Freeman v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
MARIO FREEMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
OHIO DEPARTMENT OF
REHABILITATION AND
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 1:24-cv-298
JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE
Magistrate Judge Jolson
OPINION AND ORDER
Mario Freeman, the Plaintiff in this case, and Southern Ohio Correctional
Officer Devon Yazell, the sole Defendant remaining after the Court adopted the
Magistrate Judge’s prior Report and Recommendation (R&R, Doc. 6), now cross-move
for summary judgment, (see Doc. 22; Doc. 26). In response, Magistrate Judge Jolson
has issued another R&R (Doc. 34) recommending that the Court grant Yazell’s motion
and deny Freeman’s. The Court agrees, so it ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety,
GRANTS Yazell’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 22), and at the same time
DENIES Freeman’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 26).
BACKGROUND
Freeman is currently incarcerated at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility
(SOCF). (Compl., Doc. 2, #1). He filed this action pro se in May 2024. (Id.). Although
his original Complaint named only the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Corrections (ODRC), (id.), the Complaint contained allegations against several ODRC
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officials, (see id at #3–4). Thus, on May 28, 2024, the Magistrate Judge ordered
Freeman to submit an Amended Complaint identifying all intended Defendants, (see
Doc. 3), which Freeman did, (see Doc. 5). 1 As noted, however, the Magistrate Judge
issued an R&R not long thereafter. There, after conducting an initial screening of
Freeman’s Complaint, she concluded that only Freeman’s Eighth Amendment claim
against 	Yazell 	should 	proceed. 	(Doc. 	6, 	#40–41). 	The 	Court 	agreed 	with 	that
assessment, and so it adopted the R&R in its entirety. (See Doc. 9, #55). Thus, at this
point, only the Eighth Amendment claim against Yazell remains.
Freeman’s sole allegation against Yazell is that
On [May 31, 2023] at 6:02 p.m., [Officer] Yazell pushed me and put the
cuffs on me after an incident. And during the walk to the whole [sic][,]
he bent my thumb back trying to break it[,] causing me pain[.] [I]f you
look at the camera[,] you can see him bending my thumb back trying to
make it look like I was resisting.
(Doc. 2, #3).
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Yazell offers a different account. According to a
declaration he submitted with his motion, the “incident” to which Freeman refers
arose from a “routine pat down.” (Doc. 23-1, #96). When Yazell directed Freeman to
place his hands on the wall so that Yazell could conduct the pat down, Freeman
“turned and struck [Yazell] in the face and neck.” (Id.). Another corrections officer,
Officer Wellman, stepped in to assist Yazell by holding Freeman in place while Yazell
cuffed him. (Id.). The two officers then secured Freeman and returned to their duties.
1 Or, rather, Freeman submitted an additional document identifying all the Defendants he
intended to sue. (See Doc. 3). But the operative allegations still come from Freeman’s first
Complaint. (See Doc. 1).
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(Id.). Yazell avers that he “did not utilize excessive force against Inmate Freeman” or
use “improper escort techniques before, during, or after the escort.” (Id. at #97). Yazell
also declares (1) that he did not injure Freeman, (2) that he did not attempt to break
Freeman’s thumb, (3) that he completed a true and accurate Use of Force Report, and
(4) that Freeman “was found guilty of rule violations 4, 20, and 21 (Causing, or
attempting to cause physical harm to another; Physical resistance to a direct order;
Disobedience of a direct order), for assaulting [Yazell].” Id. This is all consistent with
Yazell’s Use of Force Report, (see id. at #103), affidavits from Wellman and SOCF
Deputy Warden of Operations Garry Galloway, (see id. at #98–101), and Use of Force
reports authored by Wellman and Michael M. Richardson, another SOCF corrections
officer who apparently overheard, but did not participate in, the encounter, (see id. at
#104–05).
But the Court need not rely only on the various accounts of these events that
the parties provide. The Court also has video footage of the incident. The Magistrate
Judge aptly describes the footage as follows:
The footage begins by showing Plaintiff place his hands against the wall
in preparation for Yazell to search him. (Doc. 29, Video X60A32970 at
0:23). As Yazell bends down to search Plaintiff’s legs, Plaintiff brings his
left arm backwards. (Id. at 0:28). Plaintiff’s upper extremity makes
contact with Yazell’s upper body, though the camera angle does not
clearly show the extent of the contact. (Id.). Plaintiff immediately lifts
his hand back up against the wall. (Id. at 0:29). Yazell pushes Plaintiff’s
back towards the wall, then instructs Plaintiff to put his hands behind
his back. (Id. at 0:30–0:33). Another officer arrives and holds Plaintiff
against the wall while Yazell pulls out handcuffs. (Id. at 0:33–0:36).
