Ingrid Janice Freeman

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
In re:
Ingrid Janice Freeman,
Debtor.
:
:
:
:
:
:
Case No. 24-31728
Chapter 13
Judge Crist
ORDER DENYING, AS TO COLUMBUS CASES, AND DENYING IN PART AND
HOLDING IN ABEYANCE, AS TO DAYTON CASES, LAW FIRMS’ MOTION FOR
PROCEDURAL CONSOLIDATION (DOC. 23)
I. 	Introduction
Hallock & Associates, LLC, Brandon Ellis Law Firm, LLC, Law Office of Melissa Michel,
LLC d/b/a Spring Legal Group, Greene Legal Group, LLC d/b/a Newport Legal Group, and
Gardner Legal, LLC d/b/a Option 1 Legal (collectively the “Law Firms”), by and through their
counsel, Roetzel & Andress, LPA, filed a motion in this chapter 13 case1 to procedurally
consolidate seventeen (17) separate chapter 7 and 13 cases, six (6) of which are pending in Dayton
before this Court, and eleven (11) of which are pending before United States Bankruptcy Judges
1 As of the date of issuance of this Order, it does not appear that a motion to procedurally consolidate has been filed
in any of the other sixteen (16) cases that the Law Firms seek to consolidate before this Court.
This document has been electronically entered in the records of the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 22, 2025
Case 3:24-bk-31728 Doc 34 Filed 12/22/25 Entered 12/22/25 14:43:25 Desc Main
Document Page 1 of 9

2
Nami Khorrami and Strelow Cobb in Columbus.2 See Law Firms’ Motion for Procedural
Consolidation (Doc. 23) (the “Motion”). The Motion requests procedural consolidation pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 105,3 Bankruptcy Rule 1015, Local Bankruptcy Rule (“LBR”) 1015-2, and
Bankruptcy 	Rule 	7042, 	of 	“virtually 	identical 	Motions 	to 	Determine 	Excessiveness 	and
Unreasonableness of Fees filed by Andrew R. Vara, the U.S. Trustee for Regions 3 and 9
(collectively, the ‘Trustee’s Motions’)[,]” which “are each brought under 11 U.S.C. § 329(b).”
Mot. at 1, 6 (Argument, § II). But the Motion was only filed in this one chapter 13 case.
While the statutory basis of the Trustee’s Motions (referred to as 329 Motions below) might
be virtually identical,4 it is not possible for this Court to determine, prior to conducting any
hearings, whether the facts in each case are identical. And “[f]acts are stubborn things . . . .”5
Further, Judge Nami Khorrami already issued the first opinion in these 17 cases, adjudicating the
earliest filed 329 Motion, the outcome of which was fact-dependent although based on a stipulated
record. See Mem. Op. Granting in Part and Den. In Part Mot. to Determine Excessiveness and
Unreasonableness of Fees Under 11 U.S.C. § 329(b) (Doc. 19), In re Huff, No. 24-54407, 2025
WL 3286052, at *1, 10 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Nov. 25, 2025) (Doc. 49) (granting the U.S. Trustee’s
motion “with respect to the $106.95 in fees received by Option 1 Legal in the year before the
Petition Date.”). Further, the 329 Motion already decided by Judge Nami Khorrami involved
Option 1 Legal, which is not involved in any of the other cases.6 There are also issues concerning:
(a) the power of one judge to consolidate cases pending before other judges, as further discussed
below; (b) geography; and (c) the fact that the only thing in common between these cases are the
2 28 U.S.C. § 152(c)(1) provides “[e]ach bankruptcy judge may hold court at such places within the judicial district,
in addition to the official duty station of such judge, as the business of the court may require.” The “sitting” locations
about are each judicial officer’s official duty station.
3 Given that this statute concerns the division of Missouri into judicial districts, the Court presumes that counsel
intended to cite to 11 U.S.C. § 105, concerning what has often been referred to as bankruptcy court’s “equitable
powers.”
4 A comparison of the Trustee’s (329) Motions filed in the In re Huff, 24-54407 and In re Freeman, 24-31728 cases
reveals that the Legal Analysis sections are substantively the same and the factual backgrounds are in a similar format,
although modified to address the facts of each case.
5 	“Adams’ 	Argument 	for 	the 	Defense: 	3–4 	December 	1770,” Founders 	Online, National 	Archives,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/05-03-02-0001-0004-0016. [Original source: The Adams Papers,
Legal Papers of John Adams, vol. 3, Cases 63 and 64: The Boston Massacre Trials, ed. L. Kinvin Wroth and Hiller
B. Zobel. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965, pp. 242–270.]
6 Given that this case has already been decided, it is no longer a candidate for procedural consolidation.
Case 3:24-bk-31728 Doc 34 Filed 12/22/25 Entered 12/22/25 14:43:25 Desc Main
Document Page 2 of 9

