Nguyen v. Blanche et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
PHUONG THANH NGUYEN, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-26-1351-R
)
TODD BLANCHE, et al., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Phuong Thanh Nguyen, a noncitizen1 and Vietnamese national, filed a
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his detention by
the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). Doc. 1. United States District
Judge David L. Russell referred this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). 	Doc. 3. 	Respondents timely filed a
Response, and Petitioner timely filed a Reply. 	Docs. 15, 16. 	On September 14, 2026,
Petitioner filed a Motion to Expedite Issuance of a Report and Recommendation. Doc. 22.
For the reasons below, the undersigned recommends that the Court grant the Petition
to the extent it requests habeas relief for release from ICE custody. The undersigned further
recommends the Court deny as moot Petitioner’s motion to expedite.
1 Unless directly quoting, this Report and Recommendation “uses the term ‘noncitizen’ as
equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578 n.2 (2020)
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)).
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I. 	Background
Petitioner is a citizen of Vietnam who was lawfully admitted to the United States
and became a lawful permanent resident on or about February 19, 1991. Resp. at 9; Doc.
15-1 at ¶ 5 (Declaration of ICE Deportation Officer (“DO”) Honeycutt); Doc. 15-3 at 1
(Notice to Appear).
On February 23, 2001, Petitioner pleaded guilty in the District Court of Oklahoma
County to Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon and Attempted Subordination of
Perjury. Resp. at 9; Doc. 15-1 at ¶¶ 6-7; see also Doc. 15-2 (Petitioner’s Oklahoma State
Criminal Record). 	He was sentenced to 15 years’ and 2.5 years’ imprisonment, to serve
concurrently, in custody of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (“ODOC”); the state
judge ordered those sentences to be served concurrently with Petitioner’s 10-year sentence
from separate convictions in Oklahoma County for Kidnapping, Larceny of an Automobile,
Possession of a Firearm while Committing a Felony, and Larceny of a Motor Vehicle.
Resp. at 9; Doc. 15-1 at ¶¶ 7-8; Doc. 15-2.
On January 31, 2002, ICE initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner through
issuance 	of 	a 	Notice 	to 	Appear, 	charging 	him 	as 	removable 	under 	(1) 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for an aggravated felony conviction after admission, and (2) 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(C) for a firearm offense. Resp. at 10; Doc. 15-1 at ¶ 9; Doc. 15-3 at 1-2. On
June 18, 2002, Petitioner was ordered removed to Vietnam and his order of removal
became final on the same day. Pet. at 2; Resp. at 10; Doc. 15-4 at 1 (Order of Removal).
On May 17, 2007, ICE took custody of Petitioner after his release from ODOC.
Doc. 15-1 at ¶ 12. 	On October 12, 2007, he was released on an Order of Supervision
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(“OOS”). Resp. at 10; Doc. 15-1 at ¶ 14. On or about October 1, 2008, ICE sent Petitioner
a travel document request, asking him to provide a letter and proof of delivery to the
Government of Vietnam consulate requesting a travel document. Doc. 15- 1 at ¶ 15.2
DO Honeycutt alleges, on or about June 13, 2016, Petitioner “reported late” to a
scheduled ICE check-in that was set to occur on June 9, 2016. 	Id. ¶ 16. 	DO Honeycutt
also alleges Petitioner missed a scheduled appointment date on March 4, 2024. 	Id. ¶ 17.
ICE informed Petitioner on March 5, 2024, that it would not renew his employment
authorization if he failed to provide proof that he filed an appeal of the Immigration Judge’s
order of removal at his next check in. Id. ¶ 18. DO Honeycutt alleges Petitioner failed to
provide proof of appeal at his next check-in appointment on December 16, 2024. Id. ¶ 19.
On December 16, 2025, ICE re-detained Petitioner at a scheduled check-in
appointment and revoked his OOS.3 Pet. at 15; Doc. 15-1 at ¶ 20. Petitioner alleges he did
not violate any condition of his OOS before he was re-detained.4 Pet. at 15. That day, ICE
served5 Petitioner with a written Notice of Revocation of Release, stating his OOS was
revoked “pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 / 8 C.F.R. § 241.13,” and he would be detained
2 Neither Respondents nor DO Honeycutt address whether this request was ever sent to the
Government of Vietnam or whether Petitioner ever provided proof of delivery as requested.
3 DO Honeycutt alleges on the same day ICE “determined that the likelihood of removal
in the reasonably foreseeable future for NGUYEN.” Doc. 15-1 at ¶ 20. The undersigned
is unclear whether DO Honeycutt meant to allege ICE determined that Petitioner’s removal
was now likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.
4 Petitioner does not address DO Honeycutt’s assertions about missed ICE check-ins.
5 Petitioner alleges he was not served with the Notice of Revocation, Pet. at 15, but the
Notice provided by Respondents shows Petitioner was served, Doc. 15-5 at 2.
