Jones et al v. Comanche County Facilities Authority et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
CHARLES JONES, Individually and as )
Personal Representative of the Estate )
Of Matthew Tyler Jones, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-25-385-PRW
)
COMANCHE COUNTY FACILITIES )
AUTHORITY et al., )
)
Defendants. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Charles Jones, individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate
of Matthew Tyler Jones (Plaintiff), represented by counsel, brings this action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations under state and federal law. (ECF No. 1-3). United
States District Judge Patrick R. Wyrick has referred this matter to the undersigned
magistrate judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C).
Defendant Comanche County Facilities Authority (CCFA) has filed a Partial Motion to
Dismiss, Plaintiff has filed a response, and CCFA has filed a reply.
See ECF Nos. 8, 9, 11.
The Court should GRANT the Motion, in part, and DENY the Motion, in part, as discussed
below.
I. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
Plaintiff originally filed this case in Comanche County District Court and Defendant
CCFA removed the action to this Court.
See ECF Nos. 1, 1-1, 1-2, 1-3. The basis of the
lawsuit concerns the stabbing death of Comanche County Detention Center (CCDC)
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inmate Matthew Jones (Mr. Jones) on or about August 23, 2023. (ECF No. 1-3). At the
time of Mr. Jones’ death, Defendants Calvin Riss, Edward Brown, and Markie Ishman
were also inmates at the detention center and were housed in the same unit, or pod, as
Mr. Jones. (ECF No. 1-3:6). According to the Amended Complaint, the moving force
behind Mr. Jones’ injuries and ultimate death may be attributed to various “unlawful
policies and customs” of the CCDC in place at the time of his death, along with “systemic
failures at the CCDC and the individual jail personnel’s acts and omissions constituting
deliberate indifference towards [Mr.] Jones.” (ECF No. 1-3:20). Specifically, Plaintiff
references:
• CCFA’s “pattern of overpopulation,” in the entire facility;
• CCFA’s “pattern of overcapacity” in Mr. Jones’ particular cell;
• CCFA’s failure to adequately monitor inmate population and perform full
and proper site checks;
• CCFA’s “pattern of inadequate staffing levels and ratios;”
• Decisions made by Jail Administrator William Hobbs regarding the alleged
aforementioned deficiencies, along with Defendant Hobbs’ alleged failure to
address the alleged aforementioned deficiencies;
• Defendant Hobbs’ ratification of decisions made by his subordinates which
ultimately contributed to Mr. Jones’ death; and
• A failure to train and/or supervise CCDC personnel regarding the alleged
aforementioned deficiencies.
(ECF No. 1-3:6-7, 20, 21).
As Defendants, Plaintiff has named: (1) The CCFA; (2) The Comanche County
Board of County Commissioners (The Board); (3) William Hobbs; (4) Calvin Riss; (5)
Edward Brown; (6) Markie Ishman; (7) Calvin Wynn; and (8) John/Jane Does I-X. (ECF
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No. 1-3:1, 4-5). Plaintiff sues each individual Defendant in his/her individual capacity only
and seeks monetary damages.
See ECF No. 1-3:1, 4-5, 23-24, 28-29, 31-32, 33, 34.
Plaintiff sets forth seven claims for relief.
In Claim One, Plaintiff seeks liability against John/Jane Does I-X, alleging each
individual failed to supervise and protect Mr. Jones, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. (ECF No. 1-3:23).
In Claim Two, Plaintiff seeks liability against the CCFA, The Board, and Defendant
Hobbs, alleging liability based on the individual actions of John/Jane Does I-X and
“systemic failures” related to: (1) overcrowding at the CCDC, which led to inadequate
monitoring of inmates; (2) overcrowding in particular cells within the CCDC, which led to
inadequate monitoring of inmates; (3) failure to oversee/monitor inmates by performing
adequate site checks; and (4) inadequate staffing. (ECF No. 1-3:25). Plaintiff also alleges
that Defendant Hobbs, in particular, failed to address the aforementioned issues, and
ratified the decisions of subordinates regarding their decisions related to said issues.