In response to the second officer asking what happened, Defendant
Yazell states Plaintiff “fucking smacked me, dumbass bitch.” (Id. at
0:38–0:42). After cuffing Plaintiff, Defendant tells him to “come on,” and
Yazell, along with at least two other officers, escorts Plaintiff down the
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hallway. (Id. at 0:44–0:52). An officer tells Plaintiff to move his hands,
and the officers fumble with Plaintiff’s hands and fingers for a few
moments. (Id. at 0:53–1:03). During the escort, Yazell holds Plaintiff’s
left arm. (Id. at 1:04). One of his hands holds Plaintiff’s forearm, while
the other grips Plaintiff’s thumb. (Id.). Yazell holds Plaintiff’s thumb in
such a way that he bends Plaintiff’s thumb straight back, almost
parallel to Plaintiff’s forearm, for almost thirty seconds of the escort. (Id.
at 0:52–1:20). Defendant names this technique a “bent thumb escort”, or
a “thumb lock escort.” (Doc. 27-1[, at #197]).
The officers then hold Plaintiff against a wall, and Yazell again states
that 	Plaintiff 	“smacked 	me 	right 	in 	the 	cheek.” 	([Doc. 	29, 	Video
X60A32970,] at 1:30–1:34). When Plaintiff denies it, Yazell repeatedly
asserts, “Yes, you did.” (Id. at 1:34–1:36). The two continue to argue
before the officers escort Plaintiff to the strip cage. (Id. at 1:57–2:58).
Once in the strip cage, Plaintiff explains to a different officer that Yazell
“act[ed] like he was going to search me, and [when] I turned around to
walk he was ‘down there’ somewhere. And I didn’t even hit him. Honest.”
(Doc. 29, Video X60A3074R at 0:46–0:55). 2
(Doc. 34, #223–24).
Following the incident, Freeman declined to give an “Inmate Use of Force
Statement.” (See Doc. 23-1, #111 (“Not right now.”)). He did, however, meet with
Colton Cox, a registered nurse at SOCF, who has also submitted a declaration
describing Freeman’s post-incident conduct. (Id. at #120–21). Cox “observed no
injuries to Inmate Freeman,” and when given the opportunity to identify injuries,
Freeman declined. (Id. at #120). Freeman also declined the opportunity for an
additional medical examination. (Id.). And “[t]here is no documentation that Inmate
Freeman asked for medical care for his thumb between May 31, 2023, and October
25, 	2023.” 	(Id. 	at 	#121). 	Despite 	that, 	however, 	Freeman 	contends 	that 	he
2 The footage, honestly viewed, belies Freeman’s claim. While the blow that Freeman landed
on Yazell was no doubt a minor one that likely inflicted little damage, it was nonetheless a
deliberate strike, rather than an effort to “turn[] around,” as Freeman suggests.
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communicated a thumb injury to both medical and correctional officers at SOCF.
(Doc. 25, #176). He also says that, the day after the altercation, his thumb started to
swell and hurt badly when moved. (Id.).
Based on that record, both parties moved for summary judgment. (See Doc. 22;
Doc. 26). And in her R&R, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court grant
Yazell’s motion and deny Freeman’s. (Doc. 34, #230). The R&R explains that the
allegations underlying Freeman’s Eighth Amendment claim are corroborated in part
by the video evidence to which Freeman refers. (See id. at #223–24). Specifically, as
discussed, the video establishes (1) that Freeman assaulted Yazell, (2) that Yazell
cuffed Freeman with Wellman’s help, and (3) that Yazell used a “bent thumb escort”
or “thumb lock escort” while escorting Freeman. (Id.).
Based on that, the question for the Magistrate Judge was whether “there
remains a genuine issue of material fact for the jury as to [Freeman’s] Eighth
Amendment claim,” an inquiry that involves both an objective and a subjective prong.