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“based on a review of [his] official alien file and a determination that there are changed
circumstances.” Doc. 15-5 at 1 (Notice of Revocation of Release). The Notice also stated
Petitioner would “promptly be afforded an informal interview at which [he would] be given
an opportunity to respond to the reasons for the revocation.” Id.6 Also on December 16,
2025, he was served with a Warrant of Removal/Deportation. Doc. 15-6 at 2 (Warrant of
Removal/Deportation).
DO Honeycutt alleges in January 2026 ICE “began working on [a] request to the
Government of Vietnam for [Petitioner’s] travel document.” 	Doc. 15-1 at ¶ 21. 	ICE-
Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO) sent Petitioner’s travel document request to
Removal and International Operation (“RIO”) on January 21, 2026. 	Id. ¶ 22. 	DO
Honeycutt alleges travel document requests are sent to the Government of Vietnam, “the
Government of Vietnam schedules the applicant for an interview to make a determination
for travel,” and “generally, Vietnam facilitates travel documents within 30 days from
interview date.” 	Id. ¶ 23 (citation modified). 	According to DO Honeycutt, ICE sent
“inquiries to learn the status of [Petitioner’s] travel document request and interview with
the Government of Vietnam” in February, March, and April. 	Id. ¶ 24. 	As of DO
Honeycutt’s 	Declaration 	on 	June 	25, 	2026, 	ICE 	was 	“awaiting 	Notice 	from 	the
Government of Vietnam with the date for [Petitioner’s] nationality interview.” 	Id. ¶ 25.
On June 17, 2026, ICE conducted a custody review interview. 	Id. ¶ 26. 	DO Honeycutt
asserts “Vietnam has issued travel documents for every travel document request ICE-ERO
6 Respondents did not provide evidence in the record that any interview occurred.
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has submitted since February 2025” and ICE “has averaged at least two charter flights to
Vietnam per month.” Id. ¶ 29. He believes Petitioner’s removal is significantly likely in
the reasonably foreseeable future. Id. ¶ 30.
Petitioner, on the other hand, alleges he “has no valid travel document” but he
“provided Respondents with a copy of his Vietnamese birth certificate in or around April
2026.” Pet. at 3. He alleges if either he or Respondents ever previously applied for travel
documents, such requests were denied or ignored. Id. He alleges “the government is not
in possession of any credible or persuasive documents of evidence that [his] removal is
likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 4-5 (citation modified).
When Petitioner filed his Petition, he was detained at Cimarron Correctional Facility
in Cushing, Oklahoma. 	Id. at 4. 	He remains detained there. 	See Doc. 24 (confirming
Petitioner remains detained at Cimarron Correctional Facility).
On July 8 and July 10, 2026, Respondents informed the Court that Petitioner was
“scheduled for a flight to Vietnam to depart on or about July 28, 2026.” Docs. 17, 19. On
August 19, 2026, when no confirmation of Petitioner’s removal to Vietnam was filed, the
Court ordered Respondents to confirm whether he was removed. Doc. 20. On August 24,
2026, Respondents responded asserting (1) “the Government of Vietnam did not approve
the travel document for that flight in time”; (2) “a travel document is still pending”; and
(3) “ICE ERO headquarters is currently scheduling the next flight to Vietnam for
September 8, 2026.” Doc. 21. On September 24, 2026, Respondents confirmed Petitioner
was still detained, meaning he was not removed on the September 8, 2026, flight to
Vietnam. 	Doc. 24. 	Respondents have provided no further updates on Petitioner’s
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anticipated removal, including whether an interview with the Government of Vietnam
occurred or whether his travel document has been approved.
II. 	Petitioner’s Claims
Petitioner raises four grounds for relief:
• 	Ground One: Declaratory Relief. Petitioner requests a declaratory
judgment that he “is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1),” he “has
previously demonstrated to ICE’s satisfaction that there is no significant
likelihood 	of 	his 	removal 	in 	the 	reasonably 	foreseeable 	future
(“NSLRRFF”),” “that ICE did not rebut [his] prior NSLRRFF showing
prior to redetaining him,” and “that until ICE rebuts [his] prior NSLRRFF
showing, [he] may not be redetained.” Pet. at 25-26.
• 	Ground Two: Violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”) and Applicable ICE Regulations. Petitioner contends his
detention violates 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) and 8 C.F.R. § 241.13. Pet. at 16.
Specifically, 	he 	alleges 	Respondents 	“failed 	to 	comply 	with 	these
provisions” before re-detaining him after his release on an OOS and no
alternative basis supports their decision to re-detain him. Id.
• 	Ground Three: Violation of the Fifth Amendment. Petitioner alleges
his detention violates the Due Process Claim because he “previously
established to the government’s satisfaction that there was no significant
likelihood 	of 	removal 	in 	the 	reasonably 	foreseeable 	future,” 	“the
government has not rebutted this [showing],” “the government does not
presently have a travel document for [him],” and “there are no new
circumstances that otherwise justify [his] redetention.” 	Id. at 26-27
(citation modified).
