Lott v. Resource Mfg., et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
GAVONTYE LOTT, 	) 	CASE NO. 5:25-cv-01260
)
Plaintiff, 	) 	JUDGE BRIDGET MEEHAN BRENNAN
)
v. 	)
)
RESOURCE MFG, et al., 	) 	OPINION AND ORDER
)
Defendants. 	)
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss submitted by Defendants Resource MFG and
EmployBridge (“Defendants”) seeking dismissal of Counts One and Two of pro se Plaintiff
Gavontye Lott’s (“Lott”) Complaint. (Doc. 5.) The Motion is unopposed. For the reasons stated
below, the Motion is GRANTED. Counts One and Two are DISMISSED.
I. 	BACKGROUND1
Lott lives in Akron, Ohio. (Doc. 1-1 at 7, ¶ 1.)2 In September 2024, he worked for
Resource MFG, a subsidiary of Defendant EmployBridge. (Id. at 8, ¶ 5.) He was assigned to
DHL. (Id.) Shortly after beginning the assignment with DHL, Lott terminated his employment
with Resource MFG “due to transportation difficulties.” (Id. at 8, ¶ 6.) Resource MFG told Lott
he could seek to return when he secured reliable transportation. (Id.) In or about this time
period, Lott knew of and consented to a background investigation. (Id. at 8, ¶¶ 8, 10.)
In December 2024, Lott reapplied to Resource MFG. (Id. at 8, ¶ 7.) He was told that an
1 Lott’s factual allegations are presumed true at this stage in the litigation. Cates v. Crystal Clear
Techs., LLC, 874 F.3d 530, 534 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bickerstaff v. Lucarelli, 830 F.3d 388,
396 (6th Cir. 2016)).
2 For ease and consistency, record citations are to the electronically stamped CM/ECF document
and PageID# rather than any internal pagination.
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open shift position was available. (Id.) Resource MFG conducted a second background check.
(Id. at 8, ¶ 8.) When Lott called Resource MFG to confirm the position, Resource MFG told
Lott his employment account was frozen due to an open case found during his background
check. (Id. at 8, ¶ 9.) Lott neither received written notice of nor consented to the background
check. (Id. at 8, ¶ 10.) Because his employment account was frozen, Lott seeks damages for
economic and reputational harm. (Id. at 8, ¶ 11.)
On May 7, 2025, Lott filed his Complaint in state court. See Lott v. Resource MFG, No.
CV-2025-05-2077 (Summit Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas). On June 16, 2025, Defendants
removed the case to this Court. (Doc. 1.) The Complaint states three claims: (1) wrongful
interference with prospective economic advantage (Count One); (2) breach of implied
employment agreement (Count Two); and (3) violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15
U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.) (Count Three). (Doc. 1-1 at 8-9, ¶¶ 13-18.) On June 20, 2025,
Defendants moved to dismiss Counts One and Two. (Doc. 5.) Lott did not file any response.
II. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Legal Standard
Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers. El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 2008). However, the “lenient treatment
generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th
Cir. 1996). A complaint must still contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests whether
the complaint meets this standard. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim,
the complaint must make out a plausible legal claim, meaning the complaint’s factual allegations
must be sufficient for a court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable.”
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Plausibility
does not require any specific probability of success, but it does demand “more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
When courts evaluate whether a complaint states a plausible claim, they must accept all
factual allegations as true. Cates v. Crystal Clear Techs., LLC, 874 F.3d 530, 534 (6th Cir.
2017) (quoting Bickerstaff v. Lucarelli, 830 F.3d 388, 396 (6th Cir. 2016)). Courts must also
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and they must generally construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. Courts do not accept legal conclusions
or other conclusory allegations as true, D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 383 (6th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Terry v. Tyson Farms, Inc., 604 F.3d 272, 275-76 (6th Cir. 2010)), and courts need not
make unwarranted factual inferences, Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 688 (6th Cir. 2006).
The failure to respond or otherwise oppose the motion is a sufficient reason alone to grant
the motion to dismiss. See Humphrey v. U.S. Attorney Gen.’s Office, 279 F. App’x 328, 331 (6th
Cir. 2008) (failure to oppose arguments raised in a motion to dismiss is sufficient grounds for the
district court to find that opposition is waived); Scott v. Tenn., 878 F.2d 382 (6th Cir. 1989) (“[I]f
a plaintiff fails to respond or otherwise oppose a defendant’s motion, then the district court may
deem the plaintiff to have waived opposition to the motion.”). Even so, for the reasons below,
both claims must be dismissed.
B. 	Wrongful Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage (Count One)
“In Ohio, a tortious interference with prospective economic advantage is analyzed the
same way as tortious interference with business relationships.” J.M. Smucker Co. v. Hormel
Food Corp., 526 F.Supp.3d 294, 310 (N.D. Ohio 2021) (citing Jedson Eng’g, Inc. v. Spirit
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Constr. Servs., Inc., 720 F.Supp.2d 904, 923 (S.D. Ohio 2010)). “Tortious interference with a
business relationship occurs when a person, ‘without a privilege to do so, induces or otherwise
purposely causes a third person not to enter into or continue a business relation with another, or
not to perform a contract with another.’” Id. (quoting Wilkey v. Hull, 366 F. App’x 634, 638 (6th
Cir. 2010)). “The elements of tortious interference with a business relationship are (1) a business
relationship, (2) the wrongdoer’s knowledge thereof, (3) an intentional interference causing a
breach or termination of the relationship, and (4) damages resulting therefrom.” Geo-Pro Serv.,
Inc. v. Solar Testing Labs., Inc., 763 N.E.2d 664, 672 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (citation omitted).
