Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION - CINCINNATI
KARIM SANOGOH, 	Case No. 1:25-cv-787
Petitioner, 	Judge Matthew W. McFarland
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT,
Respondent.
ORDER AND OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Karim Sanogoh' s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). Respondent Kevin Raycraft filed a Return of Writ (Doc. 9), to
which Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 10). This matter is therefore ripe for the Court's
review. For the reasons explained below, the Petition (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Karim Sanogoh is a Fulani man, born in Mauritania, who entered the
United States on May 15, 2002. (Petition, Doc. 1, ,r,r 15-16.) Since his departure from
Mauritania, Petitioner has been unable to obtain travel documents, and he considers
himself stateless. (Id. at ,r 16.) Upon his arrival in the United States, Petitioner applied for
asylum and withholding of removal. (Id. at ,r 15.) On December 9, 2008, an immigration
judge denied Petitioner's asylum application and ordered his removal to Mauritania. (Id.
at ,r,r 17-18.) Petitioner appealed the immigration judge's decision, but his appeal was
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dismissed on September 7, 2010. (Id. at ,r 18.) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
("ICE") issued Petitioner an order of supervision on September 27, 2010. (Id. at ,r 19.) On
August 5, 2025, ICE arrested Petitioner during a check-in appointment. (Petition, Doc. 1,
,r 21.) Since his arrest, Petitioner has been detained in the custody of ICE, and he is
currently being held at the Butler County Correctional Complex in Hamilton, Ohio. (Id.
at ,r,r 1, 5, 11, 20-21; Reply, Doc. 48, Pg. ID 11, n.1.)
On October 29, 2025, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1).
Petitioner claims that his ongoing detention violates both his substantive and procedural
due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. (Petition, Doc. 1, ,r,r 32-43.) Petitioner
further alleges that he is being unlawfully detained beyond the 90-day removal period
under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) because his removal is not reasonably foreseeable and there is
no additional justification for his detention. (Id. at ,r 44.) Finally, Petitioner requests fees
and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act in the event that he prevails. (Id. at ,r,r 23,
45 .) Respondent Kevin Raycraft filed a Return of Writ (Doc. 9) on December 22, 2025, to
which Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 10) on January 6, 2026.
LAW&ANALYSIS
I. 	Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The fundamental question of subject matter jurisdiction must precede any analysis
of the merits on this matter. As federal courts are "courts of limited jurisdiction" and
"possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute," 	they "have an
independent 	obligation 	to 	determine 	whether 	subject-matter 	jurisdiction 	exists."
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375,377 (1994); Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.,
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546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006).
Petitioner asserts that this Court possesses jurisdiction to hear this matter because
it involves habeas review (28 U.S.C. § 2241), federal question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. §
1331), and the Suspension Clause (U.S. Const. art. I,§ 9, cl. 2). (Petition, Doc. 1, ,r,r 7-9.)
Respondent, in turn, contends that several statutory provisions divest this Court of
jurisdiction over Petitioner's claims. (See Return of Writ, Doc. 9, Pg. ID 33-37.)
To begin, in enacting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) through the REAL ID Act, Congress limited
the jurisdiction of federal courts as follows:
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision
of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, or any
other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, no
court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of
any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against
any alien under this chapter.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). "In the REAL ID Act, Congress decided that, as a matter of public
policy, [federal courts] do not have jurisdiction to decide claims that arise from the
decision of the Executive Branch to execute a removal order." Rranxburgaj v. Wolf, 825 F.
App'x 278,283 (6th Cir. 2020). This holds true "whether or not [federal courts] agree with
ICE's decision to execute [a petitioner's] removal order." Id. Similarly, given§ 1252(g)'s
language as to commencing proceedings and adjudicating cases, this jurisdictional bar
also extends to situations in which a petitioner is notified that he or she must "voluntarily
depart or face deportation." Ene v. Phillips, 99 F. App'x 642,643 (6th Cir. 2004).
The plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) therefore limits jurisdiction as it relates to
claims arising from the commencement of removal proceedings, adjudication of such
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cases, or the execution of removal orders - even when jurisdiction would otherwise be
proper under federal 	question jurisdiction, mandamus 	jurisdiction, 	or "any other
provision of law." See Elgharib v. Napolitano, 600 F.3d 597,607 (6th Cir. 2010); see also Karki,
et al. v. Jones, et al., No. 25-CV-281, 2025 WL 1638070, at *7 (S.D. Ohio June 9, 2025). By its
terms, this statutory limitation also applies to habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which
would typically provide jurisdiction over cases where an alien is held in custody in
violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678,687 (2001). That said, certain applications of§ 1252(g) may potentially cause tension
with the Suspension Clause. As the Framers enshrined in the Constitution: "The Privilege
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion
or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. In order to
successfully contest the constitutionality of this statute on Suspension Clause grounds,
two things must be true: (1) the petitioner must be seeking "core" habeas relief; and (2)
there is no adequate substitute to effectively test petitioner's detention. Hamama v.
Adducci, 912 F.3d 869, 875-76 (6th Cir. 2018).
Petitioner, however, contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) does not strip this Court of
jurisdiction, as he is not challenging his removal order or the Attorney General's decision
to execute it. 	(Petition, Doc. 1, ,r 10.) Instead, "Petitioner challenges his continued
detention when removal is not reasonably foreseeable." (Id.) Thus, the Court finds that
Petitioner's claims sound in core habeas relief and do not fall within the scope of §
1252(g). In Hamama, the Sixth Circuit confirmed that the" district court's jurisdiction over
the detention-based claims [was] independent of its jurisdiction over the removal-based
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claims." Hamama, 912 F.3d at 877; see also Moussa v. Jenifer, 389 F.3d 550,554 (6th Cir. 2004);
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687-88. Indeed, "[£]or over 100 years, habeas corpus has been
recognized as the vehicle through which noncitizens may challenge the fact of their
detention." Malam v. Adducci, 452 F. Supp. 3d 643,649 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (citing Chin Yow
v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 13 (1908)). Here, Petitioner argues that his detention past the
90-day removal period under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) is unlawful; in other words, he
challenges the fact of his detention, independent from his removal. Accordingly,§ 1252(g)
does not inhibit this Court from reviewing such detention-based claims. See, e.g., Zhen v.
Doe, No. 3:25-CV-1507, 2025 WL 2258586, at *2-4 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 7, 2025); Resendiz v.
Noem, No. 4:25-CV-159, 2025 WL 3527284, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 9, 2025).
Respondent's invocation of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) and (b)(9) is also unavailing as
applied to Petitioner's claims. Under these provisions, "[j]udicial review of all questions
of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory
provisions, arising from any action taken ... to remove an alien from the United States"
is exclusively funneled to the Courts of Appeals. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), (a)(5). Here, since
Petitioner contests his detention, and not his removal, § 1252(b )(9) is no bar to this Court's
jurisdiction. See Moussa, 389 F.3d at 554 (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678 ); Ramirez v. Lewis,
et al., No. 4:25-CV-143, 2025 WL 3553676, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 11, 2025) (citing DHS v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 19 (2020)); Guerra v. Noem, No. 1:25-CV-1341, 2025
WL 3204289, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 17, 2025); Alonso v. Tindall, No. 3:25-CV-652, 2025 WL
3083920, at *2 n.5 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 4, 2025).
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Thus, for all these reasons, Respondent's jurisdictional arguments concerning
Petitioner's detention-based claims do not persuade. See Bartolon v. Bondi, No. l:25-CV-
747, _ 	F. Supp. 3d ____J 2025 WL 3674604, at *5-6 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 18, 2025) (similarly
walking through why§§ 1252(g) and 1252(b)(9) do not divest jurisdiction as to detention-
based claims); Coronado v. Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., et al., No. l:25-CV-831, _ 	F. Supp.
3d _, 	2025 	WL 3628229, at *3-6 	(S.D. 	Ohio 	Dec. 	15, 2025) 	(finding the same).
Accordingly, Petitioner's claims shall proceed, and the Court will now address the
substance of these claims.
II. 	Merits of Petitioner's Claims
28 U.S.C. § 2243 requires a court to issue a writ or order the respondent to show
cause as to why a writ should not issue "unless it appears from the application that the
applicant or person detained is not entitled" to a writ of habeas corpus. The statute also
"requires an initial screening of a petition" in which "a court accepts as true the
allegations in the petition and construes them in favor of the petitioner." Espinoza v. Dir.
of Detroit Field Off, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enft, No. 4:25-CV-2107, 2025 WL 2878173, at
*2 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 9, 2025) (citing Alexander v. Northern Bureau of Prisons, 419 F. App'x
544,545 (6th Cir. 2011)). "If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits
that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court," then the court must dismiss
the petition. Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (applicable to petitions arising
under§ 2241). With this in mind, the Court turns to the substance of Petitioner's claims.
