Jones v. Prater et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
ROSHAUN JONES, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-25-1013-G
)
OKLAHOMA BOARD OF COUNTY )
COMMISSIONERS et al., )
)
Defendants. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Roshaun Jones, a convicted state prisoner, appearing
pro se, has filed a
Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging various constitutional violations. (ECF No. 1).
United States District Judge Charles B. Goodwin has referred this matter to the
undersigned magistrate judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B)-(C). A review of the Complaint has been conducted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(a). Based on that review, it is recommended that the Court dismiss the Complaint
in its entirety.
I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT
The Court must review each complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress against
a governmental entity, officer, or employee and each case in which a plaintiff proceeds
in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court is required to dismiss the complaint
or any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b);
see also Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217–
18 (10th Cir. 2007) (indicating that court uses same analysis for complaint’s sufficiency
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whether performed sua sponte or pursuant to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must accept Mr. Jones’ allegations as true and construe them, and any
reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.
See
Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). Since Mr. Jones is proceeding
pro
se, his Complaint must be construed liberally.
See id. at 1218. The Court “review[s] the
complaint for plausibility; that is, to determine whether the complaint includes enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Young v. Davis, 554 F.3d 1254,
1256 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotations and citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context does
not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in a
complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct,” then
the plaintiff has not “nudged (his) claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility requirement “serves
not only to weed out claims that do not (in the absence of additional allegations) have a
reasonable prospect of success, but also to inform the defendants of the actual grounds
of the claim against them.”
Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008).
Whether a complaint contains sufficient facts to avoid dismissal is context-specific
and is determined through a court’s application of “judicial experience and common
sense.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
III. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT/ALLEGATIONS
In 2017, officers from the Del City Police Department arrested Plaintiff on two
charges of first-degree murder. (ECF No. 1:14). Mr. Jones filed his Complaint alleging
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various constitutional violations in connection with the arrest and his subsequent
incarceration. As Defendants, Plaintiff names: (1) the Oklahoma Board of County
Commissioners (The Board); (2) Loyd Berger, Del City Police Chief; (3) Henry Matthews,
Del City Police Department detective; (4) David Prater, former Oklahoma County District
Attorney; (5) Vicki Behenna, current Oklahoma County District Attorney; (6) The City of
Del City; (7) Fifteen unnamed Del City Police Officers; (8) the Del City Police Department;
(9) Meredith Easter; and (10) Jimmy Harmon. (ECF No. 1:1, 4, 8, 15). Plaintiff sues all
Defendants in their official and individual capacities and seeks monetary damages. (ECF
No. 1:6, 8).
IV. OFFICIAL CAPACITY CLAIMS
As stated, Plaintiff has sued Defendants Barger, Matthews, Prater, Behenna,
unnamed police officers, Easter, and Harmon in their individual and official capacities and
has requested monetary relief.
See supra. But the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has long
held that “Section 1983 plaintiffs may sue individual-capacity defendants only for money
damages and official-capacity defendants only for injunctive relief.”
Brown v. Montoya,
662 F.3d 1152, 1161 n.5 (10th Cir. 2011). Thus, the Court should dismiss the official
capacity claims against these Defendants.
V. DEFENDANTS EASTER AND HARMON
On the final page of his Complaint, Plaintiff stated that he is bringing suit against
Meredith Easter and Jimmy Harmon because they “knew that [Plaintiff] was innocent, but
continued to conceal the evidence.” (ECF No. 1:15). The Court should dismiss these
allegations as conclusory, and thus dismiss these Defendants from the lawsuit, as Mr.
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Jones has not informed the Court what evidence these Defendants allegedly concealed
or how their concealment had affected Plaintiff.
