Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company v. Cleland et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
ALLSTATE VEHICLE AND PROPERTY 	:
INSURANCE COMPANY, 	:
:
Plaintiff, 	: 	Case No. 2:25-cv-805
:
v. 	: 	Judge Algenon L. Marbley
:
JEFFREY L. CLELAND, et al., 	: 	Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson
:
Defendants. 	:
OPINION & ORDER
Plaintiff Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company filed suit against Defendants
Jeffrey L. Cleland, Jennifer Nichols, and K.N., a minor child, on June 26, 2025. (See ECF No. 1).
Allstate seeks a declaratory judgment stating that it “owes no duty to provide any coverage” or
“defend” Mr. Cleland in a state court defamation case, see Nichols v. Cleland, No. 25-cv-81 (Union
Cnty. Common Pleas Ct.), as well as costs. 	(ECF No. 1 at 8). 	According to Allstate, Nichols
brought the state court case against Cleland, and Cleland requested that Allstate defend and
indemnify him. 	(Id. at 2, 7). 	Now, Allstate seeks a voluntary dismissal of this action without
prejudice per Rule 41(a)(2), noting that it no longer wishes to pursue a claim for declaratory
judgment and anticipates a resolution of the underlying state court lawsuit, pending state probate
court approval of the settlement. (ECF No. 9 at 1).
As a threshold matter, Allstate could have already voluntarily dismissed without Court
order under Rule 41(a)(1)(A) because no answers or summary judgment motions have been filed.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A); Pedreira v. Sunrise Children’s Servs., Inc., 79 F.4th 741, 749 (6th
Cir. 2023) (“Before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment
. . . plaintiffs can dismiss an action ‘without a court order.’”). Nevertheless, the Court also “can
Case: 2:25-cv-00805-ALM-KAJ Doc #: 10 Filed: 11/18/25 Page: 1 of 2 PAGEID #: <pageID>

2
dismiss a case ‘on terms that the court considers proper’” pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2). Frechette v.
Health Recovery Servs., Inc., 2024 WL 1209563, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 21, 2024) (Marbley, J.)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2)). 	In either case, dismissal is without prejudice, unless stated
otherwise. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B), (a)(2).
Dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) “is within the sound discretion of the district court,” and an
abuse of discretion is only found where the defendants “would suffer ‘plain legal prejudice.’”1
Grover by Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 33 F.3d 716, 718 (6th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). 	To
evaluate plain legal prejudice, this Court considers (1) defendants’ efforts and expense in preparing
for trial; (2) any excessive delay or lack of diligence on the plaintiff’s part in prosecuting; (3) any
insufficient explanation for the need to dismiss; and (4) whether the defendant has moved for
summary judgment. Frechette, 2024 WL 1209563, at *2 (citing Grover, 33 F.3d at 718).
Here, Defendants would not suffer plain legal prejudice. They stipulated to an extension
of time to move or plead because they had reached a settlement. 	(See ECF No. 8.) 	Moreover,
Allstate could have voluntarily dismissed this case without Court order. 	See Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(a)(1)(A)(i). 	Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion, DISMISSES this case
WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to TERMINATE this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
___________________________________
ALGENON L. MARBLEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: 	November 18, 2025
1 There mere presence of plain legal prejudice does not definitively foreclose the ability of the
district court to grant dismissal. See Pedreira, 79 F.4th at 749 n.2. Rather, dismissal could be an
abuse of discretion only in circumstances where plain legal prejudice is found.
Case: 2:25-cv-00805-ALM-KAJ Doc #: 10 Filed: 11/18/25 Page: 2 of 2 PAGEID #: <pageID>