Mendoza et al. v. Director of the Detroit Field Office for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement et al.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Jose Rodriguez Mendoza, et al.,
Petitioners,
-vs-
Kevin Raycraft, Director of the
Detroit Field Office for U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
et al.,
Respondents.
Case No. 4:25cv2183
JUDGE PAMELA A. BARKER
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
On October 13, 2025, Petitioners Jose Rodriguez Mendoza (“Mendoza”) and Guillermo
Acevedo Diaz (“Diaz”) (hereinafter referred to collectively as “Petitioners”) filed a Petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2241 for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”), in which they assert that they are presently
being unlawfully detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) without bond
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). (Doc. No. 1.) Pursuant to an expedited briefing Order issued
by this Court, Respondents Kevin Raycraft, Director of the Detroit Field Office for U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”); Todd Lyons, Acting Director of ICE; Kristi Noem, Secretary of
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”); and Pamela Bondi, Attorney General of the
United States (hereinafter referred to collectively as “Respondents”) filed a Motion to Dismiss on
October 28, 2025. (Doc. No. 12.) Petitioners filed a Response on November 4, 2025. (Doc. No. 15.)
For the following reasons, Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 12) is granted as
follows. Respondents Lyons, Noem, and Bondi are hereby dismissed. The Petition (Doc. No. 1) is
dismissed without prejudice.
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I. 	Background 1
A. 	Factual Allegations
1. 	Petitioner Jose Rodriguez Mendoza
Mendoza is a native and citizen of Honduras. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 2, 20.) He entered the United
States on August 18, 2023 near Eagle Pass, Texas. 	(Id.) 	See also Doc. No. 2-4 at PageID# 68.
Mendoza was detained by U.S. Customs and Border Protection on August 19, 2023. (Doc. No. 1 at
¶ 28; Doc. No. 2-1 at PageID# 29.) 	On that same date, DHS released Mendoza on his own
recognizance pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (Id.) See also Doc. No. 2-1 at PageID# 29 (DHS Form
1-286 titled “Notice of Custody Determination”). DHS also issued a Form I-862 Notice to Appear
which charged Mendoza with being inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), 2 i.e., as an alien
present in the United States without being admitted or paroled. 	(Doc. No. 2-4 at PageID# 68.)
Mendoza was placed in removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a and ordered to appear
before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) in Cleveland on October 17, 2024. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 29; Doc. No.
2-4 at PageID# 68.)
On July 10, 2024, Mendoza filed an application for asylum. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 30.) See also
Doc. No. 2-6 at PageID#s 81-92. Therein, Mendoza indicates that he has been married since
September 2022 and has twin sons (Jose David and Jose Anthony) who were born in July 2014. (Doc.
No. 2-6 at PageID# 82-83.) Mendoza seeks asylum on the grounds that he is fearful of being deported
1 In setting forth the factual background, the Court relies on the factual allegations in the Petition and its Exhibits. (Doc.
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4.)
2 Section 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) provides that: “An alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or
who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General, is inadmissible.”
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).
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to Honduras because of “a lengthy and escalating pattern of specific threats to kidnap and sell his
twin sons that persisted despite attempts by the family to relocate within Honduras.” (Doc. No. 1 at
¶ 30.) See also Doc. No. 2-6 at PageID# 85, 92. As of the date of the instant Petition, Mendoza’s
asylum application remained pending before the Cleveland Immigration Court. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 30.)
In March 2025, Mendoza obtained valid employment authorization from the United States
Government. (Id. at ¶ 31.) Several months later, on August 6, 2025, Mendoza was detained by ICE
during a workplace raid. (Id. at ¶ 32.) He requested a bond hearing before an IJ. (Id. at ¶ 33.) On
September 25, 2025, the IJ denied Mendoza’s request for bond on the basis of lack of jurisdiction.
(Doc. No. 2-3 at PageID# 65.) 	Specifically, Mendoza alleges that the IJ determined that the
immigration court lacked jurisdiction to conduct a bond hearing because Mendoza was an “applicant
for admission” and, therefore, subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). 3
(Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 34.)
On October 7, 2025, Mendoza (through counsel) appealed the IJ’s denial of bond to the Board
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). (Doc. No. 2-7.) In his Notice of Appeal, Mendoza set forth the
following grounds for his appeal:
The IJ erred as a matter of fact and law in finding that he did not have jurisdiction over
[Mendoza’s] bond request where: (1) Matter of Hurtado4 is not retroactive under the
Sixth Circuit’s test for retroactivity in agency adjudications, (2) [Mendoza] was not
an applicant for admission but an applicant for asylum, and a grant of asylum is not
an “admission” to the United States, (3) in any case, [Mendoza’s] “applicant for
admission” status was not administratively final because [Mendoza] had not admitted
3 As discussed in greater detail infra, there are two statutes which principally govern detention of aliens pending removal
proceedings -- 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226. The first – Section 1225 – is a mandatory detention provision, while the
second statutory provision – Section 1226 – sets forth a discretionary detention framework.
