Parker et al v. Lawton City of et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
FELISHA PARKER & LARESHA )
PARKER, as Next of Kin to ISACC )
D’WAYNE PARKER, Deceased )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
vs. ) Case No. CIV-24-178-JD
)
CITY OF LAWTON, OKLAHOMA, )
et al., )
)
Defendants. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiffs Felisha and Laresha Parker (Plaintiffs), represented by counsel, bring this
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Oklahoma state law, alleging various civil rights
violations. (ECF No. 1). United States District Judge Jodi W. Dishman has referred this
matter to the undersigned magistrate judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). Defendant Brandy Kirkpatrick-Benton has filed a Motion to
Dismiss with Brief in Support, Plaintiffs have responded, and Defendant has replied. (ECF
Nos. 73, 75, 76). For the reasons set forth herein, it is recommended that Defendant’s
motion be granted, in part.
I. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
This case presents a tragic set of circumstances resulting in the unfortunate death
of Isacc D’Wayne Parker. On April 23, 2023, at approximately 7:00 pm, Lawton City police
officers, Defendants Halligan and Paterson, were dispatched to the Lawton City library to
assist in a public disturbance matter. (ECF No. 1:5). Upon their arrival at the scene, the
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officers found Mr. Parker, holding a bible, making statements to the effect that he was
the reincarnation of Quanah Parker, that white people were taking over Indian lands, that
he was being followed by eight cars, that the “federal bureau” was watching them, and
that a “satanic cult” existed in Lawton. (ECF No. 1:5-6). Officer Halligan arrested Mr.
Parker without resistance and then asked Mr. Parker if he was a “Taliaferro patient.” (ECF
No. 1:6).1 At the question, Mr. Parker answered that he was “perfectly fine” with “good
health and everything.” (ECF No. 1:6).
Officers Halligan and Paterson proceeded to drive Mr. Parker to the Lawton City
Jail where he was booked in on one count of Disturbing the Peace, a misdemeanor crime.
(ECF No. 1:7). Apparently, a Complaint was drafted against Mr. Parker with a hand-
written note that his “PTC” (pretrial conference, presumably) would be May 16, 2023.
(ECF No. 1:8). The complaint did not indicate that whether Mr. Parker was ever given a
bond or allowed to speak to an attorney. (ECF No. 1:8). While at the jail, Mr. Parker was
placed in isolation, because, according to Lawton City jailer Defendant Watkins, Mr.
Parker “is kind of crazy.” (ECF No. 1:11). On June 3, 2023, forty-one days after he was
booked into jail, Mr. Parker was found dead on the floor of his jail cell, lying in a large
pool of water. (ECF No. 1:9-10). Findings from the Medical Examiner state that Mr. Parker
died from “acute water intoxication due to psychogenic polydipsia in setting of
schizophrenia.” (ECF No. 1:10).
1 “Taliaferro” refers to the Jim Taliaferro Community Mental Health Center in Lawton, Oklahoma.
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As a Defendant, Plaintiffs have named Brandy Kirkpatrick-Benton; both in her
individual and official capacities, premised on her supervisory role as Jail Administrator at the
Lawton City Jail.
See ECF No. 1:1, 4, 17-21, 23, 25. Against this Defendant, Plaintiffs allege
four claims: (1) deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s mental health needs in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) a violation of the Fourth Amendment, owing to a lack of
probable cause to support Mr. Parker’s arrest, (3) a violation of Mr. Parker’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel; and (3) wrongful death/negligence under Oklahoma state
law. (ECF No. 1:17-21, 23-27).2
II. MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY DEFENDANT KIRKPATRICK-BENTON
Defendant Kirkpatrick-Benton seeks dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), arguing: (1) Plaintiffs have failed to state an individual capacity claim under
either 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Oklahoma state law; (2) she is not a proper party in her official
capacity to either the state or federal claims; and (3) she is entitled to qualified immunity
on the individual capacity federal claims. (ECF No. 73:4-12).
In ruling on Defendant’s motion, the court “‘must accept all the well-pleaded
allegations of the complaint as true and must construe them in the light most favorable
to . . . [P]laintiff.’”
