including
whether he had the ability to pay, and whether he was eligible for those
benefits, can be grounds for criminal prosecution.69 He has been contacted by
an investigator who said he was investigating Mouktabis’s finances,
apparently in connection with an investigation into misuse of benefits.70
67 ECF No. 71-7 Ex. G (Transcript) at 6:4–13, 6:21 – 7:3.
68 Transcript at 7:12–15.
69 Transcript at 8:9–21.
70 Transcript at 8:22 – 9:4.
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V. 	Jurisdiction and authority
The district court has jurisdiction over the turnover motion and the
motion to compel, which are civil proceedings arising in this case.71
The district court has referred to this court all bankruptcy cases and
proceedings in this district.72 The motions are core proceedings,73 which this
court may hear and determine.74
VI. 	Principles
A. 	Meeting of creditors
The United States trustee must convene a meeting of creditors,75 at
which the debtor must appear and submit to examination under oath by the
case trustee and others.76 The permissible examination subjects include the
debtor’s acts, conduct, or property; the debtor’s liabilities and financial
condition; and any matter that may affect estate administration.77
B. 	Privilege against self-incrimination
1. 	Federal Rule of Evidence 501; Fifth Amendment
The rules of evidence that apply in a bankruptcy case are the Federal
Rules of Evidence.78 Under Evidence Rule 501, in a federal action other than
a civil action in which state law supplies the rule of decision, a claim of
71 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).
72 LR 2100-(2)(a)(1).
73 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (E).
74 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1).
75 11 U.S.C. § 341(a).
76 11 U.S.C. § 343; Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2003(b)(1)(A).
77 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004(b)(1); 11 U.S.C. § 343.
78 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9017.
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privilege is governed by the common law unless federal law, including the
U.S. Constitution, provides otherwise.
Here, the rules of decision are provided by federal law, sections of the
Bankruptcy Code: as to the turnover motion, sections 521 and 542, and as to
the motion to compel answers to questions at the meeting of creditors,
section 343. Thus, his claim of privilege is governed by the Fifth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution, not Oregon law.
Under the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause, “[n]o person
. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself
. . . .”
2. 	Availability of the privilege
The Self-Incrimination Clause applies to a civil proceeding if the
testimony sought to be compelled could later be used as evidence against the
witness in a criminal prosecution79 or in a quasi-criminal proceeding, such as
one for civil forfeiture.80 The privilege is available when disclosure is
compelled, testimonial, and incriminatory.81 The privilege applies to
“testimony that may incriminate the witness under either state or federal
law.”82 The privilege “must be accorded liberal construction in favor of the
right it was intended to secure.”83
79 Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).
80 See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1980).
81 Fisher v. U.S., 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976).
82 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Sovereign State Cap., Inc., 557 F.2d 683, 687
(9th Cir. 1977).
83 Hoffman v. U.S., 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
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To make a valid claim of the privilege against self-incrimination, a
witness “must be faced with ‘substantial hazards of self incrimination,’
. . . that are ‘real and appreciable’ and not merely ‘imaginary and
unsubstantial.’”84 The right to assert the privilege “does not depend upon the
likelihood, but upon the possibility of prosecution.”85
The privilege extends not only to answers that would in themselves
support a conviction “but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link
in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute” the witness86 or that would
constitute a “lead or clue to a source of evidence” of a crime.87 The witness is
not “required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually
required to be established in court . . . .”88 The privilege excuses an answer
that would establish even “a single incriminatory fact.”89 The witness need
not point to a pending criminal investigation of the witness; the witness need
only establish that answering questions would “the likelihood of
incrimination . . . .”90
Whether a question creates the hazard that the answer would
incriminate a witness cannot be established just by “[t]he witness’s say-so
84 United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 1980).
85 In re Master Key Litig., 507 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1974) (citing Hoffman v.
U.S., 341 U.S. 479, 486–87 (1951)); Isaacs v. U.S., 256 F.2d 654, 658 (8th Cir.
1958)).
86 Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486.
87 Hashagen v. U.S., 283 F.2d 345, 348 (9th Cir. 1960).
88 Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 487.
89 Hashagen, 283 F.2d at 352.
90 United States v. Rendahl, 746 F.2d 553, 556 (9th Cir. 1984).
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. . . .”91 “Where a question is innocuous on its face, a bare assertion of the
privilege is not enough: the witness must come forward to shed some positive
light tending to show its incriminating aspects.”92
For a privilege claim to be sustained, “it need only be evident from the
implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a
responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be
answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.”93
When appraising a claim of self-incrimination, a trial judge “’must be
governed as much by his personal perception of the peculiarities of the case
as by the facts actually in evidence.’”94 In other words, in determining
whether a particular question “is innocuous and thus unprotected absent
some positive disclosure by the witness of its hidden dangers,” . . . the judge
must “employ a large measure of his own intuition and basic legal instincts
. . . .”95 In doing so, the judge can and must view the privilege claim “in a
different perspective than he would an ordinary disputed fact in a normal
adversary proceeding; he should not confine his attention to and rest his
conclusion simply upon the facts before him, but must draw heavily upon his
own experience in weighing the please and deciding the issue.”96 If the judge
91 Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486.