VI. ALLEGATIONS AGAINST MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS AND THE FIFTEEN
UNNAMED DEL CITY POLICE OFFICERS
Throughout the Complaint, Mr. Jones presents a variety of complaints against
multiple Defendants, stating:
• “All parties involved violated my rights to due process by intentionally and
willingly and knowingly withholding evidence under long established case
law, Brady v. Maryland 373 US 83, 87 (1963). The parties involved violated
Brady by coercing false statements, relying on those false statements when
drafting offense reports, the prosecution report, and then suppressing the
truthful exculpatory statements of multiple various witnesses, and the
coercive tactics used to obtain the inculpatory statements used in the
prosecution. There are also various things missing from the investigation
file such as cell phone and credit card records. The parties involved also
conducted a warrantless search of my cell phones in violation of Riley v.
California;”
• “All of the evidence withheld by all parties involved was favorable to me, it
was suppressed, and the evidence was material because it proved I did not
do this. This is the core of a Brady violation. Brady undoubtfully put all
parties on notice that failing to disclose the witnesses truthful exculpatory
statements, the tactics used to coerce the false statements and other
evidence that cleared me;”
• “All parties involved deprived me of liberty without probable cause and used
false evidence that they manufactured in order to accuse me of this crime,
which caused the deprivation of my liberty, without probable cause in
violation of my rights secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments;”
• “All parties stood by when they all participated in all mentioned illegal
actions to incarcerate me for a crime I did not commit;”
• “All parties involved intentionally inflicted emotional distress, maliciously
prosecuted me, and acted together to deprive me of life and liberty.”
(ECF No. 1:10-12). Plaintiff also alleges that the fifteen “unnamed” Del City Police Officers
fabricated evidence against him, failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, and “made wild
threats” to Mr. Jones’ girlfriend while questioning her. (ECF No. 1:9, 10, 14).
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In a case such as this one where Mr. Jones has brought claims against more than
one defendant, (here, “all parties” and/or “unnamed Del City Police Officers,”) “it is
particularly important . . . that the complaint make clear exactly
who is alleged to have
done
what to
whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the
claims against him.”
Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008). By
repeatedly referring to “all parties,” Mr. Jones has failed in this regard and the Court “will
not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct
a legal theory on plaintiff’s behalf.”
Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74
(10th Cir. 1997). Mr. Jones’ failure to link any of the named Defendants with any of the
alleged violations as he describes them, supra, renders the allegations legally deficient.
See Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, at Arapahoe County Justice Center, 492
F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining “that, to state a claim in federal court, a
complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the
defendant did it; how the defendant’s action harmed (the plaintiff); and, what specific
legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.”).
Furthermore, even if Mr. Jones would have identified particular Defendants
responsible for the aforementioned wrongdoing, the allegations themselves are deficient.
Mr. Jones alleges that: (1) “all parties” withheld evidence, coerced false statements,
suppressed truthful exculpatory statements, deprived him of liberty without probable
cause, and used false evidence that they manufactured in order to accuse him of a crime
and (2) the unnamed police officers fabricated evidence against Plaintiff, failed to disclose
exculpatory evidence, and “made wild threats.”
See supra. In stating a claim for relief,
the plaintiff bears the burden to frame “a complaint with enough factual matter (taken
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as true) to suggest” that he or she is entitled to relief.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff’s
allegations against “all parties” and the fifteen “unnamed Del City Police Officers” are
deficient in this regard and should be dismissed on this additional basis.
VII. DEFENDANT CITY OF DEL CITY
Plaintiff sues the City of Del City under a theory of municipal liability for the actions
of the fifteen unnamed Del City Police Officers and for failing to properly train said officers.
(ECF No. 1:9, 12). A municipality or a county can be held liable for constitutional violations
committed pursuant to official policy or custom.
See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (“[I]t is when execution of a government’s policy or custom,
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible
under § 1983.”);
Cox v. Glanz, 800 F.3d 1231, 1254 (10th Cir. 2015) (applying
Monell to
a county). Municipal defendants cannot be held vicariously liable for their employees’
alleged constitutional violations under § 1983.
See Schneider v. City of Grand Junction
Police Dep't, 717 F.3d 760, 770 (10th Cir. 2013). Instead, to establish municipal liability
under § 1983, Plaintiff must establish three basic elements: (1) Defendants had an official
policy or custom; (2) that “was enacted or maintained with deliberate indifference to an
almost inevitable” federal rights violation; and (3) that caused a violation of Plaintiff's
federal rights.
