Muhammad v. Gap Inc. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
HANEEF MUHAMMAD,
Plaintiff,
v.
GAP INC., et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 2:24-cv-3676
JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE
Magistrate Judge Vascura
OPINION AND ORDER
The Court recently set a telephonic status conference to discuss the status of
this case with pro se Plaintiff Haneef Muhammad and counsel for the Defendants
who are still parties to this action. (11/7/2025 Notice). But despite the Court’s express
(and at this point oft-repeated) warning that Muhammad’s failure to appear at a
scheduled hearing could result in “sanctions up to and including monetary sanctions
and/or dismissal of this case with prejudice,” (id.), Muhammad once again declined to
show, (11/19/25 Min. Entry). Because Muhammad’s failure to appear marks the
culmination of a long train of litigation misconduct, the Court takes three steps. First,
it 	DISMISSES 	this 	case 	WITH 	PREJUDICE. 	Second, 	the 	Court 	ORDERS
Muhammad to compensate the Defendants (at least to some extent) for attorneys’
fees and costs incurred in connection with the November 19, 2025, telephonic status
conference, as well as the July 16, 2025, show cause hearing, neither of which
Muhammad attended. (7/16/25 Min. Entry; 11/19/25 Min. Entry). Finally, the Court
DESIGNATES 	Muhammad 	a 	vexatious 	litigant, 	imposing 	a 	three-part 	filing
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restriction further described below. The Court takes none of these steps lightly, but
finds each is necessary to protect the litigation process. 1
1. 	Start with the terminating sanction. It is well-settled that “[a] district
court has the inherent power to sanction a party when that party exhibits bad faith.”
Bradley J. Delp Revocable Tr. Dated January 8, 1992 v. MSJMR 2008 Irrevocable Tr.
Dated December 31, 2008, 665 F. App’x 514, 520 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43–50 (1991)). Although “outright dismissal” of a lawsuit
1 As further described below, while the Court was in the process of finalizing this Order,
Muhammad filed several new motions. One of those was a renewed Motion for Recusal (Doc.
127). When a party seeks recusal, a court, as a general matter, should respond to that motion
before moving forward with other pending matters in the case. So that is what the Court does
here. But having reviewed the motion, the Court finds it is not well-taken, and accordingly
the Court DENIES the motion. Contrary to Muhammad’s contentions, this Court did not
“reopen” a closed case. (Id. at #1753). At the time the Court dismissed the Amended
Complaint 	without 	prejudice, 	the 	Court 	specifically 	noted 	that 	there 	were 	motions
outstanding to further amend the Complaint (along with a host of other motions). (See Doc.
114, #1627). So, while the Court dismissed the Complaint, it did not dismiss the action.
Indeed, the Court expressly observed that it was “hold[ing the other motions] in abeyance for
now, pending further exploration of some apparent errors and omissions in Muhammad’s
filings,” a reference to what appeared to be hallucinated case citations. (Id. at #1643).
Muhammad also seeks recusal on the ground that the undersigned has “personally
participated in these events,” and is a “material witness.” (Doc. 127, #1757). The “events” to
which Muhammad refers are events that occurred in the courtroom or during telephonic
status conferences in connection with the undersigned’s handling of this matter. Of course, a
judge does not become a material witness to an action based on presiding over it. The only
other aspect of the motion that bears mention is Muhammad’s claim that the Court is biased
against him. (Id. at #1757–58). As was the case with his previous motion, the “evidence” of
bias relates to actions—e.g., “issu[ing] text-only docket entries,” “attempt[ing] to compel
Plaintiff’s appearance,” “monitoring filings,” and “taking judicial action,” (id. at #1757)—that
are standard judicial activities. Relatedly, the Court is not entirely clear what Muhammad
means when he refers to “informal or off-record proceedings.” (Id.). Suffice to say, Muhammad
was invited (indeed ordered) to be present at all hearings on this matter, and when he did
not show, the Court limited its discussion with the parties who did appear to addressing the
fact of Muhammad’s absence. In short, as was the case when the Court denied Muhammad’s
previous 	motion 	seeking 	recusal, 	the 	Court 	has 	no 	extra-judicial 	information 	about
Muhammad, nor is it biased against him in any way. Accordingly, there is no basis for
recusal.