92 Hashagen, 283 F.2d at 350.
93 Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486.
94 Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 487 (quoting Ex parte Irvine, 74 F.954, 960 (C.C.S.D.
Ohio, 1896).
95 Hashagen, 283 F.2d at 350.
96 Id.
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“decides from this examination of the questions, their setting, and the
peculiarities of the case, that no threat of self-incrimination exists, it then
becomes incumbent ‘upon the defendant [witness] to show that answers to
(the questions) might criminate him.’”97 The witness must make “some
positive disclosure . . . of [the question’s] hidden dangers.”98 As noted by
Judge Learned Hand—
Obviously, a witness may not be compelled to do more than show
that the answer is likely to be dangerous to him, else he will be
forced to disclose those very facts which the privilege protects.
Logically, indeed, he is boxed in a paradox, for he must prove
the criminatory character of what it is his privilege to suppress
just because it is criminatory. The only practicable solution is to
be content with the door's being set a little ajar, and while at
times this no doubt partially destroys the privilege, and at times
it permits the suppression of competent evidence, nothing better
is available.99
In the Supreme Court’s 1951 decision in Hoffman v. United States, the
Court sustained a privilege invocation, observing that “[i]n this setting it was
not ‘perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in
the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer(s) cannot possibly
have such tendency’ to incriminate.”100
97 Neff, 615 F.2d at 1240.
98 Hashagen, 283 F.2d at 350.
99 Neff, 615 F.2d at 1240 (quoting United States v. Weisman, 111 F.2d 260,
262 (2d Cir. 1940)).
100 Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 488 (emphasis in original) (quoting Temple v.
Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892, 898 (1881)).
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3. 	Waiver of the privilege
A witness’s voluntary disclosure of a fact waives the privilege against
self-incrimination “as to the details of that fact so long as they do not further
incriminate, but where those details would so incriminate, the privilege is not
waived.”101
In a proceeding other than a prosecution against the witness, the
witness “may ‘pick the point beyond which he will not go,’ and refuse to
answer any questions about a matter already discussed, even if the facts
already revealed are incriminating, as long as the answers sought may tend
to further incriminate him.”102
Huffman argues that Mouktabis has waived the Fifth Amendment
privilege by failing to invoke it timely.103 But the only sense in which she
suggests that he has failed timely to invoke the privilege is that he did not do
so in nonbankruptcy litigation or at the initial setting of the meeting of
creditors.104
4. 	Procedures for assertion and resolution of claim of
privilege
To support invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination, the
witness’s “[s]tatements under oath, in person or by affidavit, are necessary
101 Hashagen, 283 F.2d at 352.
102 United States v. Seifert, 648 F.2d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting
Shendal v. U.S., 312 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1963)).
103 ECF No. 70 at 2.
104 ECF No. 70 at 3.
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because the present penalty of perjury may be the sole assurance against a
spurious assertion of the privilege.”105
The Ninth Circuit has held that a trial court erred in overruling a
witness’s invocation of the act-of-production privilege without first examining
the requested records at the witness’s request.106
VII. 	Discussion
A. 	Mouktabis has not waived the Fifth Amendment privilege
to the extent argued by Huffman.
1. 	Mouktabis could not have waived his right to assert
the Fifth Amendment privilege by his disclosures in
litigation other than in this case.
A witness’s waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege “is limited to the
particular proceeding in which the waiver occurs.”107 And even within a
particular proceeding, “waiver at one stage of a proceeding is not a waiver of
that right for other stages.”108
Because a proceeding external to this bankruptcy case is not the same
proceeding as this case, no statement by Mouktabis in a proceeding other
than this case—including in state court either before or after the petition
105 In re Morganroth, 718 F.2d 161, 170 (6th Cir. 1983).
106 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Dated Apr. 18, 2003, 383 F.3d 905, 910 (9th
Cir. 2004). See United States v. Bodwell, 66 F.3d 1000, 1002 (9th Cir. 1995)
(remanding for in camera hearing at which witness will be asked questions
and court will determine privilege). See also Dole v. Milonas, 889 F.2d 885,
890 (9th Cir. 1989) (court may make in camera review of disputed
documents).
107 United States v. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613, 623 (9th Cir. 1979).
108 United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1978).
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date—could have waived his right to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege
in this case.
2. 	Mouktabis’s prior voluntary disclosures in the
bankruptcy case have been part of a single
“particular proceeding.”
A debtor’s duties to provide the trustee with information are formally
discrete; the debtor must complete and file the schedules and SoFA,
surrender to the trustee recorded information relating to estate property,
answer questions at the meeting of creditors, and comply with a court order
to turn over or disclose to the trustee recorded information relating to the
debtor’s property or financial affairs. Nonetheless, those duties function
together to enable the trustee to investigate the debtor’s financial affairs109
and expeditiously monetize estate property.110 In that sense, those types of
disclosures functionally constitute a single proceeding.
B. 	Mouktabis must produce the documents requested in the
turnover motion.
1. 	Turnover is required by statute.
A debtor’s duties to turn over recorded information to the trustee arise
primarily under two statutes. Section 521(a)(4) requires a debtor to
“surrender to the trustee . . . any recorded information, including books,
documents, records, and papers, relating to property of the estate.” And
under section 542(e), “subject to any applicable privilege, after notice and a
109 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(4).
