Leach v. Warden Southeastern Correctional Institution

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS
JONATHAN A. LEACH,
Petitioner, 	: 	Case No. 2:25-cv-00146
- vs - 	District Judge Michael H. Watson
Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz
WARDEN, Southeastern
Correctional Institution,
:
Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This habeas corpus case was brought pro se by Petitioner Jonathan Leach to obtain relief
from his conviction in the Madison County Court of Common Pleas and consequent sentence of
imprisonment. The case is ripe for decision on the Petition (ECF No. 3), the State Court Record
(ECF No. 8) and the Return of Writ (ECF No. 10).
Chief Magistrate Judge Stephanie Bowman to whom this case was originally referred set a
reply deadline of twenty-one days after the Return of Writ was filed (ECF No. 2). The Return was
filed August 25, 2025, making the reply deadline September 15, 2025. However, Petitioner has
never filed a reply nor sought an extension of time to do so. The case is therefore ripe for decision
without a reply.
The Magistrate Judge reference in the case was recently transferred to the undersigned to
help balance the Magistrate Judge workload in the District (ECF No. 15).
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Litigation History
A Madison County, Ohio, grand jury indicted Petitioner March 10, 2023, on two counts of
rape in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2907.02(A)(1)(b)(Indictment, State Court Record, ECF
No. 8, Ex. 1). Both counts carried the specification that the victim was under the age of ten. Id.
A trial jury found Petitioner guilty on both counts and he was sentenced to be imprisoned for life
without the possibility of parole. Id. at Exs. 13 and 14.
Represented by new counsel, Leach appealed to the Ohio Twelfth District Court of
Appeals. Id. at Ex. 15. That court affirmed. State v. Leach, 2024-Ohio-3145 (Ohio App. 12 th Dist.
Aug. 19, 2024). 	The Ohio Supreme Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over a subsequent
appeal. State v. Leach, 176 Ohio St.3d 1411 (Nov. 26, 2024).
Leach then filed his Petition in this Court, pleading the following grounds for relief
Ground One: Ineffective Counsel
Supporting Facts: I asked for new counsel when Madison County
Courts appointed me Joshua Beasley. The court said no. Joshua
Beasly asked the Court for a DNA expert. The Judge told him ok
and to get a price on what it will cost. My counsel Joshua Beasley
didn’t look for a DNA expert at all. He told me we didn’t need one
and that he or we got this. Now I’m in prison for life.
Ground Two: The court abused its discretion by disallowing
evidence of prior sexual acts by the accuser which were intended to
demonstrate the accuser’s prior knowledge of those same sexual
acts.
Supporting Facts: The mother and grandmother of the accuser told
the courts that the accuser has been caught watching porn. [Further
facts are alleged in the Petition as filed. 	This page of the Petition
has been ordered sealed for reasons given in the sealing order.]
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Ground Three: The Court committed reversible error by not
finding prejudice as a result of the prosecutor’s discovery violation
in its failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.
Supporting Facts: The State never characterized its failure to
disclose the “third voicemail” as a Brady violation. The other
voicemails one and two somehow got deleted by the Madison
County Sheriff’s Department. The jury didn’t get to hear or see any
evidence for me. Nothing at all. My counsel didn’t try to show any
evidence to support me.
Ground Four: The court committed plain error by not issuing a
limiting instruction following a sustained hearsay objection that the
accuser had retracted her retraction
Supporting Facts: How many times can some retract something
before they figure out it’s a lie? The story’s changed so many times.
Even the Grandmother’s statements changed from the first statement
on Jan 14, 2023 and the other statement on Feb 27, 2023 they
charged but that’s ok. The family of the accused tried to get a lawyer
for me, but couldn’t afford it. Look at my discovery it tells the story.
Petition, ECF No. 3, PageID 73-78.
Analysis
Ground One: Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
In his First Ground for Relief, Petitioner claims he received ineffective assistance of trial
counsel when his trial attorney failed to present testimony from a DNA expert whose employment
the trial court had approved. 	Respondent argues this claim has never been fairly presented to the
Ohio courts and is therefore unexhausted (Return, ECF No. 10, PageID 752).
Federal habeas corpus is available only to correct federal constitutional violations. 	28
U.S.C. § 2254(a); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1 (2010); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780
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(1990); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982), Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983). 	"[I]t is
not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court determinations on state law
questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction
violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62,
67-68 (1991); see also Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 160 (1825)(Marshall C. J.);
Bickham v. Winn, 888 F.3d 248 (6 th Cir. Apr. 23, 2018)(Thapar, J. concurring).