Id. at 769-71.
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Here, Mr. Jones states: “The City of Del City employed the police officers. Del City
has a policy and custom and Del City has a policy to convict at all costs. I also bring a
claim that the City failed to train its officers. The City through its policy and custom told
officers to convict at all cost.” (ECF No. 1:12). The Court should find these allegations
conclusory and insufficient to state a claim for municipal liability and dismiss the City of
Del City as a Defendant.
See Smith v. Grady Cnty. Criminal Justice Authority, 2024 WL
4846221, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 20, 2024) (dismissing municipal liability claim because
the plaintiff’s “statements regarding the existence of municipal policy are largely
conclusory or otherwise insufficient to plausibly state a municipal liability claim.”).
Furthermore, the policy or custom must be “the moving force behind the injury
alleged.”
Buchanan v. Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC, 2023 WL 6997404, at *8 (10th Cir.
2023). Mr. Jones alleges that Del City has a policy “to convict at all costs.”
See supra. But
Plaintiff does not state how this policy was the moving force behind any specific injury to
him, resulting in an alternate basis for dismissal of any claims asserted against the City
of Del City.
VIII. THE OKLAHOMA BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
Mr. Jones has named the Oklahoma Board of County Commissioners as a
defendant.
See supra. As stated, a local government, such as a county, may be liable if
the injury complained of can be attributed to a government’s policy or custom, whether
made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy.
See supra,
Monell. In the Complaint, the entirety of Mr. Jones’ allegations
against The Board are that they “maintained a policy and custom of concealing
exculpatory evidence that proved a proven is innocent.” (ECF No. 1:15). Again, the Court
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should find that “concealing exculpatory evidence” is far too vague to constitute an official
policy or custom on behalf of the Board to attribute any type of liability.
See Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. And again, Plaintiff has failed to explain what evidence was allegedly
concealed or how the evidence was exculpatory or how this “policy” was the moving force
behind any injury to him. Thus, the Court should dismiss The Board as a Defendant.
IX. THE DEL CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
Mr. Jones has sued the Del City Police Department.
See ECF No. 1:15. But this
Defendant is not a suable entity under § 1983.
See,
e.g., Moore v. Diggins, 633 F. App’x
672, 677 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding the Denver Sheriff’s Department “is not a suable entity
under § 1983” and citing
Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 444 (10th Cir. 1985) as
“dismissing § 1983 claims against the City of Denver Police Department because it was
not a separate suable entity”);
see also Lindsey v. Thomson, 275 F. App’x 744, 747 (10th
Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 claims against police departments and county
sheriff’s department, noting defendants were “not legally suable entities”);
Ketchum v.
Albuquerque Police Dep't, 1992 WL 51481, at *2 (10th Cir. 1992) (Municipal police
departments “are not suable entities under § 1983, because they lack legal identities
apart from the municipality.”). As such, the Court should dismiss this Defendant with
prejudice.
See Jones v. City of Moore, No. 24-855-D, 2025 WL 864833, at *2 (W.D. Okla.
Mar. 19, 2025) (dismissing plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against the Moore Police
Department with prejudice).
X. DEFENDANTS BERGER AND MATTHEWS
Plaintiff also names Del City Police Chief Berger and Del City Police Detective
Matthews as Defendants, in their individual capacities.
See supra;
see ECF No. 1:15.
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Personal participation is necessary for individual liability under § 1983.
See Bennett v.
Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1976) (“Personal participation is an essential
allegation in a [§] 1983 claim.”). Even if Plaintiff’s claims against either of these
Defendants was based on some sort of a supervisory role, a supervisor is liable only if he
is “personally involved in the constitutional violation, and a sufficient causal connection [
] exist[s] between the supervisor and the constitutional violation.”
Serna v. Colo. Dep't
of Corr., 455 F.3d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted);
see also Schneider
v. Grand Junction Police Dep't, 717 F.3d 760, 767 (10th Cir. 2013) (requiring a plaintiff
to show an “affirmative link” between the supervisor and the constitutional violation).
