USA v. Stewart

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CR-20-126-RAW
)
JAMES MICHAEL STEWART, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter comes before the Court on the following matters:
(1) Defendant’s Motion for Court to Order Separate Trials (Docket
Entry #39); and (2) Defendant’s Second Motion in Limine Regarding
Rule 	413 	Evidence 	(Docket 	Entry 	#41). 	United 	States 	District
Judge 	Ronald 	A. 	White 	who 	presides 	over 	this 	case 	referred 	the
subject 	Motions 	to 	the 	undersigned 	for 	the 	entry 	of 	Findings 	and
Recommendation. 	To 	that 	end, 	this 	Court 	conducted 	a 	hearing 	on
the Motion on March 8, 2021 with Nathanial Jacob Walters appearing
for 	the 	Government, 	Neil 	Van 	Dalsem 	representing 	Defendant, 	and
Defendant Steward personally appearing.
At 	the 	conclusion 	of 	the 	hearing, 	Defendant’s 	counsel
requested 	an 	opportunity 	to 	supplement 	the 	record. 	Counsel 	was
given two days to supplement but no further evidence was received.
6:20-cr-00126-RAW Document 86 Filed in ED/OK on 03/22/21 Page 1 of 14

2
Request for Separate Trials
On 	October 	29, 	2020, 	the 	Grand 	Jury 	returned 	a 	two 	count
Indictment 	against 	Defendant 	alleging 	Aggravated 	Sexual 	Abuse 	in
Indian 	Country 	in 	violation 	of 	18 	U.S.C. 	§§ 	1151, 	1153, 	2241(a)
and 	2246(2)(A) 	and 	(B). 	The 	Indictment 	alleged 	that 	oral 	and
vaginal 	sexual 	contact 	between 	Defendant, 	an 	Indian, 	and 	S.B.
occurred 	on 	October 	21, 	2018 	by 	use 	of 	force 	and 	by 	threatening
and 	placing 	S.B. 	in 	fear 	that 	she 	would 	be 	subject 	to 	death,
serious bodily injury, and kidnapping.
On 	November 	17, 	2020, 	the 	Grand 	Jury 	returned 	a 	three 	count
Superseding 	Indictment 	against 	Defendant 	– 	again, 	alleging
Aggravated Sexual Abuse in Indian Country in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 	1151, 	1153, 	2241(a) 	and 	2246(2)(A) 	and 	(B). 	The 	first 	two
counts 	involved 	the 	same 	allegations 	of 	illegal 	sexual 	contact
between 	Defendant 	and 	S.B. 	The 	third 	count 	added 	in 	the
Superseding 	Indictment 	pertains 	to 	the 	alleged 	attempted 	sexual
contact between Defendant and H.D. on May 25, 2018 by use of force
and 	by 	threatening 	and 	placing 	H.D. 	in 	fear 	that 	she 	would 	be
subject to death, serious bodily injury, and kidnapping.
Through 	the 	pending 	Motion, 	Defendant 	seeks 	to 	separate 	the
trial 	of 	counts 	one 	and 	two 	from 	a 	trial 	of 	count 	three 	because
(1) 	counts 	one 	and 	two 	allege 	completed 	sexual 	acts 	while 	count
6:20-cr-00126-RAW Document 86 Filed in ED/OK on 03/22/21 Page 2 of 14

3
three alleges an attempted sexual act; (2) the acts in count three
occurred 	five 	months 	prior 	to 	the 	acts 	alleged 	in 	counts 	one 	and
two; and (3) the offenses alleged in count one and two involved a
woman identified as S.B. while the offense alleged in count three
involved a different woman identified as H.D. 	Defendant contends
that 	severity 	of 	the 	occurrences 	and 	the 	evidence 	to 	prove 	each
are 	completely 	separate, 	distinct, 	and 	disparate 	and 	that 	the
presentation of the facts of both incidents in a single jury trial
will necessarily be unfairly prejudicial to Defendant and deprive
him of a fair trial.
The joinder of offenses in a single Indictment is governed by
Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a) which provides:
(a)Joinder 	of 	Offenses. 	The 	indictment 	or
information may charge a defendant in separate
counts with 2 or more offenses if the offenses
charged – whether felonies or misdemeanors or
both 	– 	are 	of 	the 	same 	or 	similar 	character,
or 	are 	based 	on 	the 	same 	act 	or 	transaction,
or 	are 	connected 	with 	or 	constitute 	parts 	of
a common scheme or plan.
If, 	however, 	the 	joinder 	is 	prejudicial 	to 	the 	defendant 	or
the 	government, 	the 	remedy 	is 	provided 	by 	Fed. 	R. 	Crim. 	P. 	14(a)
which states:
(a)Relief. 	If 	the 	joinder 	of 	offenses 	or
defendants 	in 	an 	indictment, 	an 	information,
or 	a 	consolidation 	for 	trial 	appears 	to
prejudice 	a 	defendant 	or 	the 	government, 	the
court 	may 	order 	separate 	trials 	of 	counts,
6:20-cr-00126-RAW Document 86 Filed in ED/OK on 03/22/21 Page 3 of 14