4 In Matter of Hurtado, 29 I&N 216, 2025 WL 2674169 (BIA 2025), the BIA held (in a precedential decision) that
“[b]ased on the plain language of section 235(b)(2)(A) of the Immigration & Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
(2018), Immigration Judges lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond to aliens who are present in the United
States without admission.”
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or conceded any additional charges, (4) DHS is barred by collateral estoppel from
asserting that [Mendoza] was detained pursuant to Section 235(b) when it had
previously explicitly released him under Section 236(a), (5) the Attorney General’s
designation of Matter of Akhmedov as precedent supersedes the decision in Hurtado
by the three-member panel of the Board, (6) Hurtado is distinguishable on its facts
because it involved person who was granted TPS, which then expired, causing him to
revert to applicant for admission status, and there was no information that Hurtado
had ever applied for asylum.
The IJ further erred in failing to grant [Mendoza’s] alternative requests for relief, viz.
setting the case for a Matter of Joseph hearing so that DHS could present its arguments
as to why [Mendoza] was subject to mandatory detention and make alternative
findings of fact as to danger and flight risk.
(Id. at PageID# 95.) In an Attachment to his Notice of Appeal, Mendoza argues that his appeal should
be reviewed by a three-board member panel for a number of reasons, including because of the need
to (1) “resolve a complex, novel, unusual, or recurring issue of law or fact;” (2) “settle inconsistencies
among the rulings of different immigration judges;” and (3) “establish a precedent construing the
meaning of laws, regulations, or procedures.” (Id. at PageID# 98.) Lastly, Mendoza requests that
the BIA issue an expedited briefing order because he is “detained and separated from his wife and
children after having committed no criminal offense.” (Id. at PageID# 99.)
Mendoza’s bond appeal remains pending as of the date of this Order. Mendoza has remained
in detention at the Northeast Ohio Correctional Center (“NEOCC”) in Youngstown, Ohio since he
was detained on August 6, 2025. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 32, 35.)
2. 	Petitioner Guillermo Acevedo Diaz
Diaz is a native and citizen of Colombia. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 3, 21.) He entered the United
States on December 29, 2023 near Eagle Pass, Texas. (Id. at ¶ 3, 37; Doc. No. 3-4 at PageID# 154.)
Diaz was detained by U.S. Customs and Border Protection on December 31, 2023. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶
39; Doc. No. 3-1 at PageID# 104.) On that same date, DHS released Diaz on his own recognizance
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pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (Id.) See also Doc. No. 3-1 at PageID# 104 (DHS Form 1-286 titled
“Notice of Custody Determination”). DHS also issued a Form I-862 Notice to Appear which charged
Diaz with being inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), i.e., as an alien present in the United
States without being admitted or paroled. (Doc. No. 3-4 at PageID# 154.) Diaz was placed in removal
proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a and ordered to appear before an IJ in Cleveland on June
18, 2025. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 40; Doc. No. 3-4 at PageID# 154.)
On July 16, 2025, Diaz filed an application for asylum. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 41.) See also Doc.
No. 4-1. Therein, Diaz indicates (among other things) that he took police training classes in
Cartagena, Colombia from February 2022 to February 2023. 	(Doc. No. 4-1 at PageID# 163.) 	He
seeks asylum on the grounds that he is fearful of being deported to Colombia because of “threats from
paramilitary groups who stalk and threaten police trainees.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 41.) See also Doc. No.
4-1 at PageID#s 164-165. As of the date of the instant Petition, Diaz’s asylum application remained
pending before the Cleveland Immigration Court. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 41.)
On August 13, 2025, Diaz was detained by ICE while leaving Immigration Court after
appearing for a scheduled hearing. (Id. at ¶ 43.) He thereafter requested a bond hearing before an IJ.
(Id. at ¶ 44.) On September 25, 2025, the IJ denied Diaz’s request for bond on the basis of lack of
jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 3-3 at PageID# 151.) Like Mendoza, Diaz alleges that the IJ determined that
there was no jurisdiction to conduct a bond hearing because Diaz was an “applicant for admission”
and, therefore, subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). (Doc. No. 1 at
¶ 45.)
On October 7, 2025, Diaz (through counsel) appealed the IJ’s denial of bond to the BIA.