110 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1).
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hearing, the court may order . . . [a] person that holds recorded information,
including books, documents, records, and papers, relating to the debtor’s
property or financial affairs, to turn over or disclose such recorded
information to the trustee.” Documents that are necessary to, or would aid
the trustee in, the performance of those duties “relate” to estate property or
the debtor’s property or financial affairs and thus are subject to compelled
turnover. And “debtor’s property” includes property the debtor owned before
the petition date, even if the debtor transferred the property before the
petition date so it never became estate property. When the two statutes are
read together, the trustee is entitled to all documents that relate to the
debtor’s prepetition property or financial affairs or to property of the estate.
In Mouktabis’s opposition to the turnover motion, he argues that, other
than proof of his Social Security number (which he appears not to seriously
contest he must produce), the requested documents either do not relate to
estate property or they relate to estate property of inconsequential value or
benefit to the estate.111 Neither a debtor’s section 521(a)(4) obligation to turn
over information to the trustee nor the court’s section 542(e) turnover power
contain any exception for information or property that is of inconsequential
value or benefit to the estate.
The recorded information Huffman seeks in the turnover motion must
be surrendered under section 521(a)(4) without court order because it is
111 ECF No. 35 at 1.
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“recorded information . . . relating to property of the estate,” or it is subject to
ordered turnover under section 542(e) because it is “recorded information . . .
relating to the debtor’s property or financial affairs.”
2. 	Turnover is not excused by the Fifth Amendment.
Mouktabis also argues that compelled production of the requested
documents would violate his privilege against self-incrimination.112 He does
not explain specifically how his production of the specifically requested
documents would incriminate him.
The privilege against self-incrimination “protects an individual against
forced production of personal papers and effects, at least to the extent that
the act of producing the documents might serve as a basis for incriminating
inferences.”113 The act of compelled production of documents “tacitly concedes
the existence of the papers demanded and their possession or control” by the
witness and the witness’s “belief that the papers are those” demanded.114 But
a witness “may not claim the [Fifth] Amendment’s protections based upon the
incrimination that may result from the contents or nature of the thing
demanded.”115
Because the privilege protects against forced production only of
“personal” papers, the act-of-production privilege can be invoked only by the
document’s owner. Property of a chapter 7 bankruptcy debtor that is not
112 ECF No. 35 at 1.
113 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 633 F.2d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1980).
114 Fisher v. U.S., 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976).
115 Baltimore City Dep’t of Soc. Servs v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 555 (1990).
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exempt becomes property of the estate.116 Thus, a debtor has no act-of-
production privilege not to produce a document that is property of the
estate.117 Here, Mouktabis does not argue that the recorded information
Huffman seeks is not estate property.
The “historic function” of the privilege against self-incrimination
protects “only the natural individual . . .,” so the papers protected by the
privilege “must be the private property of the person claiming the privilege,
or at least in his possession in a purely personal capacity.”118 Thus, the
privilege is unavailable either to an “artificial organization” or “an individual
acting in his official capacity on behalf of the organization”119 to avoid
producing entity records that are in the individual’s possession “in a
representative capacity, even if these records might incriminate him
personally.”120 Mouktabis does not argue that he possess records of or about
the LLC other than in a representative capacity.
The documents for which Huffman seeks turnover are either property
of the estate or of the LLC, and in either case the privilege is unavailable.
C. 	The timing of the Susbauer and condo transfers and the
condo’s exemptibility do not excuse Mouktabis from
116 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
117 McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 41 (1924); Ex parte Fuller, 262 U.S.
91, 93–94 (1923); Johnson v. U.S., 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913).
118 Bellis v. U.S., 417 U.S. 85, 89–90 (1974).
119 Id. at 90.
120 Id. at 88.
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producing documents and answering questions about the
transfers.
Neither a trustee’s statutory right to recorded information nor the
permissible scope of the examination of a debtor at the meeting of creditors is
limited to information about transactions that occurred within a specified
period. The timing of the Susbauer and condo transfers, including whether
avoidance actions would be time-barred, is thus irrelevant to Mouktabis’s
turnover and meeting-of-creditors-testimony obligations. And because
information about both properties “relates” to property or financial affairs of
Mouktabis, it is subject to turnover under section 542(e) even though neither
property is estate property and the condo, if recovered, might be exemptible.
D. 	The Fifth Amendment excuses Mouktabis from answering
some, but not all, of the 101 questions as to which he
invoked it at the December 18, 2025, meeting of creditors.
Huffman seeks to compel Mouktabis’s answers to 101 questions that
Hayman asked in the continued meeting of creditors on December 18, 2025,
and in response to which he invoked the Fifth Amendment. I will address the
questions in four groups: (1) five rhetorical questions, (2) 29 questions that
facially call for answers that are potentially incriminatory, (3) one question
that calls for the details of a disclosure Mouktabis has made without invoking
the Fifth Amendment, and (4) 66 questions that do not facially call for
answers that are potentially incriminatory.
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1. 	Five questions are rhetorical.
