Prather v. Sheriff of Pontotoc County

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
NATALIE PRATHER, Special
Administrator of the Estate of
Billy Jo Johnson, deceased,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN CHRISTIAN, Sheriff of
Pontotoc County,
Defendant.
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Case No. 6:23-cv-00187-RAW-JAR
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Natalie Prather, Special Administrator of the Estate of Billy Jo
Johnson, deceased, brings this action against Defendant John Christian, Sheriff
of Pontotoc County, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of the
Eighth Amendment during the decedent’s incarceration at Pontotoc County
Criminal Justice Center (“PCCJC”) in Ada, Oklahoma. Pending before the court
is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. [Docket No. 7].
Allegations
In her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Billy Jo Johnson
was housed at PCCJC in a segregated cell with inmate Kalup Allen Born. While
facing 	charges 	for 	various 	violent 	crimes, 	Born 	was 	placed 	in 	solitary
confinement for concealing a makeshift shank. At some point Born rigged the
door of his segregated cell in order to follow Johnson into the shower block. As
Johnson emerged from a stall, Born knocked him to the concrete floor and
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stomped on his head repeatedly. Although security cameras recorded the entirety
of Born’s escape and attack, PCCJC personnel did not timely intervene and
Johnson died from his injuries a few days later. Plaintiff ultimately asserts that
Defendant 	– 	as 	the 	sheriff 	responsible 	for 	managing 	PCCJC 	operations 	in
accordance with Oklahoma law – is liable under § 1983 for Eighth Amendment
violations arising from his deliberate indifference to the safety and security of
inmates, including the decedent. In his Motion to Dismiss, Defendant argues (1)
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim should be dismissed against him in his individual
capacity; (2) Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim should be dismissed against him in his
official capacity, and (3) Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity in his
individual capacity.
Analysis
In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must
determine whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be
granted. The inquiry is “whether the complaint contains ‘enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ridge at Red Hawk, LLC v. Schneider,
493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)). In order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion,
a 	plaintiff 	must 	“nudge 	[][her] 	claims 	across 	the 	line 	from 	conceivable 	to
plausible.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Thus, “the mere metaphysical
possibility that some plaintiff could prove some set of facts in support of the
pleaded claims is insufficient; the complaint must give the court reason to believe
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that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for
these claims.” Id.
First, Defendant moves to dismiss the § 1983 claim asserted against him
in his individual capacity. “Individual liability under § 1983 must be based on
personal 	involvement 	in 	the 	alleged 	constitutional 	violation.” 	Gallagher 	v.
Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009). A supervisor, such as Defendant,
is not liable under § 1983 “unless an ‘affirmative link’ exists between the
deprivation and either the supervisor’s personal participation, his exercise of
control or direction, or his failure to supervise.” Specht v. Jensen, 832 F.2d 1516,
1524 (10th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). While Defendant argues he did not
“personally participate” in the alleged deprivation of the decedent’s constitutional
rights, “personal involvement does not require direct participation because §
1983 	states 	‘[a]ny 	official 	who 	‘causes’ 	a 	citizen 	to 	be 	deprived 	of 	her
constitutional rights can also be held liable.’” Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d
1185, 1195 (10th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Public officials may very well
“cause” a deprivation of inmate rights by failing to fulfill a statutory duty. See
e.g., Butler v. City of Norman, 992 F.2d 1053, 1055 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting an
official may be liable under § 1983 for “failure to supervise”).
