GS Holistic, LLC v. Krazy Daze LLC et al

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICTOF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
GS HOLISTIC, LLC,
Plaintiff,
V.
Case No. 3:23-cv-325
Judge Walter H. Rice
Mag. Judge Michael R. Merz
KRAZYDAZEINC., ^3/.,
Defendants.
ORDER OVERRULING WITHOUT PREJUDICE MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT OF PLAINTIFF GS HOLISTIC, LLC (DOC. #34) ON THE ISSUE OF THE
VALIDITY, ACTIVITY, AND OWNERSHIP OF TRADEMARK NOS. 6, 174, 291,
6, 174, 292, AND 6, 633, 884; PLAINTIFF MAY RENEW THE MOTION WITHIN THIRTY
(30) DAYS AFTER THE CLOSE OF DISCOVERY
This case is before the Court on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
of Plaintiff GS Holistic, LLC. (Doc. #34) On January 10, 2024, Plaintiff filed its
Complaint against Defendants Krazy Daze Inc. 1 and Melissa Corey. (Doc. #3).
Defendants did not participate in the case, and a Clerk's Entry of Default was
entered on January 22, 2025. (Doc. #18). On June 20, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion
for Default Judgment against Defendants. (Doc. #24). Counsel subsequently
appeared for Defendants and, on July 8, 2025, filed a Motion to Set Aside Default.
(Doc. #26). On October 17, 2025, overruled the Motion for Default Judgment,
1 Plaintiff mistakenly identified the Defendant as Krazy Daze LLC in the Complaint. (Doc. #3,
PAGEID27; Memo. in Opp., Doc. #39, PAGEID393). The docket shall be updated to reflect Krazy
Daze Inc. as the proper Defendant.
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sustained the Motion to Set Aside, and ordered Plaintiff to move for partial
summary judgment on the issue of whether United States Patent and Trademark
Office ("USPTO") Registration Nos. 6, 174, 291; 6, 174, 292; and 6, 663, 884
("Stundenglass Marks") were valid, active, and owned by Plaintiff at all relevant
times in the litigation. (Decision, Doc. #33, PAGEID 339-40). On October 30, 2025,
Plaintiff filed its Summary Judgment Motion (Doc. #34), and Defendants filed a
memorandum contra. (Doc. #39). Plaintiff did not file a reply memorandum, and
the time for doing so has expired. S. D. OHIO Civ. R 7. 2(a)(2). The matter is ripe for
decision.
I. Legal Standards
Summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. " FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Summary judgment must be entered
"against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence
of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial. " Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U. S. 317, 322 (1986). The
moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the
basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323; see also
Borettiv. Wiscomb, 930 F. 2d 1150, 1156 (6th Cir. 1991).
Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the nonmoving party must
present evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact making it necessary
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to resolve the difference at trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 250
(1986). Once the burden has so shifted, the party opposing summary judgment
cannot rest on its pleadings or merely reassert its previous allegations. It is not
sufficient to "simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts. " Matsushita Bee. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574,
586 (1986). Rule 56 "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings,'
and present some type of evidentiary material in support of its position. Celotex,
477 U. S. at 324. "The plaintiff must present more than a scintilla of evidence in
support of his position; the evidence must be such that a jury could reasonably
find for the plaintiff. " Michigan Prot. & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 18 F. 3d 337,
341 (6th Cir. 1994).
"Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is
'genuine/ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party. " Anderson, 477 U. S. at 248. In determining
whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a court must assume as true the
evidence of the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
that party. Id. at 255. If the parties present conflicting evidence, a court may not
decide which evidence to believe. Credibility determinations must be left to the
fact-finder. 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE CIVIL § 2726 (3d ed. 1998).
In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a court
need only consider the materials cited by the parties. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3). "A
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district court is not... obligated to wade through and search the entire record for
some specific facts that might support the nonmoving party's claim. " InterRoyal
Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F. 2d 108, 111 (6th Cir. 1989). If it so chooses, however,
the court may also consider other properly presented materials in the record.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3).
II. Analysis
In its Motion, Plaintiff presents substantial evidence that the Stundenglass
Marks Nos. 6, 174, 291; 6, 174, 292; and 6, 633, 884 are valid, active, and assigned to
Plaintiff. Specifically, Plaintiff has attached true and accurate copies of the
Stundenglass Marks registration with the USPTO. (C. Folkerts Decl. 1, Doc. #34-1,
PAGEID 348, IT 7, citing Marks, Doc. #34-2, PAGEID 351-56).
Receipt of a registered trademark automatically invokes a statutory
presumption that the trademark is valid. The statutory presumption
shifts the burden of proof to the party challenging the validity of the
mark. Furthermore, the District Court may not overrule the decision
of registerability of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) unless the
party challenging the mark argues persuasively that the mark was
ineligible for protection.
Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corp. v. Appalachian Log Homes, Inc., 871 F. 2d 590, 593
(6th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted).
In their memorandum contra, Defendants concede that there is a rebuttable
presumption that the Stundenglass Marks are valid. (Doc. #39, PAGEID 394, citing
Burke-Parkson-Bowlby, 871 F. 2d at 593). However, they note that Plaintiff's
Motion was filed one day before their Answer was even filed. (C. Ziepfel Decl.,
Doc. #39-1, PAGEID 399, fl 3). Defendants state that they are not prepared to
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waive its "defenses to the rebuttable presumption, such as abandonment,
genericness, or even fraud on the USPTO. " (Doc. #39, PAGEID 394, citing
Yellowbook Inc. v. Brandeberry, 708 F. 3d 837, 844 (6th Cir. 2013; Nartron Corp. v.
STMicroelectronics, Inc.. 305 F. 3d 397, 404 (6th Cir. 2002); Scooter Store, Inc. v.
Spiniife. com, LLC, 777 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1110 (S. D. Ohio 2011) (Marbley, J. )).
Defendants assert that, without discovery, they are deprived of the opportunity
afforded litigants to raise and develop such defenses. {Id. at PAGEID 394-95,
citing Public Int. Legal Found, v. Benson, 136 F. 4th 613, 623-24 (6th Cir. 2025)).
Thus, they conclude, it would be unfairly prejudicial to rule on Plaintiff's Motion at
this juncture. [Id. at PAGEID 395).
The Court sustained Defendants' Motion to Set Aside based on a strong
policy preference to adjudicate cases on their merits. (Doc. #33, PAGEID 336-37,
citing Hogan v. Cleveland Ave. Rest, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-2883, 2023 WL 2664417, *1
(S. D. Ohio Mar. 28, 2023) (Marbley, C. J. ); Doc. #26). Upon obtaining counsel on
July 2, 2025 (Notice of Appearance, Doc. #25), Defendants have been active
participants in the litigation and have met every deadline. The defenses raised
supra by Defendants to rebut the presumption of validity are colorable but fact-
dependent. To effectuate the Court's October 17, 2025, Order (Doc. #33) and to
avoid undue prejudice. Defendants must be afforded the opportunity to engage in
discovery so as to develop those theories of defense. Thus, Plaintiff's Motion
must be overruled as premature, but it may be renewed after the close of
discovery.
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For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(Doc. #34) is OVERRULED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to refiling within thirty (30) days
of the close of discovery, a schedule for which will be set pursuant to the Court's
November 19, 2025, Order. (Doc. #38).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
December 15, 2025
<LU-^~ ^ (. d^a.
WALTER H. RICE, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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