• 	Ground 	Four: 	Violation 	of 	the 	Administrative 	Procedure 	Act
(“APA”). Petitioner alleges Respondents violated the APA because they
“have failed to articulate any reasoned explanation for redetaining [him]”
or “failing to comply with the plain language of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(g),
(i)(2)-(3).” Pet. at 27-28.
Petitioner seeks immediate release from ICE detention subject to the conditions of
his prior OOS. 	Id. at 29. 	He also seeks injunctive and declaratory relief, including
restraints on Respondents’ attempts to move him from Oklahoma, remove him to a third
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country, or re-detain him without travel documents. 	Id. at 28-30. 	Petitioner also seeks
attorney fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). Id. at 30.7
III. 	Relevant Standards
To obtain habeas corpus relief, Petitioner must show that he is “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 	28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through
habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001)).
Petitioner has a final order of removal, meaning that his detention is governed by 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a). 	Under that statute, “when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney
General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days.” 	Id.
§ 1231(a)(1)(A). This 90-day period is known as the “removal period.” Id. The removal
period begins on the latest of: (1) date that the order of removal becomes administratively
final, (2) the date of the court’s final order when a removal order is judicially reviewed, or
(3) the date the noncitizen is released from detention or confinement if detained, unless the
noncitizen is confined under immigration processes. 	Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B). 	During the
removal period, noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention. Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A).
However, the detention of a nonresident subject to a final order of removal may not
be indefinite and is presumptively reasonable for only six months beyond the removal
7 To the extent Petitioner may be entitled to EAJA fees and costs as a prevailing party, he
must seek those separately after a final judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Thus, the
Court need not address this request at this juncture.
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period. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. “This 6–month presumption, of course, does not
mean that every alien not removed must be released after six months. To the contrary, an
alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id.
Ordinarily, “if the alien does not leave or is not removed within the removal period,”
he may be released “subject to supervision.” 	8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) (citation modified).
Criminal aliens detained beyond the removal period under § 1231(a)(6) may also be
released “subject to supervision.” As relevant here, after ICE releases a noncitizen on an
OOS, federal immigration officials may later revoke his OOS and return the noncitizen to
custody if he violates conditions of release, 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(1), or “if, on account of
changed circumstances, [ICE] determines that there is a significant likelihood that the alien
may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 	Id. § 241.13(i)(2).8 Such
revocation triggers a notification and review process:
Revocation procedures. 	Upon revocation, the alien will be notified of the
reasons for revocation of his or her release. 	[ICE] will conduct an initial
informal interview promptly after his or her return to [ICE] custody to afford
the alien an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the
notification.
8 Federal officials codified Zadvydas principles into immigration regulations governing the
detention review process with amendments to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 and the addition of 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.13. See Continued Detention of Aliens Subject to Final Orders of Removal, 66 Fed.
Reg. 56967-01, 56968, 2001 WL 1408247 (F.R.) (Nov. 14, 2001) (to be codified at 8
C.F.R. Parts 3 and 241) (“In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas, this rule
revises the Department’s regulations by adding a new 8 CFR 241.13, governing certain
aspects of the custody determination of a detained alien after the expiration of the removal
period. 	Specifically, the rule provides a process for [ICE] to make a determination as to
whether there is a significant likelihood that the alien will be removed in the reasonably
foreseeable future.”).
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Id. § 241.13(i)(3).
IV. 	Analysis9
A. 	The Court has jurisdiction to hear Petitioner’s claims regarding ICE’s
revocation of his OOS.
Respondents argue this Court “lacks jurisdiction to review” Petitioner’s challenge
to his re-detention, because his challenge attacks the action taken to execute his removal
order and “8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) strips district courts of jurisdiction” over claims “arising
from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate
cases, or execute removal orders.” Resp. at 22. Relying on Tazu, Respondents assert “re-
detention [is] ‘simply the enforcement mechanism’” chosen to execute Petitioner’s
removal and therefore the Court lacks jurisdiction over his claim. Id. (quoting Tazu v. Att’y
Gen. of United States, 975 F.3d 292, 298 (3d Cir. 2020)). The undersigned disagrees.
In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999),
the Supreme Court explained § 1252(g)’s jurisdictional bar is narrow in scope and applies
only to “three discrete actions”—the commencement of removal proceedings, adjudication
of removal proceedings, and execution of removal orders. 	The Supreme Court found it
“implausible that the mention of three discrete events along the road to deportation was a
9 Petitioner claims he did not have to exhaust statutory or administrative remedies before
filing the Petition. 	Pet. at 12-15. 	Respondents do not allege he failed to exhaust his
remedies before filing the Petition. The undersigned agrees that Petitioner did not have to
exhaust before filing the Petition and therefore does not address exhaustion at length. See
Soberanes, 388 F.3d at 1310 (holding exhaustion requirements do not apply to challenges
to immigration detention brought in habeas proceedings).
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shorthand way of referring to all claims arising from deportation proceedings.” 525 U.S.
at 482.