3
contested matters initiated by the United States Trustee’s Office. Because these are consumer
chapter 7 and 13 cases, not business cases, procedural consolidation could impose undue burdens
on the parties to attend hearings in Dayton for cases filed in Columbus and vice versa. And the
Law Firms are only involved in one contested matter in each case, not the whole case, such that
procedural consolidation of the entire cases, if even possible, would be overkill. But there is also
no basis for consolidation of the entire cases, as opposed to just the contested matters. And for the
reasons explained below the Court will not procedurally consolidate all the contested matters. The
Court, however, is willing to schedule an initial status conference for all the contested matters in
the cases pending in Dayton (but not the whole cases) to better assess whether there would be any
efficiencies in hearing and determining this subset of six (6) pending contested matters together.
II. 	Background
During the period from April 11, 2025 through September 15, 2025, Andrew R. Vara, the
United States Trustee for Regions 3 and 9 (the “U.S. Trustee”) filed a Motion to Determine
Excessiveness and Unreasonableness of Fees Under 11 U.S.C. § 329(b) in each of the following
seventeen cases (collectively, the “329 Motions”), involving the following Law Firms, six of
which (collectively, the “Dayton matters”) are before Judge Crist:
1. 	In re Freeman, 24-31728: 	Hallock & Associates;
2. 	In re Price, 24-32048:7 	Hallock & Associates;
3. 	In re Thomas, 24-32084: 	Brandon Ellis Law Firm;
4. 	In re Bohn, 24-32222: 	Brandon Ellis Law Firm;
5. 	In re Johnson, 24-32250: 	Brandon Ellis Law Firm; and
6. 	In re Abel, 25-30088: 	Brandon Ellis Law Firm;
Seven of which are before Judge Nami Khorrami:
1. 	In re Baisden, 24-52898: 	Hallock & Associates;
2. 	In re Palkowski, 24-53647: 	Brandon Ellis Law Firm;
3. 	In re Huff, 24-54407: 	Option 1 Legal;8
4. 	In re Underhill, 24-55138: 	Spring Legal Group;
7 Although correct in Exhibit A attached to the Motion, within the Motion the case number for In re Price was missing
the terminal digit, 8.
8 As noted above, the 329 Motion filed in this case was decided on November 25, 2025.
Case 3:24-bk-31728 Doc 34 Filed 12/22/25 Entered 12/22/25 14:43:25 Desc Main
Document Page 3 of 9

4
5. 	In re Zonker, 25-50749: 	Hallock & Associates;
6. 	In re Stonerock, 25-51184: 	Brandon Ellis Law Firm; and
7. 	In re Telzrow, 25-51706: 	Brandon Ellis Law Firm;
And four of which (together with the matters before Judge Nami Khorrami, the “Columbus matters”)
are before Judge Strelow Cobb:
1. 	In re Rhodes, 24-53341: 	Hallock & Associates;
2. 	In re Ingram, 25-50653: 	Hallock & Associates;
3. 	In re Townsend, 25-52194: 	Newport Legal Group; and
4. 	In re Conger, 25-52204: 	Hallock & Associates.
The first 329 Motion was filed in the Huff case on April 11, 2025, before Judge Nami Khorrami,
and has already been decided as noted above. In re Huff, No. 24-54407, 2025 WL 3286052. By
comparison, the 329 Motion filed in this case before Judge Crist was filed on September 16, 2025. See
Doc. 21. And the 329 Motions filed in the remaining fifteen (15) cases were filed on September 15,
16, 17, 19, and 22, 2025. See In re Price, 24-32048 (Doc. 29); In re Thomas, 24-32084 (Doc. 21); In
re Bohn, 24-32222 (Doc. 31); In re Johnson, 24-32250 (Doc. 22); In re Baisden, 24-52898 (Doc. 23);
In re Rhodes, 24-53341 (Doc. 30); In re Palkowski, 24-53647 (Doc. 55); In re Underhill, 24-55138
(Doc. 43); In re Abel, 25-30088 (Doc. 30); In re Ingram, 25-50653 (Doc. 19); In re Zonker, 25-50749
(Doc. 35); In re Stonerock, 25-51184 (Doc. 53); In re Telzrow, 25-51706 (Doc. 31); In re Townsend,
25-52194 (Doc. 15); In re Conger, 25-52204 (Doc. 18).
In all but the Huff case, after stipulated extensions of time, the Law Firms recently filed
responses to the 329 Motions on December 12, 2025, such that these contested matters may now be in
a posture to schedule for status conferences or hearings.
III. 	Analysis
Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Civil Rules”), made applicable to
contested matters in bankruptcy cases by Bankruptcy Rules 9014(c) and 7042, provides that “[i]f
actions before the court involve a common question of law or fact, the court may do one of the
following:
(1) 	join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions;
(2) 	consolidate the actions; or
(3) 	issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.
Case 3:24-bk-31728 Doc 34 Filed 12/22/25 Entered 12/22/25 14:43:25 Desc Main
Document Page 4 of 9

