Nigmatov v. Noem et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
KAMRONBEK NIGMATOV,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, et al.,
Respondents.
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Case No. CIV-25-1515-SLP
O R D E R
Petitioner, Kamronbek Nigmatov, represented by counsel, filed a Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	Before the Court is the Report and
Recommendation [Doc. No. 11] (R&R) of United States Magistrate Judge Suzanne
Mitchell. The Magistrate Judge recommends granting, in part, the Petition. Both Petitioner
and Respondents have filed an Objection [Doc. Nos. 12, 13] and each filed Responses to
the other’s Objections [Doc. Nos. 15, 16], and the matter is at issue. The Court reviews de
novo any portion of the R&R to which the parties have made specific objections. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). 	Review of all other issues addressed by the
Magistrate Judge are deemed waived. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th
Cir. 1991); see also United States v. 2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996).
Having conducted that review, and for the reasons that follow, the Court ADOPTS the
R&R and GRANTS IN PART the Petition.
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I. 	Background
Petitioner, a citizen of Uzbekistan, entered the United States around December 13,
2022, at the age of nineteen. 	Prior to his entry, Petitioner’s uncle obtained a special
findings order from a juvenile court that enabled Petitioner to seek Special Immigrant
Juvenile (SIJ) status.1 On December 16, 2022, he was placed into removal proceedings by
U.S. 	Immigration 	and 	Customs 	Enforcement 	(ICE) 	but 	was 	released 	on 	his 	own
recognizance. Since his December 2022 release, Petitioner has resided continuously in the
United States and has not incurred any criminal convictions.
On December 2, 2024, USCIS approved Petitioner’s I-360 self-petition, granting
him SIJ status with deferred action and a priority date of August 29, 2024. See I-797 Notice
[Doc. No. 1-1] (USCIS states Petitioner “warrant[ed] a favorable exercise of discretion to
receive deferred action” which “will remain in effect for a period of four years from the
date of this notice unless terminated earlier by USCIS”). A year later, on October 27, 2025,
ICE re-arrested him. As set forth in the R&R, “[u]pon his detention, ICE issued a custody
determination to continue [Petitioner’s] detention without an opportunity to post bond or
be released on other conditions.” R&R at 3. While Petitioner states he requested a bond
1 Beginning in 1990, Congress created Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) status as part of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to protect vulnerable immigrant children. See 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(27)(J); 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h). The intent of SIJ classification is to provide relief for certain
noncitizen juveniles who have been subjected to abuse, abandonment, or neglect. 	See Murillo-
Chavez v. Bondi, 128 F.4th 1076, 1085 (9th Cir. 2025) (citations omitted). 	To qualify for SIJ
status, petitioners must be under the age of 21 at the time of filing, unmarried, and physically
present in the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(b). A state court must also declare the petitioner
a ward of the court or commit the petitioner to the custody of “an agency or department of a State,
or an individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c); see also 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J).
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hearing twice before an Immigration Judge (IJ), those requests were “denied because all
IJs are subject to the binding precedent of Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I & N Dec. 216
(BIA 2025), which holds that those who entered the United States without admission or
parole are ineligible for a bond hearing.” Id. 	Petitioner has been continuously detained at
Cimarron Correctional Facility in Cushing, Oklahoma since his re-arrest pursuant to the
mandatory detention provision set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).2
On December 15, 2025, Petitioner filed this action, claiming violations of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a violation of his due process rights under the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and a violation of the Administrative
Procedures Act (APA). Petitioner claims that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to him and
that his continued detention without a bond hearing violates his due process rights. 	As
relief, Petitioner seeks release from custody or, in the alternative, a bond hearing pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
While this action has been pending, and after the Magistrate Judge issued her R&R,
USCIS issued a Termination Notice to Petitioner dated January 28, 2026. See [Doc. No.
