Morgan v. Oklahoma State of

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
DAVID BRIAN MORGAN, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) No. CIV-25-1317-R
)
STATE OF OKLAHOMA, )
)
Respondent. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner, a state prisoner appearing
pro se, has filed a Petition seeking a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1). United States District Judge David L.
Russell has referred the matter to the undersigned magistrate judge for initial proceedings
consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). In accordance with Rule 4 of the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases, the undersigned has examined the Petition and taken
judicial notice of various other records.1 For the reasons discussed below, the Court
should summarily DISMISS the Petition.
I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT
The Court is required to review habeas petitions promptly and to “summarily
dismiss [a] petition without ordering a responsive pleading,”
Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644,
656 (2005), “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the
1
See United States v. Pursley, 577 F.3d 1204, 1214 n.6 (10th Cir. 2009) (exercising discretion
“to take judicial notice of publicly-filed records in [this] court and certain other courts concerning
matters that bear directly upon the disposition of the case at hand”).
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petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.”
See R. 4, R. Governing § 2254
Cases in U.S. Dist. Ct.2
II. DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION
In 2011, in Oklahoma County District Court Case No. CF-2010-7695, Petitioner
pled guilty to thirteen counts of rape, kidnapping, molestation, and weapons possession.
See State Court Docket Sheet,
State of Oklahoma v. Morgan, Case No. CF-2010-7695
(Okla. Co. Dist. Ct. Mar. 30, 2011);
see ECF No. 1:1. For these convictions, Mr. Morgan
states that he was sentenced to “two life sentences plus.” (ECF No. 1:2). Indeed, the
state court docket sheet indicates that Counts One-Five were to be served concurrently
and consecutive to Counts Six-Thirteen and that he was sentenced to one life sentence
on Count Five and one life sentence on Count Twelve.
See State Court Docket Sheet,
State of Oklahoma v. Morgan, Case No. CF-2010-7695 (Okla. Co. Dist. Ct. Mar. 30, 2011).
Mr. Morgan also states that he has been incarcerated “for almost fifteen years less good
days, less earned work credits,” and he believes he is entitled to immediate release based
on the Oklahoma Legislature’s definition of a life sentence, which he states is defined as
18-60 years. (ECF No. 1:1-2).
On its face, the Court should find that the Petition lacks any merit. Mr. Morgan’s
life sentences are exactly that—sentences detaining him for the remainder of his natural
life (unless the State grants him parole).
See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 130 P.3d 273, 286
(Okla. Crim. App. 2006) (“Life, in Oklahoma, means life ... [.]” (Lumpkin, V.P.J.,
2 The district court may apply any or all” of the Rules governing § 2254 cases to a habeas petition
brought under § 2241. R. 1(b), R. Governing § 2254 Cases in U.S. Dist. Ct.
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concurring in part and dissenting in part));
May v. McCollum, No. CIV-14-30-M, 2015 WL
586330, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 11, 2015) (unpublished district court order adopting
report and recommendation) (“Contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, a life sentence in
Oklahoma is simply that—a convicted offender is required to remain in the custody of the
Oklahoma Department of Corrections ... for the remainder of his or her natural life.”). As
this Court has noted before, “in 1997 the Oklahoma Legislature defined ‘life imprisonment’
as ‘a period of not less than eighteen (18) years nor more than sixty (60) years,’
[however] this provision was repealed in 1999
before taking effect.”
May, 2015 WL
586330, at *4 (citations omitted; emphasis added). So, Petitioner’s premise—that he is
entitled to release pursuant to a law that never took effect—is baseless.
See, e.g., Landes
v. McCollum, No. CIV-14-190-R, 2014 WL 6455483, at *1, *3 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 13, 2014)
(unpublished district court order adopting report and recommendation) (noting
petitioner’s argument his life sentence should be calculated as not less than eighteen
years nor more than sixty years was based on repealed law and constituted an “imprecise
... description of Oklahoma law regarding the duration of a sentence of life
imprisonment”).
And while prison officials shall keep “a complete record of the inmate’s
participation in work, school, vocational training, or other approved program ... for
consideration by the paroling authority,” “[n]o deductions [for earned credits] shall be
credited to any inmate serving a sentence of life imprisonment[.]” Okla. Stat. tit. 57, §
138(A). So, Petitioner lacks any right to have prison officials apply earned credits to his
life sentence.
See, e.g., Burnett v. Leatherwood, 557 F. App’x 739, 742 n.3 (10th Cir.
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2014) (noting petitioner’s “life sentence precludes the use of [earned] credits to shorten
the length of his confinement” under Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 138(A)).
In sum, contrary to Mr. Morgan’s belief, his life sentences are not calculated as
“18-60 year” sentences and he is not entitled to earned credits. Additionally, Petitioner’s
own statements and the record undermine his argument. He appears to be seeking
immediate release based on the fact that he believes each life sentence should be
calculated as requiring incarceration of “18-60 years” each, but Petitioner himself states
that he has been incarcerated for less than fifteen years, which is less than the minimum
18-year requirement under the law he cites. Not to mention the fact that the Court
sentenced him to two life sentences, to be served consecutively.
See supra. Because it
plainly appears Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief, the court should summarily
dismiss his petition.
III. RECOMMENDATION
The Court should DISMISS the Petition (ECF No. 1) as it plainly appears that
the petitioner is not entitled to the relief requested.
IV. NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
The Petitioner is advised of his right to file an objection to this Report and
Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by December 11, 2025, in accordance
with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. The Petitioner is further advised that failure
to make timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate
review of both factual and legal issues contained herein.
Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d
1120, 1123 (10th Cir. 2010).
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V. STATUS OF REFERRAL
This Report and Recommendation terminates the referral by the District Judge in this
matter.
ENTERED on November 24, 2025.
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