Wilson v. Calendar et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 5:25-cv-01093-JD Document 9 Filed 12/12/25 Page 1 of 11
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
TUHTAKA NESHOBA WILSON, )
)
Plaintiff,
) )
v.
)
Case No. CIV-25-1093-JD
)
AMANDA CALENDAR et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Tuhtaka Neshoba Wilson, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil rights complaint against the "Chief Health Services Administrator" and two health care providers at James Crabtree Correctional Center (JCCC). Doc. 1, at 4-5.1 He alleges Defendants violated his rights against cruel and unusual punishment by exhibiting indifference to his medical needs. Id. at 7-9. United States District Judge Jodi W. Dishman referred the matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Doc. 5. The undersigned recommends the Court dismiss the complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
1 Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation and pagination. Apart from alterations to capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless indicated.
AUTHENTICATED U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GPO

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I. 	Screening.
Federal law requires this Court to screen complaints filed by parties
proceeding 	in 	forma 	pauperis 	and 	prisoners 	seeking 	relief 	against 	a
governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss the complaint, or
any portion of the complaint, if it is “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted” or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. §§ 1915A(b), 1915(e)(2)(B).
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show
that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘“state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. 	Corp. 	v. 	Twombly, 	550 	U.S. 	544, 	570 	(2007)). 	“A 	claim 	has 	facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Gee v. Pacheco, 627
F.3d 1178, 1184 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing Iqbal standard).
This Court construes “[a] pro se litigant’s pleadings . . . liberally,” holding
them “to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
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Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991); see Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). But the Court does not excuse a pro se
litigant from complying with the minimal pleading demands “because a pro se
plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his
alleged injury.” Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. And the Court may not serve as
Plaintiff’s advocate by creating arguments on his behalf. See Yang v. Archuleta,
525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
II. 	Plaintiff’s claims.
Plaintiff, a state prisoner housed at JCCC in Helena, Oklahoma,2 sues
Amanda Calendar, the “Chief Health Services Administrator” at the prison, in
her official capacity. Doc. 1, at 4. He also sues two “Health Care Provider[s]” at
the prison, Dr. Pitts and Dr. Kim, in their official and individual capacities. Id.
at 4-5.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ “negligence/deliberate indifference . . .
resulted in the complete loss of [his] right foot.” Id. at 7. He explains he is a
“diabetic patient suffering neuropathy.” Id. at 8. He “sought footwear from
[the] Medical provider for [his] condition [but] none was provided.” Id. Because
the prison-provided footwear was causing him “pain and injury,” he asked if
his family could provide him “comfortable footwear.” Id. But “[m]edical ignored
2 	JCCC 	is 	a 	medium-security 	state 	institution. 	See
https://oklahoma.gov/doc/facilities.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2025).
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this [request] and did not help.” Id. He also “sought a wheelchair from [the]
medical provider to keep [him] off [of his] feet due to the pain and damage being
caused by DOC indigent footwear, [but] no wheelchair was provided.” Id. at 9.
His toes were amputated after sores formed on them. Id. “Further damage
occurred due to negligence by Dr. Pitts and Dr. Kim at JCCC and [he] . . . had
[his] entire foot amputated.” Id. Plaintiff describes Dr. Pitts as “the main
Health Care provider responsible,” and states that Dr. Kim “also showed
deliberate indifference.” Id. at 7.
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages “since DOC can’t give [him] back [his]
foot.” Id. at 8. He also seeks punitive damages against Defendants Pitts and
Kim and states that “their negligence should also be addressed by a medical
board.” Id.
III. 	Plaintiff fails to state a claim.
Section 1983 is a “remedial vehicle for raising claims based on the
violation of constitutional rights.” Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151, 1161 n.9
(10th Cir. 2016). It authorizes relief against those who violate a person’s civil
rights while acting under color of state law. West, 487 U.S. at 48.
Every 	person 	who, 	under 	color 	of 	any 	statute, 	ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law . . . .
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42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a viable claim a plaintiff must allege that each
government official, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated
his Constitutional rights. See, e.g., Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250
(10th Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is particularly important in [a § 1983 action] that the
complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to
provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against
him or her, as distinguished from collective allegations against the state.”).
A. 	Plaintiff sues immune Defendants.
Plaintiff names Defendant Calendar in her official capacity as Chief
Health Services Administrator and both doctors in their official capacities as
“Health Care Provider[s]” at JCCC. Doc. 1, at 4-5, 7. But state “officials acting
in their official capacities are [not] ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67, 71 (1989).
“When a suit alleges a claim against a state official in his [or her] official
capacity, the real party in interest in the case is the state . . . .” Callahan v.
Poppell, 471 F.3d 1155, 1158 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted). And “[s]tates enjoy sovereign immunity from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment.”3 Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Pruitt, 669 F.3d 1159, 1166 (10th
3 	The Court may raise the issue of immunity sua sponte. Colby v. Herrick,
849 F.3d 1273, 1278 (10th Cir. 2017).
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Cir. 2012); see also Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (“Because of the
Eleventh Amendment, States may not be sued in federal court unless they
consent to it in unequivocal terms or unless Congress, pursuant to a valid
exercise 	of 	power, 	unequivocally 	expresses 	its 	intent 	to 	abrogate 	the
immunity.”). Just as the Eleventh Amendment protects states from suit, an
Oklahoma Department of Corrections employee sued in his or her official
capacity also enjoys the Eleventh Amendment’s protection of immunity. Colby,
849 F.3d at 1278 (“Damage claims against state officers in their official
capacities trigger Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); see also Eastwood v.