Respondents’ position has been rejected by Judges in this District, including this
Court, and the Court should do the same here. See, e.g., Vu v. Blanche, No. CIV-26-446-
R, 2026 WL 1757826, at *1 (W.D. Okla. June 18, 2026) (rejecting “Respondents’
arguments again” as to § 1252(g) and “find[ing] the statute does not jurisdictionally bar
consideration of the Petition”); Cao v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-1403-G, 2026 WL 637617, at
*3 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 6, 2026) (noting Tazu “is not persuasive in light of the Supreme
Court’s consistent use of an exceedingly narrow construction on the jurisdiction channeling
provisions of § 1252,” and concluding the Court’s “ability to consider the petition is not
barred by § 1252(g)” because petitioner was “not seeking review of the Executive’s
decision to execute an order of removal” but arguing “he is detained in violation of the
INA because Respondents failed to comply with the applicable regulations prior to
redetaining him after he was previously released on an OOS” (citation modified)); Nguyen
v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-1402-D, 2026 WL 396548, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 12, 2026) (“The
Court agrees with the magistrate judge’s finding that neither 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) nor
§ 1252(g) deprives the Court of jurisdiction here.”).
Here, Petitioner does not challenge the underlying merits of the removal. 	Rather,
he contends ICE unlawfully revoked his OOS, rendering his detention unlawful. The Court
should find it has jurisdiction to consider the Petition.
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B. 	ICE failed to abide by its regulations when it revoked Petitioner’s
OOS.
Petitioner alleges Respondents failed to comply with the INA and ICE’s applicable
regulations before re-detaining him after his prior release on an OOS. 	Pet. at 26. 	“‘It is
well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law’ in the
context of removal proceedings.” Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (per curiam)
(quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)). 	The Due Process Clause is also
implicated where “an individual has reasonably relied on agency regulations promulgated
for his guidance or benefit and has suffered substantially because of their violation by the
agency.” United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 752-53 (1979).
Petitioner’s re-detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) and its related
regulations because he was released on an OOS on October 12, 2007. Resp. at 10; Doc.
15-1 at ¶ 14. Further, Petitioner’s OOS was revoked under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13. Doc. 15-5
at 1 (Notice of Revocation of Release “pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 / 8 C.F.R. § 241.13”).
Respondents do not rebut Petitioner’s allegation that ICE previously released him
in 2007 because ICE determined that there was no significant likelihood of his removal in
the reasonably foreseeable future. See Pet. at 2 (alleging he was placed on an OOS under
8 C.F.R. §§ 241.5, 241.13 “due to evidence in [his] file that demonstrated there was no
significant likelihood of his removal to Vietnam in the reasonably foreseeable future”).
The undersigned therefore reasonably infers that when Petitioner was previously released
in 2007 ICE must have determined “there was no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future” under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(a), (b)(1), before issuing the OOS.
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See, e.g., Hamidi v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-1205-G, 2025 WL 4034263, at *5 (W.D. Okla.
Nov. 14, 2025) (finding “it is reasonable to infer that ICE must have made a determination
that ‘there was no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future’”
in similar circumstances (citing § 241.13(a), (b)(1)) (R&R), adopted, 2025 WL 3452454
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 1, 2025); Pham v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-1157-SLP, 2025 WL 3477023, at
*3 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 30, 2025) (same) (R&R), adopted, 2025 WL 3243870 (W.D. Okla.
Nov. 20, 2025).
The issue before the Court is whether Petitioner’s OOS was properly revoked when
ICE re-detained him on December 16, 2025. The undersigned determines that it was not.
1. 	Violation of § 241.13(i)(2)
ICE may revoke an OOS and “return the alien to custody” if he violates the
conditions of supervised release or “if, on account of changed circumstances, [ICE]
determines that there is a significant likelihood that the alien may be removed in the
reasonably foreseeable future.” 	8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(1)-(2). 	Though Respondents
reference Petitioner’s purported missed check-in appointments, they do not contend that
was the reason for his re-detention in December 2025.10 Rather, Respondents rely on “the
drastically changed circumstances regarding removals to Vietnam” and DO Honeycutt’s
bare assertion that “it was determined by ICE that Petitioner was significantly likely to be
10 In any event, the record does not support an argument Petitioner’s purported missed
check-ins were the reason for his re-detention, considering he allegedly missed a check-in
in June 2016 and March 2024 but was not re-detained until December 2025—despite other
contacts with ICE between March 2024 and December 2025. Doc. 15-1 at ¶¶ 16-19.
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removed to Vietnam.” 	Resp. at 21, 25; see also id. at 20 (“Stated simply, the new
administration’s 	prioritization 	of 	removals 	to 	Vietnam 	establish 	a 	clear 	change 	in
circumstances for those individuals ordered removed to Vietnam. 	And Petitioner is no
different.”).
As an initial matter, Judges in this District have concluded “the burden [is] on
Respondents to establish a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future in the context of re-detention under § 241.13(i)(2).” 	Pham v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-
1157-SLP, 2025 WL 3243870, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 20, 2025); see Ye v. Bondi, No.