To preserve a federal constitutional claim for presentation in habeas corpus, the claim must
be "fairly presented" to the state courts in a way which provides them with an opportunity to
remedy the asserted constitutional violation, including presenting both the legal and factual basis
of the claim. Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789, 806 (6th Cir. 2006); Levine v. Torvik, 986 F.2d
1506, 1516 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 907 (1993), overruled in part on other grounds by
Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995); Riggins v. McMackin, 935 F.2d 790, 792 (6th Cir.
1991). The claim must be fairly presented at every stage of the state appellate process. Wagner v.
Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 418 (6th Cir. 2009).
Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was not presented to the Twelfth
District on direct appeal and in fact could not have been properly presented there because it
depends on facts outside the appellate record. 	That is, Petitioner needed to present evidence of
what a DNA expert would have testified to. It cannot be ineffective assistance of trial counsel to
fail to present evidence unless that evidence would have had probative value, but no such evidence
is of record.
Ohio has a remedy for claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel which cannot be
litigated on direct appeal: a defendant can file a petition for post-conviction relief which presents
evidence outside (“dehors”) the record under Ohio Revised Code § 2953.21. However, review of
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the State Court Record shows that Petitioner has not filed such a petition and because the one-year
statute of limitations for such petitions has passed, he can no longer do so. Therefore Ground One
is procedurally defaulted and barred from consideration on the merits by that default. Ground One
should be dismissed as procedurally defaulted.
Ground Two: Exclusion of Evidence of Knowledge of Sexual Acts by the Victim
In his Second Ground for Relief, Petitioner asserts the trial judge abused his discretion by
excluding evidence that the victim had knowledge of the nature of certain sexual acts. 	Leach
presented this claim as his fourth assignment of error on direct appeal and the Twelfth District
decided it as follows:
{¶ 31} In his fourth assignment of error, Leach argues that the trial
court should have admitted evidence that Emma1 had witnessed
cunnilingus and fellatio while watching a sexually explicit program
on 	Netflix. 	Leach 	argues 	that 	this 	evidence 	would 	have
demonstrated Emma's prior knowledge of the sexual acts she
accused Leach of committing against her. We disagree.
{¶ 32} R.C. 2907.02(E) and (F) permit the trial court to determine
the admissibility of evidence of any sexual activity of the victim
after a hearing on the matter in chambers prior to, or for good cause
shown, during trial. When evidence is offered to show a child's
knowledge of sexual acts, its relevance depends on whether the prior
sexual acts closely resemble the acts in question. State v. Young,
2009-Ohio-5354, ¶ 33 (8th Dist.). Where allegations of prior sexual
acts are unsubstantiated or where the prior sexual acts are dissimilar
to the allegations made against the defendant, such evidence is not
probative or relevant. See Id. at ¶ 36-37.
{¶ 33} Emma's mother testified in an in camera hearing that she
noticed on her Netflix account that someone had begun watching a
sexually explicit program. She later caught Emma watching the
program on one occasion, and immediately stopped her. It could not
be established how much of the program Emma had actually
1 “Emma” is the pseudonym used by the Twelfth District to protect the anonymity of the child victim.
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watched. Emma's mother separately viewed the first two episodes
of the show, and testified that it depicted people naked on top of one
another, but did not depict cunnilingus or fellatio.
{¶ 34} The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it disallowed
this evidence because it could only be speculated as to how much of
the program Emma had watched, and there was no indication that
Emma witnessed cunnilingus or fellatio, therefore the evidence was
not probative or relevant.
{¶ 35} Leach's fourth assignment of error is overruled.
State v. Leach, supra.
The standard of review followed by Ohio appellate courts in reviewing admissibility of
evidence is whether the trial court has abused its discretion. Id. 12, citing at State v. Knecht, 2015-
Ohio-4316, ¶ 20 (12th Dist.). That was the standard of review Leach invoked in presenting his
fourth assignment of error and he invokes the same standard of review here in his pleading of
Ground Two.
However, this Court does not review state court rulings for abuse of discretion. Put another
way, abuse of discretion is not a denial of due process. Sinistaj v. Burt, 66 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 1995).