4
sever 	the 	defendants’ 	trials, 	or 	provide 	any
other relief that justice requires.
For 	clarity 	in 	the 	analysis, 	this 	Court 	will 	initially
consider 	the 	joinder 	of 	the 	charges. 	On 	the 	question 	of 	whether
joinder 	of 	the 	two 	events 	into 	the 	charges 	in 	the 	Superseding
Indictment was appropriate, the Tenth Circuit has admonished that
“[t]he Court should construe ‘Rule 8 . . . broadly to allow liberal
joinder to enhance the efficiency of the judicial system.” United
States 	v. 	Bagby, 	696 	F.3d 	1074, 	1086 	(10th 	Cir. 	2012) 	quoting
United 	States 	v. 	Price, 	265 	F.3d 	1097, 	1105 	(10th 	Cir. 	2001)
abrogated on other grounds recognized United States v. Lymon, 905
F.3d 	1149, 	1152-53 	(10th 	Cir. 	2018). 	As 	is 	apparent 	from 	the
language 	employed, 	the 	“same 	or 	similar 	character” 	requirement
under Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a) “is not limited to crimes of the ‘same’
character but also covers those of ‘similar’ character, which means
‘[n]early 	corresponding; 	resembling 	in 	many 	respects; 	somewhat
alike; 	having 	a 	general 	likeness.’” 	United 	States 	v. 	Sapp, 	835
F. Supp. 1346, 1347–48 (D. Kan. 1993) quoting U.S. v. Lindsey, 782
F.2d 116, 117 (8th Cir. 1986).
At the very least, the conduct and events alleged in the two
incidents 	are 	“similar.” 	Both 	involved 	unwelcome 	sexual 	contact
between 	Defendant 	and 	the 	two 	women 	named 	in 	the 	Superseding
Indictment – the primary difference between the allegations being
6:20-cr-00126-RAW Document 86 Filed in ED/OK on 03/22/21 Page 4 of 14

5
that 	one 	sexual 	contact 	allegedly 	culminated 	in 	oral 	and 	vaginal
sex 	while 	the 	other 	did 	not. 	The 	fact 	that 	the 	incidents 	are
temporally 	separated 	by 	five 	months 	does 	not 	affect 	their
similarity. 	United 	States 	v. 	Thomas, 	61 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	1221, 	1227
(D.N.M. 2014), aff'd in part, 849 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 2017) citing
United 	States 	v. 	Coleman, 	22 	F.3d 	126, 	133 	(7th 	Cir. 	1994).
Moreover, 	the 	involvement 	of 	two 	different 	women 	does 	not 	affect
the similarity of the incidents. 	As a result, this Court concludes
that 	the 	joinder 	of 	counts 	one 	and 	two 	with 	count 	three 	was
authorized by Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a).
The 	analysis 	under 	Fed. 	R. 	Crim. 	P. 	14(a) 	is 	somewhat
different. 	Defendant 	bears 	the 	burden 	to 	show 	that 	“the 	denial
of severance would result in ‘actual prejudice’ to his defense, .
. 	. 	and 	that 	this 	prejudice 	would 	‘outweigh’ 	the 	expense 	and
inconvenience 	of 	separate 	trials.” 	United 	States 	v. 	Tucker, 	502
F. 	App'x 	720, 	723 	(10th 	Cir. 	2012) 	quoting 	United 	States 	v.
Hutchinson, 	573 	F.3d 	1011, 	1025 	(10th 	Cir. 	2009)(citations
omitted). 	Defendant 	argues 	that 	the 	charges 	are 	factually
distinct 	but 	also 	that 	the 	victims’ 	version 	of 	the 	facts 	are
“questionable.” 	The 	“questionable” 	nature 	of 	the 	charges 	is
precisely 	the 	purpose 	of 	a 	jury 	trial 	– 	to 	determine 	whether 	the
events 	giving 	rise 	to 	the 	charges 	are 	as 	the 	victims 	claim 	or 	as
6:20-cr-00126-RAW Document 86 Filed in ED/OK on 03/22/21 Page 5 of 14