CIV-25-1230-D, 2025 WL 3485420, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 4, 2025) (finding “the
magistrate judge appropriately placed the burden on Respondents to establish that, on
account of changed circumstances, there is a significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future, pursuant to Section 241.13(i)(2)”). 	Other courts have
agreed. 	See, e.g., Kong v. United States, 62 F.4th 608, 619-20 (1st Cir. 2023) (finding it
was ICE’s burden to demonstrate substantial likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future at the time of re-detention); Roble v. Bondi, 803 F. Supp. 3d 766, 772-
73 (D. Minn. 2025) (same); Escalante v. Noem, No. 25-cv-182, 2025 WL 2206113, at *3
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2025) (same); Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d 144, 150-51 (D. Mass.
2025) (same).
When deciding to revoke an OOS on account of changed circumstances, ICE must
make an individualized determination that the changed circumstances make removal of the
noncitizen significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. See Kong, 62 F.4th at
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619-20 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)). The regulations specify that ICE should consider
several factors in making this determination, including:
[t]he history of the alien’s efforts to comply with the order of removal, the
history of [ICE’s] efforts to remove aliens to the country in question or to
third countries, including the ongoing nature of [ICE’s] efforts to remove this
alien and the alien’s assistance with those efforts, the reasonably foreseeable
results of those efforts, and the views of the Department of State regarding
the prospects for removal of aliens to the country or countries in question.
8 C.F.R. § 241.13(f).
The record evidence here, however, shows ICE failed to make any individualized
determination about the significant likelihood of Petitioner’s removal based on changed
circumstances, as required by § 241.13(i)(2). In the Notice of Revocation of Release, ICE
alleges “changed circumstances in [Petitioner’s] case” but does not identify what those
changed circumstances are. Doc. 15-5 at 1. In his declaration, DO Honeycutt asserts only
that ICE determined, on or about December 16, 2025, “the likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future for NGUYEN,” and “on or about January 21, 2026, ICE-
ERO sent the Removal and International Operation (RIO) [Petitioner’s] completed travel
document request.” 	Doc. 15-1 at ¶¶ 20, 22 (citation modified). 	According to DO
Honeycutt, “travel requests are sent to the Government of Vietnam” and “the Government
of Vietnam then schedules the applicant for an interview to make a determination for
travel.” Id. ¶ 23 (citation modified).
When confronted with similar facts, Judge Maxfield of this District recommended
habeas relief, observing:
ICE also asserts that “following Petitioner’s arrest, ICE gathered the relevant
paperwork and compiled a travel document request,” which was sent to ICE
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headquarters on October 27, 2025, i.e., more than a month after Petitioner was
detained. Respondents assert that headquarters “then sends the request to the
People’s Republic of China.” 	Again, this information about ICE’s internal
process lacks sufficient specificity with regard to Petitioner’s likelihood of
removal. Respondents do not state if or when ICE headquarters actually sent
the request to China, where the request was sent – for instance, a consulate or
embassy – whether it was received, or whether China has made any response.
In 	the 	absence 	of 	further 	factual 	declarations 	from 	Respondents, 	the
undersigned assumes that none of these actions have occurred. 	There is
nothing about local ICE authorities sending a travel document request for
Petitioner 	to 	a 	particular 	ICE 	department 	that 	constitutes 	“changed
circumstances” making his removal any more likely than it ever was.
Ye v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-1230-D, 2025 WL 4034264, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 18, 2025)
(citation modified) (R&R), adopted in relevant part, 2025 WL 3485420 (W.D. Okla. Dec.
4, 2025).
Similarly, DO Honeycutt here asserts that ICE-ERO sent to RIO inquiries about the
status of Petitioner’s travel document request and interview in February, March, and April
of 2026, Doc. 15-1 at ¶ 24, but he does not allege Petitioner’s travel document request was
ever sent to Vietnam or an interview was ever scheduled. Thus, record evidence of ICE’s
efforts to secure a travel document for Petitioner consists only of internal agency
communications 	without 	direct 	engagement 	with 	Vietnamese 	authorities, 	whose
cooperation 	is 	essential 	for 	effectuating 	Petitioner’s 	removal. 	And 	the 	Honeycutt
Declaration is dated June 24, 2026. Doc. 15-1 at 6. Over the past 16 weeks, Respondents
have provided no updates regarding the status of the travel document request, including
whether RIO forwarded the request to the Government of Vietnam or an interview with the
Government of Vietnam has been scheduled. 	See, e.g., Khaliq v. Noem, 828 F. Supp. 3d
1260, 1269 (W.D. Okla. 2026) (considering “there has been no supplementation of the
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record” by ICE officials about petitioner’s passport application since initial briefing several
weeks prior, when concluding there was no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future). 	With no information to the contrary, the undersigned
presumes ERO has not taken additional steps to obtain Petitioner’s travel document apart
from those provided in DO Honeycutt’s declaration. See Ye, 2025 WL 4034264, at *5 (“In
the absence of further factual declarations from Respondents, the undersigned assumes that
none of these actions [related to progress with travel document requests] have occurred.”)
