Parker et al v. Lawton City of et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
FELISHA PARKER and )
LARESHA PARKER, as Next of Kin )
to ISACC D’WAYNE PARKER, Deceased, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-24-178-JD
)
CITY OF LAWTON, OKLAHOMA )
et al., )
)
Defendants. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiffs Felisha and Laresha Parker (Plaintiffs), represented by counsel, bring this
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Oklahoma state law, alleging various civil rights
violations. (ECF No. 1). United States District Judge Jodi W. Dishman has referred this
matter to the undersigned magistrate judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). Defendants Ronnie Watkins, Timothy Scanlon, Savannah
Freeman, and Axle Ocasio have filed a Motion to Dismiss with Brief in Support, Plaintiffs
have responded, and Defendants have replied. (ECF Nos. 40, 44, 50). For the reasons
set forth herein, the Court should: (1) grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on the
allegations of deliberate indifference as set forth in Claim One as to Defendants Scanlon,
Freeman, and Ocasio; (2) conclude that Plaintiffs have stated a claim for deliberate
indifference under the Fourteenth Amendment against Defendant Watkins as set forth in
Claim One; and (3) grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on the allegations of wrongful
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death/negligence as set forth in Claim Five as to Defendants Watkins, Scanlon, Freeman,
and Ocasio.
I. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
This case presents a tragic set of circumstances resulting in the unfortunate death
of Isacc Parker. On April 23, 2023, at approximately 7:00 pm, Lawton City police officers,
Defendants Halligan and Paterson, were dispatched to the Lawton City library to assist in
a public disturbance matter. (ECF No. 1:5). Upon their arrival at the scene, the officers
found Mr. Parker, holding a bible, making statements to the effect that he was the
reincarnation of Quanah Parker, that white people were taking over Indian lands, that he
was being followed by eight cars, that the “federal bureau” was watching them, and that
a “satanic cult” existed in Lawton. (ECF No. 1:5-6). Officer Halligan arrested Mr. Parker
without resistance, and then asked Mr. Parker if he was a “Taliaferro patient.” (ECF No.
1:6).1 There was no indication that either officer explained to Mr. Parker what “Taliaferro”
was. (ECF No. 1:6). At the question, Mr. Parker answered that he was “perfectly fine”
with “good health and everything.” (ECF No. 1:6).
Officers Halligan and Paterson proceeded to drive Mr. Parker to the Lawton City
Jail where he was booked in on one count of Disturbing the Peace, a misdemeanor crime.
(ECF No. 1:7). Upon being booked in, Mr. Parker was placed in isolation, because,
according to Lawton City jailer Defendant Watkins, Mr. Parker “is kind of crazy.” (ECF No.
1:11). Despite such belief, Mr. Parker was never taken to a hospital or mental health
1 “Taliaferro” refers to the Jim Taliaferro Community Mental Health Center in Lawton, Oklahoma.
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facility to be examined. (ECF No. 1:9). On June 3, 2023, forty-one days after he was
booked into jail, Mr. Parker was found deceased on the floor of his jail cell, lying in a
large pool of water. (ECF No. 1:9-10). When asked what had brought on Mr. Parker’s
Death, Defendant Watkins allegedly stated that Mr. Parker had been “puking all night.”
(ECF No. 1:11). Findings from the Medical Examiner state that Mr. Parker died from “acute
water intoxication due to psychogenic polydipsia in setting of schizophrenia.” (ECF No.
1:10).
II. MOTION TO DISMISS BY DEFENDANTS WATKINS, SCANLON, FREEMAN,
AND OCASIO
Against Defendants Watkins, Scanlon, Freeman, and Ocasio (Defendants),
Plaintiffs allege two claims: (1) deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s mental health needs
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment as set forth in Claim One and (2)
negligence/wrongful death under Oklahoma State law as set forth in Claim Five. (ECF No.
1:12-15, 25-27). Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss both claims, arguing: (1) that
Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, (2) they are
entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourteenth Amendment claim, and (3) they are
exempt from liability pursuant to the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act. (ECF No.
40). Plaintiffs have responded and Defendants have replied. (ECF Nos. 44 & 50). The
Court should grant Defendants’ Motion, in part, as discussed below.