(Doc. No. 4-2.) See also Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 47. 	In his Notice of Appeal, Diaz set forth the same reasons
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for appeal that are set forth in Mendoza’s Notice of Appeal. 	(Doc. No. 4-2 at PageID# 176.) 	In
addition, Diaz likewise argues that his appeal should be reviewed by a three-board member panel
because of the need to (1) “resolve a complex, novel, unusual, or recurring issue of law or fact;” (2)
“settle inconsistencies among the rulings of different immigration judges;” and (3) “establish a
precedent construing the meaning of laws, regulations, or procedures.” (Id. at PageID# 179.) Lastly,
Diaz requests that the BIA issue an expedited briefing order because he is “detained and separated
from his family after having committed no criminal offense.” 5 (Id. at PageID# 180.)
Diaz’s bond appeal remains pending as of the date of this Order. 	Diaz has remained in
detention at the NEOCC since he was detained on August 13, 2025. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 43, 46.)
B. 	Procedural History
On October 13, 2025, Petitioners filed a habeas petition with this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. (Doc. No. 1.) Therein, Petitioners assert that they are being unlawfully held without bond
because ICE and the IJ have improperly determined that they are subject to mandatory detention
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), rather than to discretionary bond determinations under 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a). (Id. at ¶¶ 5, 6.) Petitioners allege that their continued detention “is plainly contrary to the
statutory framework of the INA and contrary to both agency regulations and decades of consistent
agency practice applying § 1226(a) to people like Petitioners.” (Id. at ¶ 8.) Petitioners further allege
that “[i]t violates their right to due process by depriving them of their liberty without any
consideration of whether such a deprivation is warranted.” (Id.) Moreover, Petitioners claim that
5 Diaz alleges that he “has no criminal record anywhere in the world” and “supports his family, including a disabled
brother.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 38, 46.)
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“this interpretation [of § 1225(b)(2)(A)] contradicts DHS's own previous determinations that both
Petitioners should be subject to § 1226(a) detention authority.” (Id.)
Petitioners assert claims for violations of the INA (Count I) and the Due Process Clause of
the United States Constitution (Count II). (Id. at PageID#s 21-22.) Petitioners request that this Court:
(1) “[i]ssue a writ of habeas corpus requiring that Respondents release Petitioners from custody or,
in the alternative, provide Petitioners with a bond hearing at which Respondents bear the burden of
proof as to flight risk and danger, and/or pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within 7 days;” (2) enjoin
Respondents from transferring Petitioners from the jurisdiction of this District pending these
proceedings; (3) “[d]eclare that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) -- and not 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) -- is the
appropriate statutory provision that governs Petitioners’ detention and eligibility for bond because
they are not a recent arrival ‘seeking admission’ to the United States, and instead were already
residing in the United States when they were apprehended and charged as inadmissible for having
allegedly entered the United States without inspection;” and (4) award Petitioners attorney’s fees and
costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any
other basis justified under law. (Id. at PageID# 23.)
Petitioners argue that this Court has jurisdiction to grant the above relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(5) (habeas corpus); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question); and Article I, Section 9, clause 2
of the United States Constitution (the Suspension Clause). (Id. at ¶ 14.)
On October 14, 2025, this Court ordered Petitioners to immediately forward a copy of the
Petition and its attachments, and the Court’s briefing Order, to each of the Respondents and to file a
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Notice on the docket confirming that they had done so. 6 (Doc. No. 6.) In addition, the Court directed
the Clerk to forward a copy of the Petition and its Exhibits (Doc. Nos. 1 through 5), together with
this Order, to the Office of the United States Attorney, Northern District of Ohio. 	(Id.) 	Lastly,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243 and for good cause shown, the Court ordered (1) Respondents to respond
to the Petition by no later than October 28, 2025; and (2) Petitioner to file a Reply by no later than
November 4, 2025. (Id.)
On October 28, 2025, Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 12.) Petitioners filed their Response on November 4, 2025. (Doc. No.
15.)
II. 	Statutory Framework regarding Detention and Bond
Two statutes principally govern the detention of aliens pending removal proceedings: 	8
U.S.C. § 1225 and § 1226. 	Section 1225(b)(2)(a)(i) provides for mandatory detention pending
removal, as follows:
(2) INSPECTION OF OTHER ALIENS
(A) In general
Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
6 The docket reflects that, on October 30 and 31, 2025, Petitioners filed a Notice of Service and a Return of Service
executed upon the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Ohio. (Doc. Nos. 13, 14.) In their Motion to
Dismiss, Respondents state that “they have not yet been served” but “in deference to the Court’s October 14 Order,
Respondents are filing this Response.” (Doc. No. 12-1 at PageID# 220, fn 2.) Respondents indicate that, by filing their
Motion, they “do not waive any defenses based on insufficiency of service.” (Id.) In light of the emergency nature of
the relief requested in the instant Petition, the Court directed Petitioners to forward a copy of the Petition and its Exhibits
to Respondents and file Notice of the same on the docket. Notably, the docket reflects that the Clerk of Court also sent a
copy of the Petition and its Exhibits (Doc. Nos. 1 through 5) to both the Attorney General of the United States and the
Office of the United States Attorney, Northern District of Ohio. (Doc. No. 6; Remark by Clerk dated Nov. 7, 2025). See
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (providing that “the clerk must serve a copy of the petition and any
order on the respondent and on the attorney general or other appropriate officer of the state involved”).