(R&R), adopted in part, 2025 WL 3485420.11
Thus, the undersigned concludes these generalized statements about ICE’s intention
to request a travel document from Vietnam are insufficient to establish a significant
likelihood of Petitioner’s removal to Vietnam in the reasonably foreseeable future. 	This
analysis is consistent with other district courts. 	See Sun v. Noem, 2025 WL 2800037, at
*2-3 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 30, 2025) (“Respondents say they are ‘putting together a travel
document [TD] request to send to [the] Cambodian embassy,’ and that ‘[o]nce ICE receives
the TD, it will begin efforts to secure a flight itinerary for Petitioner.’ 	The Court finds
these kind of vague assertions—akin to promising the check is in the mail—insufficient to
11 While this case has been pending, Respondents informed the Court that Petitioner was
scheduled for removal. 	See Doc. 17 (“Petitioner is scheduled for a flight to Vietnam to
depart on or about July 28, 2026.”); Doc. 21 (“Petitioner was previously scheduled for
removal on July 28, 2026, but the Government of Vietnam did not approve the travel
document for that flight in time. . . . A travel document is still pending, and ICE ERO
headquarters is currently scheduling the next flight to Vietnam for September 8, 2026.”).
But Petitioner remains detained with no update from Respondents whether (1) Vietnam has
approved his travel document request or (2) he is scheduled on any future flight to Vietnam.
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meet ICE’s own requirement to show ‘changed circumstances’ or ‘a significant likelihood
that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.’”) (citation modified);
Hoac v. Becerra, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025) (“The fact that
Respondents intend to complete a travel document request for Petitioner does not make it
significantly likely he will be removed in the foreseeable future.”).
Nor did Respondents initiate the process to obtain a travel document for Petitioner
until January 2026—after his re-detention on December 16, 2025—when ICE-ERO began
working on a request to the Government of Vietnam. See Doc. 15-1 at ¶ 21. Courts have
held travel documents requested or received after the revocation of release are not changed
circumstances that can justify revocation under § 241.13(i)(2) because they did not exist or
occur at or before the time of revocation. See, e.g., Munagi v. McDonald, 813 F. Supp. 3d
225, 229 (D. Mass. 2025) (granting petitioner’s release, even though the government had
obtained travel documents for petitioner’s return to Kenya, because the travel documents
were not requested until after petitioner’s release had been revoked); Duong v. Charles,
No. 25-cv-1375, 2025 WL 3187313, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2025) (granting petitioner’s
immediate release, even though the government had obtained travel documents for
petitioner’s return to Vietnam, because the travel documents were not requested until
almost one month after petitioner’s release had been revoked); Sarail A. v. Bondi, 803 F.
Supp. 3d 775, 788 (D. Minn. 2025) (recommending petitioner’s release after concluding
respondents violated § 241.13(i)(2) because, among other things, a request for travel
documents several weeks after petitioner’s release was revoked “could not have constituted
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the supposedly changed circumstances underlying the Notice”) (R&R), adopted, 803 F.
Supp. 3d 775, 784 (D. Minn. 2025).
Respondents argue the increased removals to Vietnam show circumstances have
changed such that Petitioner’s removal is substantially likely in the reasonably foreseeable
future, in part relying on statistics provided in DO Honeycutt’s declaration. See Resp. at
20-21. Respondents contend:
in fiscal year 2024, only 58 removals occurred; however, in FY 2025 that
number jumped to 699. And removals in FY 2026 are already at 632. DO
Honeycutt indicates that Vietnam is willing to accept its citizens and,
incredibly, that every travel document request ERO has submitted since
February 2025 has resulted in an issued travel document, and that two
chartered flights are leaving to Vietnam each month.
Id. at 20 (citation modified).
However, Judges in this District and elsewhere have found increased removals alone
do not demonstrate significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future
for a particular petitioner’s removal. 	See, e.g., Pham, 2025 WL 3243870, at *2 (finding
similar claims of increased removals to Vietnam “alone does not demonstrate significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future”); Tran v. Blanche, No. CIV-
25-1357-G, 2026 WL 1181700, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 30, 2026) (“Respondents’ citation
of evidence showing a general upswing in Vietnam’s willingness to repatriate its citizens
who are in the United States does not suffice to show that Respondents made a specific
determination, prior to revoking Petitioner’s OOS and detaining Petitioner, that in light of
changed circumstances there was a significant likelihood that Petitioner may be removed
to Vietnam in the reasonably foreseeable future.”).
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First, neither Respondents nor DO Honeycutt explain why Petitioner’s removal is
likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. 	Second, even if the Court were to accept as
true DO Honeycutt’s claim that “the Government of Vietnam has issued travel documents
for 	every 	travel 	document 	request 	ERO 	has 	submitted 	since 	February 	2025,” 	the
declaration is too vague to carry Respondents’ burden under § 241.13(i)(2). Critically, DO
Honeycutt does not state how many travel document requests ERO has submitted since
February 2025. 	Without that denominator, Respondents’ “every request” statistic is not
probative: it could reflect a substantial, sustained shift in Vietnam’s practices, or it could
reflect a small number of requests. 	This ambiguity matters because not every removal
requires a travel document request from Vietnam—for example, when a noncitizen
possesses a valid passport or other acceptable documentation). See Nguyen, 788 F. Supp.