6
Defendant 	claims. 	This 	alone 	does 	not 	justify 	the 	expense 	and
time for the separation of the charges into two trials.
Additionally, the court is “not required to sever the counts
simply 	because 	the 	cumulative 	effect 	of 	evidence 	of 	similar
misconduct 	might 	potentially 	prejudice 	the 	defendant.” 	United
States 	v. 	Hollis, 	971 	F.2d 	1441, 	1457 	(10th 	Cir. 	1992) 	citing
United States v. Cox, 934 F.2d 1114, 1120 (10th Cir. 1991); United
States 	v. 	Taylor, 	800 	F.2d 	1012, 	1017 	(10th 	Cir. 	1986), 	cert.
denied, 	484 	U.S. 	838, 	108 	S.Ct. 	123, 	98 	L.Ed.2d 	81 	(1987).
Moreover, “the mere fact that a defendant may have a better chance
for 	acquittal 	by 	separate 	trials 	of 	charges 	is 	not 	sufficient 	to
require 	severance.” 	Id. 	citing 	United 	States 	v. 	Valentine, 	706
F.2d 282, 290 (10th Cir. 1983)(citations omitted).
Outside of contending that the “cumulative effect” of counts
one 	and 	two 	combined 	in 	a 	trial 	with 	count 	three 	will 	prejudice
him, Defendant has failed in his heavy burden to demonstrate actual
prejudice justifying the separation of the charges for trial. 	The
similarity of the conduct alleged has been discussed in connection
with 	the 	propriety 	of 	joinder 	under 	Fed. 	R. 	Crim. 	P. 	8(a) 	and
applies 	equally 	to 	the 	analysis 	under 	Rule 	14(a). 	Any
“generalized 	prejudice” 	to 	Defendant 	which 	might 	arise 	from 	the
inclusion 	of 	all 	three 	charges 	in 	a 	single 	trial 	can 	be 	remedied
6:20-cr-00126-RAW Document 86 Filed in ED/OK on 03/22/21 Page 6 of 14

7
with 	the 	use 	of 	an 	appropriate 	limiting 	instruction 	to 	the 	jury.
United States v. Thomas, 61 F.Supp.3d at 1227 citing United States
v. Hutchinson, 573 F.3d at 1026.
Admissibility of Evidence under Rule 413
As 	a 	secondary 	argument 	to 	the 	request 	for 	separate 	trials,
the 	Government 	has 	contended 	that 	the 	evidence 	pertaining 	to 	the
charges 	represented 	in 	counts 	one 	and 	two 	would 	be 	admissible 	in
a trial of count three and the evidence pertaining to count three
would be admissible in the trial of counts one and two under Fed.
R. 	Evid. 	413. 	The 	admissibility 	of 	evidence, 	according 	to 	the
Government, essentially renders the separation of the charges into
two trials academic. 	Defendant also challenges the admissibility
of the evidence on each charge by separate motion.
As 	an 	initial 	matter, 	this 	Court 	notes 	that 	both 	S.B. 	and
H.D. 	were 	subpoenaed 	by 	the 	Government 	for 	the 	hearing 	on 	the
motions. 	S.B. 	was 	available 	to 	testify 	but 	H.D. 	did 	not 	respond
to 	the 	subpoena 	and 	appear 	for 	the 	hearing. 	Defendant 	requested
to call S.B. as a witness “to find out from her as of now what she
did 	say 	happened.” 	Noting 	that 	the 	burden 	of 	admitting 	evidence
under 	Fed. 	R. 	Evid. 	413 	rests 	with 	the 	Government, 	this 	Court
denied Defendant’s request but allowed argument from counsel as to
any perceived inconsistencies in S.B.’s recitation of events.
6:20-cr-00126-RAW Document 86 Filed in ED/OK on 03/22/21 Page 7 of 14