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admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be
detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Section 1225 applies to “applicants for admission,” who are aliens “present
in the United States who [have] not been admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). The statute provides that
“applicants for admission” must undergo screening by an examining immigration officer, and if it is
determined that the applicant for admission “is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted,” they “shall be detained for” removal proceedings under Section 1229a. 	8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A). 	The only exception to this mandatory detention provision is for aliens who are
released “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
See Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL 2496379 at * 3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29,
2025).
Section 1226, by contrast, sets forth a discretionary detention framework. 	Specifically,
Section 1226(a) provides, in relevant part:
(a) ARREST, DETENTION, AND RELEASE
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.
Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such decision, the Attorney
General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing
conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General ...
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 	Subsection (c) of Section 1226 prohibits certain aliens who are inadmissible
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) by virtue of their presence in the country without being admitted
from being released on bond, but only if the alien has also been “charged with, is arrested for, is
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convicted of, admits having committed, or admits committing acts which constitute the essential
elements of any burglary, theft, larceny, shoplifting, or assault of a law enforcement officer offense,
or any crime that results in death or serious bodily injury to another person.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E).
Relevant here, aliens arrested and detained under Section 1226 have a right to request a custody
redetermination (i.e. a bond hearing) before an IJ. 	See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1). 	The IJ
evaluates whether there is a risk of nonappearance or danger to the community.
For many years, the Government applied the discretionary detention framework set forth in
Section 1226(a) to aliens (such as Petitioners herein) who entered the United States without inspection
and were subsequently placed in regular removal proceedings. 	See Maldonado v. Olson, ---
F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL 2374411 at * 11 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025) (“Historically, noncitizens who
resided in the United States, but who had previously entered without inspection, were not deemed
‘arriving aliens’ under § 1225(b), but were instead subject to § 1226(a).”) 	See also Rodriguez v.
Bostock, 779 F.Supp.3d 1239, 1259 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (noting ICE's “longstanding agency practice
[of] applying Section 1226(a) to inadmissible noncitizens already residing in the country.”); Matter
of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216, 2025 WL 2674169 (BIA 2025) (“We acknowledge that for
years Immigration Judges have conducted bond hearings for aliens who entered the United States
without inspection.”)
On May 15, 2025, however, the BIA decided Matter of Q. Li, 29 I&N 66, 2025 WL 1442892
(BIA May 15, 2025). 	In that decision, the BIA changed course, finding that “an applicant for
admission who is arrested and detained without a warrant while arriving in the United States, whether
or not at a port of entry, and subsequently placed in removal proceedings is detained under [Section
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1225(b)], and is ineligible for any subsequent release on bond under [Section 1226(a)].” Matter of
Q. Li, 29 I&N at 69.
Several months later, on July 8, 2025, the Government announced a new policy in an internal
memorandum entitled 	“Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for
Admission.” Pursuant to this policy memo, the Government stated that it now deemed all persons
who entered the United States without inspection “applicants for admission” under Section 1225(a)
and, therefore, subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A). 7 See Maldonado, 2025
WL 2374411 at * 11. 	See also Martinez v. Hyde, --- F.Supp.3d ---, 2025 WL 2084238 at * 4 (D.
Mass. July 24, 2025) (noting that “mandatory detention for all applicants has ... been the official
policy of the [DHS] .... since July 8, 2025, when Acting Director of [ICE], Todd M. Lyons, issued
an internal memorandum explaining that the agency had ‘revisited its legal position’”).
On September 5, 2025, the BIA issued a precedential decision 8 in Matter of Yajure Hurtado,
29 I&N Dec. 216, 2025 WL 2674169 (BIA 2025). 	Therein, the BIA considered the following
question: “Does the INA require that all applicants for admission, even those like the respondent who
have entered without admission or inspection and have been residing in the United States for years
7 To this Court’s knowledge, the “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission” policy
memorandum is not available on a Government website. However, a district court recently explained that this internal
policy memo was “leaked by legal advocacy groups” and quoted it as providing as follows: “DHS, in coordination with
the Department of Justice (DOJ), has revisited its legal position on detention and release authorities. DHS has determined
that [section 1225] of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), rather than [section 1226], is the applicable immigration
detention authority for all applicants for admission.” Martinez v. Hyde, --- F.Supp.3d ---, 2025 WL 2084238 at * 4 and
fn 10 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025). See also E.V., et al. v. Raycraft, et al., 2025 WL 3122837 at * 9 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 7,
2025).
