Bocook v. Dr. Eddy et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
DARYL D. BOCOOK,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action 2:23-cv-3481
v. 	Chief District Judge Sarah D. Morrison
Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson
DR. EDDY, et al.,
Defendants.
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff’s Motion to Withdraw from the Settlement (Doc. 74) is before the Court. Plaintiff
would like to withdraw from the Settlement Agreement reached between him and ODRC because
he claims that “the state of Ohio has not held up to their end of the Agreement.” (Id. at 1). He
also seeks Leave to Amend his Complaint (Doc. 77). For the following reasons, the Undersigned
RECOMMENDS that both Motions be DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, an inmate of Virginia Department of Corrections (the “Virginia Facility”), filed
this case in 2023 against Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections (ODRC) and other
Defendants for failing to provide adequate care. (Doc. 1). On a screen, the Court dismissed all of
Plaintiff’s claims against all Defendants, except for his Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference
claim asserted against ODRC. 	(Docs. 13, 39). 	Plaintiff and ODRC then reached a settlement
agreement (“the Agreement”), and agreed to dismiss the remaining claim with prejudice. (Doc.
73). 	Over six months later, Plaintiff filed a Motion seeking to withdraw from the Agreement.
(Doc. 77).
Plaintiff argues that ODRC breached the Agreement, so the Agreement should be vacated
entirely, and the case should move forward with litigation. 	(Doc. 74 at 2 (“Let’s just move
Case: 2:23-cv-03481-SDM-KAJ Doc #: 79 Filed: 02/26/26 Page: 1 of 10 PAGEID #: <pageID>

2
forward”); Doc. 76 at 5 (“I would hope that this court will take this matter under great consideration
and hear this case.”)). Because Plaintiff seeks to set aside the consent judgment, the Undersigned
CONSTRUES Plaintiff’s Motion as one for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6);
United States v. City of Eastpointe, No. 17-CV-10079, 2020 WL 127953, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan.
10, 2020) (“Because the primary relief Timmon seeks appears to be setting aside the consent
decree, the Court construes her motion as one for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Futernick v. Sumpter Twp., 207 F.3d 305, 313 (6th Cir. 2000)
(construing plaintiff’s motion to enforce settlement as 60(b) motion where plaintiff seeks “a
determination that the Township is in breach of the settlement agreement and an order compelling
the Township to proceed immediately with the bond sale”); This Motion is ripe for consideration.
(Docs. 75, 76).
Perhaps hoping to get an early start on litigation, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend his
Complaint. (Doc. 77). In it, Plaintiff attaches a new complaint against all original Defendants,
asserting Due Process violations, legal mail violations, fraud, and retaliation. (Id.). This Motion
is also ready for consideration.
II. 	STANDARD
Two Rules of Civil Procedure matter here. First, under Rule 60(b), a party may seek relief
from a judgment under the following circumstances:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence
(3) fraud ..., misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an
earlier 	judgment 	that 	has 	been 	reversed 	or 	vacated; 	or 	applying 	it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Case: 2:23-cv-03481-SDM-KAJ Doc #: 79 Filed: 02/26/26 Page: 2 of 10 PAGEID #: <pageID>

3
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The Sixth Circuit has articulated that “[c]ourts must apply subsection (b)(6)
only as a means to achieve substantial justice when something more than one of the grounds
contained in Rule 60(b)’s first five clauses is present. The something more must include unusual
and extreme situations where principles of equity mandate relief.” Ford Motor Co. v. Mustangs
Unlimited, Inc. (Ford Motor I), 487 F.3d 465, 468 (6th Cir.2007); see also CJPS Healthcare
Supplies & Equip. v. Ansar Med. Techs., Inc., No. 12-CV-14885, 2014 WL 3708612, at *5 (E.D.
Mich. July 28, 2014). Thus, a mere breach of a settlement agreement is not sufficient justification
to mandate relief under 60(b)(6), absent exceptional and extraordinary circumstances. Id. Instead,
a plaintiff alleging the defendant failed to meet their end of the deal must prove one of the
following “exceptional and extraordinary circumstances” to receive relief from judgment: “(i) the
defendant’s confusion as to the operation of the consent judgment; (ii) the defendant’s ‘substantial
and continuing disregard for the bargain struck between the parties;’ and (iii) the fact that the
defendant’s conduct and post-hoc excuses for non-compliance constituted ‘a repudiation of
important terms of the Consent Agreement.’” 	CJPS Healthcare Supplies & Equip., 2014 WL
3708612, at *6 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Mustangs Unlimited, Inc. (Ford Motor II), No. 99–
cv–73933, 2007 WL 2584502, at *7–8 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 7, 2007)).
Second, Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that when a party
seeks leave of court to file an amended pleading, “[t]he court should freely give leave when justice
so requires.” 	This rule, which allows a liberal policy in favor of granting amendments,
“reinforce[s] the principle that cases ‘should be tried on their merits rather than the technicalities
of pleadings.’” Inge v. Rock Fin. Corp., 388 F.3d 930, 936 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Moore v. City
of Paducah, 790 F.2d 557, 559 (6th Cir. 1986)). In exercising its discretion, the trial court may
consider such factors as “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of a movant, repeated
Case: 2:23-cv-03481-SDM-KAJ Doc #: 79 Filed: 02/26/26 Page: 3 of 10 PAGEID #: <pageID>

