Jarrell et al v. Haaji et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
LYNN JARRELL, LINDA JARRELL,
DUSTIN CHANCE, and DUSTIN
CHANCE, as father and next friend of
T.C., a minor,
Plaintiffs,
v.
AHMED IBRAHIM HAAJI, U.S.
ROADWAYS ENTERPRISES, INC., and
CSAA GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) 	Case No. CIV-23-00037-PRW
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Roadways Enterprises, Inc.’s (“Roadways’”) Partial
Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support (Dkt. 4). Roadways seeks an order dismissing
Plaintiffs’ direct negligence and punitive damages claims against it. Plaintiffs filed a
response in opposition, alternatively asking for leave to amend their Complaint.
Background
This case arises out of a vehicle collision between Plaintiffs and Defendant Haaji.
On or about December 9, 2020, Defendant Haaji was operating a commercial motor vehicle
owned by his employer, Roadways. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Haaji made a negligent
U-turn on to westbound US-412, blocking the roadway down which Plaintiffs were
traveling and resulting in an unavoidable accident. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant
Haaji first attempted to flee the scene of the accident, then failed to render aid to Plaintiffs.
Case 5:23-cv-00037-PRW Document 14 Filed 12/14/23 Page 1 of 7

2
Plaintiffs filed this action on December 5, 2022, alleging several claims against
Roadways, including: (1) vicarious liability for Defendant Haaji’s negligence under the
doctrine 	of 	respondeat 	superior; 	(2) 	direct 	liability 	for 	negligent 	hiring, 	training,
supervision, retention, and entrustment; and (3) punitive damages. 	Roadways moves for
dismissal of Plaintiffs’ direct liability and punitive damages claims against it for failure to
state a claim.1
Legal Standard
When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[a]ll well-pleaded facts, as
distinguished from conclusory allegations,”2 must be accepted as true and viewed “in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.”3 Parties bear the “obligation to provide the grounds
of their entitlement to relief,” which requires “more than labels and conclusion, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”4 The pleaded facts
must be sufficient to establish that the claim is plausible.5 In considering whether a claim
is plausible, the Court “liberally construe[s] the pleadings and make[s] all reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party.”6
1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
2 Brokers’ Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 861 F.3d 1081, 1105 (10th Cir.
2017).
3 Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting David v.
City & Cnty. of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1352 (10th Cir. 1996)).
4 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (cleaned up).
5 See id.
6 Brokers’ Choice, 861 F.3d at 1105.
Case 5:23-cv-00037-PRW Document 14 Filed 12/14/23 Page 2 of 7

3
Discussion
I. Negligent Hiring, Training, Supervision, and Retention
Roadways stipulates that Defendant Haaji was acting within the scope of his
employment at the time of the collision. As a result, it argues, Plaintiffs may not maintain
their 	direct 	actions 	for 	negligent 	hiring, 	training, 	supervision, 	and 	retention 	under
controlling Oklahoma law. That precedent is Jordan v. Cates,7 in which the Oklahoma
Supreme Court held that “[w]hen an employer stipulates that an employee is acting within
the scope of employment . . . and punitive damages are available against it under the theory
of respondeat superior, an additional claim for negligent hiring [and retention] exposes the
employer to no additional liability.”8 “[W]here the employer stipulates that liability, if any,
would be under the respondeat superior doctrine,” it explained, “any other theory for
imposing liability on the employer [becomes] unnecessary and superfluous.”9
Plaintiffs respond that the scope of Jordan was sharply curtailed by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Fox v. Mize.10 There, say Plaintiffs, the Court limited
Jordan to cases of intentional torts while recognizing that simultaneous claims of direct
and vicarious liability for negligent employment practices could go forward.11 Roadways
7 935 P.2d 289 (Okla. 1997).
8 Id. at 294.
9 Id. at 293.
10 428 P.3d 314 (Okla. 2018).
11 See id. at 323 & n.12.
Case 5:23-cv-00037-PRW Document 14 Filed 12/14/23 Page 3 of 7

4
responds that Fox did not sweep so broadly; rather, Fox simply declined to extend Jordan
to claims of negligent entrustment.
Courts in this District have repeatedly joined with the latter view, that “Jordan
remains good law, and this Court is obliged to follow it.”12 Plaintiffs direct the Court’s
attention to Stalnaker v. Three Brothers Transport, LLC,13 a Northern District of Oklahoma
case in which Judge Tymkovich predicted that the Oklahoma Supreme Court would rethink
Jordan if given the opportunity. This Court has previously acknowledged that Jordan is
“roundly criticized” and “ripe for reconsideration.”14 But until that reconsideration occurs,
“[t]o properly discern the content of state law, we ‘must defer to the most recent decisions
of the state’s highest court.’”15 Fox remains the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s latest word on
this matter, and its holding was expressly limited to negligent entrustment claims.16
For the above reasons, the Court finds that Jordan remains good law. Under Jordan,
Roadways’ stipulation that any liability would be under the respondeat superior doctrine
means that Plaintiffs may not maintain their direct actions for negligent hiring, training,
supervision, and retention. As a matter of law, these claims must be dismissed.
12 See, e.g., Schriner v. Gerard, No. CIV-23-206-D, 2023 WL 3138026, at *1–2 (W.D.
Okla. Apr. 27, 2023); Gregory v. Lindamood Heavy Hauling, Inc., No. CIV-22-327-R,
2022 WL 2792203, at *2 (W.D. Okla. July 15, 2022); Estate of Ratley ex rel. Ratley v.
Awad, No. CV-19-00265-PRW, 2021 WL 1845497, at *4–5 (W.D. Okla. May 7, 2021).
13 20-CV-00140-JED-CDL (N.D. Okla. Jan. 31, 2022).
14 Estate of Ratley, 2021 WL 1845497, at *4.
15 Kokins v. Teleflex, Inc., 621 F.3d 1290, 1295 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Wankier v. Crown
Equip. Corp., 353 F.3d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 2003)).
16 See Fox, 428 P.3d at 322 (“[W]e need not determine whether a negligent hiring claim
should be treated differently than a negligent entrustment claim.”).
Case 5:23-cv-00037-PRW Document 14 Filed 12/14/23 Page 4 of 7