8 The BIA may designate a decision as precedential. BIA precedential decisions “serve as precedents in all proceedings
involving the same issue or issues.” 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(g)(2). See Gimenez Gonzalez v. Raycraft, 2025 WL 3006185 at fn
3 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 27, 2025); Chavez v. Noem, ---- F.Supp.3d -----, 2025 WL 2730228 at * 3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025).
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without lawful status, be subject to mandatory detention for the duration of their immigration
proceedings, and thus the Immigration Judge lacks authority over a bond request filed by an alien in
this category?” Id. at 220. After considering the statutory language and legislative history of Sections
1225 and 1226, the BIA answered this question in the affirmative, concluding that IJs lack authority
to grant bond to aliens who are present in the United States without admission, even with respect to
aliens who have been residing in the United States for a lengthy period of time following entry without
inspection. 9 Id. at 225, 228.
III. 	Analysis
In Count I of the Petition (entitled “Violation of the INA”), Petitioners assert that Respondents
“are unlawfully detaining Petitioners without bond pursuant to the mandatory detention provision of
8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(2).” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 70.) Petitioners allege that “Section 1225(b)(2) does not apply
to Petitioners, who previously entered the country and have long been residing in the United States
prior to being apprehended and detained by Respondents in August 2025.” 	(Id. at ¶ 71.) 	Rather,
Petitioners allege that they are “plainly subject to the detention provisions of § 1226(a) and are
therefore entitled to custody determinations by ICE, and if custody is continued, to custody
redeterminations (i.e., bond hearings) by an IJ.” (Id. at ¶ 72.) Petitioners assert that “[t]he application
9 In support of its conclusion, the BIA explained: “Aliens, like the respondent, who surreptitiously cross into the United
States remain applicants for admission until and unless they are lawfully inspected and admitted by an immigration
officer. Remaining in the United States for a lengthy period of time following entry without inspection, by itself, does
not constitute an ‘admission.’ [citation omitted]. Likewise, being arrested pursuant to a warrant and placed into removal
proceedings does not constitute an admission. Therefore, just as Immigration Judges have no authority to redetermine
the custody of arriving aliens who present themselves at a port of entry, they likewise have no authority to redetermine
the custody conditions of an alien who crossed the border unlawfully without inspection, even if that alien has avoided
apprehension for more than 2 years. Holding otherwise would require reading the INA to conclude that Congress intended
that aliens unlawfully entering the United States without inspection, particularly those who successfully evaded
apprehension for more than 2 years, be rewarded with the opportunity for a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge,
whereas aliens who present themselves to officers at a port of entry are ineligible for a bond hearing. This is an
incongruous result which is not supported by the plain language or any reasonable interpretation of the INA.” Id. at 228.
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of § 1225(b)(2) to [them] unlawfully mandates their continued detention without bond and violates
the INA.” (Id. at ¶ 73.)
In Count II (entitled “Violation of Due Process”), Petitioners allege that “[t]he government’s
detention of Petitioners without an opportunity for a custody determination or bond hearing to decide
whether [they] are a flight risk or danger to others violates [their] right to due process.” (Id. at ¶ 77.)
In their Motion to Dismiss, Respondents request that the Court dismiss all Respondents except
Respondent Raycraft (the Director of ICE’s Detroit Field Office) because he is Petitioners’
“immediate custodian” and, therefore, the only proper Respondent in this habeas suit. (Doc. No. 12-
1). Respondents next argue that the Petition should be dismissed in its entirety because Petitioners
have failed to exhaust their claims with the BIA. (Id.) 	On the merits, Respondents maintain that
Petitioners’ due process claim fails because “administrative immigration proceedings define aliens’
due process rights, and Petitioners received all process available in those proceedings.” 	(Id. at
PageID# 220.) 	Lastly, Respondents assert that ICE properly detained Petitioners under Section
1225(b)(2) and, therefore, Petitioners are not entitled to a bond hearing. (Id.)
In response, Petitioners argue that the Court should exercise its discretion and waive the
administrative exhaustion requirement because appeal to the BIA would “both cause intolerable delay
and be futile.” 	(Doc. No. 15 at PageID# 238.) 	Petitioners next assert that, although procedural
protections exist in the context of removal proceedings, “Petitioners have a liberty interest in freedom
from detention that is distinct from their liberty interest in remaining in the U.S.” and that
“[d]eprivation of either requires due process.” 	(Id. at PageID# 242.) 	Lastly, Petitioners argue, at
length, that the mandatory detention provision set forth in Section 1225(b)(2)(A) only applies to the
inspection of recent arrivals, whereas the discretionary framework in Section 1226(a) governs the
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detention of individuals such as Petitioners. (Id. at PageID#s 243-251.) 	Petitioners request that “this
Court should simply order [their] immediate release rather than [require] that another bond hearing
be held before the agency.” (Id. at PageID# 251.)