8
Defendant 	also 	requested 	that 	the 	failure 	of 	H.D. 	to 	appear
at the hearing should be considered by this Court in assessing the
credibility 	of 	her 	statements 	of 	the 	events 	that 	allegedly
transpired 	with 	Defendant. 	While 	this 	Court 	certainly 	does 	not
condone H.D.’s failure to abide by the subpoena served upon her by
the 	Government, 	the 	same 	basis 	for 	not 	requiring 	S.B. 	to 	testify
at the hearing applies to H.D. 	The determination on admissibility
of 	the 	evidence 	will 	turn 	on 	the 	evidence 	presented 	not 	upon 	the
lack of testimony from the victims.
Generally, “[e]vidence of a crime is not admissible to prove
a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion
the person acted in accordance with the character.” 	Fed. R. Evid.
404(b)(1). 	In sexual assault cases, an exception has been carved
out 	of 	this 	Rule 	to 	allow 	the 	admission 	of 	“evidence 	that 	the
defendant 	committed 	any 	other 	sexual 	assault. 	The 	evidence 	may
be 	considered 	on 	any 	matter 	to 	which 	it 	is 	relevant.” 	Fed. 	R.
Evid. 413(a).
In order to determine the admissibility of the evidence, the
evidence 	must 	meet 	certain 	threshold 	requirements: 	(1) 	the
defendant is accused of a crime involving sexual assault or child
molestation, 	(2) 	the 	evidence 	proffered 	is 	evidence 	of 	the
defendant's 	commission 	of 	another 	offense 	or 	offenses 	involving
6:20-cr-00126-RAW Document 86 Filed in ED/OK on 03/22/21 Page 8 of 14

9
sexual 	assault 	or 	child 	molestation, 	and 	(3) 	the 	evidence 	is
relevant. 	United 	States 	v. 	Benally, 	500 	F.3d 	1085, 	1090 	(10th
Cir. 2007).
Certainly, 	S.B. 	and 	H.D.’s 	allegations 	meet 	all 	three
criteria. 	The 	Court 	first 	analyzes 	whether 	S.B.’s 	allegations
would 	be 	admissible 	in 	Defendant’s 	trial 	of 	alleged 	acts 	against
H.D. 	S.B. 	alleges 	that 	on 	October 	18, 	2018, 	she 	traveled 	to 	the
All In Tavern in Muskogee, Oklahoma with a friend and Defendant in
the 	friend’s 	vehicle 	after 	having 	already 	consumed 	alcohol 	at
another establishment. 	At some point in the night, S.B.’s friend
left S.B. and Defendant. 	S.B. could not locate her grandmother’s
bracelet 	or 	her 	cell 	phone. 	Defendant 	and 	S.B. 	went 	outside 	and
behind the tavern where Defendant began making sexual suggestions
to 	S.B. 	S.B. 	stated 	that 	she 	was 	married 	to 	which 	Defendant
responded 	that 	“you 	don’t 	look 	very 	married 	to 	me.” 	Defendant
allegedly forced S.B. to engage him in oral sex. 	S.B. then stated
that Defendant forced her into her friend’s vehicle which had been
left 	at 	the 	tavern, 	punched 	and 	slapped 	her 	about 	the 	face 	and
forced her to engage in sexual intercourse. 	When Defendant exited
the 	truck 	to 	urinate, 	S.B. 	ran 	to 	a 	nearby 	gas 	station 	where 	911
was 	called. 	Defendant’s 	injuries 	noted 	at 	the 	hospital 	were
consistent with her allegations.
6:20-cr-00126-RAW Document 86 Filed in ED/OK on 03/22/21 Page 9 of 14