Five questions were phrased as questions, but they ask Mouktabis to
confirm information already known to Hayman and thus serve to convey
information to him, rather than to seek information from him. I need not
consider whether answers to those questions could have been incriminating,
and I will not require answers.
The five questions are—
(1) 	Do you understand that you’re required to disclose
financial information in order to receive your
discharge?121
(2) 	You understand that you’re not going to be able to
continue to pursue these arguments, to the extent
that you invoke the Fifth Amendment?122
(3) 	Your bankruptcy statements disclose that you
transferred property to this person [Soumia El
Massaoudi] in 2024; is that correct?123
(4) 	Do you understand that claims arising before you
filed for bankruptcy are property of the bankruptcy
estate?124
(5) 	Do you understand that all claims arising before
your bankruptcy was filed is property of your
bankruptcy estate?125
121 Transcript at 12:16-18.
122 Transcript at 15:20–22.
123 Transcript at 22:3–5.
124 Transcript at 27:20–22.
125 Transcript at 30:15–17.
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2. 	Twenty-nine questions are facially potentially
incriminatory.
As to 29 questions, it is evident from their implications, in the settings
in which they are asked, that responsive answers might be dangerous
because injurious disclosure could result, and the hazard of self-incrimination
is substantial, real, and appreciable, not merely imaginary and
unsubstantial, so answers are excused by the Fifth Amendment. I will
address the questions in seven groups according to their topics: LLC
membership transfers, LLC’s finances, the Susbauer property, the condo,
personal finances, taxes, and Maria Clemens.
(a) 	LLC membership transfers
Mouktabis was asked three questions about prepetition transfers of
membership interests in the LLC. They are—
(1) 	When did you transfer membership interests to the
other members of the LLC?126
(2) 	What value was exchanged when those parts [sic,
parties] were given an interest in the LLC?127
(3) 	Did you receive any value in exchange for your
guarantee [sic, granting] of membership interest to
third parties related to the LLC?128
Section 152 of title 18, U.S. Code, criminalizes certain acts related to a
bankruptcy case. Under section 152(2), it is a crime for a person to knowingly
and fraudulently make a false oath or account in or in relation to any
126 Transcript at 15:3–4.
127 Transcript at 15:6–7.
128 Transcript at 15:9–11.
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bankruptcy case; under section 152(3), it is a crime for a person to knowingly
and fraudulently make a false declaration, certificate, verification, or
statement under penalty of perjury in or in relation to a bankruptcy case; and
under section 152(7), it is a crime for a person to knowingly and fraudulently
transfer or conceal any of the person’s property in contemplation of a
bankruptcy case by or against the person or with the intent to defeat the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. So an omission from or false statement in
a debtor’s schedules or SoFA, both of which must be made under oath, can be
an element of a violation of sections 152(2) or (3), and a debtor’s prepetition
transfer of property can be an element of a violation of section 152(7).
Bankruptcy schedules must be accompanied by a declaration under
penalty of perjury that the schedules are true and correct.129 A SoFA asks five
questions about prepetition property transfers, the broadest of which is
question 18: “Within 2 years before you filed for bankruptcy, did you sell,
trade, or otherwise transfer any property to anyone, other than property
transferred in the ordinary course of your business or financial affairs?”
It does not matter whether Hayman, when questioning Mouktabis, had
in mind potential criminal liability under section 152, as opposed to a
potential civil fraudulent-transfer claim. If he had answered that he had
transferred membership interests shortly before the petition date, that
admission could be used against him in a future prosecution under
129 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1008; Official Form 106Dec; Official Form 107 part 12.
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section 152. It would not be enough to prove guilt, but it would establish one
of the elements (the transfer) and, by revealing the time of the transfer,
might provide circumstantial evidence of the specific-intent element.
(b) 	LLC’s finances
Mouktabis was asked, “Does the LLC owe you personally any
money?”130Mouktabis was required to disclose in his asset schedule whether
any debts were owing to him.131 He disclosed none.132 By asking him whether
the LLC owes him any money, Hayman was effectively challenging the
accuracy or completeness of his asset schedule by asking whether it was
correct—specifically, whether he correctly did not disclose any debts owed
him by others. If at the petition date the LLC owed him any money, his
failure to disclose that asset could be an element of violations of
sections 152(2) or (3).
(c) 	Susbauer property
Mouktabis was asked 11 questions asked about a prepetition transfer
of the Susbauer property. They are—
(1) 	Did you previously own the Susbauer property?133
(2) 	When did you purchase it?134
(3) 	And how much did you buy it for?135
130 Transcript at 18:8.
131 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9009(a); Official Form 106A/B items 28, 30, 33, 34.
132 ECF No. 1 Sched. A/B items 28, 30, 33, 34.
133 Transcript at 19:2–3.
134 Transcript at 19:5.
135 Transcript at 19:7.
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(4) 	Did you transfer the Susbauer property to your
sister, Cutter Matilis [sic, Kaoutar Mouktabis]?136
(5) 	When did you transfer the property to her?137
(6) 	Why did you transfer the property to her?138
(7) 	At the time that you transferred the Susbauer
property to your sister, was there a mortgage
against the property?139
(8) 	[H]ow much money did she pay you for the
property?140
(9) 	[D]id she actually pay you money for the
property?141
(10) 	What proof of payment can you provide that you
received money from your sister in exchange for
your interest in the property?142
(11) 	Do you have any role related to the Susbauer
property as of the petition date?143
Mouktabis disclosed in his SoFA that he lived at the Susbauer address
through January 1, 2024, which is within two years before the petition date.