A. Standard Of Review
Defendants Watkins, Scanlon, Freeman, and Ocasio seek dismissal under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 40). In ruling on Defendants’ motion, the court
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“‘must accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and must construe
them in the light most favorable to . . . [P]laintiff.’”
Thomas v. Kaven, 765 F.3d 1183,
1190 (10th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). To survive dismissal, Plaintiff's “complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).
“Plausible” in this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the
scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide
swath of conduct,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged (his) claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible.”
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The
plausibility requirement “serves not only to weed out claims that do not (in the absence
of additional allegations) have a reasonable prospect of success, but also to inform the
defendants of the actual grounds of the claim against them.”
Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519
F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability
requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility. . . .”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
A complaint fails to state a claim when it lacks factual allegations sufficient “to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations
in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. (footnote
and citation omitted). Bare legal conclusions in a complaint are not assumed to be true;
legal conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations” to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662.
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Whether a complaint contains sufficient facts to avoid dismissal is context-specific
and is determined through a court’s application of “judicial experience and common
sense.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679;
see also Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1184-85 (10th
Cir. 2010) (discussing
Iqbal).
B. Qualified Immunity
“Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense to a section 1983 action, providing
immunity from suit from the outset.”
DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 971 (10th Cir.
2001) (quoting
Adkins v. Rodriguez, 59 F.3d 1034, 1036 (10th Cir. 1995)). “The doctrine
of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.’ ”
Ullery v. Bradley, 949 F.3d 1282, 1289
(10th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). Once a
defendant has asserted a qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
establish that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) the right was
“clearly established” at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct.
Estate of Smart
by Smart v. City of Wichita, 951 F.3d 1161, 1168 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Perea v. Baca,
817 F.3d 1198, 1202 (10th Cir. 2016)). “[I]f the plaintiff fails to establish either prong of
the two-pronged qualified-immunity standard, the defendant prevails on the defense.”
A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1134-35 (10th Cir. 2016);
Felders ex rel. Smedley v.
Malcom, 755 F.3d 870, 877-78 (10th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he record must clearly demonstrate
the plaintiff has satisfied his heavy two-part burden; otherwise, the defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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“Although qualified immunity defenses are typically resolved at the summary
judgment stage, district courts may grant motions to dismiss on the basis of qualified
immunity.”
Thomas v. Kaven, 765 F.3d 1183, 1194 (10th Cir. 2014). “Asserting a qualified
immunity defense via a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, however, subjects the defendant to a more
challenging standard of review than would apply on summary judgment.”
Id. (quoting
Peterson v. Jensen, 371 F.3d 1199, 1201 (10th Cir. 2004));
see Behrens v. Pelletier, 516
U.S. 299, 309 (1996) (“At [the motion to dismiss] stage, it is the defendant’s conduct
as
alleged in the complaint that is scrutinized for objective legal reasonableness.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).
C. The Fourteenth Amendment Claim
As stated, in Claim One, Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants were deliberately
indifferent to Mr. Parker’s mental health needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See supra. To state this § 1983 claim against these Defendants, Plaintiffs must allege
that each Defendant had personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation.
Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1165 (10th Cir. 2011). To establish personal
participation, a plaintiff must show how the defendant caused the deprivation of a federal
right.
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 159, 166 (1985). In other words, an affirmative
link must exist between the alleged constitutional violation and the defendant’s
participation, control, direction, or failure to supervise.
Serna v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 455
F.3d 1146, 1151-52 (10th Cir. 2006). Further, “[t]o state a claim in federal court, a
complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the plaintiff], when the defendant
did it, how the defendant’s actions harmed him [ ]; and, what specific legal right the
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plaintiff believes the defendant violated.”
Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492
F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007).
Regarding Plaintiffs’ specific allegations of deliberate indifference to Mr. Parker’s
mental health needs, the right to custodial medical care is well settled.
See generally
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). “The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
entitles pretrial detainees to the same standard of medical care that the Eighth
Amendment requires for convicted inmates.”
Lance v. Morris, 985 F.3d 787, 793 (10th
Cir. 2021);
see also Clark v. Colbert, 895 F.3d 1258, 1267 (10th Cir. 2018) (explaining
the Eighth Amendment includes “an entitlement to a certain minimum standard of medical
care while incarcerated”). “Although pretrial detainees are protected under the Due
Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment, this Court applies an analysis identical
to that applied in Eighth Amendment cases brought pursuant to § 1983.”