10
The Government introduced the bodycam video of the officers’
response 	to 	the 	911 	call. 1 	The 	encounter 	was 	carefully 	reviewed
by 	this 	Court. 	In 	accordance 	with 	the 	test 	laid 	out 	in 	Benally,
“the 	district 	court 	must 	make 	a 	preliminary 	finding 	that 	a 	jury
could 	reasonably 	find 	that 	the 	‘other 	act’ 	occurred 	by 	a
preponderance 	of 	the 	evidence.” 	United 	States 	v. 	Benally, 	500
F.3d 	at 	1090 	citing 	United 	States 	v. 	Enjady, 	134 	F.3d 	1427, 	1433
(10th 	Cir. 	1998). 	The 	bodycam 	video 	of 	S.B.’s 	demeanor 	and
recitation 	of 	events 	both 	at 	the 	gas 	station 	and 	in 	the 	hospital
to where she was transported demonstrates the likelihood the events
occurred 	by 	a 	preponderance 	of 	the 	evidence. 	Defendant 	contends
that 	other 	evidence 	indicates 	that 	the 	sexual 	acts 	alleged 	were
consensual. 	Defendant 	would 	be 	entitled 	to 	introduce 	this
evidence 	at 	his 	trial. 	It 	does 	not 	lessen 	the 	proof 	offered 	by
the Government for the necessary preliminary finding.
This Court is then to consider:
1) how clearly the prior act has been proved;
2) 	how 	probative 	the 	evidence 	is 	of 	the
material fact it is admitted to prove; 3) how
seriously 	disputed 	the 	material 	fact 	is; 	and
4) whether the government can avail itself of
any less prejudicial evidence. When analyzing
the 	probative 	dangers, 	a 	court 	considers: 	1)
how likely it is such evidence will contribute
to 	an 	improperly-based 	jury 	verdict; 	2) 	the
extent 	to 	which 	such 	evidence 	will 	distract
1 See Gov’t Exh. No. 1.
6:20-cr-00126-RAW Document 86 Filed in ED/OK on 03/22/21 Page 10 of 14

11
the jury from the central issues of the trial;
and 3) how time consuming it will be to prove
the prior conduct. 	Id.
Primarily through the video evidence, S.B.’s allegations have
been proved by a preponderance of the evidence and it is probative
on 	the 	issue 	of 	Defendant’s 	conduct. 	Defendant 	contends 	that
material 	evidence 	in 	the 	form 	of 	testimony 	from 	other 	witnesses
indicates 	that 	the 	sex 	acts 	between 	Defendant 	and 	S.B. 	were
consensual. 	This 	evidence 	was 	presented 	in 	the 	form 	of 	police
statements. 2 	As represented, employees at the tavern will testify
that 	they 	observed 	individuals 	having 	consensual 	sex 	behind 	the
bar. 	It is unclear that they will testify that those individuals
were 	Defendant 	and 	S.B. 	Also, 	none 	of 	these 	witnesses 	appear 	to
testify 	concerning 	the 	assault 	that 	allegedly 	occurred 	in 	S.B.’s
friend’s truck. 	No less prejudicial evidence is available to the
Government 	on 	this 	matter. 	The 	probative 	value 	of 	the 	evidence
far 	outweighs 	the 	prejudice 	to 	Defendant. 	This 	Court 	has
considered 	the 	probative 	dangers 	and 	finds 	the 	evidence 	would 	be
admissible 	in 	a 	trial 	of 	the 	allegations 	against 	Defendant 	as 	it
pertains to H.D.
H.D.’s 	allegations 	which 	form 	the 	basis 	of 	count 	three 	are
2 See Defendant’s Exh. No. 1, Bates Nos. 57, 58, 63, 104, and 105.
6:20-cr-00126-RAW Document 86 Filed in ED/OK on 03/22/21 Page 11 of 14