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a. 	Applicability of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)
Petitioner first contends that because he is neither a danger to the community nor
a flight risk, Respondent had no basis on which to revoke his order of supervision, arrest
him, and detain him beyond the 90-day removal period under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
(Petition, Doc. 1, ,r,r 25, 33; Reply, Doc. 10, Pg. ID 54-55.) But, Petitioner wrongly asserts
that§ 1231(a)(6) applies only to aliens who present a flight risk or who engage in criminal
or terrorist activity. (See Reply, Doc. 10, Pg. ID 54-55.) Instead, § 1231(a)(6) states:
An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section 1182 of this title,
removable under section 1227(a)(l)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of this title
or who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the
community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be
detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to the
terms of supervision in paragraph (3).
(emphasis 	added). 	As 	Respondent 	notes, 	Petitioner 	does 	not 	contest 	that 	he 	is
inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182. (Return of Writ, Doc. 9, Pg. ID 37.) In any event, §
1182 provides that "[a]n alien present in the United States without being admitted or
paroled ... is inadmissible." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). And, the record lacks any
indication that Petitioner was admitted or paroled into the United States. On the contrary,
Petitioner's final removal order, which he does not challenge and the Court has no
jurisdiction to review, implies that he is inadmissible under§ 1182. (See Petition, Doc. 1,
,r,r 14, 18, 21; see also Zhen, 2025 WL 2258586, at *11 (finding the petitioner "inadmissible"
under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and thus subject to § 1231(a)(6) where she was previously
released from initial detention, and rejecting the petitioner's argument that a "concession
of deportability is not an admission of inadmissibility"); Leal-Rodriguez v. I.N.S., 990 F.2d
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939, 942 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that "[t]he grounds for exclusion largely overlap with
those for deportation")). Thus, the Court finds that§ 1231(a)(6) applies to Petitioner.
b. 	Reasonable Foreseeability of Petitioner's Removal
Petitioner next argues that because his removal from the United States is not
reasonably foreseeable, his continued detention beyond the 90-day removal period under
§ 1231(a)(6) is unlawful. (Petition, Doc. 1, ,r 44.) Rather than authorizing "indefinite
detention,"§ 123l(a)(6) has been read to "limitO an alien's post-removal-period detention
to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien's removal." Zadvydas, 533 U.S.
at 689. The Supreme Court anticipated that determining a "reasonably necessary" period
in any particular case, while still affording the executive branch the appropriate "leeway"
in this field, "will often call for difficult judgments." Id. at 699-701. So, the Supreme Court
handed down a general rule: a 6-month period of detention is presumptively reasonable.
Id. at 701. "After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the
Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing." Id.
"This 6-month presumption, of course, does not mean that every alien not
removed must be released after six months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in
confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal
in the reasonably foreseeable future." 	Zadvydas, 	533 U.S. 	at 701. 	And, "[i]n other
analogous cases where the only impediment to removal is the issuance of the appropriate
travel documentation, courts have uniformly held that mere delay by the foreign
government in issuing travel documents, despite reasonable efforts by United States
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authorities to secure them, does not satisfy a detainee' s burden under Zadvydas to provide
good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future." Ali v. Lynch, No. 1:16-CV-1182, 2017 WL 1535116, at *3 (S.D. Ohio
Apr. 27, 2017) (collecting cases) (cleaned up), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:16-
CV-1182, 2017 WL 2191047 (S.D. Ohio May 17, 2017).
Turning to the record here, an ICE deportation officer averred that ICE "requested
a travel document for the [P]etitioner from the government of Mauritania." (Parker Deel.,
Doc. 9-1, ,r 15.) Additionally, the deportation officer indicated that "ICE has successfully
removed individuals to Mauritania," that "there is no reason to believe that ICE will be
unable to continue doing so," and that she is unaware of any institutional barriers that
would prevent ICE from removing Petitioner to Mauritania in the reasonably foreseeable
future. (Id. at ,r,r 17-19.) While Petitioner argues that Mauritania will not issue travel
documents or admit him into its borders, he offers nothing in support of these assertions
beyond ICE statistics from 2024 which verify that the United States has successfully
removed aliens to Mauritania. (Petition, Doc. 1, ,r,r 21, 23; Reply, Doc. 10, Pg. ID 11-12.)