4
failures to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing
party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of the amendment.” Foman v. Davis,
371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
III. 	DISCUSSION
The Court addresses the two Motions separately.
A. 	Motion to Withdraw from Settlement
As noted, Plaintiff wants relief from judgment because of an alleged breach of the
Agreement. Breaching a settlement agreement does not constitute any of the enumerated reasons
for relief from judgment under 60(b)(1)–(5). 	And courts have held that breach of a settlement
agreement alone does not otherwise constitute justification for relief under Rule 60(b)(6)’s
exceptional-circumstance requirement. 	G.G. Marck & Assoc., Inc. v. North Am. Investments,
Corp., 465 F. App’x 515, 517 (6th Cir. 2012) (“A breach of a settlement agreement does not meet
the exceptional-circumstances requirement of Rule 60(b)(6).”). Instead, the breach must present
an “unusual and extreme situation,” where equitable principles mandate relief. Ford Motor I, 487
F.3d at 468.
Plaintiff has not met that high bar here. He has failed to demonstrate that ODRC expressed
an unwillingness to fulfill its obligations or that it showed “substantial and continuing disregard
for the bargain struck” between the parties. See Ford Motor II, 2007 WL 2584502, at *7. Rather,
the record demonstrates that ODRC has made consistent efforts to follow through with the
Agreement and has not expressed any intent to go back on its word.
The Agreement states, in relevant part:
1. Plaintiff agrees to dismiss with prejudice Bocook v. Dr. Eddy, et al., Case No.
2:23-cv-3481. ***
2. In consideration of Plaintiffs release of all claims as further set forth in Section
III of this Agreement, ODRC shall make its best efforts to ensure that Plaintiff
Case: 2:23-cv-03481-SDM-KAJ Doc #: 79 Filed: 02/26/26 Page: 4 of 10 PAGEID #: <pageID>

5
continues to receive ongoing medical and mental health treatment in accordance
with existing Virginia Department of Corrections policies until Plaintiff is
discharged from treatment.
3. ODRC shall make its best efforts to ensure that Plaintiff receive a phone call with
his Mother, despite Plaintiff currently being on phone restrictions.
(Doc. 75-1 at 3).
1. 	Term Two: Ensure Plaintiff Receives Physical and Mental Health
Treatment
Plaintiff asserts ODRC did not fulfill its requirement to “ensure that Plaintiff continues to
receive ongoing medical and mental health treatment in accordance with existing Virginia
Department of Corrections policies.” 	(Doc. 75-1 at 3). 	Specifically, Plaintiff says he has not
received proper shoes, dental care, or mental health treatment. (Doc. 74 at 2). Looking at each
allegation, Plaintiff has not met his burden of proof.
a. 	Orthopedic Shoes
Plaintiff first claims he “need[s] shoes to wear” for his nerve damage and “Drop-Foot.”
(Id.; see also Doc. 12 at 6 (describing his medical condition)). Plaintiff brings no evidence that
ODRC failed to make sure he had the proper medical shoes. On the other hand, ODRC represents
that Plaintiff was prescribed two custom shoes and was scheduled to visit an offsite clinic on
February 3, 2026, and again in March. 	(Doc. 75 at 3). 	It supports this statement with proof of
Plaintiff’s prescription and referral to the clinic. (Doc. 75-1 at 11–13 (documenting Plaintiff’s two
prescriptions for orthotic shoes and his referral to Hanger Clinic)). Plaintiff states in his reply that
his shoes have worn out, but he does not dispute his upcoming appointment or his referral. (Doc.
76 at 2 (noting only the orthopedic shoes have worn out)). 	For these reasons, Plaintiff has not
demonstrated that ODRC disregarded this term as it applied to his footwear.
Case: 2:23-cv-03481-SDM-KAJ Doc #: 79 Filed: 02/26/26 Page: 5 of 10 PAGEID #: <pageID>