Thomas v. Kaven, 765 F.3d 1183, 1190 (10th Cir. 2014) (citation
omitted). To survive dismissal, Plaintiff's “complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft
2 Initially, Plaintiffs named Terry Sellers as Jail Administrator instead of Ms. Kirkpatrick-Benton.
See ECF No. 1. Subsequently, however, Plaintiff dismissed Mr. Sellers as a defendant and named
Ms. Kirkpatrick-Benton instead, noting that “all previous damages and injuries alleged against jail
administrator, Terry Sellers, are replaced and now asserted with the same force and effect against
Brandy Kirkpatrick-Benton.” (ECF Nos. 42, 56:3).
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v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context does not
mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint:
if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct,” then the plaintiff
has not “nudged (his) claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”
Bell Atlantic
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility requirement “serves not only to
weed out claims that do not (in the absence of additional allegations) have a reasonable
prospect of success, but also to inform the defendants of the actual grounds of the claim
against them.”
Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008). “The
plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a
sheer possibility. . . .”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
A complaint fails to state a claim when it lacks factual allegations sufficient “to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations
in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. (footnote
and citation omitted). Bare legal conclusions in a complaint are not assumed to be true;
legal conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations” to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662. Whether a complaint contains sufficient
facts to avoid dismissal is context-specific and is determined through a court’s application
of “judicial experience and common sense.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679;
see also Gee v.
Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1184-85 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing
Iqbal).
In response to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs have conceded that Ms. Kirkpatrick-
Benton: (1) is immune from suit in both her official and individual capacities on the state
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law claim, pursuant to the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act and (2) should only
be named in her individual capacity on the remaining federal claims.
See ECF No. 75:9.
Thus the issues before the Court involve Ms. Kirkpatrick-Benton’s potential individual
liability on the three federal claims based on her supervisory role as the Jail Administrator
of the Lawton City Jail.
III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUPERVISORY LIABILITY
“Section 1983 does not authorize liability under a theory of
respondeat superior.”
Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1164 (10th Cir. 2011). As a result, government officials
have no vicarious liability in a § 1983 suit for the misconduct of their subordinates because
“there is no concept of strict supervisor liability under section 1983.”
Jenkins v. Wood, 81
F.3d 988, 994 (10th Cir. 1996) (quotations omitted). Instead, to establish supervisory
liability, “[t]he plaintiff . . . must show an ‘affirmative link’ between the supervisor and
the constitutional violation.”
Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 435 (10th Cir.
2014). An “affirmative link,” in turn, requires “more than a supervisor’s mere knowledge
of his subordinate’s conduct.”
Id. Indeed, to state a successful § 1983 claim against a
defendant based on his or her supervisory responsibilities, a plaintiff must sufficiently
allege three elements: (1) personal involvement; (2) causation; and (3) state of mind.
Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 435 (10th Cir. 2014).
Additionally, supervisory liability may be founded on either a policy deficiency or a
failure to properly train.
See Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960, 997 (10th Cir. 2019)
(stating that supervisory liability may be founded on establishing “the [supervisor]
promulgated, created, implemented[,] or possessed responsibility for the continued
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operation of a policy,” or “the establishment or utilization of an unconstitutional policy or
custom,” provided the policy or custom resulted in a violation of the plaintiff's
constitutional rights.) (internal citations omitted);
McCarty v. Gilchrist, 646 F.3d 1281,
1288–89 (10th Cir. 2011) (noting that supervisory liability may be premised on a failure
to properly train or supervise employees).
IV. THE COURT SHOULD PARTIALLY GRANT DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS
In the three remaining federal claims asserted against Ms. Kirkpatrick-Benton,
Plaintiffs allege both deficiencies in policy and lack of proper training as bases for liability.
See ECF No. 1:17-25. As discussed, to state a claim for supervisory liability, Plaintiffs must
sufficiently allege Ms. Kirkpatrick-Benton’s “personal involvement” in the alleged
constitutional violations, along with causation and state of mind.
See supra. Despite the
fact that the law requires proof of all three elements, however, Ms. Kirkpatrick-Benton
has limited her argument for dismissal to the absence of her “personal involvement” in
the alleged deprivations. (ECF No. 75:4-6). In doing so, she offers two theories: (1)
Plaintiffs fail to allege “any acts or conduct that can be attributed to [her]” and (2) she
has no final policymaking authority regarding the operation of the Lawton City Jail;
rendering supervisory liability legally impossible. (ECF No. 73:5-6).3
3 Although Ms. Kirkpatrick-Benton fails to specifically address the allegations related to inadequate
training, the undersigned will examine both theories—deficiencies in policy and training, as both
theories of individual supervisory liability require the individual’s “personal involvement.”