The Court will address the parties’ arguments, in turn, below.
A. 	Proper Respondent
Respondents first argue that the only proper respondent in a habeas corpus case is the
detainee’s “immediate custodian.” (Doc. No. 12-1 at PageID# 221.) Respondents therefore assert
that only the only proper Respondent herein is Respondent Raycraft because, as the Director of the
ICE Detroit Field Office, Respondent Raycraft is the Petitioners’ immediate custodian for purposes
of the instant Petition. (Id.) Respondents maintain that Respondents Lyons (Acting Director of ICE),
Noem (Secretary of DHS), and Bondi (the Attorney General) are not proper Respondents and should
therefore be dismissed. (Id.) Petitioners fail to acknowledge, address, or otherwise respond to this
argument in their Response. (Doc. No. 15.)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243, a writ of habeas corpus may be issued by “the person having
custody of the person detained.” In the context of a habeas corpus petition filed by an alien detained
in a local detention facility contracted by ICE, the Sixth Circuit has held that “although the warden
of each detention facility technically has day-to-day control over alien detainees, the [ICE District]
Director for the district where a detention facility is located ‘has power over’ alien habeas corpus
petitioners.” 	Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 320 (6th Cir. 2003). 	Therefore, the Sixth Circuit
explained, ”a detained alien generally must designate his immediate custodian – the INS District
Director for the district where he is being detained—as the respondent to his habeas corpus petition.”
Roman, 340 F.3d at 320. 	See also Woldeghergish v. Lynch, 2025 WL 2469584 at * 1 (S.D. Ohio
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Aug. 5, 2025), adopted by 2025 WL 2468042 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 27, 2025); Hango v. McAleenan, 2019
WL 7944352 at *2-3 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2019) (granting motions to dismiss by DHS Secretary,
USAG, and County Sheriff because only the Field Director of the ICE Detroit Field Office is the
proper respondent), adopted by 2019 WL 6695829 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 9, 2019); Orozco-Valenzuela v.
Holder, 2015 WL 1530631 at * 4 (N.D. Ohio April 6, 2015) (noting that the Field Office Director of
the Detroit Field Office of ICE is the proper respondent for a habeas petition brought by an alien in
ICE custody at detention facilities in Ohio.)
In light of the above, and in the absence of any opposition from Petitioners, the Court grants
Respondents’ Motion to the extent it requests the dismissal of Respondents Lyons, Noem, and
Bondi. 10 Respondents Lyons, Noem, and Bondi are hereby dismissed from the instant action.
B. 	Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The Court will next address Respondents’ argument that the Petition should be dismissed
without prejudice because Petitioners have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. 	The
general rule is that “a party may not seek federal judicial review of an adverse administrative
determination until the party has first sought all possible relief within the agency itself.” Howell v.
INS, 72 F.3d 288, 291 (2nd Cir. 1995) (quoting Guitard v. United States Sec'y of Navy, 967 F.2d 737,
740 (2nd Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51,
56 (2nd Cir. 2003). 	“Exhaustion of administrative remedies serves numerous purposes, including
protecting the authority of administrative agencies, limiting interference in agency affairs, and
10 In Roman, the Sixth Circuit further explained that the Attorney General may also be named as a respondent to an alien’s
habeas corpus petition “under extraordinary circumstances where it is necessary to preserve a person’s access to habeas
corpus relief.” Roman, 340 F.3d at 325. Here, Petitioners do not argue that there are any “extraordinary circumstances”
that would warrant naming the Attorney General as a Respondent herein. Thus, the Court does not reach this issue.
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promoting judicial efficiency by resolving potential issues and developing the factual record.”
Beharry, 329 F.3d at 56. See also Anversa v. Partners Healthcare Sys., Inc., 835 F.3d 167, 175-176
(1st Cir. 2016) (noting that exhaustion allows “an agency the first opportunity to apply [its] expertise”
and “obviat[es] the need for [judicial] review in cases in which the agency provides appropriate
redress.”)
The requirement of administrative exhaustion can be either statutorily or judicially imposed
as a matter of prudence. See Beharry, 329 F.3d at 56. See also Perkovic v. I.N.S., 33 F.3d 615, 619
(6th Cir. 1994) (holding that exhaustion requirements not written into the text of a statute are
prudential, not jurisdictional); Brito v. Garland, 22 F.4th 240, 255 (1st Cir. 2021) (“There are two
species of exhaustion: statutory and common-law.”); Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir.
2007). 	“The former deprives a federal court of jurisdiction, while the latter ‘cedes discretion to a
[federal] court to decline the exercise of jurisdiction.’” Brito, 22 F.4th at 255 (quoting Anversa, 835
F.3d at 174). See also Puga, 488 F.3d at 815. In other words, “exhaustion of administrative remedies
is absolutely required if explicitly mandated by Congress,” but “courts have more latitude in dealing
with exhaustion questions when Congress has remained silent.” Portela-Gonzalez v. Sec'y of the
Navy, 109 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir. 1997).