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is a “particularly severe sanction,” it is nonetheless “within the court’s discretion.”
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45. And that includes cases brought by pro se litigants, as such
litigants, “regardless of their level of legal sophistication, may not disregard the law
or engage in abusive conduct.” Jamar-Mamon X v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 758 F. Supp.
3d 756, 764 (S.D. Ohio 2024).
The Sixth Circuit has identified four factors to guide a district court’s decision
to impose a terminating sanction: “(1) whether the party’s conduct was due to
willfulness, bad faith, or fault; (2) whether the adversary was prejudiced by the
dismissed party’s conduct; (3) whether the dismissed party was warned that failure
to cooperate could lead to dismissal; and (4) whether less drastic sanctions were
imposed or considered before dismissal was ordered.” Bradley, 665 F. App’x at 520–
21 (cleaned up). While no single factor is dispositive, “a case is properly dismissed by
the district court where there is a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct.”
Knoll v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 176 F.3d 359, 363 (6th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
“Contumacious” 	in 	this 	context 	means 	“perverse 	in 	resisting 	authority” 	and
“stubbornly disobedient.” Schafer v. City of Defiance Police Dep’t, 529 F.3d 731, 737
(6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “If dismissal [is] warranted by contumacious
conduct, the importance of the remaining three factors fades in the face of this
conclusion.” Bradley, 665 F. App’x at 521 (quoting Knoll, 176 F.3d at 366) (cleaned
up).
The record here abounds with evidence of Muhammad’s stubborn disobedience
and otherwise contumacious conduct. As the Court has detailed elsewhere (see Doc.
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114, #1627–33 (laying out this case’s procedural history up to the Court’s July 3, 2025,
Opinion & Order); Doc. 124, #1740–42 (summarizing the procedural history up to the
Court’s September 29, 2025, Order)), Muhammad has filed dozens of frivolous
motions, admitted to putting AI-hallucinated case law before the Court, (see Doc. 120,
#1701), and repeatedly failed to attend proceedings, including when the purpose of
those 	proceedings 	was 	to 	discuss 	emergency 	relief 	that 	Muhammad 	himself
requested.
That last point—his refusal to appear for hearings—bears emphasis. Issues on
this front started on June 18, 2025, when the Court held a telephonic status
conference to discuss the emergency relief that Muhammad had requested in some of
his many motions. (See 6/18/25 Min. & Order). But despite that it was Muhammad
who had declared the need for emergency relief, he declined to appear. (Id.). Instead,
he filed what he styled a “Declaration of Non-Appearance” (Doc. 92), in which he
explained that he would not appear for the telephonic status conference out of fears
for his personal safety. How appearance at a telephonic status conference could put
his safety at risk, he did not explain.
Shortly thereafter, in the Court’s July 3, 2025, Opinion and Order, the Court
set a July 16, 2025, show cause hearing. The Court explained that the purpose of that
hearing would be to discuss what appeared to be AI-hallucinated case citations in
various of Muhammad’s filings. (Doc. 114, #1627). And the Court also expressly
warned 	Muhammad 	that, 	in 	response 	to 	Muhammad’s 	apparent 	reliance 	on
hallucinated case citations, the Court was “considering sanctions up to and including
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denial of his outstanding motions, dismissal of this action, designating Muhammad
a vexatious litigant (thereby subjecting him to pre-filing restrictions), revocation of
his right to proceed pro se in this matter, monetary sanctions, or other sanctions, as
appropriate.” (Id.). Muhammad responded to the Court setting an in-person hearing
by asking for permission to attend the hearing remotely. (See Doc. 117, #1679). But
the Court denied that request. (7/10/25 Not. Order). Moreover, in light of his earlier
failure to appear at the telephonic status conference, the Court specifically warned
Muhammad that “failing to appear at the hearing” “may result in him being deemed
in contempt of court.” (Id.). Then, the day of the scheduled hearing, Muhammad filed
a continuance request, (Doc. 120), which the Court denied, (7/16/25 Not. Order). But
Muhammad nonetheless declined to appear. (7/16/25 Min. Entry).