For reasons discussed in part VII.D.2(a) above, questions about prepetition
property transfers are facially potentially incriminatory.
136 Transcript at 19:21–22.
137 Transcript at 19:24.
138 Transcript at 20:1.
139 Transcript at 20:3–5.
140 Transcript at 20:7–8.
141 Transcript at 20:10–11.
142 Transcript at 20:13–15.
143 Transcript at 20:17–18.
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(d) 	Condo
In three questions, Mouktabis was asked about a prepetition transfer
of the condo. They are—
(1) 	Why did you transfer the property [the condo at
4345 Summerlin, West Linn, Oregon] to this person
[Kasimia Alvosodi [sic, Soumia El Massaoudi]]?144
(2) 	Who is this person?145
(3) 	Did you receive any money in exchange for the
transfer of the condo in 2024?146
For reasons discussed in part VII.D.2(a) above, questions about
prepetition property transfers are facially potentially incriminatory.
Although the SoFA disclosed Mouktabis’s transfer of the condo to El
Massaoudi, answering questions about Mouktabis’s motivation for the
transfer and consideration he received for it might show that he made the
transfer with fraudulent intent and in anticipation of bankruptcy, satisfying
elements of a violation of section 152.
(e) 	Personal finances
Mouktabis was asked, “[d]o you have any other bank accounts [than
the scheduled account with Chase Bank] in your name personally?”147
144 Transcript at 22:7–8.
145 Transcript at 22:10.
146 Transcript at 22:24–25.
147 Transcript at 18:13–16.
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A debtor’s bank accounts must be scheduled.148 Mouktabis scheduled
only an account with Chase.149 For the reasons described in
part VII.D.2(b)VII.D.2(b) above, a question that effectively challenges the
accuracy or completeness of schedules is facially potentially incriminatory.
(f) 	Taxes
In six questions, Mouktabis was asked about his income taxes. They
are—
(1) 	When was the last time you filed a tax return with
the state of Oregon?150
(2) 	When was the last time you filed a federal tax
return?151
(3) 	Do you currently owe taxes?152
(4) 	You do not list taxing authorities as creditors in
your bankruptcy; is that correct?153
(5) 	Have you filed taxes for the year that you reported
for the sale of the Susbauer property?154
(6) 	Do you owe federal or state taxes as a result of the
sale of the Susbauer property?155
I infer from the third question that Mouktabis was asked whether he
owed taxes as of the petition date and from the fourth question that he was
asked whether he was correct in listing no taxing authorities as creditors.
148 Official Form 106A/B item 17.
149 ECF No. 1 at 16 Sched. A/B item 17.
150 Transcript at 26:13–14.
151 Transcript at 26:16–17.
152 Transcript at 26:19.
153 Transcript at 26:21–22.
154 Transcript at 26:24–27.
155 Transcript at 27:2–3.
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Under Oregon law, it is a crime to intentionally evade any tax-law
requirement, including to pay a tax or file a return,156 and it is a federal
crime to willfully fail to file a required federal tax return or to fail to pay a
federal tax.158 So answers to all but the fourth of those questions could
establish elements of those offenses, and because Mouktabis did not schedule
any tax debt,159 the fourth question challenged the accuracy or completeness
of the schedules, an element of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152(2) or (3).
(g) 	Maria Clemens
In four questions, Mouktabis was asked about Maria Clemens. They
are—
(1) 	So you filed a complaint and a stipulated judgment
in Clackamas County Circuit Court after your
bankruptcy case was filed against Maria Clemmons
[sic, Clemens] . . . for breach of contract for $7,000.
Who is Maria Clemmons [sic, Clemens]?160
(2) 	What contract was breached?161
(3) 	When was that contract entered?162
(4) 	What happened after June 8th that you’re seeking
recovery for?163
I infer that these questions were designed to determine whether
Mouktabis’s claim against Clemens had accrued before the petition date,
156 Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 314.075, 314.991(2).
158 26 U.S.C. § 7203.
159 ECF No. 1 Sched. E/F.
160 Transcript at 27:9–13.
161 Transcript at 27:15–16.
162 Transcript at 27:18.
163 Transcript at 30:8–9.
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making it estate property. He did not include in his asset schedule or SoFA
any claim or litigation against Clemens. So these four questions challenge the
accuracy or completeness of the schedules or SoFA.
3. 	One question calls for the details of a prior
voluntary disclosure, so it must be answered.
Mouktabis was asked, “[i]n 2024, you recorded a deed transferring the
property [the condo] to . . . Kasimia Alvosodi [sic, Soumia El Massaoudi]. . . .
Is that correct?”164
Mouktabis’s transfer of the condo to El Massaoudi was disclosed in the
SoFA.165 This question, asking whether that transfer was memorialized in a
recorded deed, asks about the details of the voluntarily disclosed transfer. He
must answer.