Here, the parties agree (and the Court presumes) that the requirement of administrative
exhaustion in the instant matter falls within this Court’s discretion. (Doc. No. 12-1 at PageID# 221;
Doc. No. 15 at PageID# 237.) The Court notes that the parties fail to sufficiently identify, discuss,
or direct this Court’s attention to any binding authority regarding the appropriate standard for
evaluating whether to require exhaustion as a prudential matter in this context. And this Court is not
aware of any Sixth Circuit precedent regarding the application of prudential exhaustion in this
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particular context. 11 Several other Circuits, however, have examined prudential exhaustion in similar
circumstances. 	In the absence of any meaningful argument from counsel regarding this issue, and
consistent with other recent district court decisions in this Circuit, 12 this Court will set forth and apply
the Ninth Circuit’s test for prudential exhaustion below.
Under the Ninth Circuit’s test, courts may require prudential exhaustion when:
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper
record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage
the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is
likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for
judicial review.
Puga, 488 F.3d at 815 (citations omitted) (hereinafter “the Puga factors”). 	See also Hernandez v.
Sessions, 872 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2017). 	If a petitioner fails to exhaust prudentially required
administrative remedies, then “a district court ordinarily should either dismiss the petition without
prejudice or stay the proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies.” Leonardo v. Crawford,
646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011)).
11 The Sixth Circuit has held that, as a general rule, “[f]ederal prisoners must exhaust their administrative remedies prior
to filing a habeas petition under § 2241.” Fazzini v. Northeast Ohio Correctional Center, 473 F.3d 229, 231 (6th Cir.
2006). See also Little v. Hopkins, 638 F.2d 953, 953-954 (6th Cir. 1981); Aron v. LaManna, 4 Fed. Appx. 232, 233 (6th
Cir. 2001). Moreover, in several recent decisions, District Judges in the Northern District of Ohio have applied principles
of prudential exhaustion to dismiss § 2241 petitions without prejudice due to the petitioner’s failure to appeal an IJ’s
denial of bond to the BIA before filing his or her habeas petition. See Villalta v. Greene, et al., --- F.Supp.3d --- 2025
WL 2472886 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2025); Laguna Espinoza v. Director of Detroit Field Office, ICE, 2025 WL 2878173
(N.D. Ohio Oct. 9, 2025); Abdoulaye Ba v. Director of Detroit Field Office, ICE, 2025 WL 2977712 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 22,
2025).
12 Numerous district courts in this Circuit (including this Court) have applied the Ninth Circuit’s test for prudential
exhaustion in the immigration context, including in the context of challenges to an IJ’s denial of bond. 	See, e.g.,
Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 2025 WL 2444114 at * 8-9 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025);
Shweika v. DHS, 2015 WL 6541689 at * 12 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2015) (applying Ninth Circuit’s prudential exhaustion
framework in immigration context); Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379 at * 4 (same); Mejia v. Woosley, 2025 WL
2933852 at * 2 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 15, 2025)(same); Sanchez Alvarez v. Noem, et al., 2025 WL 2942648 at * 2-3 (W.D. Mich.
Oct. 17, 2025) (same).
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The Court first notes that, in their respective filings, neither Petitioners nor Respondents
directly address the three Puga factors or make any attempt to apply them to the question of whether
to require exhaustion herein. The Court has nonetheless carefully considered the Puga factors and,
for the reasons set forth below, finds that all three weigh in favor of requiring administrative
exhaustion.
Beginning with the first Puga factor, the Court finds that the BIA’s expertise makes agency
consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision. As noted above, in
their Notices of Appeal to the BIA, both Petitioners raise numerous grounds for appeal that hinge on
the interpretation and application of the governing removal regime and statutes. 	For example,
Petitioners argue that they were not “applicants for admission” but, rather, “applicants for asylum,”
and urge the BIA to find that “a grant of asylum is not an ‘admission’ to the United States.” (Doc.
No. 2-7 at PageID# 95; Doc. No. 4-2 at PageID# 176.) 	Petitioners further assert, as grounds for
appeal, that “Hurtado is distinguishable on its facts because it involved [a] person who was granted
TPS [i.e., temporary protected status], which then expired, causing him to revert to applicant for
admission status, and there was no information that Hurtado had ever applied for asylum.” 	(Id.)
Petitioners also maintain that “in any case, [their] ‘applicant for admission’ status was not
administratively final because [they] had not admitted or conceded any additional charges.” (Id.)