The Court did not address his failure to appear at the time. That was because
Muhammad had by that point filed a Notice of Appeal to the Sixth Circuit, (Doc. 116),
rendering the Court uncertain of its jurisdiction. So the Court elected to enter a
Notation Order staying the case pending resolution of that appeal. (7/16/25 Not.
Order). In that Order, though, the Court specifically advised Muhammad that his
failure to appear at the hearing that day put him in “violation of three separate
Orders requiring him to appear at the Show Cause Hearing.” (Id.). And the Court
again warned Muhammad that sanctions would be on the table once the case
returned to this Court, including “monetary sanctions, dismissal, revocation of his
right to proceed pro se in this Court, and/or a vexatious litigator determination.” (Id.).
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Shortly thereafter, the Sixth Circuit dismissed Muhammad’s appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. (Doc. 123). With the case back before this Court, the Court began by
denying Muhammad’s Motion to Recuse. (Doc. 124). The Court then set the matter
for a telephonic status conference on October 9, 2025. (10/1/25 Am. Notice). Given his
history of non-appearance, the Court again warned Muhammad that “[f]ailure to
appear will result in potential sanctions up to and including monetary sanctions
and/or dismissal of this case with prejudice.” (Id.). But before the appointed day, the
Court learned that Muhammad had submitted a petition for rehearing en banc in the
Sixth Circuit on the jurisdictional dismissal. (See 10/9/5 Not. Order). Again, out of an
abundance of caution, and not wanting to interfere with appellate jurisdiction, the
Court stayed the case pending disposition of that petition. (Id.). But once the Sixth
Circuit declined the petition, the Court reset the telephonic status conference for
November 19, 2025. And, once again, the Court specifically warned Muhammad that
“[f]ailure to appear will result in potential sanctions up to and including monetary
sanctions and/or dismissal of this case with prejudice.” (11/7/25 Notice).
Yet somehow, despite this clear and oft-repeated warning, Muhammad opted
not to show. (11/19/25 Min. Entry). Nor did he contact chambers to explain his
absence. His failure to appear, which is simply the last in a long string of “stubbornly
disobedient” behavior, is the final straw. Schafer, 529 F.3d at 737. Moreover, while
his repeated failure to appear is enough, in and of itself, to warrant dismissal, the
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Court would be remiss if it failed to mention his (apparently ongoing) use of AI
resulting in fabricated citations. 2
The Court’s finding that Muhammad has engaged in contumacious conduct
means that the Court need not even consider the three remaining factors governing
dismissal—prejudice to the opposing party, warnings, and the consideration of less-
drastic sanctions. Bradley, 665 F. App’x at 521. But even were that not so, the Court
notes that each of those factors also favors dismissal. To start, Muhammad’s conduct
has prejudiced the Defendants by needlessly delaying this litigation and increasing
the Defendants’ expense. Cf. Carpenter v. City of Flint, 723 F.3d 700, 707 (6th Cir.