In the Complaint, Plaintiff states: “I also bring a claim against Detective Henry
Matthews of the Del City Police Department [and] I bring suit against . . . Del City Police
Chief Loyd Berger.” (ECF No. 1:15). But Mr. Jones has failed to allege that either of these
Defendants personally participated in any in any of the actions or events underlying any
of his claims.
See ECF No. 1. Thus, the Court should dismiss both of these Defendants,
without prejudice.
See Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1220, 1227-28 (10th Cir. 2006)
(upholding dismissal of § 1983 claims because the complaint did not indicate personal
participation by the named defendants).
XI. DEFENDANTS BEHENNA AND PRATER
Mr. Jones alleges that he was wrongly accused of first degree murder, with charges
having been filed on February 2, 2017, and the charges being dismissed on September
5, 2024. (ECF No. 1:14-15). Plaintiff sues Mr. Prater, the Oklahoma County District
Attorney in office when he was charged, and Ms. Behenna, the current Oklahoma County
District Attorney. (ECF No. 1:15). According to Mr. Jones, “The Prosecutors were acting
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as investigators when they had my cell phone searched with no warrant.” (ECF No. 1:13).
But Plaintiff does not specifically attribute any wrongdoing to either Defendant, instead
stating only: “I bring suit against David Prater, who was then the elected Oklahoma
County District Attorney. . . . I also bring suit against Vicki Behenna (Duly elected)
Because she is now the District Attorney.” (ECF No. 1:15).
Because Plaintiff fails to “explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff];
when the defendant did it; how the defendant’s action harmed (the plaintiff); and, what
specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated” the Court should dismiss
these Defendants, without prejudice.
See supra,
Nasious.
XII. THE OKLAHOMA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
Mr. Jones has sued the Oklahoma County District Attorney’s Office, arguing a
violation of his right to a speedy trial. (ECF No. 1:13-15). The Court should conclude that
Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a claim.
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Indeed, “[t]he sole remedy for a violation of the
speedy trial right [is] dismissal of the charges.”
Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. 437, 444
(2016);
see also United States v. Medina, 918 F.3d 774, 779-80 (10th Cir. 2019)
(“[A]lthough the [Sixth Amendment] right [to a speedy trial] is somewhat amorphous,
the remedy is severe: dismissal of the indictment.”). Here, the Court cannot grant Plaintiff
the only relief available for a violation of the right to a speedy trial because the District
Attorney’s Office has already dismissed all charges against Plaintiff.
See ECF No. 1:15;
State Court Docket Sheet,
State of Oklahoma v. Jones, Case No. CF-2017-673 (Okla. Co.
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Dist. Ct. Sept. 5, 2024).1 Thus, the Court should dismiss this claim for failure to state a
claim.
See Phillips v. New Mexico, No. 22-356-GJF, 2022 WL 1597539, at *2 (D.N.M. May
19, 2022) (dismissing speedy trial claim for failure to state a claim because the district
attorney’s office had previously dismissed the charges against the plaintiff).
XIII. RECOMMENDATION AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
Based on the foregoing, the Court should dismiss the Complaint in its entirety.
Plaintiff is hereby advised of his right to object to this Report and Recommendation.
See
28 U.S.C. § 636. Any objection must be filed with the Clerk of the District Court by
October 16, 2025.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to
make timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate
review of both factual and legal questions contained herein.
Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595
F.3d 1120, 1123 (10th Cir. 2010).
XIV. STATUS OF THE REFERRAL
This Report and Recommendation terminates the referral to the undersigned
magistrate judge in the captioned matter.
ENTERED on September 29, 2025.
1
See United States v. Pursley, 577 F.3d 1204, 1214 n.6 (10th Cir. 2009) (exercising discretion “to
take judicial notice of publicly-filed records in [this] court and certain other courts concerning
matters that bear directly upon the disposition of the case at hand”) (citation omitted).
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