Gawron, III v. Warden Grafton Correctional Institution

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS
JOHN GAWRON, III,
Petitioner, 	: 	Case No. 2:25-cv-00628
- vs - 	District Judge Algenon L. Marbley
Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz
JERRY SPATNY, Warden,
Grafton Correctional Institution,
:
Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This is a habeas corpus case brought pro se by Petitioner John Gawron III to obtain relief
from his conviction in the Belmont County Court of Common Pleas (Petition, ECF No. 1). It is
before the Court on Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss based on the statute of limitations (ECF No.
9). Petitioner opposes the Motion (ECF No. 13). Respondent’s time to file a reply in support has
expired, making the Motion ripe for decision.
The Magistrate Judge reference in the case was recently transferred to the undersigned to
help balance the Magistrate Judge workload in the District (ECF No. 14).
Analysis
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Pub. L. No 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214)(the "AEDPA"), effective April 24, 1996, enacted for the first time a statute of limitations
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for habeas corpus cases. The time limit is one year. Unless a different starting date is appropriate,
the time runs from when a conviction becomes final on direct review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
Respondent calculates that date to be November 9, 2021, the last date on which Petitioner could
have appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio (Motion, ECF No. 9, PageID 313). The statute would
have expired, under that calculation, on November 9, 2022. Gawron filed his Petition by placing
it in the prison mailing system May 8, 2025 (Petition, ECF No. 1, PageID 14). 	Unless he can
establish some basis for tolling, the filing is untimely.
In the Petition itself, Gawron claimed his late filing was excused by his actual innocence.
Id. He repeats that claim in his Memorandum in Opposition (ECF No. 13). He writes:
It is well established that, even with all of the restrictions associated
with the AEDP A revisions to Habeas Corpus practice, a colorable
claim of actual innocence is sufficient to require merit review of
claims deemed untimely under the AEDPA. See, e. g. In re: Davis
(2009) 557 U.S. 952, citing, inter alia, Triestman v U.S. (CA 2,
1997) 124 F3d 361, 377-380; McQuiggin v Perkins (2013) 569
U.S. 383. See also Souter v Jones (6th Cir., 2005) 395 F3d 577.
Id. at PageID 327.
Then, instead of outlining his “colorable claim” of actual innocence, Petitioner blames his
failure to present certain issues in a timely manner to Ohio’s failure to mandate appointment of
counsel on collateral review. Id. at PageID 329-31.
In McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013), the Supreme Court held:
[A]ctual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a
petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar, as
it was in Schlup and House, or, as in this case, expiration of the
statute of limitations. We caution, however, that tenable actual-
innocence gateway pleas are rare: “[A] petitioner does not meet the
threshold requirement unless he persuades the district court that, in
light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have
voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.
S., at 329, 115 S. Ct. 851, 130 L. Ed. 2d 808; see House, 547 U. S.,
at 538, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 165 L. Ed. 2d. 1 (emphasizing that the
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Schlup standard is “demanding” and seldom met). And in making
an assessment of the kind Schlup envisioned, “the timing of the
[petition]” is a factor bearing on the “reliability of th[e] evidence”
purporting to show actual innocence. Schlup, 513 U. S., at 332, 115
S. Ct. 851, 130 L. Ed. 2d. 808.
* * *
[A] federal habeas court, faced with an actual-innocence gateway
claim, should count unjustifiable delay on a habeas petitioner’s part,
not as an absolute barrier to relief, but as a factor in determining
whether actual innocence has been reliably shown.
McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386-87 (2013).
Simply put, Petitioner here has presented no new evidence at all, much less evidence
sufficient to persuade the Court that no rational juror would have voted to convict if he or she had
heard this new evidence. The test is not, as Petitioner would have it, whether he has presented a
“colorable” claim of actual innocence, but whether he had presented persuasive new evidence. In
the absence of any new evidence, Petitioner has not met his burden under McQuiggin. The Motion
to Dismiss should therefore be granted.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Magistrate Judge respectfully recommends the
Petition be dismissed with prejudice. 	Because reasonable jurists would not disagree with this
conclusion, it is also recommended that Petitioner be denied a certificate of appealability and that
the Court certify to the Sixth Circuit that any appeal would be objectively frivolous and should not
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be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis.
February 13, 2026.
s/ Michael R. Merz
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections to the
proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen days after being served with this Report
and Recommendations. Because this document is being served by mail, three days are added under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 6, but service is complete when the document is mailed, not when it is received. Such
objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a
memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party may respond to another party’s
objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections
in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal.
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