4. 	Sixty-six questions do not facially call for answers
that are potentially incriminatory
As to 66 questions, it is not evident from the implications of the
questions, in the settings in which they are asked, that responsive answers or
explanations why they cannot be answered might be dangerous because
injurious disclosure could result. In other words, the questions do not facially
call for answers that are potentially incriminatory—they are innocuous—and
Mouktabis has not pointed to contextual information demonstrating that
truthful answers might incriminate him, so he must answer these questions
164 Transcript at 21:22 – 22:2.
165 ECF No. 1 at 54, SoFA item 18.
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unless he is prepared to set “the door . . . a little ajar,”166 by divulging some
information suggesting that there is a substantial risk that a truthful answer
would incriminate him.
I will address the questions in 10 groups according to their topics: the
LLC’s formation, its members, Mouktabis’s nonmember role in the LLC, the
LLC’s business, the LLC’s finances, garnishment from the LLC’s bank
account, the Susbauer property, the condo, personal finances, and taxes.
(a) 	LLC’s formation
Mouktabis was asked two innocuous questions about the LLC’s
formation. They are—
(1) 	When was the LLC created?167
(2) 	Did you, yourself, create the LLC?168
(b) 	LLC members
Mouktabis was asked four innocuous questions about the LLC’s
members. They are—
(1) 	Your bankruptcy schedules disclose an interest in a
LLC. Is that Amana Ranch?169
(2) 	When the LLC was created, were you the sole
member of the LLC?170
(3) 	If not, who were the other members of the LLC
when it was established?171
166 See text accompanying note 99.
167 Transcript at 14:16.
168 Transcript at 14:18.
169 Transcript at 13:3–4.
170 Transcript at 14:20–21.
171 Transcript at 14:23-24.
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(4) 	[W]ho are the members of the LLC now?172
(c) 	Mouktabis’s nonmember role in LLC
Mouktabis was asked three innocuous questions about his nonmember
role in the LLC. They are—
(1) 	As of the petition date, which is . . . June 8, 2025,
what was your role in Amana Ranch LLC?173
(2) 	Are you the manager of the LLC?174
(3) 	Are you a signatory on any of the LLC’s bank
accounts?175
(d) 	LLC’s business
Mouktabis was asked two innocuous questions about the LLC’s
business. They are—
(1) 	Is the LLC still active and operating?176
(2) 	Is the LLC currently licensed to act as a property
manager in the state of Oregon177
(3) 	Was the LLC ever licensed to act as a property
manager in the state of Oregon?178
(4) 	[W]as the LLC operating as of the petition date,
which is, again, June 8, 2025?179
172 Transcript at 15:1.
173 Transcript at 13:11–16.
174 Transcript at 13:24.
175 Transcript at 16:3–4.
176 Transcript at 14:1.
177 Transcript at 14:4–5.
178 Transcript at 14:7–8.
179 Transcript at 14:13–14.
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(e) 	LLC’s finances
Mouktabis was asked 17 innocuous questions about the LLC’s
finances. They are—
(1) 	As of the petition date, what were the assets of the
LLC?180
(2) 	You previously testified that the LLC has bank
accounts at Chase Bank and Thread Bank. Does
the LLC have any other bank accounts?181
(3) 	Where did the funds in the LLC bank accounts
come from?182
(4) 	Regarding the funds held in the Washington
County Circuit County court that were garnished
from Thread Bank, what were the source of those
funds?183
(5) 	You stated, in your objection to the garnishment in
Washington County court, that those funds that
were subject to the garnishment that were held in
Thread Bank were security deposits. Who were
those security deposits from?184
(6) 	What property were those security deposits related
to?185
(7) 	If so, where are those funds now?186
(8) 	[H]ow have those funds been spent?187
180 Transcript at 15:17–18.
181 Transcript at 15:24 – 16:1.
182 Transcript at 16:6–7.
183 Transcript at 16:16–19.
184 Transcript at 16:21–25.
185 Transcript at 17:2–3.
186 Transcript at 17:8.
187 Transcript at 17:10.
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(9) 	As of the petition date, was the LLC a party to any