Finally, Plaintiff alleges liability based on a failure to train CCDC personnel regarding the
operational issues which form the basis of the alleged systemic failures. (ECF No. 1-3:24-
28).
Plaintiff asserts Claim Three against the CCFA, alleging negligence under
Oklahoma state law for failing to properly monitor Mr. Jones while he was in the CCDC
and failing to protect him from harm at the hands of other inmates. (ECF No. 1-3:29-31).
Plaintiff asserts Claim Four against Defendants Riss, Brown, Ishman, and Winn,
alleging assault and battery in violation of Oklahoma state law, specifically alleging that
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these Defendants attacked and stabbed Mr. Jones, causing him severe injury and
ultimately, death. (ECF No. 1-3:31-32).
In Claim Five, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Riss, Brown, Ishman, and Winn are
liable under a theory of wrongful death under Oklahoma state law for causing injuries to
Mr. Jones which ultimately resulted in his death. (ECF No. 1-3:32).
In Claim Six, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Riss, Brown, Ishman, and Winn are
liable under a theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress under Oklahoma state
law based on the actions allegedly committed by these Defendants which resulted in Mr.
Jones’ death. (ECF No. 1-3:32-33).
Finally, in Claim Seven, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Riss, Brown, Ishman, and
Winn are liable under a theory of conspiracy under Oklahoma state law, alleging these
Defendants “all conspired and worked together to cause injury and, eventually, the death
of Matthew Jones.” (ECF No. 1-3:33).
II. CCFA’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant CCFA: (1) seeks dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1), alleging Plaintiff lacks standing, in his individual capacity, to assert state and
federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and (2) seeks dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), alleging Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. (ECF Nos. 8 & 11).
A. Defendant’s First Proposition
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit individually and as the Personal Representative of the
Estate of Matthew Tyler Jones.
See ECF No. 1-3. CCFA has moved for dismissal under
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1),1 arguing that Plaintiff lacks standing to assert
state and/or federal claims in his individual capacity. (ECF No. 8:5-6). Regarding any
federal claim, Plaintiff argues that CCFA’s argument is moot, as he “has not made any
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in an individual capacity.” (ECF No. 9:2). CCFA agrees that
this point is moot.
See ECF No. 11:2.
However, as argued by CCFA, Plaintiff failed to address the standing argument as
it pertains to the state law claim of negligence asserted against CCFA in Claim Three.
See
ECF Nos. 9 & 11:2). As noted by this Defendant, Oklahoma law provides: “When the
death of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the personal
representative of the former may maintain an action therefor against the latter, or his or
her personal representative if he or she is also deceased.” Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 1053.
Thus, the Court should dismiss Claim Three, as it is asserted by Plaintiff in his individual
capacity against CCFA. However, Plaintiff may assert Claim Three against CCFA, in his
capacity as the personal representative of Mr. Jones.
1 A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) takes one of two
forms: a facial attack or a factual attack.
Pueblo of Jemez v. United States, 790 F.3d 1143, 1148
n. 4 (10th Cir. 2015). A facial attack questions the sufficiency of the complaint’s allegations.
Id.
In reviewing a facial attack, a district court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true.
Id. In a factual attack, the moving party may go beyond allegations contained in the complaint
and challenge the facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction depends.
Id. When reviewing a
factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction, a district court may not presume the truthfulness of
the complaint’s factual allegations.
Id. Instead, the court has wide discretion to allow affidavits,
other documents, and a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts.
Id.
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B. Defendant’s Second Proposition
Next, CCFA has moved for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
alleging that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. (ECF No. 8:7-13). The Court should deny
this portion of CCFA’s motion.
1. Standard of Review—Motion to Dismiss
Under this rule, to survive a motion to dismiss, a “complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). Plausibility, in this context, “refer[s] to the scope of the allegations in
a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much
of it innocent, then the plaintiffs ‘have not nudged their claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible.’”
Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008)
(quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The plausibility requirement “serves not only to
weed out claims that do not (in the absence of additional allegations) have a reasonable
prospect of success, but also to inform the defendants of the actual grounds of the claim
against them.”