Olsen v. Layton
Hills Mall, 312 F.3d 1304, 1315 (10th Cir. 2002).
Prison officials violate the Constitution when they act with “deliberate indifference
to an inmate’s serious medical needs.”
Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 751 (10th Cir. 2005).
“The deliberate indifference standard lies ‘somewhere between the poles of negligence
at one end and purpose or knowledge at the other.’ ”
Id. at 752 (quoting
Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994)). The contours of constitutional liability under the
deliberate indifference standard are familiar: there is both an objective and a subjective
component.
See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “[T]he focus of the objective component is the
seriousness of the plaintiff’s alleged harm, while the focus of the subjective component
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is the mental state of the defendant with respect to the risk of that harm.”
Prince v.
Sheriff of Carter Cnty., 28 F.4th 1033, 1044 (10th Cir. 2022).
To satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff must produce evidence that the
prisoner’s medical need was “sufficiently serious.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citation
omitted). “A medical need is sufficiently serious if it is one that has been diagnosed by a
physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would
easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”
Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d
1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). A delay in medical care
can also be sufficiently serious if “the delay resulted in substantial harm.”
Mata, 427 F.3d
at 751. “The substantial harm requirement may be satisfied by lifelong handicap,
permanent loss, or considerable pain.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The subjective prong requires a plaintiff to establish that a prison official had “a
sufficiently culpable state of mind.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “In prison-conditions cases that state of mind is one of deliberate indifference
to inmate health or safety.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Deliberate indifference
means “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety;
the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”
Id. at 837.
“Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a
question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from
circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a
substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.”
Mata, 427 F.3d at 752
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(citation omitted). “This is so because if a risk is obvious so that a reasonable man would
realize it, we might well infer that the defendant did in fact realize it.”
Id. (brackets and
internal quotation marks omitted). But “prison officials who actually knew of a substantial
risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded
reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at
844.
In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that after Mr. Parker died, Defendant Watkins
stated: (1) Mr. Parker had been in isolation “because he is kind of crazy” and (2) that Mr.
Parker had been “puking all night” the night before he was found deceased. (ECF No.
1:11). Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants Watkins, Scanlon, Freeman, and Ocasio
“knew that Mr. Parker was suffering from mental health issues and failed to perform
timely and adequate checks on him in his isolation cell.” (ECF No. 1:12). Specifically,
Plaintiffs allege that these Defendants knew Mr. Parker was “throwing up and screaming
all night” and “took absolutely no steps whatsoever to help him.” (ECF No. 1:16). With
this knowledge, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to Mr.
Parker’s mental health needs by: (1) failing to provide him with “timely and adequate
evaluation, observation, and treatment” and (2) disregarding their own internal policy to
provide proper mental health treatment to Mr. Parker. (ECF No. 1:15-16).
In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to state a
claim for deliberate indifference because Plaintiffs “lump all individual Defendants
together and offer conclusory statements such as ‘Defendant Watkins, Brooks, Scanlon,
Horne, Freeman, Ocasio, and all other jailers currently unknown, knew that Mr. Parker
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was suffering from mental health issues and failed to perform timely and adequate checks
on him in his isolation cell.’” (ECF No. 40:8). According to Defendants, Plaintiffs fail to
allege:
• What each of these Defendants knew about the Decedent;
• What “risk of harm” each person was allegedly aware of; and
• what “obvious signs of distress” each Defendant purportedly observed
which would have put them on notice that Mr. Parkers was at risk of acute
water intoxication.
(ECF No. 40:8-9). According to Defendants, “the Complaint is devoid of any allegation of
fact indicating that any of these Defendants directly participated in the alleged violations
of the Decedent’s constitutional right to medical care.” (ECF No. 40:8).
In response, Plaintiffs have alleged that the four Defendants were “the ones
present when the Lawton City Police Department began their investigation the day Mr.
Parker was found deceased and can be heard on body camera footage.” (ECF No. 44:9).
But the only officers that Plaintiffs allege spoke on body camera footage regarding having
specific knowledge related to the incident are Defendants Brooks and Watkins.
See ECF
No. 1:10-11.2
Here, the Defendants have alleged they are entitled to qualified immunity.
See
supra. As such, the plaintiff must allege facts that show the defendant, through personal
participation, caused a violation of the plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights.