ongoing contract or lease agreement?188
(10) 	If so, what were the terms of any of those
contracts?189
(11) 	As of the petition date, did any party owe money to
the LLC?”190
(12) 	As of the petition date, what were the liabilities of
the LLC?191
(13) 	How did the LLC incur those liabilities?192
(14) 	Does the LLC have any trade creditors or
vendors?193
(15) 	Who are the LLC’s creditors?194
(16) 	Does the LLC have any employees?195
(17) 	Have you ever received any money from the
LLC?196
(f) 	Garnishment from LLC’s account
Mouktabis was asked four innocuous questions about the garnishment
from the LLC’s bank account. They are—
(1) 	Were any funds garnished from the LLC’s bank
account prior to the bankruptcy filing?197
188 Transcript at 17:12–13.
189 Transcript at 17:15–16.
190 Transcript at 17:18–19.
191 Transcript at 17:21–22.
192 Transcript at 17:24.
193 Transcript at 18:1–2.
194 Transcript at 18:4.
195 Transcript at 18:6.
196 Transcript at 18:10–11.
197 Transcript at 16:9–10.
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(2) 	Which accounts were garnished?198
(3) 	[H]ow much was garnished?199
(4) 	Were any of the funds garnished from the LLC’s
bank accounts returned?200
(g) 	Susbauer property
Mouktabis was asked seven innocuous questions about the Susbauer
property. They are—
(1) 	Did you ever live at the Susbauer property?201
(2) 	Did you ever consider the Susbauer property to be
your residence?202
(3) 	If so, when was the Susbauer property your
residence?203
(4) 	[H]ow was the Susbauer property awarded in your
divorce with Malika Amaro [sic, Amarou]?204
(5) 	Do you know, are there tenants currently on the
property?205
(6) 	Are there any lease agreements related to the
property?206
(7) 	Is Amana Ranch LLC involved relating to the
property in any way?207
198 Transcript at 16:12.
199 Transcript at 16:14.
200 Transcript at 17:5–6.
201 Transcript at 19:9–10.
202 Transcript at 19:12–13.
203 Transcript at 19:15–16.
204 Transcript at 19:18–19.
205 Transcript at 20:20–21.
206 Transcript at 20:23–24.
207 Transcript at 21:1–2.
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(h) 	Condo
Mouktabis was asked 16 innocuous questions about the condo. They
are—
(1) 	You owned the condo, and then it was awarded to
Malika Amaro [sic, Amarou] in the divorce
proceeding; is that correct?208
(2) 	Did Amana Ranch LLC ever have an interest in the
condo?209
(3) 	How does disclosure of this person [Kasimia
Alvosodi [sic, Soumia El Massaoudi]], your
relationship with this person, implicate any of your
contempt or other criminal proceedings? I’m asking
for your relationship to her.210
(4) 	So your invocation of the Fifth Amendment is
related to the contempt proceedings related to your
prior divorce decree; right? I’m asking who this
person is.211
(5) 	Did you ever live at the condo?212
(6) 	When did you reside at the condo?213
(7) 	Did you ever rent the condo to any third party?214
(8) 	To who did you rent the condo?215
(9) 	When did you rent the condo?216
208 Transcript at 21:13–17.
209 Transcript at 21:18–19.
210 Transcript at 22:12–15.
211 Transcript at 22:18–21.
212 Transcript at 23:5–6.
213 Transcript at 23:8.
214 Transcript at 23:13–14.
215 Transcript at 23:16.
216 Transcript at 23:18.
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(10) 	[D]o any of the tenants of the condo owe you any
money?217
(11) 	Do you owe any tenants of the condo any money?218
(12) 	Do you believe that you have an ownership interest
in the condo now?219
(13) 	Who do you believe is the current owner of the
condo?”220
(14) 	[W]ho should the owner of the condo be, if
different?221
(15) 	Do you believe the trustee has the ability to sell the
condo?222
(16) 	Why or why not?223
(i) 	Personal finances
Mouktabis was asked nine innocuous questions about personal
finances. They are—
(1) 	At the first meeting of creditors held on June 16,
2025, you indicated that you were employed. Are
you still employed?224
(2) 	In your bankruptcy schedules . . . you list Katar
[sic, Kaoutar] Mouktabis as a creditor, with the
claim for $13,000. Who is Katar [sic, Kaoutar]
Mouktabis?225
217 Transcript at 23:20–21.
218 Transcript at 23:12–13.
219 Transcript at 25:15–16.
220 Transcript at 25:18–19.
221 Transcript at 25:21–22.
222 Transcript at 25:24–25.
223 Transcript at 26:2.
224 Transcript at 12:21–23.
225 Transcript at 33:10–13.
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(3) 	[W]hy do you owe Katar [sic, Kaoutar] Mouktabis
money?226
(4) 	[Y]ou list Mahawk Singal [phonetic] [sic, Mahak
Singhal] . . . as a creditor, with a claim of $2,250.
Who is this person?227
(5) 	Why does this person owe you money?228
(6) 	Do you owe this person money, or is it Amana
Ranch LLC that owes this person money?229
(7) 	Again, in your schedules, you list Andrew Newsom
[phonetic] as a creditor. Who is Andrew
Newsom?230
(8) 	And why do you owe Andrew Newsom money?231
(9) 	Are your wife and daughter living with you?232
I take the sixth question to have been intended to ask why Mouktabis
owes money to Singhal, not vice-versa.
5. 	Mouktabis has not provided the required positive
disclosure of the questions’ hidden dangers.