Id. at 1248. To that end, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. However, “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge
that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and
unlikely.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal quotations omitted).
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2. Denial of Defendant’s Second Proposition
In its Second Proposition, CCFA argues that it is immune from suit on Plaintiff’s
state law negligence claim as set forth in Claim Three.
See ECF No. 8. Specifically, CCFA
invokes immunity under § 155(25) of the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act
(OGTCA), which provides that a political subdivision shall not be liable for claims resulting
from the “[p]rovision, equipping, operation or maintenance of any prison, jail or
correctional facility ....” Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 155(25).
See ECF No. 8:7-9. In response,
Plaintiff argues that § 153.1 of the OGTCA abrogates this immunity with respect to a
public trust that houses federal inmates, such as the CCFA. (ECF No. 9:4-9). The Court
should agree with Plaintiff.
The full text of § 153.1 states:
Nothing in the Governmental Tort Claims Act shall be construed as allowing
an action or recovery against this state, against any city, town or county
that is the sole beneficiary of a public trust, or against any employee of this
state or any city, town or county of this state due to the housing of federal
inmates or inmates from another state in facilities owned or operated by
private prison contractors. If a public trust that has as its sole beneficiary a
city, town or county has a facility that houses federal inmates or inmates
from another state, the immunity provided for in the Governmental Tort
Claims Act shall not apply to that trust.
Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 153.1.
In its reply, CCFA contends that this provision is not applicable because “Section
153.1 clearly applies in situations where a private prison is operating a jail facility, and
there is no evidence in the record that the CCFA is owned or operated by a private prison
contractor.” (ECF No. 11:3). According to CCFA, Section 153.1 “has no bearing on other
liability exemptions” outside of situations dealing with liability on a public trust who has
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contracted with a private contractor to operate its jails. (ECF No. 11:3-4). This Court has
previously rejected this exact argument, stating:
The first sentence of § 153.1 provides that the OGTCA should not be
construed as allowing an action against a county that is the sole beneficiary
of a public trust due to the housing of federal and out-of-state inmates in
facilities operated by private prison contractors. In other words, this
sentence appears to preclude a claim under the OGTCA against a county
where the county is the sole beneficiary of a public trust and the claim is
premised on the housing of a federal or out-of-state prisoner in a private
prison facility. The second sentence then refers to ‘the immunity provided
for in the Governmental Tort Claims Act’ and indicates that it ‘shall not apply’
to a public trust if the public trust has a county as its sole beneficiary and
has a facility that houses federal or out-of-state inmates. Contrary to the
[public trust’s] stance, this sentence does not obviously refer to the
immunity provided for in § 153.1 but instead speaks more broadly of “the
immunity provided for in the Governmental Tort Claims Act.” Additionally,
unlike the first sentence, the second sentence makes no reference to a
facility being owned or operated by a private contractor.
Bonilla v. Gerlach, No. CIV-23-1060-R, 2024 WL 457172, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 6, 2024).
Here, Plaintiff has alleged that CCFA is a public trust, that it houses federal
inmates, and that it has a county as its sole beneficiary.
See ECF No. 1-3, at ¶¶ 120-124.
Under these circumstances, § 153.1 provides that “the immunity provided for in the
Governmental Tort Claims Act shall not apply to that trust.” Given this language, the
Court should find that dismissal of Plaintiff’s state law claim against CCFA is not warranted
at this stage.
See supra,
Bonilla v. Gerlach (rejecting similar argument and denying partial
motion to dismiss).
III. RECOMMENDATION AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
Based upon the foregoing, the Court should GRANT Defendant CCFA’s Partial
Motion to Dismiss in part, and DENY the Motion, in part, as discussed.
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The parties are advised of their right to file an objection to this Report and
Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by February 17, 2026, in accordance with
28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. Petitioner is further advised that failure to make
timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate review
of both factual and legal issues contained herein.
Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120,
1123 (10th Cir. 2010).
IV. STATUS OF REFERRAL
This Report and Recommendation does not terminate the referral by the District
Judge in this matter.
ENTERED on February 3, 2026.
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