6
b. 	Dental Care
Plaintiff says ODRC has not provided sufficient dental care as required under the
Agreement. (Doc. 74 at 2). Defendants say Plaintiff saw a dentist on February 5, 2025, and is on
the list for routine examinations. (Doc. 75-1 at 11–13). Though Plaintiff does not have an exact
date for his next appointment—by virtue of an examination backlog—Defendants say he may
request urgent care if needed. (Id.). Importantly, Plaintiff does not dispute that he received this
initial dental treatment (Doc. 76 at 3 (noting he received dental treatment on February 5, 2025)).
Nor does he state that ODRC has failed to ensure he received additional dental care in accordance
with the Virginia facility’s policy. 	In fact, Plaintiff says that he is receiving dental care in
accordance with that procedure. 	He simply dislikes the Virginia dental policy. 	(Doc. 76 at 3
claiming the policy is “wait you out so that they can just pull your teeth” and complaining that his
“the nerves are exposed and now it cannot be fixed it has to be pulled, and the other tooth has had
its filling fall out for a year and they are going to try and wait me out on that one too”).
On this record, Undersigned cannot find that ODRC failed to ensure Plaintiff received
dental care in compliance with the Virginia facility’s policy.
c. 	Mental Health
Plaintiff then says ODRC failed to comply with the Agreement because his mental health
“is in bad shape,” and that “they don’t take my mental health serious in this state.” (Doc. 74 at 2;
Doc. 76 at 3). Plaintiff provides little support. At best, Plaintiff says in his reply that his mental
health provider has “made appointments” but has not shown up for them. 	(Doc. 76 at 3). 	The
Undersigned does not find that a Virginia therapist’s supposed failure to attend appointments she
scheduled constitutes clear and convincing evidence that ODRC was unwilling to comply with this
part of the Agreement. 	Even more, Plaintiff fails to state whether he has requested any
appointments with a psychologist himself. 	As ODRC makes clear, if Plaintiff wishes to seek
Case: 2:23-cv-03481-SDM-KAJ Doc #: 79 Filed: 02/26/26 Page: 6 of 10 PAGEID #: <pageID>

7
mental health treatment beyond that of his psychiatrist, he can submit a request to be seen by a
mental health provider through the Virginia facility—but he has not done so. (Id. at 3–4). It is
clear from this record that ODRC has made appointments available for Plaintiff and has done their
part to ensure he receives mental health treatment.
As it stands, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that ODRC substantially and continuously
disregarded its obligation to make its “best efforts to ensure that Plaintiff continues to receive
ongoing medical and mental health treatment in accordance with existing Virginia Department of
Corrections policies.” (Doc. 75-1 at 3).
2. 	Term Three: Ensuring Visits with Mother
The Undersigned now turns to Term Three: “ODRC shall make its best efforts to ensure
that Plaintiff receive a phone call with his Mother, despite Plaintiff currently being on phone
restrictions.” (Doc. 75-1 at 3). Plaintiff claims he has not seen his mother in twelve years, despite
this provision. (Doc. 74 at 2). Here too, Plaintiff has not met his burden of proof. On the contrary,
ODRC asserts Plaintiff has been approved to have a special video visit with his mother, who lives
in a nursing home, and that Plaintiff may make these virtual visits by coordinating the call with
his case manager and sister. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff does not dispute this and instead argues that he
should not have to make these arrangements himself because he signed the Agreement with Ohio
and not his family members. (Doc. 76 at 3). But the Agreement mandates that ODRC make best
efforts to ensure his phone visit is available to him—it does not require them to coordinate the
phone call on Plaintiff’s behalf. (Doc. 75-1 at 3). On this record, Plaintiff has not demonstrated
that ODRC has disregarded this obligation.
Case: 2:23-cv-03481-SDM-KAJ Doc #: 79 Filed: 02/26/26 Page: 7 of 10 PAGEID #: <pageID>