3d at 151 (finding the government’s assertion that 44 individuals were removed to Vietnam
in fiscal year 2024 and 285 were removed in fiscal year 2025 failed to establish a change
in circumstances to show a substantial likelihood that removal was reasonably foreseeable
where the government did not identify how many of the 328 removed individuals were pre-
1995 Vietnamese refugees, like petitioner, and also failed to indicate how many travel
document requests had been made).
Therefore, even on Respondents’ own framing, generalized statistics and assertions
in DO Honeycutt’s Declaration are insufficient to satisfy Respondents’ burden to show the
existence of “changed circumstances” 	when revoking the 	OOS, as required under
§ 241.13(i)(2). 	Respondents fail to demonstrate how these general conditions, when
considering the record as a whole, show a significant likelihood that Petitioner will be
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removed 	in 	the 	reasonably 	foreseeable 	future. 	Without 	individualized 	evidence,
Respondents’ reliance on vague, unquantified claims about travel documents issued in
other cases does 	not 	establish 	changed circumstances 	making 	Petitioner’s 	removal
substantially likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. See Vu, 2026 WL 1757826, at *1
(“Respondents reliance on an overall increase in removals to Vietnam and general
statements about attempting to obtain a travel document do not show a significant
likelihood that Petitioner will, on account of changed circumstances, be removed in the
near future.”); Tran, 2026 WL 1181700, at *2 (finding “Respondents’ citation of evidence
showing a general upswing in Vietnam’s willingness to repatriate its citizens who are in
the United States does not suffice to show that Respondents made a specific determination”
about petitioner).
2. 	Habeas relief as an appropriate remedy
Respondents fail to show ICE abided by its own regulations when revoking
Petitioner’s OOS, making the revocation unlawful. 	The undersigned next considers an
appropriate remedy for ICE’s failure to comply with its own regulations. 	Judges in this
District have found “fail[ure] to comply with § 241.13(i)(2) in establishing a change of
circumstances that demonstrated a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future at the time of Petitioner’s re-detention” “amounts to a due process
violation, entitling the petitioner to habeas relief.” 	Pham, 2025 WL 3243870, at *1; see
also Vu, 2026 WL 1757826, at *2 (agreeing “that ICE’s failure to comply with its own
regulations when revoking the Order of Supervision renders the revocation unlawful and
release is the appropriate remedy”); Ye, 2025 WL 3485420, at *3 (finding “ICE’s failure
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to abide by its own regulations in making the decision to revoke Petitioner’s OOS renders
the revocation unlawful, and that his release is therefore appropriate”); Hamidi v. Bondi,
No. CIV-25-1205-G, 2025 WL 3452454, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 1, 2025) (granting habeas
relief where respondents failed to satisfy § 241.13(i)(2)).
Respondents rely on two local District Judges’ decisions to argue habeas “is not a
mechanism for courts to order the fulfillment of administrative requirements or direct
release on that basis.” Resp. at 25-26; see Bahadorani v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-1091-PRW,
2025 WL 3048932, at *3-4 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 31, 2025); Nguyen v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-
1204-JD, Order, Doc. 20 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 31, 2025). The undersigned finds these cases
to be factually distinguishable.12 The undersigned agrees with the predominant view of
Judges in this District who have found habeas relief to be appropriate when ICE violates
its own regulations when re-detaining a noncitizen like Petitioner’s circumstances here.
Therefore, because ICE violated its own regulations, Petitioner’s detention is
unlawful and his release is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 	See Vu, 2026 WL
1757826, at *2 (ordering release after finding revocation of petitioner’s OOS was unlawful
where ICE failed to establish changed circumstances before revocation as required by
§ 241.13(i)(2)); Ye, 2025 WL 3485420, at *3 (same); Hamidi, 2025 WL 3452454, at *3
12 “Judge Wyrick in Bahadorani acknowledges there are circumstances where a violation
of 241.13(i)(2) and (i)(3) can warrant habeas relief where the violation rises to the level of
‘a serious substantive defect . . . beyond a mere failure to follow the regulation to a T.’” Li
v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-1480-J, 2026 WL 475133, at *3 n.2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 19, 2026)
(quoting Bahadorani, 2025 WL 3048932, at *3). 	The undersigned concludes ICE’s
violation of 241.13(i)(2) is a serious substantive defect.