Indeed, Plaintiff points to Oklahoma law imposing certain duties upon
Defendant as the Sheriff of Pontotoc County. See e.g., 19 Okla. Stat. § 513 (“The
sheriff shall have the charge and custody of the jail of his county, and all the
prisoners in the same, and shall keep such jail himself, or by his deputy or jailer,
for whose acts he and his sureties shall be liable”); Id. § 513.1 (“Every sheriff
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shall require appropriate training for jailers”); Id. (Sheriffs “shall comply with all
minimum supervision standards pursuant to the jail standards promulgated by
the State Department of Health”). A sheriff violates these duties if he “knew or
should have known of the [alleged] misconduct” and “yet failed to prevent future
harm.” 	Meade 	v. 	Grubbs, 	841 	F.2d 	1512, 	1528 	(10th 	Cir. 	2010). 	Plaintiff
accordingly 	argues 	that 	Defendant 	should 	have 	been 	more 	involved 	with
operations at PCCJC and should have known inadequate security measures
and/or 	understaffing 	could 	expose 	inmates 	to 	violent 	attacks 	from 	fellow
prisoners. Defendant’s deliberate indifference toward his statutory duties, as
Plaintiff contends, resulted in the alleged misconduct. Therefore, Plaintiff has
stated a plausible § 1983 claim against Defendant in his individual capacity.
Second, Defendant moves to dismiss the § 1983 claim asserted against
him in his official capacity. “A [§ 1983] suit against a municipality and a suit
against a municipal official acting in his official capacity is the same.” Myers v.
Okla. Cnty. Bd. Of Cnty. Comm’rs, 151 F.3d 1313, 1316 n. 2 (10th Cir. 1998).
To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show: “(1) the
existence of a municipal policy or custom and (2) a direct causal link between
the policy or custom and the injury alleged.” Graves v. Thomas, 450 F.3d 1215,
1218 (10th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff can demonstrate a “municipal policy or custom”
through, for example, an officially promulgated policy or deliberately indifferent
training that results in the violation of federally protected rights. See e.g.,
Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 602 F.3d 1175, 1189 (10th Cir.
2010); Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). Here, Plaintiff alleges that
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deliberate indifference on the part of Defendant who, as Sheriff, was responsible
for operations at PCCJC, allowed for a dangerous inmate to break free from a
segregated cell and fatally attack a fellow inmate without detection. Plaintiff
claims this event could have been avoided if Defendant had properly staffed,
trained, 	and 	supervised 	jail 	operations 	in 	accordance 	with 	Oklahoma 	law.
Therefore, Plaintiff has stated a plausible § 1983 claim against Defendant in his
official capacity.
Third, Defendant claims he is entitled to dismissal of the suit against him
by virtue of qualified immunity. Government officials are entitled to qualified
immunity “shielding them from civil damages liability as long as their actions
could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged
to have violated.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987). This inquiry
turns on “the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ of the action [] assessed in light of
the legal rules that were ‘clearly established’ at the time it was taken[.]” Id.
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982)). In its prohibition of
“cruel and unusual punishment,” the Eighth Amendment imposes duties on
prison officials, who must, for example, “take reasonable measures to guarantee
the safety of [] inmates.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-527 (1984); see
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991) (describing “the protection [an inmate]
is afforded against other inmates” as a “conditio[n] of confinement” subject to the
strictures of the Eighth Amendment). Here, Plaintiff plausibly alleges that any
reasonable sheriff would understand the security precautions at PCCJC were
inadequate and allowed for a dangerous prisoner like Kalup Born to escape
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solitary confinement and violently attack the decedent without intervention from
jail staff. The decedent’s constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment was violated, according to Plaintiff, by Defendant’s failure to do his
duty under Oklahoma law in the operation of PCCJC and the supervision of his
subordinates. Accordingly, Defendant’s dismissal request on grounds of qualified
immunity is denied.
Conclusion
Therefore, for the above and foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge
recommends that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant John Christian,
Sheriff of Pontotoc County, [Docket No. 7] should be DENIED. The parties are
herewith given fourteen (14) days from the date of the service of this Report and
Recommendation to file any objections with the Clerk of the court any objections.
Any such objection shall be limited to ten (10) pages in length. Failure to object
to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days will preclude review
of this decision by the District Court. See 18 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b).
DATED this 26th day of December, 2023.
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JASON A. ROBERTSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
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