Nor is the Court aware of any Supreme Court decision which would render unconstitutional the
exclusion of the particular evidence the defense sought to introduce about the victim’s sexual
knowledge.
Ground Two should be dismissed as without merit.
Ground Three: Failure to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence
In his Third Ground for Relief Petitioner appears to be claiming that the prosecutor failed
to disclose exculpatory evidence which would be, if it happened, a violation of the Due Process
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Clause. 	The evidence in question is one of three voicemails which evidence the victim’s
recantation of her accusations against Leach; prior to trial she had withdrawn her recantation
Petitioner presented this claim as his second assignment of error on direct appeal and the
Twelfth District decided it as follows:
{¶ 21} In his second assignment of error, Leach argues he suffered
prejudice when the state failed to disclose a voicemail recording
until the middle of trial, when the state realized it had not been
turned over.
{¶ 22} Crim.R. 16 governs discovery in criminal prosecutions. State
v. 	Wilson, 	2013-Ohio-3877, 	¶ 	14 	(12th 	Dist.). 	“Prosecutorial
violations of Crim.R. 16 are reversible only when there is a showing
that (1) the prosecution's failure to disclose was a willful violation
of the rule, (2) foreknowledge of the information would have
benefited the accused in the preparation of his defense, and (3) the
accused suffered some prejudicial effect.” State v. Joseph, 73 Ohio
St.3d 	450, 	458 	(1995). 	Sanctions 	for 	a Crim.R. 	16 discovery
violation are within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Palmer,
2014-Ohio-5491, ¶ 39 (12th Dist.). When deciding on a sanction,
the trial court must impose the least severe sanction that is consistent
with the purpose of the rules of discovery. Id.
{¶ 23} On January 19, 2023, the police had received two voicemails
from Ana and from Emma's mother, advising them that Emma had
recanted her accusations against Leach. The police failed to preserve
these voicemail recordings; however, the state provided the content
of these voicemails to the defense in discovery. At trial, Leach
moved to dismiss the charges due to the state's failure to preserve
these voicemails. On July 25, 2023, during the discussion of the
defense's motion to dismiss, the prosecutor disclosed that there was
a third voicemail left by Emma's mother for the state's victim's
advocate on February 22, 2023, advising the victim's advocate of
Emma's recantation. The prosecutor conceded that he knew of this
voicemail more or less immediately and had neglected to provide it
to the defense in discovery. The third voicemail was then provided
to the defense and played for the trial court.
{¶ 24} The trial court ultimately overruled Leach's motion to
dismiss, reasoning that the defense had been informed of the content
of the first two voicemails and was able to use the information about
Emma's recantation in cross-examination. Further, the trial court
found that the specific recordings were not material to the defense,
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and the third voicemail was cumulative to the other voicemails. The
defense learned of this third voicemail prior to the testimony of
Emma's mother and Ana. Thus, this information was available to use
on cross-examination of those witnesses. Nevertheless, the defense
did not move for a continuance or an adjournment to investigate the
third voicemail or consider its significance to the defense.
{¶ 25} On appeal, the defense asserts that the third voicemail was
important for establishing a timeline and the time period over which
Emma maintained her recantation before retracting it. However, the
dates of the voicemails were apparent and constructing the timeline
was not a complicated undertaking. There is no indication that the
state's failure to provide the third voicemail in discovery was willful,
and the third voicemail was otherwise cumulative to the first two
voicemails. Therefore, the defense did not suffer prejudice from the
late disclosure.
{¶ 26} Leach's second assignment of error is overruled.
State v. Leach, supra.
The State has a duty to produce to a defendant exculpatory evidence in a criminal case. If
the State withholds evidence and it is material, the conviction must be reversed. Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Here the content of the first two voicemails was revealed prior to
trial, but it was discovered during trial that the third voicemail had not been produced. As noted
by the Twelfth District, it was produced mid-trial and played in court.
The Twelfth District concluded that Leach suffered no prejudice from the disclosure of
the third voicemail mid-trial. That conclusion is binding on this Court unless Petitioner can
show that it is a determination based on an objectively unreasonable reading of the facts.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Applying that statute, the Sixth Circuit has held:
"[R]egardless of whether we would reach a different conclusion
were we reviewing the case de novo, the findings of the state court
must be upheld unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary." Clark v. O'Dea, 257 F.3d 498, 506 (6th Cir. 2001)
(applying 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)); see also Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S.