5
Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a). Because only the contested matters initiated by the 329 Motions are at issue
and because there is no basis to consolidate the entire bankruptcy cases, as analyzed below, the
contested matters are the “actions,” in the parlance of Civil Rule 42, that the Court will consider
for potential consolidation.
Civil Rule 42 does not govern the consolidation of entire bankruptcy cases given there are
different considerations at play, as further discussed below, but it can apply to the consolidation
of either adversary proceedings or contested matters within bankruptcy cases. Thus, case law such
as Troy Stacy Enterprises Inc. v. Cincinnati Insurance Company, 337 F.R.D. 405 (S.D. Ohio 2021)
(concerning the consolidation of civil actions raising “claims related to insurance coverage for
business interruption losses” under Civil Rule 42(a)) does not apply to or support the consolidation
or joint administration of bankruptcy cases, which are governed by Bankruptcy Rule 1015 and
LBR 1015-2, or the substantive consolidation doctrine, often said to be rooted in the general
powers provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)). As explained below, none of those
apply either; however, the Court may have the power to consolidate contested matters under Civil
Rule 42. See State Bank v. Miller (In re Miller), 459 B.R. 657, 670 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2011)
(observing that “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42, which applies in contested matters, Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 7042 and 9014, grants broad discretion to the bankruptcy court to decide how cases are
to be tried ‘so that the business of the court may be dispatched with expedition and economy while
providing justice to the parties.’ ” (quoting Iron-Oak Supply Corp. v. NIBCO, Inc. (In re Iron-Oak
Supply Corp.), 162 B.R. 301, 304 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1993) (quoting 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur
R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2381 (1971))), aff’d by 513 F. App’x 566, 570 (6th Cir. Feb. 5,
2013) (noting that “[t]he Bank did not object to this order [of consolidation]”)).
The Motion requests “transfer of the cases to either Judge Tyson A. Crist in the instant
matter (the first-filed case) or to Judge Nami Khorrami, who is assigned the In [r]e Arlene Huff
matter (Case No. 24-54407).” However, when the bankruptcy cases were filed is less important
than when the 329 Motions were filed, as the Law Firms appear to only be involved in these cases
because of the 329 Motions. In fact, the present Motion to consolidate cases was not filed until
October 27, 2025, which was more than two months after Judge Nami Khorrami held a hearing on
Case 3:24-bk-31728 Doc 34 Filed 12/22/25 Entered 12/22/25 14:43:25 Desc Main
Document Page 5 of 9

