Corley v. State Of Ohio

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
RECHARD F. CORLEY,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF OHIO,
Respondent.
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Case No. 2:25-cv-1051
District Judge Sarah D. Morrison
Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner, a pretrial detainee at the Franklin County Corrections Center, has filed
a pro se Petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Doc. 1). The Petition is brought in connection with Petitioner’s pending criminal charges
in Franklin County Common Pleas Case Nos. 2024 CR 5943 and 2023 CR 2397. (See id.
at PageID 2). Petitioner raises a number of alleged constitutional violations in the state-
court proceedings, including claims for excessive bail and speedy trial violations. The
Petition appears to be premised on Petitioner’s claim that the Franklin County Court of
Common Pleas lacks subject matter jurisdiction over his case. (See id. at PageID 1). As
relief, Petitioner seeks immediate release from custody. (Id. at PageID 1; Doc. 3 at
PageID 34).
On September 25, 2025, the undersigned issued an Order for Petitioner to show
cause why this action should not be dismissed without prejudice on the ground that
Petitioner has not exhausted his available state-court remedies. (Doc. 2). Petitioner filed
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a response to the Order, reasserting his claim that the state court does not have subject
matter jurisdiction over his criminal case, asserting a number of constitutional violations
with respect to the pending charges, and seeking immediate release. (See id.).
As noted in the Court’s prior Order, although it is well-settled that a pretrial
defendant may seek federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, see Braden v. 30th
Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 489-90 (1973); see also Atkins v.
Michigan, 644 F.2d 543, 546-47 (6th Cir. 1981), it is also well-settled that a federal court
should not interfere in pending state-court criminal proceedings absent the threat of
“irreparable injury” that is “both great and immediate.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
46 (1971). Abstention from adjudicating the merits of an affirmative defense to a state
criminal charge prior to the state court’s entry of the final judgment of conviction is
justified by considerations of comity. Atkins, 644 F.2d at 546. Therefore, intrusion into
state proceedings already underway is warranted only in extraordinary circumstances.
Braden, 410 U.S. at 489 (1973); Atkins, 644 F.2d at 546. Furthermore, even if
extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant federal court intervention into on-going state
criminal prosecutions, the petitioner must exhaust all available state-court remedies
before seeking federal habeas relief. See, e.g., Braden, 410 U.S. at 490; Atkins, 644 F.2d
at 546.
The Sixth Circuit “has recognized three exceptions [to abstention] that permit a
federal court to consider a pre-trial habeas petition.” Folley v. Banks, No. 20-3554, 2020
WL 9813535, *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 31, 2020). They are: (1) where “the petitioner seeks a
speedy trial, and available state-court remedies have been exhausted;” (2) where “the
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petitioner seeks to avoid a second trial on double jeopardy grounds;” and (3) where “the
petitioner faces prejudice from prior ineffective assistance of counsel and due process
violations on retrial.” Id. (citations omitted). 	The Sixth Circuit appears to have also
recognized that an argument concerning the denial of a reasonable bond may also be
available prior to trial, where a petitioner has exhausted his state-court remedies. See
Atkins, 644 F.2d at 549.
In this case, Petitioner does appear to assert that excessive bail was imposed
against him and that his speedy trial rights have been violated. (See Doc. 1 at PageID 5,
7). However, even assuming that extraordinary circumstances exist to justify this Court’s
intervention in the ongoing state criminal proceedings against Petitioner, the Petition
should be dismissed because Petitioner has not exhausted his available state-court
remedies before applying for federal habeas corpus relief.1
From a review of the Franklin County Clerk of Court online docket records, it
does not appear that Petitioner has raised his speedy trial or excessive bond claims at any
point during the state-court proceedings or otherwise exhausted his grounds for relief. It
therefore appears that Petitioner has not exhausted his available state court remedies prior
1 Although Petitioner includes claims that his public defender “refused to file any of the
necessary motions in his defense for the petitioner” (see Doc. 1 at PageID 1-2), on August
21, 2025, Petitioner was appointed private counsel and his public defender withdrew from
the case. 	As noted below, a review of the Franklin County Clerk of Courts online docket
records does not reveal that Petitioner has challenged the state-court’s bail determination,
asserted his speedy trial rights, or otherwise exhausted his claims in the state court.
(Viewed at: https://fcdcfcjs.co.franklin.oh.us/CaseInformationOnline under Case Nos.
2024 CR 5943 & 2023 CR 2397). This Court may take judicial notice of court records that
are available online to members of the public. 	See Lynch v. Leis, 382 F.3d 642, 648 n.5
(6th Cir. 2004) (citing Lyons v. Stovall, 188 F.3d 327, 332 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999)).
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to filing the instant petition. See, e.g., Rivers v. Kountz, No. 4:22-CV-591, 2022 WL
2718833, at *2 (N.D. Ohio June 27, 2022) (“Pretrial detainees proceeding under Section
2241 ‘must exhaust all available state court remedies before proceeding in federal court,
and this usually requires that they appeal an adverse decision all the way to the state’s
court of last resort.’”) (quoting Phillips v. Hamilton Cty. Ct. of Comm. Pleas, 668 F.3d
804, 810 n.4 (6th Cir. 2012)).
Moreover, with respect to his speedy trial claim, Petitioner does not seek a prompt
trial date to ensure enforcement of his constitutional right, but rather he appears to assert
the claim in an effort to have the pending criminal charges dismissed. See Atkins, 644
F.2d at 546-47 (pretrial consideration of an exhausted speedy trial claim was proper
where the petitioner sought a prompt trial date, as opposed to dismissal of the charges, as
relief); Hairston v. Franklin Cnty. Court of Common Pleas, No. 2:17-cv-353, 2017 WL
2628236, at *2 (S.D. Ohio June 16, 2017) (“a federal court may issue an order requiring a
state to promptly bring a petitioner to trial after a petitioner has exhausted all state
remedies available to him on that issue. On the other hand, on the basis of comity
considerations, federal courts abstain from exercising habeas jurisdiction where a
petitioner seeks to have charges dismissed on speedy trial grounds.”) (Report &
Recommendation), adopted, 2017 WL 2972151 (S.D. Ohio July 12, 2017).
Accordingly this action should be dismissed without prejudice for lack of
exhaustion and, with respect to his speedy trial claim, because Petitioner’s requested
relief is not properly brought in a pretrial § 2241 petition, see Atkins, 644 F.2d at 546-48.
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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. Petitioner’s pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED
without prejudice to refiling after Petitioner has exhausted all available state court
remedies.
2. A certificate of appealability should not issue because, for the foregoing
reasons, Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right that is remediable at this juncture in this proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed.
R. App. P. 22(b).
3. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that with respect to any
application by Petitioner to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis, an appeal of any Order
adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in “good faith,” and
therefore DENY Petitioner leave to appeal in forma pauperis. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a);
Kincade v. Sparkman, 117 F.3d 949, 952 (6th Cir. 1997).
/s/ Caroline H. Gentry
Caroline H. Gentry
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a
copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written
objections to the proposed findings and recommendations. 	This period may be extended
further by the Court on timely motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the
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portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in
support of the objections. If the Report and Recommendation is based in whole or in part
upon matters occurring on the record at an oral hearing, the objecting party shall
promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such portions of it as all parties
may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the assigned District
Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections WITHIN 14
DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in accordance
with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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