2 Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Scanlon was heard on body camera footage stating that Mr.
Parker was still being detained in the jail because he refused to take a plea from the prosecutor.
(ECF No. 1:8). But these allegations give no indication that Defendant Scanlon had direct
knowledge of Plaintff’s mental health needs prior to his death.
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Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1228 (10th Cir. 2013). Allegations of “personal
participation in the specific constitutional violation complained of [are] essential,”3
because § 1983 imposes liability for a defendant’s “own individual actions.”
Pahls, 718 F.3d at 1225 (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)).
As noted by Defendants, the Court should find that the requisite specificity is
lacking regarding the allegations as pled against Defendants Scanlon, Freeman, and
Ocasio. Plaintiffs appear to name these four Defendants because they were employed at
the jail and present on the scene when Mr. Parker’s death was being investigated. Based
on this fact alone, Plaintiffs have argued that the Defendants “knew” Mr. Parker was
suffering a mental health episode—throwing up and screaming all night; but these
allegations are conclusory with regard to Defendants Scanlon, Freeman, and Ocasio, and
are insufficient to state a claim.
See Walker v. Mohiuddin, 947 F.3d 1244, 1250 (10th Cir.
2020) (“Merely lumping [a defendant] in with . . . other medical professionals under the
generic label “defendants” . . . does not adequately plead a § 1983 claim against him.”);
Shauf v. Rios, 313 F.Supp.3d 1262, 1269 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 2, 2018) (“[B]y alleging
Appellants ‘knew or should have known’ of a risk, [the plaintiff] has merely recited an
element of a claim without providing the facts from which one could draw such a
conclusion.”) (citing
Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 2013)).
Even so, Plaintiff specifically alleges that Defendant Watkins stated that Plaintiff
was “kind of crazy” and “puking all night” before he was found deceased the next day.
3
Henry v. Storey, 658 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir. 2011).
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(ECF No. 1:11). These allegations sufficiently allege that Defendant Watkins had
knowledge of Mr. Parker’s mental health and subsequent mental and physical decline and
disregarded the same. But Plaintiffs fail to offer any factual allegations that plausibly
support such an inference that Defendants Scanlon, Freeman, or Ocasio had any
knowledge of the specific mental or physical breakdown that Mr. Parker experienced prior
to his death. In sum, the Court should conclude that the Complaint does not plausibly
allege that Defendants Scanlon, Freeman, or Ocasio consciously disregarded Mr. Parker’s
serious mental or physical health needs. As such, the Court should: (1) conclude that
Defendants Scanlon, Freeman, and Ocasio are entitled to qualified immunity and dismissal
on the Fourteenth Amendment claim as set forth in Ground One;4 (2) reject the argument
for dismissal/qualified immunity as to Defendant Watkins, and (3) conclude that Plaintiffs
have adequately stated a claim for relief against Defendant Watkins under the Fourteenth
Amendment as set forth in Claim One through allegations of deliberate indifference to
Plaintiff’s mental health needs.5
4	
See Matthews v. Bergdorf, 889 F.3d 1136, 1144-45 (10th Cir. 2018) (relying on
Pahls and
Robbins to hold that once a defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity, a presumption
of immunity arises which the plaintiff must rebut by demonstrating the complaint's “factual
allegations established [its] right to recover against
each” defendant).
5 In Plaintiffs’ Response to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs state: “Should the Court determine
Plaintiffs failed to properly state any of their claims, Plaintiffs respectfully request leave to amend,”
citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.
See ECF No. 44:14. But the Court should deny this
specific request, as the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated: “a bare request to amend in
response to a motion to dismiss is insufficient to place the court and opposing parties on notice
of the plaintiff’s request to amend and the particular grounds upon which such a request would
be based.
Albers v. Board of Cnty. Com'rs of Jefferson Cnty., Colo., 771 F.3d 697, 706 (10th Cir.
2014).
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D. The Wrongful Death/Negligence Claim
In Claim Five, Plaintiffs allege liability against Defendants Watkins, Scanlon,
Freeman, and Ocasio for the wrongful death of Mr. Parker owing to negligence of jail
officials. (ECF No. 1:25-26). These Defendants have moved to dismiss the state law claim,
arguing that they are immune from liability under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort
Claims Act (OGTCA). (ECF No. 40:11-13). The Court should agree and dismiss the
wrongful death claim against Defendants Watkins, Scanlon, Freeman, and Ocasio.