6
the fully briefed 329 Motion in the Huff case on August 13, 2025.9 Moreover, apart from the 329
Motions, the Law Firms do not state there are any other similarities between the cases and there is
no stated basis to consolidate or jointly administer the cases in their entirety, as opposed to just
consolidating the contested matters involving the 329 Motions. In other words, the Law Firms do
not argue that the chapter 7 and 13 cases are related in any of the ways relevant for the purposes
of consolidation or joint administration of entire bankruptcy cases under Bankruptcy Rule 1015
and LBR 1015-2, which are inapplicable to this circumstance. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1015(a)
(concerning consolidation of cases involving the same debtor); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1015(b)
(concerning joint administration of cases involving related debtors, such as spouses, partnerships
and general partners, and affiliates).10 In fact, the advisory committee notes to Bankruptcy Rule
1015 state, in pertinent parts, that “[t]his rule does not deal with the consolidation of cases
involving two or more separate debtors” and “[c]onsolidation, as distinguished from joint
administration, is neither authorized nor prohibited by this rule since the propriety of consolidation
depends on substantive considerations and affects the substantive rights of the creditors of the
different estates.”). Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1015, Advisory Committee Note (1983).
As it concerns 11 U.S.C. § 105, that provision is sometimes invoked as support for the
judicially created substantive consolidation doctrine, but the Law Firms have not mentioned this
doctrine and it would not have any application to these cases in any event. See, e.g., In re Holiday
Ham Holdings, LLC, Nos. 23-23313 and 23-23685, 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 2775, at *8 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. Nov. 17, 2023) (“Substantive consolidation is defined as ‘a judicially created doctrine,
stemming from the Court’s equitable powers under § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code, that treats
separate entities as one, pooling their assets into a common fund that can be used to satisfy the
liabilities of both entities.’ ” (quoting Bavely v. Daniels (In re Daniels), 641 B.R. 165, 191 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 2022) (citing Huntington Nat’l Bank v. Richardson (In re Cyberco Holdings, Inc.), 734
F.3d 432, 438-39 (6th Cir. 2013))). And it is very doubtful that § 105(a) could be invoked to
9 In addition to the 329 Motion (24-54407, Doc. 19), there was a response filed by Gardner Legal, LLC (“Option 1
Legal”) (24-54407, Doc. 23) and the U.S. Trustee’s reply (24-54407, Doc. 27), and the parties filed post-hearing
supplemental briefs in accordance with the Agreed Order Setting Briefing Schedule (24-54407, Doc. 39) entered by
Judge Nami Khorrami on August 15, 2025.
10 Counsel cites Bankruptcy Rule 1015 and LBR 1015-2 as bases to consolidate these cases. However, Bankruptcy
Rule 1015 only pertains to the consolidation or joint administration of cases involving the same debtor or related
debtors by virtue of the debtors being spouses or related business entities. And LBR 1015-2 provides for assignment
or reassignment of such related cases by the Court.
Case 3:24-bk-31728 Doc 34 Filed 12/22/25 Entered 12/22/25 14:43:25 Desc Main
Document Page 6 of 9

7
support the consolidation of bankruptcy cases outside the context of substantive consolidation
given that there is some disagreement over whether the general powers provision, § 105(a), is even
an appropriate basis for substantive consolidation given the “admonition that ‘whatever equitable
powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the
Bankruptcy Code.’ ” In re Cyberco Holdings, Inc., 431 B.R. 404, 422 (Bankr. W.D. Mich 2010)
(quoting Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 108 S. Ct. 963, 969, 99 L. Ed.
2d 169 (1988) and citing Mitan v. Duval (In re Mitan), 573 F.3d 237, 243 (6th Cir. 2009) (other
citations omitted)). In short, apart from consolidating cases of the same debtor under Bankruptcy
Rule 1015(a) and substantively consolidating cases under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), neither of which
apply in this circumstance, there is no other basis for consolidating bankruptcy cases. And there is
no basis for joint administration of the cases under Bankruptcy Rule 1015(b).
Although the Law Firms assert that “further efficiencies will be achieved if the matters
were consolidated before Judge [Nami] Khorrami, who is already handling the In re Huff case,
Case No. 24-54407,” the Motion is only filed in this one case before Judge Crist.11 Moreover, the
Huff case has since been resolved. As used in the Bankruptcy Rules, through which Civil Rule 42
is made applicable, the terms “ ‘[c]ourt’ or ‘judge’ means the judicial officer who presides over
the case or proceeding.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9001(b)(4). Consolidation under Civil Rule 42 is only
available for other “actions before the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a). Accordingly, similar to the
requirement in LBR 1015-2, consolidation of contested matters (or adversary proceedings) would
appear to require the concurrence of the judicial officers before whom the other matters are
pending, such that this Court cannot, unilaterally, order the consolidation of contested matters
pending in different cases.12 Bennett v. Morton Bldgs., Inc. (In re Bennett), No. 10-37438, 2015
Bankr. LEXIS 4107, at *6-7 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Dec. 7, 2015) (determining that consolidation
under Civil Rule 42 of adversary proceedings pending before two different judicial officers might
11 Even though the Court has considered the Motion on the merits, it is also worth noting that the Motion was
procedurally deficient because it was not accompanied by the twenty-one (21) day notice that is required for all
motions and applications filed with this Court which are not excepted from the noticing requirements by Bankruptcy
Rule 2002, General Order 12-4, other Local Rules, or upon order of the Court for cause shown. LBR 9013-1(a)(1)(C)
and (2).
12 Although not applicable to this circumstance, LBR 1015-2(d)(2), regarding the reassignment of cases, provides that
“[a]ny reassignment of a case . . . shall require the concurrence of the judges to whom and from whom such case is to
be reassigned.” See also LBR Form 1015-2 (requiring the debtor to list all prior cases within the last eight (8) years,
including the judge assigned the case).
Case 3:24-bk-31728 Doc 34 Filed 12/22/25 Entered 12/22/25 14:43:25 Desc Main
Document Page 7 of 9