As support for his privilege invocation, Mouktabis argues that answers
could incriminate him in pending or future contempt proceedings for
nonpayment of child and spousal support, and he implies that he could be
accused of improper use of benefits. He does not identify or produce the court
order he claims to have been charged with not following, leading to the
226 Transcript at 34:2.
227 Transcript at 34:4–8.
228 Transcript at 34:10.
229 Transcript at 34:12–13.
230 Transcript at 34:16–17.
231 Transcript at 34:19.
232 Transcript at 34:25 – 35:1.
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contempt motion. Huffman says that “adjudication of the Contempt Matter is
complete and there is no realistic or reasonable threat of further
incrimination for failure to pay his domestic support obligation,” but she
offers no specific proof of that allegation.233
The failure to support a child is a crime under Oregon law,234 and
Oregon law permits criminal prosecutions as well as civil-coercive
proceedings for disobedience of a court order.235 Although Mouktabis does not
specify the benefits he has received and that might be the subject of
investigation, the contempt order refers to him receiving “TANF,” an
initialism for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, a federally funded
but state-administered benefits program.236 Oregon law makes it unlawful for
a person knowingly to obtain for the benefit of the person or another person
any public assistance to which the person or other person is not entitled
under Oregon law by means of any false representation or fraudulent device
or failure to notify the state Department of Human Services of the receipt or
possession of property or income that affects the eligibility for assistance.237
233 ECF No. 89 at 3:15–17.
234 Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.555.
235 Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 33.015(3), (4) (distinguishing punitive contempt from
remedial contempt); 33.065 (authorizing criminal proceedings for contempt of
court).
236 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, title I §§ 101–16 (1996); Or. Admin. Rule § 137-055-
1020, 461-195-0601.
237 Or. Rev. Stat. § 411.630(1).
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Doing so is a state crime.238 Also, under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), it is a federal
crime to knowingly and willfully make any materially false statement or
representation “in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive
. . . branch of the Government of the United States . . . .” A false statement to
a state agency that receives federal support and is subject to federal
regulation involves a matter within executive-branch jurisdiction,239 making
it a federal crime. A false statement is with the jurisdiction of the executive
branch if is concerns the “authorized function of any agency or department,”
rather than “matters peripheral to the business of that body.” An agency or
department has jurisdiction in that sense “when it has the power to exercise
authority in a particular situation.” 241 To support jurisdiction under
section 1001(a), there must be “a direct relationship . . . between the false
statement and an authorized function” of the agency or department.243 A
federal program established to provide federal funds for states to pay
additional unemployment compensation after exhausting compensation
under a state program is a “matter within the jurisdiction of” the executive
branch, making a false representation on a benefits application a federal
crime.244
238 Or. Rev. Stat. § 411.990(1), (2).
239 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 8 F.3d 923, 929 (2d Cir. 1993); United
States v. Shafer, 199 F.3d 826, 829 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Herring,
916 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1990).
241 United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 479 (1984).
243 United States v. Facchini, 874 F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 1989).
244 Facchini, 874 F.2d at 640.
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If Mouktabis was held in contempt for his failure to make payments or
transfer property, true disclosure of his assets might assist enforcement of
those obligations against him, but the disclosure would not incriminate him.
On the other hand, if he had defended the contempt motion by falsely
testifying to financial inability to comply, disclosure now of the truth could be
the basis for someone to contend that he previously perjured himself or
committed criminal contempt. In other words, for him to demonstrate that
answering Huffman’s questions could incriminate him for failure to pay or
transfer property, he must show not only that he has been ordered to pay or
transfer but also that he has been accused, or could be accused, of failing to
pay or transfer and that truthful answers to one or more specific questions
would be relevant to, and could be used against him in, a prosecution for
failure to pay or transfer or for criminal contempt. And to demonstrate that
answering could incriminate him for unlawfully obtaining public assistance,
he must separately show not only that he has obtained public benefits but
also that he has been accused, or could be accused, of obtaining the benefits
unlawfully and that truthful answers to one or more specific questions would
be relevant to, and could be used against him in, a prosecution for doing so.
He has not yet satisfied those burdens.
(a) 	I will allow Mouktabis to supplement his
response to the motion to compel to support his
privilege claims as to the questions I have
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found do not facially call for answers that are
potentially incriminatory.
Ordinarily, when disputes over oral questioning of a witness arise in a
nontrial setting, such as at a deposition or examination ordered under
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2004, the judge has the discretion to
order the parties to continue the examination before the judge, so the judge
can resolve disputes as they arise. If the disputes are over the witness’s
assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination and the judge decides
that the question is innocuous, the judge can give the witness—especially one
who is self-represented—the opportunity to make the required “positive
disclosure . . . of [the question’s] hidden dangers.” 245 But here, the challenged
privilege invocations occurred at the meeting of creditors, and for me to
preside over the continued meeting-of-creditors examination of Mouktabis
would constitute my presiding at or attending the meeting, which the law
does not permit.246
Considering the significance of an overruling of a Fifth Amendment
privilege claim, especially by a self-represented litigant, I will give Mouktabis
the same opportunity to supplement his privilege claim that he would have
had had the examination not been in the meeting of creditors. To do so, I will
allow him 30 days to supplement his opposition to the motion to compel,
supported by an affidavit or declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 1746, and if he
245 Hashagen, 283 F.2d at 350.
246 11 U.S.C. § 341(c).
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does so, I will set a hearing to allow argument on the supplemented privilege
claim. He may include in his supplement a renewed request that I consider
evidence in camera.
E. 	I will partially stay the order on this decision.
At Mouktabis’s request, I will stay the order on this decision, except
the 30-day deadline discussed in part VII.D.5(a) above, for 14 days.
VIII. Conclusion
I will prepare a separate order, so none need be lodged.
# # #
cc: Nour Eddine Mouktabis
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