Dep’t of Corr. of State of Okla., 846 F.2d 627, 631-32 (10th Cir. 1988) (“We
conclude that the DOC is an arm of the state and should be entitled to absolute
immunity.”); Cleveland v. Martin, 590 F. App'x 726, 730 (10th Cir. 2014)
(“Because the defendants are employees of the Oklahoma Department of
Corrections[,] . . . the Eleventh Amendment applies to the official-capacity
claims for damages.”).
While Congress did create a private right of action under § 1983, it did
not abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment. Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 611 F.3d 1222,
1227 (10th Cir. 2010); see also Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 342-45 (1979).
Nor has Oklahoma waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by consenting
to suit in federal court. See Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 152.1(B) (“[I]t is not the intent
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of the state to waive any rights under the Eleventh Amendment to the United
States Constitution.”).
In short, § 1983 “does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek
a remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties.” Will, 491
U.S. at 66. The Court should thus dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants
in their official capacities. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2) (authorizing the court
to dismiss a claim that “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief”); Colby, 849 F.3d at 1278.4
B. 	Plaintiff 	has 	not 	adequately 	stated 	a 	deliberate
indifference claim against Defendants Pitts and Kim in
their individual capacities.
“[I]t is particularly important in [a § 1983 action] that the complaint
make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each
individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against him or her, as
distinguished from collective allegations against the state.” Robbins, 519 F.3d
at 1250. If a plaintiff pleads sufficient factual content the Court may “draw the
4 	No exceptions to this immunity apply because Plaintiff does not allege
an ongoing violation of federal law for which he seeks prospective relief. See,
e.g., Pruitt, 669 F.3d at 1166 (noting the Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1980),
exception to sovereign immunity and stating “a plaintiff may bring suit against
individual state officers acting in their official capacities if the complaint
alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and the plaintiff seeks prospective
relief”). Instead, he seeks only damages for a past wrong and a review of the
doctors’ negligent 	conduct by a medical board, which 	this Court 	has no
jurisdiction to provide to him.
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reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). But “[w]here a
complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability,
it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to
relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Plaintiff 	alleges 	“negligence/deliberate 	indifference” 	to 	his 	serious
medical needs. Doc. 1, at 7. The Eighth Amendment proscribes cruel and
unusual punishment which includes the “deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); see
Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000) (“A prison official’s
deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth
Amendment.”). “But ‘[a] negligent failure to provide adequate medical care,
even one constituting medical malpractice, does not give rise to a constitutional
violation.’” Wells v. Krebs, 432 F. App’x 724, 727 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Perkins v. Kansas Dep’t of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 809 (10th Cir. 1999)). And a
prisoner’s mere disagreement with “‘a diagnosis or a prescribed course of
treatment does not state a constitutional violation.’” Id. (quoting Perkins, 165
F.3d at 809).
The test for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs “includes an
objective component and a subjective component.” Clark v. Colbert, 895 F.3d
1258, 1267 (10th Cir. 2018) (citing Martinez v. Garden, 430 F.3d 1302, 1304
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(10th 	Cir. 	2005)). 	“The 	objective 	component 	is 	met 	if 	the 	deprivation 	is
‘sufficiently serious.’” Sealock, 218 F.3d at 1209 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). “A medical need is sufficiently serious ‘if it is one
that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is
so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a
doctor’s attention.’” Id. (quoting Hunt v. Uphoff, 199 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir.
1999)). “The subjective component is met if a prison official ‘knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.’” Id. (quoting Farmer,
511 U.S. at 837).
Plaintiff alleges his lack of medical care resulted in the amputation of
his toes and eventually his foot. Doc. 1, at 9. This allegation of harm is
sufficiently serious to meet the objective component. See, e.g., Martinez v.
Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2009) (explaining “it is the harm claimed
by the prisoner that must be sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective
component, and not solely ‘the symptoms presented at the time the prison
employee has contact with the prisoner’” (quoting Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745,
753 (10th Cir. 2005)).
Plaintiff’s allegations do not, however, meet the subjective component.
Plaintiff states he requested shoes from the “medical provider” to replace his
uncomfortable prison-issued footwear and eventually a wheelchair due to his
“pain and injury.” Doc. 1, at 8-9. But Plaintiff does not identify the medical
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provider, and he does not state if he made the request directly to Defendant
Pitts or Defendant Kim. He also does not state when he made his requests,
who denied or ignored them, when they were denied or ignored, and what type
of treatment, if any, Defendants were providing to him for his diabetes.
Plaintiff names two doctors who worked at JCCC. But he makes only
collective allegations against them which do not allow the Court “draw the
reasonable inference” that either Defendant had a sufficiently culpable state
of mind or “is [otherwise] liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. While one or the other may possibly be liable for deliberate indifference,
the complaint falls short of making a plausible claim for relief against the
individual Defendants. See id. (“Where a complaint pleads facts that are
‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line
between 	possibility 	and 	plausibility 	of 	entitlement 	to 	relief.’” 	(quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)). So the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s deliberate
indifference claim against the individual Defendants without prejudice for
failure to state a claim.
IV. 	Recommendation and notice of right to object.
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the Court
dismiss this action without prejudice.
The undersigned advises Plaintiff of his right to file an objection to this
Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by January 2, 2026,
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in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. The undersigned further advises Plaintiff that failure to make timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives his right to appellate review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991). This Report and Recommendation disposes of the issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the captioned matter. ENTERED this 12th day of December, 2025.
Dizan Neo
SUZANNE MITCHELL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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