2013) (quoting Harmon v. CSX Transp., Inc., 110 F.3d 364, 368 (6th Cir. 1997) (“A
defendant is prejudiced by a plaintiff’s dilatory conduct if the defendant is required
to waste time, money, and effort in pursuit of cooperation which the plaintiff was
legally obligated to provide.” (cleaned up)). When the Court sets a hearing, clients
pay their attorneys to be present. When one party refuses to show, that money is
wasted. Turning to the topic of previous warnings, as explained above, the Court has
repeatedly warned Muhammad of the consequences that will follow from his bad-
faith litigation tactics. And those warnings have all informed Muhammad of the
possibility of lesser sanctions. Indeed, one of the purposes of the July show cause
2 One of his most recent filings, see infra note 4, references United States v. Holloway, 939
F.3d 1088 (10th Cir. 2019), which he cites as a Sixth Circuit case and argues as support for
his belief that various of the Court’s actions are “void” for lack of jurisdiction. (Doc. 127,
#1757). In fact, Holloway, a Tenth Circuit case, has nothing to do with the Court’s jurisdiction
over this matter. Muhammad’s mis-citation to that case suggests to the Court that
Muhammad is once again relying on AI tools to craft his arguments. At the very least, it
shows he did not bother to confirm the accuracy of either the citation form or the contents of
the case.
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hearing and the most recent telephonic status conference was to discuss the issue of
appropriate 	sanctions. 	But 	despite 	those 	warnings 	and 	threats 	of 	sanctions,
Muhammad simply refuses to participate. Litigation cannot proceed if a party
repeatedly 	refuses 	to 	appear 	in 	person 	or 	telephonically 	when 	summoned.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that only dismissal will suffice.
2. 	Separately, but for much the same reasons, the Court finds that
monetary sanctions are appropriate. See Dell, Inc. v. Elles, No. 07-2082, 2008 WL
4613978, at *3–4 (6th Cir. June 10, 2008) (affirming district court’s use of inherent
authority to impose various sanctions, including monetary sanctions, based on a
litigant’s repeated bad-faith failure to obey court orders). As noted, when one party
to a suit declines to appear at the Court-appointed time, all other parties who have
appeared incur an economic harm. Attorneys, and especially attorneys on the
defendants’ side of a case, typically bill by the hour. Time, as they say, is money. So,
when Muhammad did not appear at the hearing in July, and the telephonic status
conference this month (or the telephonic status conference in June, for that matter),
the meter nonetheless was running for all of the Defendants in this action who did
appear as the Court had ordered. Accordingly, the Court holds that Muhammad must
pay 	$600 	to 	each 	group 	of 	defendants 	represented 	by 	separate 	counsel 	as
compensation for his failure to appear at the July 16, 2025, show cause hearing, and
an 	additional 	$150 	for 	the 	November 	19, 	2025, 	telephonic 	status 	conference
(representing the Court’s admittedly rough estimate of the cost of an hour and one-
quarter hour of time, undoubtedly a low estimate of the economic harm the parties
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actually incurred) (7/16/25 Min. Entry; 11/19/25 Min. Entry). Four separate groups of
counsel representing the various Defendants appeared at both hearings. 3 Thus, at a
rate 	of 	$750 	per 	separately 	represented 	group, 	that 	totals 	$3,000. 	But 	while
Muhammad has caused that harm (and likely far more) by his failure to appear, the
Court is also cognizant of Muhammad’s status as an individual pro se Plaintiff
squaring off against better-funded corporate defendants. Thus, the Court elects to
reduce the (already-reduced) amount by an additional 50%, for an amount of $375
per group or $1,500 total. The point is simply that, as a frequent litigator, Muhammad
must come to terms with the fact that his unilateral actions in declining to appear for
court-ordered hearings have real-world financial consequences for other parties. The
Court’s hope is that, by forcing him to bear some small part of those costs, he may
take them more fully into account in his future behavior.
3. 	Finally, the Court designates Muhammad a vexatious litigant. A district
court “has inherent authority to issue an injunctive order to prevent prolific litigants
from filing harassing and vexatious pleadings.” Clemons v. DeWine, No. 19-3033,
2019 WL 7567197, at *3 (6th Cir. May 1, 2019) (first citing Feathers v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 141 F.3d 264, 269 (6th Cir. 1998); and then citing Filipas v. Lemons, 835
F.2d 1145, 1146 (6th Cir. 1987)). The Sixth Circuit adheres to a four-part test for the
propriety of such an order, which considers whether the district court (1) provided
3 Attorney Murch represents Gap Inc. and GPS Consumer Direct Inc.; Attorney Eberly
represents Seth Vogelstein and Disability Occupational Consultants; Attorneys DeRoos and
Haskins represent Verisk Analytics; and Attorneys Mathisen and Ottinger represent the
Hartford. (See 7/16/25 Min. Entry; 11/19/25 Min. Entry).