See
supra.
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Ms. Kirkpatrick-Benton’s first theory is rooted in fact. Plaintiffs have not alleged
that Ms. Kirkpatrick-Benton directly participated in the violation of Mr. Parker’s
constitutional rights.
See ECF No. 1. However, as stated, “direct participation” is not
necessary to establish supervisory liability.
See supra. Additionally, Plaintiff’s second
theory seems to hinge on the fact that Ms. Kirkpatrick-Benton is not the individual who
would have created policies relevant to the jail—according to her, this duty belongs solely
to the Lawton City Council. (ECF No. 73:6). But “personal involvement” can be established
any number of ways, including:
• exercise of control or direction,
• failure to supervise;
• knowledge of the violation and acquiesce[nce] in its continuance; or
• promulgation, creation, implementation, or utilization of a policy that
caused a deprivation of plaintiff's rights.
Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1195 (10th Cir. 2010). Even if Ms. Kirkpatrick-
Benton did not create the jail policies, it is logical to assume that as a Jail Administrator,
she would have been charged with a duty to implement and/or utilize said policies. To
determine whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged Ms. Kirkpatrick’s “personal
involvement,” the undersigned will examine the allegations with respect to each of the
remaining three federal claims.
A. Deliberate Indifference to Mr. Parker’s Serious Mental Health
Needs
In Claim One, Plaintiffs allege deliberate indifference to Mr. Parker’s serious mental
health needs based on the actions of the arresting officers from the Lawton Police
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Department and the jailers who were employed at the Lawton City Jail during Mr. Parker’s
incarceration. (ECF No. 1:12-16). According to Plaintiffs, the arresting officers ignored a
policy which would have required them to attempt to contact Mr. Parker’s family members
and/or take Mr. Parker to a local mental health treatment center, based on the actions
he was displaying at the time of his arrest. (ECF No. 1:14). Plaintiffs also allege that
certain jailers: (1) disregarded an internal policy which would have required Mr. Parker
to have been transported from the Jail to the mental health treatment center, based on
his actions while at the Jail and (2) failed to provide any treatment for Mr. Parker although
he was displaying symptoms of undergoing a mental health crisis, which ultimately led to
his death. (ECF No. 1:14-16).
In Claim Two, Plaintiffs allege supervisory liability against Ms. Kirkpatrick-Benton
and other city officials for the actions of the arresting officers and jailers as set forth in
Claim One.
See ECF No. 1:17. As stated, liability cannot lie against Ms. Kirkpatrick-Benton
merely because she was the Jail Administrator.
See supra. Instead, the Court must
examine whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled Defendant Kirkpatrick-Benton’s
“personal involvement” which would implicate supervisory liability by way of a deficient
policy or lack of training. In support of the allegations that Ms. Kirkpatrick-Benton is liable
as a supervisor, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Kirkpatrick-Benton:
• failed to enforce internal policies related to the arrest and detention of
mentally ill inmates, such as Mr. Parker;
• failed to create an “emergency medical plan” for mentally ill jail detainees;
and
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• failed to adequately train and supervise the arresting officers and jailers
regarding established internal policy concerning the treatment of individuals
displaying signs of mental illness.
(ECF No. 1:17-21).
Application of “judicial experience and common sense,” dictate that Ms.
Kirkpatrick-Benton, as the Jail Administrator, would not be responsible for training or
enforcing policies related to the arresting officers. In this regard, the Court may take
judicial notice of the Lawton Police Department Policy Manual which provides that the
“order of rank” in the Lawton City Police Department begins with the highest ranked
official—the Chief of Police, followed by the Assistant Chief of Police, Major, Captain,
Lieutenant, and Patrolman.4 “Jail Administrator” for the Lawton City Jail simply is not
mentioned in the chain of command for the arresting officers, and the Jail Administrator
would therefore, not be responsible for ensuring their enforcement of policies or providing
them with any type of training. Likewise, based on Ms. Kirkpatrick-Benton’s statement
that she is not a final policymaker, logic dictates that she would be legally incapable of
creating an “emergency medical plan” for mentally ill inmates. Even so, the Court should
conclude that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged Ms. Kirkpatrick-Benton’s “personal
involvement” related to the allegations of deliberate indifference owing to: (1) a failure
to enforce existing internal jail policies regarding the treatment of jail detainees displaying
symptoms of mental illness and (2) inadequate training of jail employees related to the
treatment of jail detainees displaying symptoms of mental illness.