12-1]. 	The Termination Notice, which is devoid of any explanation or reasoning, states
that 	USCIS 	is 	terminating 	Petitioner's 	period 	of 	deferred 	action 	and 	revoking 	his
employment authorization, though his SIJ status “remains approved.” Id. As it relates to
the revocation of his employment authorization, Petitioner had until February 15, 2026 to
2 As of the date of this Order, Petitioner remains at Cimarron Correctional Facility. 	See
https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/results (last visited March 2, 2026).
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submit “countervailing evidence” to USCIS, or else his employment authorization will be
revoked. Id. The parties have not provided any further updates regarding this matter.
II. Discussion
The Magistrate Judge issued a thorough and well-reasoned R&R and concluded that
habeas relief should be granted, in part. As an initial matter, the Magistrate Judge found
that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) is not a jurisdictional bar to this Court’s review of the claims
asserted by Petitioner.3 	The Magistrate Judge then recommended that the Court grant
habeas relief and order Respondents to provide Petitioner with an individualized bond
hearing under § 1226(a) within five business days or otherwise release Petitioner if he has
not received a lawful bond hearing within that time period. The Magistrate Judge further
recommended that the Court order Respondents to certify compliance by filing a status
report within seven business days of the Court’s Order. 	Finally, the Magistrate Judge
recommended that the Court decline to address Petitioner’s due process claim and APA
claim.
Petitioner objects to the R&R on the grounds that the R&R acknowledged
Petitioner’s SIJ status but “treats that status as irrelevant to the detention classification
analysis.” Pet. Obj. [Doc. No. 12] at 2-3. This objection is unpersuasive, however, as the
R&R did address Petitioner’s SIJ status, concluding that his status bolsters the argument
that § 1226 applies rather than § 1225 and rejecting Respondents’ argument that Petitioner
3 Respondents did not object to the R&R’s conclusion that the Court has jurisdiction to review the
Petition. See generally, Obj. [Doc. No. 13].
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is not “seeking admission” under § 1225(b)(2).4 See R&R [Doc. No. 11] at 19-20 (citing
Del Valle Castillo v. Wamsley, No. 2:25-CV-02054-TMC, 2025 WL 3524932, at *6 (W.D.
Wash. Nov. 26, 2025) (holding SIJ status “‘weighs in favor’ of a finding that a petitioner
is not ‘seeking admission’ under § 1225(b)(2)” because “the rights conferred by SIJ status
distinguish designees ‘from arriving aliens who cannot lay claim to constitutional rights’”)
(citation omitted))).
Petitioner also objects on the grounds that the Magistrate Judge erred in not
considering his due process claims. While Petitioner notes that “courts routinely adjudicate
constitutional claims even when statutory relief is granted,” Petitioner provides no
authority requiring courts to do so that would support a conclusion that the Magistrate
Judge erred. [Doc. No. 12] at 5. 	Because the Court grants habeas relief to Petitioner on
the basis of his statutory claim and directs that Petitioner be provided a bond hearing in
accordance with § 1226(a), the Court declines to address the due process claims.5
Accordingly, the Court finds Petitioner’s objections lack merit.6
4 Respondents do not specifically challenge the Magistrate Judge’s finding that Petitioner’s SIJ
status 	supports 	the 	conclusion 	that 	he 	is 	not 	“seeking 	admission” 	under 	§ 1225. 	See
generally Resp. Obj [Doc. No. 13]. 	In fact, despite arguing to the Magistrate Judge that
Petitioner’s SIJ status is relevant to the analysis, [Doc. No. 9] at 16, Respondents now argue in
response to Petitioner’s objection that Petitioner’s SIJ status “has no bearing” on the 1225/1226
analysis. See [Doc. No. 16] at 5. Thus, it appears Respondents abandoned their initial argument
but regardless, because this conclusion was not challenged in their Objection, the issue is waived
and the Court need not address it.
5 To this end, Petitioner raises the due process claims in rather conclusory and unclear terms, and
his arguments throughout his Objection are largely underdeveloped.