Petitioner has been in ICE custody since August 5, 2025-just under six months
ago - meaning that Petitioner's detention is still presumed to be reasonable under
Zadvydas. (Petition, Doc. 1, ,r 20.) In any event, the Court finds that Respondent's efforts
to obtain the relevant travel documentation cut against Petitioner's arguments. See Ali,
2017 WL 1535116, at *3; Zhen, 2025 WL 2258586, at *11 (collecting cases that found
"requests 	for 	travel 	documents 	[to] 	support 	a 	finding 	of 	reasonably 	foreseeable
removal"). 	Given 	the 	timeframe 	and 	Respondent's 	well-supported 	indication that
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Petitioner will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, Petitioner fails to
establish that his detention under§ 1231(a)(6) is unlawful.
c. 	Procedural Due Process
Finally, Petitioner contends that Respondent's revocation of Petitioner's order of
supervision without notice and an opportunity to respond violated his procedural due
process rights under the Fifth Amendment. (Petition, Doc. 1, ,r,r 36-43.) Petitioner
specifically 	argues 	that 	Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security 	regulations 	mandate
notification of revocation, an initial informal interview, and an opportunity to respond to
the department's reasons for revocation. (Reply, Doc. 10, Pg. ID 60 (citing 8 C.F.R. §
241.4(1)(1)).) In determining whether the regulatory process outlined in § 241.4(1)(1)
applies where the Department revoked an alien's order of supervision to effectuate his
removal, courts have taken diverging approaches. Compare Barrios v. Ripa, No. 1:25-CV-
22644, 2025 WL 2280485, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2025) (finding that§ 241.4(1)(1) does not
entitle an alien to notice and interview where the Department revoked an order of
supervision to effectuate his removal), with K.E.O. v. Woosley, No. 4:25-CV-74, 2025 WL
2553394, at *5-6 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 4, 2025) (finding the opposite). But, even if§ 241.4(1)(1)
applies to Petitioner, he still must show that any deprivation of procedural due process
by Respondent was prejudicial- in other words, Petitioner must show that, absent the
deprivation, the outcome would have been different. See Graham v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 546,
549-50 (6th Cir. 2008) ("[T]o establish the requisite prejudice, [the alien] must show that
the due process violations led to a substantially different outcome from that which would
have occurred in the absence of those violations."); Karki v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-CV-13186,
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2025 WL 3516782, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 8, 2025) ("[A]ssuming ... that ICE failed to
provide [the petitioner] with the correct process, habeas petitioners . . . still need to show
that any error was prejudicial.").
Petitioner asserts that he did not receive proper notice of his revocation and the
opportunity for an informal interview. (Petition, Doc. 1, Pg. ID ,r,r 40-42; Reply, Doc. 10,
Pg. ID 61 (citing§ 241.4(1)(1)).) However, through the instant habeas review, Petitioner
challenges 	the 	revocation 	of 	his 	order 	of 	supervision 	by 	Respondent. 	With 	the
representation of counsel, he asserts before a federal court that his detention is unlawful,
and he offers both argument and evidence in support. Respondent has explained,
through briefing and a declaration from an ICE deportation officer, the basis for both the
revocation of his order of supervision and his continued detention. And, Petitioner
exercised his ability to reply to Respondent's arguments. As a result, habeas review has
afforded Petitioner both notice of the basis of Respondent's actions and an opportunity
to respond.
Thus, any deprivation of Petitioner's procedural rights under the regulation by
Respondent is harmless and does not warrant his release from detention. See, e.g., Karki,
2025 WL 3516782, at *6-7 (finding that "any deprivation of process by the Government's
failure to follow its regulatory procedures is harmless" after noting, among other things,
the fact that the petitioner had filed habeas petitions); Hammouda v. Dep't of Homeland Sec.,
No. 4:25-CV-2696, 2026 WL 91465, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 13, 2026) (denying habeas relief
when removal was reasonably foreseeable, "notwithstanding the procedural violations");
Ladak v. Noem, No. 1:25-CV-194, 2025 WL 3764016, at *16 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 30, 2025)
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("Because habeas is not backward-looking, the process provided now renders forward-
looking relief separately inappropriate.").
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to
habeas relief at this time. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS the following:
1) 	The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE; and
2) 	This matter is TERMINATED from the Court's docket.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
By ~11.11~
JUDGE MATTHEW W. McFARLAND
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