An essential element of the tort is interference by someone who is not a party or agent of the
party to the contract or relationship at issue.” Komorek v. Conflict Int’l, Inc., No. 24-cv-1227,
2025 WL 948973, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59437, *59 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2025) (quoting
Dorricott v. Fairhill Ctr. for Aging, 2 F.Supp.2d 982, 989-90 (N.D. Ohio 1998)).
Defendants argue the Complaint fails to identify any third-party at all, let alone allege a
third-party relationship. (Doc. 5 at 38.) To state a claim for tortious interference with a business
relationship, a complaint cannot rely on a “vague assertion that a party interfered with certain
unspecified business relationships.” Barrio Bros., LLC v. Revolucion, LLC, No. 18-cv-2052,
2020 WL 3547014, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113656, *22 (N.D. Ohio June 30, 2020) (citing
Wilkey, 366 F. App’x at 638.) Dismissal is appropriate “[a]bsent some factual allegation that
[the defendant’s] actions ended or prevented a business relationship.” Wilkey, 366 F. App’x at
638. A complaint must allege the relationship interfered with, including identifying the parties
involved. BCG Masonic Cleveland, LLC v. Live Nation Ent., Inc., 570 F.Supp.3d 552, 559 (N.D.
Ohio 2021) (the “claim fails because [plaintiff] does not identify any specific business
relationships with which [defendant] interfered”). And a complaint must allege how the
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defendant interfered with that relationship. Id.
The Complaint here fails to set forth any allegations explaining how Defendants caused a
breach or termination of an unspecified employment relationship with a third party. The
employment relationship Lott sought was with Defendants. His assignments would have been
secured through Defendants. Defendants froze his employment account when he reapplied
because of “an alleged open case.” (Doc. 1-1 at 8, ¶ 9.) Drawing all inferences in Plaintiff’s
favor, the Complaint does not state a wrongful interference claim.
C. 	Breach of Implied Employment Agreement (Count Two)
“Under Ohio law, ‘the existence of express or implied-in-fact contracts . . . hinge[s] upon
proof of all of the elements of a contract.’” Ramsey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 514 F. App’x 554, 558
(6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Stepp v. Freeman, 694 N.E.2d 510, 514 (Ohio 1997)). “To prove a
breach of an implied contract claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the existence of a
contract; (2) performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach by the defendant; and (4) damage or loss to
the plaintiff.” Gruger v. Diversified Air Sys., Inc., No. 07-MA-52, 2008 WL 2633470, 2008
Ohio App. LEXIS 2869, *42 (Ohio Ct. App. June 30, 2008) (citing Doner v. Snapp, 649 N.E.2d
42, 44 (Ohio 1994)); Mitchell v. Fujitec Am., Inc., 518 F.Supp.3d 1073, 1098 (S.D. Ohio 2021)
(“[T]o successfully state [such] a breach of implied contract claim . . . a plaintiff must plausibly
allege the existence of a contract, performance by the plaintiff, breach by the defendant, and
damage or loss to the plaintiff.”) (quotation and citation omitted). But “[e]xpress contracts
diverge from implied-in-fact contracts in the form of proof that is needed to establish each
contractual element.” Stepp, 694 N.E.2d at 514. “[I]n implied-in-fact contracts the parties’
meeting of the minds is shown by the surrounding circumstances, including the conduct and
declarations of the parties, that make it inferable that the contract exists as a matter of tacit
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understanding.” Ramsey, 514 F. App’x at 558. “To establish a contract implied in fact a plaintiff
must demonstrate that the circumstances surrounding the parties’ transaction make it reasonably
certain that an agreement was intended.” Id. (quoting Stepp, 694 N.E.2d at 514).
In support of his breach of an implied employment agreement claim, Lott avers (1)
Defendants told him he could return once reliable transportation was secured, and (2) he fulfilled
this condition by securing reliable transportation. 	(Doc. 1-1 at 8, ¶¶ 6-7.) To state a claim for
breach of an implied employment agreement, the Complaint must plead the fundamentals of the
existence of a contract: a definite offer that was accepted and a meeting of the minds. Here, that
means Lott must allege facts from which it can be inferred that Defendants committed to rehire
Lott. He has not done so. At best, the Complaint sets forth allegations of Defendants
willingness to work with him again, provided he secured reliable transportation. These
allegations do not support an inference that Defendants committed to his rehiring or placing him
at the first-shift position. Thus, the Complaint fails to state an implied-in-fact employment
agreement existed between Lott and Defendants.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5) is GRANTED.
Counts One and Two of the Complaint are DISMISSED. Plaintiff Gavontye Lott’s claim for
violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (Count Three) remains. A Case Management
Conference Scheduling Order will follow.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: November 19, 2025 	_________________________________
BRIDGET MEEHAN BRENNAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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