(Id. at #224–229). The Magistrate Judge concluded that, while the video partly
corroborates 	Freeman’s 	story, 	the 	injury 	about 	which 	Freeman 	complains 	is
insufficient 	as 	a 	matter 	of 	law 	under 	the 	objective 	component 	of 	the 	Eighth
Amendment analysis. (See id. at #224–27). As for the subjective component, the
Magistrate Judge concluded that “there may be a question as to whether [Freeman’s]
earlier contact with Yazell justified the use of the bent thumb technique for the first
thirty seconds of [Freeman’s] escort.” (Id. at #229). But ultimately, the Magistrate
Judge’s analysis under the objective component obviated the need for a determination
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either way. (Id.). In short, then, the Magistrate Judge found the objective component
dispositive.
The R&R explained that Freeman had fourteen days from the date of receipt
to object to the recommended disposition. (See id. at #230). The Court received
Freeman’s objections eighteen days later, on September 26, 2025. (Doc. 35). Yazell
then filed a Response, contending that Freeman’s objections were late (and contained
other technical defects), and also reiterated his argument on the merits. (See Doc. 36,
#238–44). Freeman then replied to that Response, explaining that he did not receive
the R&R until eight days after the Magistrate Judge issued it. (See Doc. 37, #246).
And Freeman also took the opportunity to remind the Court of his views on the
merits. (See id. at #247). With Freeman’s objections in the record, the matter is ripe
for review.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3), “district courts review a[]
[report and recommendation] de novo after a party files a timely objection.” Bates v.
Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., No. 1:22-cv-337, 2023 WL 4348835, at *1 (S.D. Ohio
July 5, 2023). But that de novo review requirement extends only to “any portion to
which a proper objection was made.” Id. (citation omitted). In response to such an
objection, 	“the 	district 	court 	may 	accept, 	reject, 	or 	modify 	the 	recommended
disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge
with instructions.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3)) (cleaned up).
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By contrast, if a party makes only a general objection, that “has the same
effect[] as would a failure to object.” Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 932
F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). A litigant must identify each issue in the report and
recommendation to which he objects with sufficient clarity for the Court to identify
it, or else the litigant forfeits the Court’s de novo review of the issue. Miller v. Currie,
50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995) (“The objections must be clear enough to enable the
district court to discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious.”).
That said, Freeman is proceeding pro se. A pro se litigant’s pleadings should
be construed liberally and are subject to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings filed by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Franklin
v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 84–85 (6th Cir. 1985). But pro se litigants still must comply with
the procedural rules that govern civil cases. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106,
113 (1993). And “[t]he liberal treatment of pro se pleadings does not require lenient
treatment of substantive law, and the liberal standards that apply at the pleading
stage do not apply after a case has progressed to the summary judgment stage.”
Johnson v. Stewart, No. 08-1521, 2010 WL 8738105, at *3 (6th Cir. May 5, 2010)
(citations omitted).
For any unobjected portions of an R&R, “the advisory committee notes to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) suggest that the Court still must ‘satisfy itself
that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the
recommendation.’” Redmon v. Noel, No. 1:21-cv-445, 2021 WL 4771259, at *1 (S.D.
Ohio Oct. 13, 2021) (collecting cases).
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LAW AND ANALYSIS
The R&R recommends summary judgment for Yazell on Freeman’s remaining
Eighth Amendment claim. (Doc. 34, #230). Ultimately, the Court agrees. Before
turning to the merits, though, the Court starts with a threshold issue—the timeliness
of Freeman’s objections. On that front, given Freeman’s explanation for any delay,
along with his pro se status, the Court concludes it will consider Freeman’s objections.
That said, the objections do not change much. As relevant here, Freeman
“objects to bending the thumb back as a legal technique to escort an inmate
somewhere because it causes so much pain unnecessarily.” (Doc. 35, #233). In his
view, “[a]ny intelligent person can see Yazell was not being attacked when he bent
Plaintiff Freeman[’s] thumb back.” (Id.). The Court construes Freeman’s objection to
the “legal technique” (i.e., the “thumb lock escort”) as an objection to the Magistrate
Judge’s analysis under the objective prong of Freeman’s Eighth Amendment claim.
So the Court will review that issue de novo.