8
not be possible and, even if it was, was not appropriate). Further, a motion to consolidate was not
filed in any of the cases pending before Judge Nami Khorrami or Judge Strelow Cobb. Moreover,
even if it were possible, it does not appear sensible to consolidate the Dayton matters and the
remaining Columbus matters—the contested matters initiated by the 329 Motions—due to the
burden that might impose upon the parties to consumer chapter 7 and 13 cases, which are very
time and cost sensitive. And the Court cannot readily determine at this time, based on the limited
record before it and the factually dependent tests at issue in analyzing the application of 11 U.S.C.
§ 329(b), whether it would be appropriate to consolidate the Dayton matters.13
IV. 	Conclusion
For all the foregoing reasons, the Law Firms’ Motion for Procedural Consolidation (Doc.
23) is hereby DENIED with respect to the request to consolidate the seventeen (17) bankruptcy
cases. The Law Firms’ Motion is also hereby DENIED with respect to the request to consolidate
the contested matter already decided by Judge Nami Khorrami, and the ten (10) other contested
matters in the chapter 7 and 13 cases pending in Columbus—the Columbus matters.
With respect to the contested matters in the six (6) cases pending before this Court—the
Dayton matters—and considering that the Law Firms recently filed responses to the 329 Motions,
the Court will separately schedule a status conference in each of the contested Dayton matters, part
of which will be to determine if there would be any efficiencies in hearing and determining those
contested matters together. In this limited respect the Motion is hereby held in abeyance.
Scheduling orders will be separately entered in the Dayton matters.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Copies to: Default List
Pamela Arndt (Counsel for the United States Trustee)
13 See In re Huff, No. 24-54407, 2025 WL 3286052, at *6 (describing the analysis of § 329(b) as involving examination
of two tests: (1) the “ ‘in contemplation of’ ” test as “a subjective test based on the debtor’s mental state[;]” and (2)
the “ ‘in connection with’ the bankruptcy case” test which “is generally a more objective inquiry.” (quoting In re
Mayeaux, 269 B.R. 614, 622 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2001) and In re Keller Fin. Servs. of Fla., Inc., 248 B.R. 859, 878-79
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000))). In addition, there is the issue of whether the fees were paid within the one-year reachback
period, which might (or might not) be subject to equitable tolling based on “fraud, concealment, or similar
misconduct.” Id. at *7 (citing Arens v. Boughton (In re Prudhomme), 43 F.3d 1000, 1003 (5th Cir. 1995)). For the
avoidance of doubt, this Court is not deciding any of these issues at this time, merely noting the parameters of the
legal analysis that appears to lie ahead in adjudicating the 329 Motions.
Case 3:24-bk-31728 Doc 34 Filed 12/22/25 Entered 12/22/25 14:43:25 Desc Main
Document Page 8 of 9

9
Edward H. Cahill, Office of the US Trustee, 170 North High Street, Suite 200, Columbus, OH
43215-2417
Case 3:24-bk-31728 Doc 34 Filed 12/22/25 Entered 12/22/25 14:43:25 Desc Main
Document Page 9 of 9