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notice to the plaintiff; (2) created an adequate record for review, including a “listing
of all the cases and motions that led the district court to conclude that a vexatious
litigant order was needed;” (3) made “substantive findings as to the frivolous and
harassing nature of the litigant’s actions”; and (4) narrowly tailored the order “to
closely fit the specific vice encountered.” Id. (citing De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d
1144, 1147–48 (9th Cir. 1990)).
Here, the Court has repeatedly warned Muhammad of the possibility of a
vexatious-litigant designation. (See Doc. 114, #1627; 7/16/25 Min. Entry). Beyond
that, the Court specifically finds that Muhammad’s pattern of submitting various
filings 4 and then failing to appear at proceedings held in connection with those filings
4 The Court denied seven such filings in its June 18, 2025, Minutes and Order alone. (6/18/25
Min. Entry). At the time the Court started drafting this Order, Muhammad had 18 motions
pending. (See Docs. 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 75, 94, 95, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 110).
For the sake of providing a list of all the filings that lead the Court to conclude that a
vexatious-litigant order is needed, see Clemons, 2019 WL 7567197, at *3, the Court notes that
in the three-month period between May and July 2025, Muhammad submitted a total of 45
filings, (see Docs. 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89,
92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 109, 110, 111, 112, 115, 116, 117,
118, 120, 121). Many of these filings included a slew of additional attachments. (See, e.g., Doc.
101 (including 17 separate attachments along with the principal document)). Indeed, many
of the filings occurred in the same one- or two-day period. For example, between June 10 and
11, Muhammad submitted a total of ten filings, seeking everything from emergency relief to
sanctions. (See Docs. 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85). All of that is sufficient to support
a filing restriction. See Qiu v. Scott Cnty., Ky. Bd. of Educ., No. 23-5842, 2024 WL 4257198,
at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 8, 2024) (upholding pre-filing restriction on “additional motions or
pleadings” for a litigant deemed vexatious based on “nine pending motions” that “contained
lengthy allegations” and “consistently failed to cite with particularity the legal foundation”
for the relief sought).
Muhammad’s conduct as the Court was preparing to publish this Order bolsters this
conclusion. On November 24, 2025, Muhammad submitted six new filings: (1) a new Motion
to Recuse (Doc. 127); (2) a document purporting to “provide[] Judicial Notice” that “Attorney
Sam Ottinger is a material fact witness under Ohio Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7” (Doc.
128, #1760); (3) a so-called “Notice of Structural Irregularity and Request for Administrative
Review” (Doc. 129); (4) a “Motion to Stay All Proceedings Pending Resolution of Mandamus,
Recusal, and Jurisdictional Challenges” (Doc. 130); (5) a “Motion to Reassign and Objection
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significantly 	“tax[es] 	judicial 	resources,” 	and 	therefore 	amounts 	to 	frivolous
harassment. Clemons, 2019 WL 7567197, at *3. His reliance on AI-generated and
hallucinated citations only adds to the scope of that harm. While the Court does not
have a full count of the motions that included such citations, it has identified at least
two in which Muhammad has conceded that such citations were present. (See Doc.
96; Doc. 111; Doc. 120, #1701 (conceding that these filings include AI-hallucinated
case citations)). But the Court has good cause to believe that the number is in fact
higher—indeed, as described above, see supra note 2, the Court has good reason to
believe that even Muhammad’s most recent filings may reflect errant citations.