5
II. Negligent Entrustment and Punitive Damages
Roadways moves to dismiss Plaintiffs negligent entrustment and punitive damages
claims for failure to plead sufficient facts. As to negligent entrustment, Plaintiffs argue that
the Complaint alleges two sets of specific facts supporting the claim. First, Plaintiffs allege
that Defendant Haaji’s actions at the scene of the accident violated various federal and state
statutes and regulation. Plaintiffs state that these allegations “establish [that] Haaji was an
incompetent and/or reckless driver,” which “Roadways knew or should have known . . .
when it entrusted Haaji with its tractor-trailer.”17 Second, Plaintiffs point to “Roadways’
above average out-of-service violations” as “evidence of systemic problem[s]” with
Roadways’ employment practices.
The Court agrees with Roadways that the Complaint fails to nudge the negligent
entrustment claim across the line to plausibility. “Negligent entrustment requires proof that
‘an individual supplies a chattel for the use of another whom the supplier knows or should
know is likely to use the chattel in a way dangerous and likely to cause harm to others.”18
Even viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the fact that
Defendant Haaji allegedly proved a bad driver in the course of the accident says nothing
about whether Roadways knew or should have known that Defendant Haaji would use their
truck in a dangerous way at the time Roadways entrusted it to him. Similarly, Roadways’
alleged poor safety record is not probative of Roadways’ knowledge of Defendant Haaji
17 Pls.’ Resp. (Dkt. 12), at 8.
18 Fox, 428 P.3d at 320 (quoting Pierce v. Okla. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 901 P.2d 819, 823
(Okla. 1995)).
Case 5:23-cv-00037-PRW Document 14 Filed 12/14/23 Page 5 of 7

6
individually. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient facts to support
their negligent entrustment claim against Roadways.
As to punitive damages, the Complaint alleges that “U.S. Roadways’ independent
acts and omissions were done with malice and/or reckless disregard for the right of the
motoring public, including Plaintiffs.”19 Even in their Response (Dkt. 12) to the Motion,
Plaintiffs fail to point to specific facts supporting this conclusory allegation, except for an
oblique reference to Roadways’ safety record discussed above.20 Even construed in the
light most favorable to Plaintiffs, a higher than average record of out-of-service violations,
standing alone, is not enough to ground an allegation of malice or reckless disregard. The
Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient facts to support their punitive
damages claim against Roadways.
III. Leave to Amend
In their Response (Dkt. 12), Plaintiffs ask for leave to amend their Complaint should
the Court find that any claims have not been sufficiently pleaded. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15 states that leave to amend should be freely given when justice so requires.21
However, leave to amend may be denied where amendment would be futile.22 Roadways
argues that, in light of Jordan, amendment would be futile for the direct claims of negligent
hiring, training, supervision, and retention. For the reasons discussed above, the Court
19 Compl. (Dkt. 1-2), at ¶ 65.
20 Pls.’ Resp. (Dkt. 12), at 16–17.
21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
22 See Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1126 (10th Cir. 1997).
Case 5:23-cv-00037-PRW Document 14 Filed 12/14/23 Page 6 of 7

7
agrees that these claims are barred as a matter of law, and therefore that any amendment to
the Complain on these grounds would be futile. However, the Court is not persuaded by
Roadways’ conclusory assertion that “Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden to show the Court
sufficient facts exist that would support any direct negligence and/or punitive damage
claims.”23 Enough facts may exist to support negligent entrustment or punitive damage
claims, or at least to clear the relatively lenient pleading standard. The Court finds that an
amendment to allege such facts would not be futile.
Conclusion
In accordance with the above discussion, the Motion (Dkt. 4) is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs’ direct claims against Roadways for negligent
hiring, 	training, 	supervision, 	and 	retention, 	are 	DISMISSED. 	As 	to 	the 	negligent
entrustment and punitive damage claims against Roadways, Plaintiffs may file an amended
complaint within 30 days of this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 14th day of December 2023.
23 Def.’s Mot. (Dkt. 4), at 13–14.
Case 5:23-cv-00037-PRW Document 14 Filed 12/14/23 Page 7 of 7