290, 130 S. Ct. 841, 849, 175 L. Ed. 2d 738 (2010) (stating that as
for 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), "a state-court factual determination is
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not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would
have reached a different conclusion in the first instance"). And that
deference must be paid even to state-court factual findings made on
appeal. See Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 120, 104 S. Ct. 453, 78
L. Ed. 2d 267 (1983); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47, 101
S. Ct. 764, 66 L. Ed. 2d 722 (1981). "Further, the Supreme Court
has very recently made abundantly clear that the review granted by
AEDPA is even more constricted than AEDPA's plain language
already suggests." Peak v. Webb, 673 F.3d 465, 472 (6th Cir. 2012).
"[S]o long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of
the state court's decision," relief is precluded under AEDPA.
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Franklin v. Bradshaw, 695 F.3d 439 (6 th Cir. 2011). The third voicemail was revealed at a time
when the jury could hear it and defense counsel could use it in cross-examination. 	There is no
evidence that its revelation at an earlier time would have made a difference in the outcome of the
trial.
As to Ground three, the Twelfth District’s decision is entitled to deference and Ground
Three should therefore be dismissed on the merits.
Ground Four: Failure to Give A Limiting Instruction
In his Fourth Ground for Relief, Petitioner asserts the trial court erred in failing to give a
proposed limiting instruction. He presented this claim to the Twelfth District which decided it as
follows:
{¶ 28} In his third assignment of error, Leach argues that the trial
court erred by not issuing a limiting instruction after it sustained a
hearsay objection to Ana's testimony that Emma had retracted her
recantation of the rape accusation against Leach. Leach did not
request 	such 	an 	instruction; 	therefore 	we 	review 	for 	plain
error. “Plain error does not exist unless the error is obvious and but
for 	the 	error, 	the 	outcome 	of 	the 	trial 	would 	have 	been
different.” State v. Warnock, 2024-Ohio-382, ¶ 32 (12th Dist.).
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Emma's initial disclosures of being raped, made under the stress of
the events that had just occurred, combined with the DNA evidence,
established Leach's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Because of the
overwhelming evidence supporting the convictions, a limiting
instruction would not have changed the outcome of the trial.
{¶ 29} Leach's third assignment of error is overruled.
State v. Leach, supra.
Ground 	Four 	is 	procedurally 	defaulted 	because 	Petitioner’s 	counsel 	made 	no
contemporaneous objection and the Twelfth District reviewed only for plain error. 	Plain error
review is enforcement, not waiver, of the underlying procedural rule. Wogenstahl v. Mitchell, 668
F.3d 307, 337 (6th Cir. 2012); Jells v. Mitchell, 538 F.3d 478, 511 (6 th Cir. 2008); Lundgren v.
Mitchell, 440 F.3d 754, 765 (6 th Cir. 2006); White v. Mitchell, 431 F.3d 517, 525 (6 th Cir. 2005); Biros
v. Bagley, 422 F.3d 379, 387 (6th Cir. 2005); Hinkle v. Randle, 271 F.3d 239 (6th Cir. 2001). Ohio’s
contemporaneous objection rule is an adequate and independent state rule of decision. States have a
very strong interest in the contemporaneous objection rule. 	Scott v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 854 (6th
Cir. 2000), quoting extensively from Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88-90 (1977). 	Ohio’s
contemporaneous objection rule is an adequate and independent state ground. Hinkle v. Randle,
271 F.3d 239, 244 (6th Cir. 2001);Scott v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000), citing Engle v.
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 124-29 (1982).
Leach has offered no excusing cause and prejudice to excuse this procedural default and
Ground Four should be dismissed on that basis.
Ground Four is also without merit. 	No Supreme Court precedent known to the Court
requires that a limiting instruction be given in these circumstances.
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Conclusion
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Magistrate Judge respectfully recommends the
Petition be dismissed with prejudice. Because reasonable jurists would not disagree with this
conclusion, it is also recommended that Petitioner be denied a certificate of appealability and
that the Court certify to the Sixth Circuit that any appeal would be objectively frivolous and
should not be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis.
February 12, 2026.
s/ Michael R. Merz
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections to the
proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen days after being served with this Report
and Recommendations. Because this document is being served by mail, three days are added under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 6, but service is complete when the document is mailed, not when it is received. Such
objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a
memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party may respond to another party’s
objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections
in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal.
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