The OGTCA reaffirms sovereign immunity of the state, its political subdivisions,
and employees acting within the scope of their employment.
See 51 O.S. § 152.1(A)
(recognizing immunity from tort liability for “the state, its political subdivisions, and all of
their employees acting within the scope of their employment.”). The state and its political
subdivisions may consent to suit only to the extent and in the manner provided in the
OGTCA.
Id. at § 152.1(B). Additionally, “Section 153 of the OGTCA provides that a
municipality is liable for loss resulting from the torts of its employees acting within the
scope of their employment.”
Lawrence v. City of Owasso, No, 10-CV-GKF-FHM, 2014 WL
693443, at *4 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 21, 2014) (
citing 51 O.S. § 153(A)).
Here, Plaintiffs have alleged liability against the Defendants on the wrongful death
claim, stating that the Defendants:
• “were negligent in failing to provide needed medical care to Mr. Parker
allowing him to law unconscious in a pool of water on the floor of his cell
for hours without help and without proper supervision from them;” and
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• acted “within the course and scope of their employment with the City of
Lawton.”
(ECF No. 1:26)
In moving for dismissal, Defendants invoke 51 O.S. § 153(C), which provides: “In
no instance in any such action shall an employee of the state or of a political subdivision
of the state acting within the scope of employment be named as defendant[.]” (ECF No.
40:12).6 In response, Plaintiffs cite
Pendergraft v. Bd. of Regents of Oklahoma Colleges,
No. CV-18-793-D, 2019 WL 3806639, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Aug, 13, 2019) for the statement
from that Court that “while this issue [of exemption from liability under the OGTCA] may
be adjudicated upon consideration of a summary judgment motion, it cannot properly be
determined in a motion to dismiss.” (ECF No. 44:14). But as noted by Defendant, in
Pendergraft (and the cases it cites) the plaintiff pled both negligence and that the
defendants had acted “with malice and bad faith.”
See Pendergraft, 2019 WL 3806689,
at *6. Thus, because the allegations against the defendants in
Pendergraft could have
conceivably fallen outside of the “scope of employment,”7 the Court could not resolve the
issue of immunity under the OGTCA at the dismissal stage. But here, Plaintiffs have
alleged only that Defendants acted in the scope of their employment.
See supra. Although
6 Defendants also cite 51 O.S. § 163(C) which stands for the same proposition, stating: “In no
instance shall an employee of the state or political subdivision acting within the scope of his
employment be named as defendant[.]”
7	
See 51 O.S. § 152(12) (“Scope of employment” means performance by an employee acting in
good faith within the duties of the employee's office or employment or of tasks lawfully assigned
by a competent authority including the operation or use of an agency vehicle or equipment with
actual or implied consent of the supervisor of the employee, but shall not include corruption or
fraud[.]”).
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an employee “may be named as defendant under alternative allegations that such person
did not act within the scope of employment,”8 Plaintiffs have
only and specifically alleged
that Defendants acted “within the course and scope of their employment with the City of
Lawton.” (ECF No. 1:26). As a result, Plaintiffs’ reliance on
Pendergraft is inapposite and
the Court should dismiss the allegations of negligence against Defendants Watkins,
Scanlon, Freeman, and Ocasio as set forth in Claim Five.
III. RECOMMENDATION AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
Based upon the foregoing analysis, the Court should: (1) grant Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss on the allegations of deliberate indifference as set forth in Claim One as to
Defendants Scanlon, Freeman, and Ocasio; (2) conclude that Plaintiffs have stated a claim
for deliberate indifference under the Fourteenth Amendment against Defendant Watkins
as set forth in Claim One; and (3) grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on the allegations
of wrongful death/negligence as set forth in Claim Five as to Defendants Watkins,
Scanlon, Freeman, and Ocasio.
The parties are advised of their right to file an objection to this Report and
Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by October 15, 2024, in accordance with
28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. Petitioner is further advised that failure to make
timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate review
of both factual and legal issues contained herein.
Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120,
1123 (10th Cir. 2010).
8 51 Okla. Stat. § 153(C).
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IV. STATUS OF REFERRAL
This Report and Recommendation does not terminate the referral by the District
Judge in this matter.
ENTERED on September 26, 2024.
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