Johnson v. National Collegiate Athletic Association

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
:
Donovan “Puff” Johnson, :
: Case No. 2:26-cv-00090
Plaintiff, :
v. : Judge Graham
:
National Collegiate Athletic
Association,
: Magistrate Judge Jolson
:
:
Defendant. :
ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon Plaintiff Donovan “Puff” Johnson’s
(“Johnson”) Emergency Motion to Remand to State Court. Doc. 7. Defendant National
Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) filed an expedited response in opposition.
Doc. 9. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion and REMANDS
this matter to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
On January 15, 2026, Johnson filed a complaint in the Franklin County Court
of Common Pleas seeking injunctive relief which would allow him to play basketball
for the Ohio State University’s Men’s Basketball Team by enjoining the NCAA from
enforcing its eligibility rules against him. He argued that such relief was warranted
because the NCAA rules at issue violate Ohio’s Valentine Anti-Trust Act. On January
16, that court granted Johnson motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and
set a hearing for January 30—the date of the order’s expiration—to determine
whether to keep the order in force beyond its initial temporary effective period. On
January 26, the NCAA removed the case to this Court. The following day, January 27,
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Johnson filed the instant “emergency” motion seeking remand to state court, citing
the imminent expiration of the temporary restraining order. That motion also
included a request for attorney fees, alleging that the NCAA had no objectively
reasonable basis to remove the matter. Thereafter, he filed another “emergency”
motion, this time asking this Court to “extend the [TRO] entered by the Franklin
County Court of Common Pleas.” Doc. 10.
This is not Johnson’s first pass through this Court. On November 5, 2025,
Johnson filed a complaint in this Court, seeking (for practical purposes) the same
injunctive relief. On November 11, this Court denied Johnson’s motion for a
temporary restraining order. He voluntarily dismissed that case on January 2, 2026,
shortly before filing his case (this case) in Franklin County. The complaint in this
case, as the NCAA describes it, is “nearly identical” to the complaint filed in this
Court in 2025. Doc. 9, # 8. But there is one material difference: while Johnson’s 2025
complaint, filed in this Court, invoked the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, the instant
complaint does not allege any federal causes of action—instead grounding its request
for relief in Ohio’s Valentine Anti-Trust Act.
The NCAA argues that Johnson’s claim under the Valentine Act is really just
a Sherman Act claim under federal law, and therefore removal was proper on that
basis, citing Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp., 501 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2007). In
Mikulski, the Sixth Circuit described the “artful pleading doctrine,” stating that
“plaintiffs may not ‘avoid removal jurisdiction by artfully casting their essentially
federal law claims as state-law claims.’” Id. at 560 (quoting Federated Dep't Stores,
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Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397 n. 2, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981)). To
support its argument, the NCAA points to Johnson’s complaint, arguing that he has
failed to allege the necessary elements of a Valentine Act claim—namely, a
conspiracy among two or more actors—thus revealing its true nature as a Sherman
Act claim (which does not require a conspiracy).
Johnson argues that the artful pleading doctrine does not apply to his
complaint, because the Sixth Circuit has further clarified that the artful pleading
doctrine only permits removal “where federal law completely preempts a plaintiff’s
state law claim.” Ohio ex rel. Skaggs v. Brunner, 629 F.3d 527, 532 (6th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 475, 118 S. Ct. 921, 925,
139 L. Ed. 2d 912 (1998)). And “complete preemption” only applies in limited
circumstances, not including anti-trust law. See Skaggs, 629 F.3d at 531 (discussing
areas of complete preemption); and California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 102,
109 S. Ct. 1661, 1665, 104 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1989) (“[O]n several prior occasions, the Court
has recognized that the federal antitrust laws do not pre-empt state law.”). Johnson
further argues that, even if his Valentine Act claim is deficiently pleaded, the proper
vehicle for such an argument is a motion to dismiss in the state court proceeding,
rather than construing the deficient pleading as creating a federal cause of action.
The Court agrees with Johnson that the artful pleading doctrine does not apply
here. As the Sixth Circuit stated in Skaggs, “the ‘artful pleading’ doctrine does not
apply whenever it is possible to construe a state-law theory as a federal one.” 629 F.3d
at 532. “Since the plaintiff is the ‘master of his complaint,’ the fact that a claim could
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be stated under federal law does not prevent him from stating it under state law
only.” Eastman v. Marine Mech. Corp., 438 F.3d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Alexander v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 940, 943 (6th Cir.1994)).
The NCAA, in response to Johnson’s motion for remand, argues that Berera v.
Mesa Med. Grp., PLLC, 779 F.3d 352 (6th Cir. 2015) opens the door for the “artful
pleading” doctrine to apply beyond complete preemption. But Berera is
distinguishable. In that case, the plaintiff filed a complaint in state court for unpaid
wages under a state statute authorizing the claim. However, during the proceedings,
it became apparent that the plaintiff’s claim was in fact for a refund of taxes under
the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (“FICA”). As the Sixth Circuit explained:
The Complaint unequivocally states that the putative class
on whose behalf Berera sues consists of Mesa employees
whom Mesa has “forced to pay [Mesa's] share of payroll
taxes and other taxes and withholdings.” Although Berera
also alleged that this forced payment caused the employees
to receive an underpayment of wages, the Complaint states
that the underpayment of wages “resulted” from the forced
payment of payroll taxes. Therefore, the allegation
regarding the forced payment of payroll taxes is the factual
foundation of Berera's purported state-law claims.
Id. at 358. The Sixth Circuit further reasoned that “preemption is an unnecessary
analytical framework for this case” for three reasons: (1) the “express allegations” of
the complaint showed a FICA claim; (2) the plaintiff “failed to exhaust administrative
remedies with the IRS” and (3) because 26 U.S.C.A. § 7422 “mandates dismissal of
unexhausted FICA claims.” Id. at 361, n. 12. Though not based on “complete
preemption,” the reasoning in Berera was consistent with the complete-preemption
reasoning in that the nature of the plaintiff’s claims necessarily—rather than just
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“possibly”—implicated federal law. Accord Skaggs, 629 F.3d at 532 (“the ‘artful
pleading’ doctrine does not apply whenever it is possible to construe a state-law
theory as a federal one.”).
None of the above circumstances applies here. Therefore, the Court finds the
NCAA’s arguments against remand unpersuasive. However, given the reasoning in
Berera, which appeared to move away from a complete preemption requirement, the
Court finds that the NCAA had an objectively reasonable basis for removal and thus
declines to order and award of attorney fees to Johnson.
CONCLUSION
The Court finds the Plaintiff’s motion for remand well-taken. Based on the law
of this circuit, his complaint does not raise a federal question, artfully or otherwise.
Therefore, the motion is GRANTED and this matter is REMANDED to the Franklin
County Court of Common Pleas for further proceedings. The Court declines to order
an award of attorney fees. Finally, in light of the remand, the Court declines to rule
on Johnson’s emergency motion to extend the Temporary Restraining Order issued
by the Franklin County court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James L. Graham
JAMES L. GRAHAM
United States District Judge
DATE: January 28, 2026
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