12
that 	H.D. 	and 	Defendant, 	who 	H.D. 	stated 	she 	had 	known 	for 	some
time, 	had 	consumed 	alcohol 	at 	a 	bar. 	They 	proceeded 	to 	a 	hotel
room in Muskogee, Oklahoma to consume more alcohol. 	At some point,
Defendant 	took 	all 	of 	his 	clothes 	off 	and 	was 	naked 	in 	front 	of
H.D. 	H.D. 	remained 	fully 	clothed 	during 	the 	alleged 	encounter.
According 	to 	H.D.’s 	statement 	recorded 	in 	bodycam 	footage
introduced 	by 	the 	Government, 	Defendant 	who 	appears 	much 	larger
physically than H.D. grabbed her legs, flipped her onto the bed by
picking 	up 	her 	legs, 	laid 	his 	body 	across 	her 	so 	that 	she 	could
not 	move, 	told 	her 	“I 	wanna 	fuck 	you” 	in 	her 	ear, 	and 	restricted
her 	movements. 	According 	to 	H.D. 	at 	the 	time 	of 	the 	incident,
Defendant “overpowered” and “pinned” her, he “got aggressive” and
“scared” 	her. 	As 	Defendant 	lifted 	his 	weight, 	H.D. 	ran 	to 	the
bathroom, locked the door, and called 911. 	Both the audio of the
911 call and the bodycam video indicated H.D. was fearful, crying,
and did not want to see Defendant. 	The police kept them separated
during their investigation. 	The officer discussed H.D. obtaining
a 	protective 	order 	because 	H.D. 	was 	scared 	Defendant 	“might
retaliate.”
The admissibility of H.D.’s testimony in S.B’s trial is also
permitted under Benally. 	The video alone provides ample proof by
a 	preponderance 	of 	the 	evidence 	that 	the 	events 	related 	by 	H.D.
6:20-cr-00126-RAW Document 86 Filed in ED/OK on 03/22/21 Page 12 of 14

13
occurred. 	The 	events 	have 	been 	as 	clearly 	proved 	as 	possible
under 	the 	evidence 	available 	and 	the 	evidence 	is 	material 	to
Defendant’s conduct. 	Defendant contends that the facts pertaining
to 	H.D. 	is 	seriously 	contested, 	although 	the 	only 	contesting
evidence is Defendant’s testimony and his version of his conduct.
It is also apparent that no less prejudicial evidence is available.
The 	probative 	value 	of 	the 	evidence 	outweighs 	Defendant’s
prejudice 	and 	the 	probative 	dangers 	have 	been 	considered.
Considering 	all 	of 	these 	factors, 	this 	Court 	concludes 	that 	the
allegations 	provided 	by 	H.D. 	would 	be 	admissible 	under 	Fed. 	R.
Evid. 	413(a) 	in 	a 	trial 	of 	the 	charges 	pertaining 	to 	Defendant’s
conduct with S.B.
The admissibility of testimony of an individual identified as
K.F. 	also 	appears 	in 	the 	record 	of 	this 	case. 	There 	appears 	to
be 	some 	confusion 	regarding 	whether 	the 	admissibility 	of 	the
statements 	of 	K.F. 	has 	been 	referred 	to 	the 	undersigned 	by 	Judge
White. 	The 	source 	of 	the 	confusion 	is 	the 	Government’s 	adoption
of 	its 	briefing 	in 	connection 	with 	its 	First 	Motion 	in 	Limine 	to
Admit 	Evidence 	Under 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Evidence 	413(a) 	and 	404(b)
(Docket 	Entry 	#47) 	in 	response 	to 	Defendant’s 	Second 	Motion 	in
Limine 	Regarding 	Rule 	413 	Evidence 	(Docket 	Entry 	#59). 	While
Defendant’s Second Motion in Limine was referred, the Government’s
6:20-cr-00126-RAW Document 86 Filed in ED/OK on 03/22/21 Page 13 of 14

14
First 	Motion 	in 	Limine 	was 	not. 	Absent 	an 	express 	referral 	of
this 	matter 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge, 	this 	Court 	is 	without
jurisdiction to consider the matter.
IT 	IS 	THEREFORE 	THE 	RECOMMENDATION 	OF 	THIS 	COURT 	that
Defendant’s Motion for Court to Order Separate Trials (Docket Entry
#39) be DENIED.
IT 	IS 	THE 	FURTHER 	RECOMMENDATION 	OF 	THIS 	COURT 	that
Defendant’s 	Second 	Motion 	in 	Limine 	Regarding 	Rule 	413 	Evidence
(Docket Entry #41) be DENIED.
The parties are given fourteen (14) days from the date of the
service of these Findings and Recommendation to file any objections
with 	a 	supporting 	brief. 	Failure 	to 	object 	to 	the 	Findings 	and
Recommendation 	within 	fourteen 	(14) 	days 	will 	preclude 	appellate
review 	of 	the 	judgment 	of 	the 	District 	Court 	based 	on 	such
findings.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 22 nd day of March 2021.
_____________________________
KIMBERLY E. WEST
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
6:20-cr-00126-RAW Document 86 Filed in ED/OK on 03/22/21 Page 14 of 14