8
*****
In sum, Plaintiff has not shown that ODRC repudiated on its end of the deal, nor has he
demonstrated that ODRC engaged in “substantial and continuing disregard for the bargain struck”
between the parties. 	Ford Motor II, 2007 WL 2584502, at *7. 	The Undersigned therefore
RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion to Withdraw from Settlement (Doc. 74) be DENIED.
B. 	Motion to Amend
Next, Plaintiff submits a Motion for Leave to Amend his Complaint. 	(Doc. 77). 	It is
apparent that in light of Plaintiff’s Motion to seek relief from the consent judgment (Doc. 74),
Plaintiff seeks to reassert claims against Defendants. 	But upon review, Plaintiff’s proposed
amendment is actually a new complaint asserting claims he did not put forth in this case. (Compare
Doc. 13 at. 4–5 (construing Plaintiff’s claims as one for Eighth Amendment Deliberate
indifference, denial of access to courts in violation of the First Amendment, cruel and unusual
punishment, and violation of confidentiality) with Doc. 77 at 3 (seeking relief for fraud, legal mail
violations and due process violations)). 	In his proposed amendment, Plaintiff seeks to sue the
same Defendants for fraud, legal mail violations and due process violations. (Doc. 77). He also
claims ODRC “is retaliating on the plaintiff by withholding him from his family, his support
system and using [t]his interstate compact agreement as a weaponized tactic against the plaintiff.”
(Id. at 3–4). The Undersigned finds no basis to allow Plaintiff to file such new causes of action in
an old, unrelated case. Should Plaintiff wish to sue the Defendants for the claims, Plaintiff should
file this complaint as a separate case.
To the extent Plaintiff’s amended complaint seeks to revive or amend claims previously
dismissed with prejudice, such an attempt is similarly unavailing. “The Sixth Circuit has held that
where a plaintiff stipulates to dismissal of certain claims with prejudice, she is forbidden from later
attempting to amend her complaint to include the dismissed claims, even where she has discovered
Case: 2:23-cv-03481-SDM-KAJ Doc #: 79 Filed: 02/26/26 Page: 8 of 10 PAGEID #: <pageID>

9
new evidence to support her claims.” Mostoller v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 2:06-CV-668, 2009 WL
3854227, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 17, 2009) (citing Baker v. City of Detroit, 217 Fed.Appx. 491,
497 (6th Cir.2007) (“[T]he district court did not abuse its discretion in requiring that the
plaintiff . . . abide by the very conditions to which she agreed.”)). This case has settled, all of
Plaintiff’s claims here have been dismissed with prejudice (Doc. 73), and Plaintiff may not bring
these claims again.
Even more, to allow Plaintiff to revive his claims against the same Defendants—all of
whom have been dismissed from this case in one way or another—would amount to severe
hardship against these parties. Aubrey v. Ameritech Mobile Commc'ns, Inc., No. 00-75080, 2002
WL 32521813, at *5 (E.D. Mich. June 17, 2002) (“To permit him to reinstitute this case through
the process of amending the Complaint after it has been dismissed would work a serious hardship
against, and unduly prejudice, the Defendant.”). Not to mention that allowing such an amendment
at this late, post-settlement stage would also prejudice Defendants. 	Hipple v. Matrix Absence
Mgmt., Inc., No. 13-CV-11059, 2014 WL 3900579, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 11, 2014) (“Allowing
amendment at this time—after the parties have settled the sole cause of action in Hipple’s
Complaint—would cause substantial prejudice to Defendants Matrix, Denso, and the Plan.”).
It is therefore RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. 77)
be DENIED. Again, should Plaintiff wish to file new claims, he should do so by filing a separate
case.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion to
Withdraw from Settlement (Doc. 74) be DENIED. It is further RECOMMENDED Plaintiff’s
Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. 77) be DENIED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Case: 2:23-cv-03481-SDM-KAJ Doc #: 79 Filed: 02/26/26 Page: 9 of 10 PAGEID #: <pageID>

10
Procedure on Objections
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen
(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting
authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination
of those portions of the Report or specific proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made. 	Upon proper objection, a District Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further
evidence, or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 	28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1).
The 	parties 	are 	specifically 	advised 	that 	failure 	to 	object 	to 	the 	Report 	and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the district judge review the Report
and Recommendation de novo and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of
the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
Date: February 26, 2026 	/s/ Kimberly A. Jolson
KIMBERLY A. JOLSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case: 2:23-cv-03481-SDM-KAJ Doc #: 79 Filed: 02/26/26 Page: 10 of 10 PAGEID #: <pageID>