To start, it is clear that the Eighth Amendment provides the proper rubric to
analyze Freeman’s claim. Freeman is a convicted prisoner, and “all post-conviction
excessive force claims are to be raised ‘exclusively under the Eighth Amendment’s
cruel and unusual punishment clause.’” Pelfrey v. Chambers, 43 F.3d 1034, 1036–37
(6th Cir. 1995) (quoting Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912, 915 (6th Cir. 1992)). “The
Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ upon
prisoners.” Cordell v. McKinney, 759 F.3d 573, 580 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting U.S.
Const. amend. VIII)). “But not every shove or restraint gives rise to a constitutional
violation.” Id. (quoting Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 604 (6th Cir. 1986)). And
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sometimes, “[t]he maintenance of prison security and discipline may require that
inmates be subjected to physical contact actionable as assault under common law.”
Combs v. Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548, 556 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Pelfrey, 43 F.3d at 1037).
That said, prison officials are still barred from inflicting “unnecessary and wanton”
pain in carrying out their duties. Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir.
2011).
As mentioned, Eighth Amendment claims involve an objective and a subjective
component. Cordell, 759 F.3d at 580. Generally, “[t]he objective component requires
the pain inflicted to be ‘sufficiently serious.’” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). But that’s not the only consideration. The
Eighth 	Amendment 	inquiry 	is 	“contextual” 	and 	“responsive 	to 	contemporary
standards of decency.” Id. (citation omitted). And the Supreme Court has held that
“when 	prison 	officials 	maliciously 	and 	sadistically 	use 	force 	to 	cause 	harm,
contemporary standards of decency are always violated whether or not significant
injury is evident.” Id. (citation omitted). “Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would
permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolical or inhumane, inflicting
less than some arbitrary quantity of injury.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9
(1992). But even here, context figures centrally in the analysis. It is not the case that
“every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.” Id.
(citation omitted). As a result, the ban on cruel and unusual punishments does not
extend to “de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a
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sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)).
In this case, the Magistrate Judge concludes that Freeman’s injury represents
precisely the sort of de minimis injury that the Eighth Amendment does not reach.
And, considering the issue de novo, the Court agrees. Case after case from the Sixth
Circuit and the district courts within it holds that injuries like Freeman’s are simply
not enough to satisfy the Eighth Amendment’s objective component. See Lockett v.
Suardini, 526 F.3d 866, 876 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Shoving, grabbing, and bending back
two of Lockett’s fingers also required only minimal force and was reasonably related
to the need for forcibly bringing Lockett under control and returning him to his cell.”);
Johnson v. Unknown Coolman, R.U.O., 102 F. App’x 460, 461 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding
that “attempt[ing] to bend [the plaintiff’s] thumb back” inflicted only de minimis
injury); Bullocks v. Hale, 478 F. Supp. 3d 639, 646 (S.D. Ohio 2020) (“[M]inor bruising
and slight swelling seem like almost paradigmatic examples of a de minimis injury.”
(italics omitted)), aff’d, No. 20-3428, 2021 WL 1578198 (6th Cir. Mar. 1, 2021); Wicker
v. Lawless, 278 F. Supp. 3d 989, 1009 (S.D. Ohio 2017) (“[A]n alleged ‘shove’ that
caused Plaintiff to ‘bump’ her head—causing no discernable harm of record—is
insufficient harm.”). To be sure, if Freeman had shown that Yazell, for example, broke
Freeman’s thumb, the result would be different. See Bullocks, 478 F. Supp. 3d at 645;
see also Cowan v. Wellman, No. 1:23-cv-315, 2024 WL 5187004, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Dec.
20, 2024) (holding that there was no genuine dispute of material fact as to the
plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim where it was undisputed that the
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defendant had broken the plaintiff’s pinky finger). But, as the undisputed evidence
shows, that’s not what happened here.
In sum, the objective component of Freeman’s Eighth Amendment claim fails.
Because success on this element is a necessary condition of Freeman’s victory in this
case, summary judgment for Yazell is appropriate. The Court need not, and does not,
consider the subjective component of the claim.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court ADOPTS the R&R (Doc. 34) in its entirety,
GRANTS Yazell’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 22), and thus DENIES
Freeman’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 26). The Court further DIRECTS
the Clerk to enter judgment for Yazell and TERMINATE this case on its docket.
SO ORDERED.
February 19, 2026
DATE 	DOUGLAS R. COLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
NATE this cccccccccccccccccccccccccccase on its doc
LAS R. COLE
D STATES DISTRICT J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J
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