Moreover, Muhammad’s pattern of repeatedly filing related motions—without
providing the Court or the other parties even the chance to respond to the already-
filed motions—further exacerbates the harassing nature of those filings. See supra
note 4. As just one example, in a two-week period in mid to late May, he filed four
separate motions to amend his Complaint. (See Docs. 65, 66, 67, and 68).
But because the conduct on which the Court relies in designating him
vexatious all arose from this case (as opposed to multiple separate cases), the Court
has endeavored to structure relief that is narrowly tailored to address Muhammad’s
and Related-Case Transfer” (Doc. 131), which appears to be essentially another recusal
motion; and (6) a “Motion to Restore PACER and ECF Filing Access” (Doc. 132). The surfeit
of filings has also spilled over into related cases pending before the Court (discussed further
below). In Muhammad v. Gap, Inc. et al., Muhammad submitted five new filings on November
25, 2025, and filed eight separate motions on November 26, 2025. (See Muhammad v. Gap,
Inc. et al., No 2:25-cv-1379 (S.D. Ohio), Docs. 3–5, 7–8, 10–17). At around the same time,
Muhammad filed six new motions in Muhammad v. The Hartford. (See Muhammad v. The
Hartford, No. 2:25-cv-1323 (S.D. Ohio), Docs. 23–28). And that’s on top of the dozen filings
that Muhammad had already submitted in that case. (See Muhammad v. The Hartford, No.
2:25-cv-1323 (S.D. Ohio), Docs. 6–16, 19).
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“specific vice,” i.e., submitting a deluge of frivolous filings in this case and then
refusing to participate in the proceedings necessary to resolve those filings. Clemons,
2019 WL 7567197, at *3. While it is possible that Muhammad’s conduct warrants an
even broader restriction than the one the Court orders here, the Court concludes that,
at least on the first go-around, a court should tailor filing restrictions to matters
involving the particular subject matters and defendants that gave rise to the need for
the restriction in the first instance. See Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1077 (10th
Cir. 	2007) 	(Gorsuch, 	J.) 	(narrowing 	a 	district 	court’s 	vexatious-litigant 	filing
restrictions because, at least the first time a court imposes them on a given litigant,
they should be tailored to the particular subject matter and defendant).
Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	imposes 	only 	the 	following 	restriction. 	Absent 	a
certificate from an attorney admitted to the bar of this Court stating that there is a
good-faith basis, or leave or express permission of the Court, Muhammad may not
(1) initiate any new action in the Southern District of Ohio that is related to the
subject matter of this action, (2) submit any filing in any pending case in the Southern
District of Ohio related to the subject matter of this action, including Case Nos. 2:24-
cv-3676 (this case), 2:25-cv-1379, and 2:25-cv-1323 (all of which are assigned to the
undersigned), or (3) submit filings in cases that are related to the subject matter of
this action and that have been removed from state court to the Southern District of
Ohio. See Hobbs v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., No. 1:13-cv-928, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
137298, at *7–8 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 1, 2024) (ordering a vexatious-litigant prefiling
restriction that barred the litigant from “filing any further documents or filing a new
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case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio on any of
[the] grounds or collateral arguments raised in this case or in [a related case]”);
Andrews, 483 F.3d at 1077 (ordering a restriction that covers “these or future matters
related to the subject matter of Mr. Andrew’s three federal lawsuits”).
To implement the first part of this restriction, the Clerk is directed to forward
any pro se complaint that Muhammad seeks to file in this Court, before accepting the
complaint for filing, to the undersigned for a determination as to whether it is subject
to this Order. As to the second part, the Clerk is directed to refuse to allow
Muhammad to make further filings in Case Nos. 2:24-cv-3676 (this case), 2:25-cv-
1379, and 2:25-cv-1323 (all of which are assigned to the undersigned) without the
required attorney certification or leave from the Court. The only exception to that
shall be as to any notice of appeal that Muhammad may wish to file in any of those
cases, which the Clerk shall allow him to do. Finally, as to any case that Muhammad
files in the future in state court, and which is then removed to the Southern District
of Ohio, Muhammad shall, within thirty days of the date on which the action is
removed, provide a copy of this Order to all opposing parties in the removed action,
who may then decide whether to seek reassignment to the undersigned on related-
case grounds. Should he fail to provide the Order as required, the Court advises
Muhammad that he may be subject to sanctions in that case up to and including
dismissal of the case with prejudice, as the assigned judge deems appropriate.