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(“ICE’s violation of § 241.13(i) denied Petitioner the process to which he was entitled by
law and that such a denial entitles Petitioner to habeas relief”).13
The undersigned notes this Court has declined to order a petitioner’s immediate
release, in a case where respondents failed to follow 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2), when the
petitioner’s removal was “imminent.” 	Bol v. Mullin, No. CIV-26-449-R, 2026 WL
1452462, at *3-4 (W.D. Okla. May 22, 2026). Respondents here filed a Notice on July 8,
2026, of Petitioner’s anticipated removal, but more than three months have passed and
multiple flights to Vietnan have presumably occurred since that time, and Petitioner
remains detained. 	See Doc. 15-1 at ¶ 29 (stating that “DHS has averaged at least two
charter flights of removals to Vietnam per month”); Doc. 21 (noting the next scheduled
flight to Vietnam was on September 8, 2026, but not alleging Petitioner was scheduled to
13 Other districts courts have found release appropriate in similar circumstances. 	See
Nguyen v. Warden of the Golden State McFarland Det. Facility, No. 2:25-CV-03297-SKO
(HC), 2026 WL 72110, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2026) (“Because the Government was
required to, but failed to comply with, section 241.13(i) when it revoked Petitioner’s
supervised release on October 16, 2025, issuing a writ to reinstate that release is warranted
to preserve the status quo before the Government's unlawful actions.”); Sanchez v. Bondi,
No. 25-CV-02287, 2025 WL 3484756, at *1 (D. Colo. Dec. 4, 2025) (granting petitioner’s
release because revocation of his OOS was effected without compliance with applicable
regulations); Tran v. Bondi, No. C25-01897-JLR, 2025 WL 3140462, at *3 (W.D. Wash.
Nov. 10, 2025) (finding petitioner’s re-detention did not comply with the requirements of
8 C.F.R. § 241.13, and granting habeas relief); E.M.M. v. Almodovar, No. 25-CV-08212
(MMG), 	2025 	WL 	3077995, 	at 	*4 	(S.D.N.Y. 	Nov. 	4, 	2025) 	(holding 	“[i]f 	the
Government’s violation of its own regulations culminates in an alien’s detention, due
process may require that alien’s release” and granting habeas relief); Yee S. v. Bondi, 2025
WL 2879479, at *6 (D. Minn. Oct. 9, 2025) (ordering release because petitioner showed
ICE’s re-detention of him “violated the law because ICE did not comply with its own
regulations under section 241.13(i)(2)”); Roble, 803 F. Supp. 3d at 774 (holding “ICE, like
all government agencies, must follow its own regulations,” and ordering release based on
violation of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i) (citation modified)); Sarail A., 803 F. Supp. 3d at 784
(ordering release based on violation of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)).
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be on that flight). Respondents have neither provided a new date for Petitioner’s scheduled
removal nor otherwise updated the Court about his purported removal. 	Unlike Bol, no
evidence in the record here indicates “Petitioner’s imminent removal,” 2026 WL 1452462,
at *4. As a result, while a close call, the undersigned concludes release is the appropriate
remedy notwithstanding Respondents’ previous assertions that he is scheduled for removal.
C. 	The Court should decline to address Petitioner’s additional claims.
Petitioner also alleges his re-detention violated his Fifth Amendment right to due
process, the APA, and the Declaratory Judgment Act. 	Pet. at 25-28. 	Because the
undersigned recommends the Court grant the Petition after finding ICE violated its own
regulations by revoking Petitioner’s OOS and re-detaining him, the Court should decline
to address his remaining claims. See Sanchez, 2025 WL 3484756, at *1 (declining to reach
petitioner’s Zadvydas claim after agreeing with him on his regulatory violation claim); see
also Ye, 2025 WL 3485420, at *2 n.2 (acknowledging the Magistrate Judge did not
consider petitioner’s remaining arguments for habeas relief after recommending habeas
relief on the regulatory violation); Hamidi, 2025 WL 3452454, at *2 n.2 (same). Further,
considering the recommended relief, the Court need not address Petitioner’s other requests
for injunctive and declaratory relief. See Pet. at 28-31.
V. 	Petitioner’s Motion to Expedite, Doc. 22
On September 14, 2026, Petitioner filed a Motion to Expedite Issuance of Report
and Recommendation. 	Doc. 22. 	Adoption of this Report and Recommendation would
moot Petitioner’s motion.
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VI. 	Recommendation and Notice of Right to Object
For these reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court GRANT the Petition,
Doc. 1, to the extent Petitioner requests habeas relief for release from ICE custody. 	The
undersigned recommends that the Court order Respondents to release Petitioner from ICE
custody immediately, subject to an appropriate Order of Supervision. See Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 696 (“The choice, however, is not between imprisonment and the alien ‘living at
large.’ It is between imprisonment and supervision under release conditions that may not
be violated.” (citation modified)). 	The undersigned further recommends that the Court
order Respondents to certify compliance by filing a status report within five business days
of the Court’s order. Adoption of this recommendation would MOOT Petitioner’s pending
Motion to Expedite Issuance of Report and Recommendation, Doc. 22.
The parties are advised of their right to object to this Report and Recommendation.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636. Any objection must be filed not later than October 23, 2026. See id.
§ 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 	If a party wishes to respond to the other party’s
objections, such response must be filed not later than October 28, 2026. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b)(2). Failure to object timely waives the right to appellate review of the factual and
legal issues addressed in this Report and Recommendation. 	See Moore v. United States,
950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned
Magistrate Judge in this matter.
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ENTERED this 16 th day of October, 2026.
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