6 Petitioner’s remaining objections are better characterized as arguments re-urged that are either
largely in accordance with the R&R’s conclusions or wholly irrelevant to the R&R. See e.g., Pet.
Obj. [Doc. No. 12] at 3 (arguing that “applicant for admission” is not the same as “seeking
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Respondents also object to the R&R. Respondents argue that the Magistrate Judge
erroneously found that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention rather than
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). 	The Court concurs with the Magistrate Judge’s findings and,
having thoroughly reviewed the Objection, rejects Respondents’ statutory interpretation of
§§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2)(A). The Court further adopts the reasoning set forth in Lopez
v. CoreCivic Cimarron Corr. Facility, No. CIV-25-1175-SLP, 2026 WL 165490 at *3-7
(W.D. Okla. Jan. 21, 2026), where this Court has previously addressed, in a more detailed
Order, these same issues. 	In doing so, the Court joins the decision reached by the vast
majority of district courts in this judicial district,7 in district courts within the Tenth
Circuit,8 and across the country9 to have addressed the same issues as those raised by
Petitioner.10 The Court’s decision is also in accord with the Seventh Circuit, which rejected
admission,” which the R&R likewise concludes); id. at 4 (arguing the Matter of Yajure Hurtado
does not control – a conclusion not reached in the R&R). To the extent that Petitioner objects to
the Government terminating his deferred action, Petitioner provides no authority that the Court
can properly consider such an argument when first raised in an objection briefing regarding an
R&R. Accordingly, the Court declines to consider this argument. In doing so, the Court makes
no substantive ruling regarding whether this argument would merit habeas relief if raised properly
before the Court.
7 See, e.g., Ramirez Rojas v. Noem, No. CIV-25-1236-HE, 2026 WL 94641 at *2 (W.D. Okla. Jan.
13, 2026) (collecting cases in this judicial district finding that § 1252(g) does not present a
jurisdictional bar); Lopez, 2026 WL 165490 at *5 (collecting cases in this judicial district
concluding that §1225(b)(2) does not govern the petitioner’s detention).
8 See, e.g., Aguilar Tanchez v. Noem, No. 2:25-cv-1150, 2026 WL 125184 (D. Utah Jan. 16, 2026);
Hernandez v. Baltazar, No. 1:25-CV-03094-CNS, 2025 WL 2996643 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2025).
9 See, e.g., Lopez, 2026 WL 165490 at *7 (collecting cases concluding that §1226(a) is the
governing statutory framework).
10 The Court is certainly aware of authority to the contrary, including two decisions entered in this
judicial district. See Gutierrez Sosa v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1257-PRW, 2026 WL 36344 at **3-5
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the statutory interpretation of §1225(b)(2) as urged by Respondents. See Castañon-Nova
v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1061 (7th Cir. 2025); but see Buenrostro-
Mendez v. Bondi, No. 25-20496, 2026 WL 323330 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026). 	Accordingly,
the Court concludes that § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention, and he is entitled to an
individualized bond hearing.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation [Doc. No.
11] is ADOPTED and the Petition [Doc. No. 1] is GRANTED IN PART as follows:
1. 	Count I of the Petition is GRANTED and Respondents are ORDERED to
provide Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven (7)
days of the date of this Order, or otherwise release Petitioner if he has not received a lawful
bond hearing within that period.
2. 	Counts II and III are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents shall certify their compliance with
this Order by filing a status report within ten (10) days of this Order. 	The status report
shall detail whether Petitioner was provided a bond hearing or has been released, including
the associated dates with either action. If a bond hearing is provided, the status report shall
advise as to the outcome of the hearing or shall attach a copy of the IJ’s bond order.
A separate judgment shall be entered.
(W.D. Okla. Jan. 6, 2026); Montoya v. Holt, No. CIV-235-1231-JD, 2025 WL 3733302 at **5-12
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 26, 2025).
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IT IS SO ORDERED this 4 th day of March, 2026.
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