4	
See https://www.lawtonok.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/1174/638277005664430000
(last visited Nov. 21, 2024).
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B. The Fourth Amendment Claim
In Claim Three, Plaintiffs seek liability against the arresting officers under the
Fourth Amendment, alleging that they lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. Parker. (ECF
No. 1:21-23). Relatedly, Plaintiffs seek liability against Ms. Kirkpatrick-Benton and other
Lawton City officials for failing to properly train the arresting officers “in regard to what
constitutes probable cause in a misdemeanor arrest.” (ECF No. 1:23). But again, the
Lawton Police Department Policy Manual dictates that Ms. Kirkpatrick-Benton would not
be responsible for the training of city police officers.
See supra. Due to the absence of
Ms. Kirkpatrick-Benton’s “personal involvement,” the Court should dismiss the allegations
against her as set forth in Claim Three.
C. The Sixth Amendment Claim
In Claim Four, Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Parker “spent over a month incarcerated in
the Lawton City Jail without the appointment of counsel or the right to be released on
bond.” (ECF No. 1:23). According to Plaintiffs, Ms. Kirkpatrick-Benton failed to arrange
for the appointment of an attorney for Mr. Parker or “release[ ] him to bail on his personal
recognizance.” (ECF No. 1:25). But the Lawton City Code of Ordinances, of which the
Court may take judicial notice, states that the judge of the municipal criminal court is
responsible for: (1) informing any criminal defendant of his legal rights, which would
include his Sixth Amendment right to an attorney and (2) arranging any terms related to
bail.5 Thus, Ms. Kirkpatrick-Benton would not have been responsible for failing to appoint
5	
See City of Lawton, Code of Ordinances, Supplement 10, Update 3, Ch. 9, Art. 9-1-118 & 9-1-
11, last updated Nov. 15, 2024, found at
https://library.municode.com/ok/lawton/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeld=14726 (last visited
Nov. 21, 2024).
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Mr. Parker an attorney or arrange his bail. As a result, the Court should dismiss the
allegations against Ms. Kirkpatrick-Benton as set forth in Claim Four based on her lack of
“personal involvement.”
D. Defendant’s Argument for Qualified Immunity
Ms. Kirkpatrick-Benton argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity because
“Plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible § 1983 claim against the Defendant in her
individual capacity.” (ECF No. 73:11). However, Ms. Kirkpatrick-Benton has not
thoroughly addressed whether Plaintiffs have stated a claim in the first instance, as she
limited her arguments to a lack of “personal involvement” without addressing the
elements of causation and intent, which are necessary to state a claim.
See supra. As a
result, the Court should not entertain Ms. Kirkpatrick-Benton’s argument for qualified
immunity.
V. RECOMMENDATION AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
Based upon the foregoing analysis, the Court should: (1) deny the Motion to
Dismiss on Claim Two related to the allegations that Ms. Kirkpatrick-Benton failed to
enforce existing jail policies and properly train regarding the treatment of inmates
displaying symptoms of mental illness; (2) grant the Motion to Dismiss with respect to
the allegations in Claim Two that Ms. Kirkpatrick-Benton failed to create an “emergency
medical plan” for mentally ill jail detainees and failed to enforce internal policies related
to the arrest of Mr. Parker and the training of the arresting officers regarding the
treatment of individuals displaying symptoms of mental illness; and (3) dismiss the
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allegations of individual supervisory liability as set forth against Ms. Kirkpatrick-Benton in
Claims Three and Four.
The parties are advised of their right to file an objection to this Report and
Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by January 3, 2025, in accordance with
28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. The parties are further advised that failure to
make timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate
review of both factual and legal issues contained herein.
Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d
1120, 1123 (10th Cir. 2010).
VI. STATUS OF REFERRAL
This Report and Recommendation does not terminate the referral by the District
Judge in this matter.
ENTERED on December 20, 2024.
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