As already noted, the Court does not take any of the above steps lightly. But
the Court cannot continue to overlook Muhammad’s refusal to participate in good
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faith in the actions that he commences, nor his ongoing efforts to deluge the Court
with frivolous and unsupported arguments. Our court system has limited judicial
resources—(mis)directing those resources to any one case necessarily imposes harms
on other litigants in other cases in the form of delays. And in a similar vein, conduct
like that in which Muhammad has engaged here imposes significant costs on the
parties he sues, who end up paying attorneys to attend hearings that do not occur, or
to respond to motions that are built on hallucinated foundations.
To be clear, just like any litigant, Muhammad is entitled to pursue his legal
rights and remedies through lawsuits. But also like any litigant, he must do so in a
manner that is consistent with seeking justice, rather than using the litigation
process as a tool for waste and abuse.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court DENIES Muhammad’s renewed Motion for
Recusal (Doc. 127), DISMISSES this case WITH PREJUDICE, DENIES all other
outstanding 	motions 	in 	this 	case 	as 	moot, 	and 	directs 	the 	Clerk 	to 	ENTER
JUDGMENT in favor of Defendants Gap Inc., Seth Vogelstein, Verisk Analytics, and
the Hartford, 5 in the amount of $375 each, for a total award of $1,500 against
Muhammad. The Court further DESIGNATES Muhammad a vexatious litigant.
Consistent with that determination, the Court ORDERS the Clerk as follows:
5 As noted above, the Defendants consisted of four separately represented groups. The Court
is awarding $375 to each of these groups by selecting a given Defendant in each group. To
the extent that does not reflect which Defendant actually paid for the attorney time, the
Defendants are free to remit the funds to the appropriate Defendant in the group.
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x 	First the Clerk shall not accept from Muhammad any filing that purports to
initiate in the Southern District of Ohio a new case that is related to the subject
matter of this case, absent a signed certificate from an attorney who is a
member in good standing of the bar of this Court stating that there is a good-
faith basis for the filing, or absent leave or express permission from the Court.
In connection with that, the Clerk is DIRECTED to forward any pro se
complaint that Muhammad seeks to file in this Court, before accepting the
Complaint for filing, to the undersigned for a determination as to whether it is
subject to this Order.
x 	Second, the Clerk is DIRECTED to refuse to allow Muhammad to make any
further filings in Case Nos. 2:24-cv-3676 (this case), 2:25-cv-1379, or 2:25-cv-
1323 (all of which are assigned to the undersigned) without the required
attorney certification or leave from the Court, with the exception being any
notice of appeal that Muhammad may wish to file in any of the listed actions,
which the Clerk shall allow.
x 	Third, as to any case that Muhammad files in state court, but that any
defendant then removes from state court to the Southern District of Ohio in
the future, Muhammad shall, within thirty days of the date of removal, provide
a copy of this Order to all opposing parties in that action, who can then decide
whether to seek reassignment to the undersigned on grounds that the case is
related. Should Muhammad fail to provide the Order as required, the Court
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advises Muhammad that he may be subject to sanctions up to and including
dismissal of that case with prejudice, as the assigned judge deems appropriate.
Finally, the Court DIRECTS the Clerk to TERMINATE this matter on the Court’s
docket.
SO ORDERED.
December 9, 2025
DATE 	DOUGLAS R. COLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
ERMINATE	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E th	tttttttttttt is matter on th
OUGLA	A	AS R. COLE
NITED STATES DISTRICT	CT	CT	C	C	C	CT	T	CT	CT	C	C	CT	T	T	T	T	T	T	CT	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	CT	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T
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