The Court finds that principles of exhaustion weigh in favor of allowing the BIA to apply its
considerable agency expertise to consider and determine these important issues. 	Indeed, in their
Notices of Appeal, Petitioners themselves characterize the above issues as “complex, novel, unusual,
or recurring” and stress the “need to settle inconsistencies among the rulings of different immigration
judges” and “establish a precedent construing the meaning of laws, regulations, or procedures.”
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(Doc. No. 2-7 at PageID# 98; Doc. No. 4-2 at PageID# 179.) While Petitioners do not expressly raise
herein all of the issues that are set forth in their Notices of Appeal, the Court nonetheless finds that
the BIA’s consideration of Petitioners’ arguments and issues on appeal, with the benefit of its
significant experience and expertise with the relevant removal statutes and regulations, is necessary
to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision in the instant case.
For similar reasons, the Court finds that the third Puga factor weighs heavily in favor of
requiring exhaustion. As noted above, the third Puga factor asks whether “administrative review is
likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.”
Puga, 488 F.3d at 815. It does not appear to be disputed that, if the BIA were to agree with Petitioners
on even one of the six (6) arguments raised in their respective Notices of Appeal, Petitioners would
be provided a new bond hearing where they could request release under Section 1226. 	Requiring
exhaustion under these circumstances therefore promotes the main purposes of exhaustion, i.e., it
protects the BIA’s authority by allowing it the opportunity to correct its own mistakes and, further,
promotes judicial efficiency by resolving potential issues and potentially obviating the need for
judicial review. See Beharry, 329 F.3d at 56. See also Fazzini, 473 F.3d at 232 (noting that the two
main purposes of administrative exhaustion in the § 2241 context are to (1) “protect administrative
agency authority” by allowing “an agency the opportunity to correct its own mistakes with respect to
the programs it administers before it is haled into federal court;” and (2) promote judicial efficiency.)
Lastly, the Court also finds that the second Puga factor weighs in favor of requiring
administrative exhaustion. As noted supra, this factor asks whether “relaxation of the [exhaustion]
requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme.” Puga, 488 F.3d
at 815. Here, Petitioners have made clear that they believe the BIA has “predetermined the issue”
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and that it will take too long to resolve their respective bond appeals. (Doc. No. 15 at PageID#s 238-
239.) 	Indeed, Petitioners emphasize that habeas is their preferred strategy, asserting that habeas
“demands a ‘swift’ remedy” in the face of allegedly illegal detention. 	(Id. at PageID# 239.) 	The
Court, thus, has concerns that relaxing the exhaustion requirement would encourage the deliberate
bypass of the administrative scheme in favor of what may be perceived as a potentially more favorable
and/or timely reviewing body, i.e., federal court. This is particularly problematic given the important
purposes served by exhaustion, including protecting the authority of administrative agencies and
limiting interference in agency affairs. Beharry, 329 F.3d at 56.
Accordingly, and for all the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the three Puga factors
weigh in favor of requiring Petitioners to exhaust their administrative remedies.
Nonetheless, even if the three Puga factors set forth above weigh in favor of requiring
exhaustion, a court may waive the prudential exhaustion requirement if “administrative remedies are
inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable
injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994,
1000 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation and quotation marks omitted). See Beharry, 329 F.3d at 62 (finding
that exhaustion of administrative remedies may not be required when “(1) available remedies provide
no genuine opportunity for adequate relief; (2) irreparable injury may occur without immediate
judicial relief; (3) administrative appeal would be futile; and (4) in certain instances a plaintiff has
raised a substantial constitutional question.”) (quotation omitted). See also Aron v. LaManna, 4 Fed.
Appx. 232, 233 (6th Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal of § 2241 petition on basis of failure to exhaust
administrative remedies where “nothing in the record indicates that it would have been futile for Aron
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21
to pursue his administrative remedies or that those remedies would have been unable to afford him
the relief he requests.”).
Here, Petitioners argue that this Court should exercise its discretion to waive the prudential
exhaustion requirement because it “would both cause intolerable delay and be futile.” (Doc. No. 15
at PageID# 238.) Regarding the issue of delay, Petitioners argue that “[a]gency data shows that, on
average, the BIA took over six months to decide bond appeals in 2024.” (Id.) Petitioners maintain
that “such a delay surely means hardship for Petitioners, who would have to remain unlawfully
detained for months ... before the BIA could rule on the legality of their bond denial and on any
underlying merits appeal.” (Id.) Regarding futility, Petitioners assert that “waiver based on futility
is especially appropriate when, as here, the administrative agency has ‘predetermined the disputed
issue’ by having a ‘clearly stated position’ that the petitioner is not eligible for the relief sought.” (Id.
at PageID#s 238-239) (citation omitted). Petitioners also argue that waiver is appropriate given that
they have raised non-frivolous constitutional questions that are purely legal in nature, which neither
an immigration judge nor the BIA are positioned to properly adjudicate. (Id. at PageID# 239-240.)
In response, Respondents argue that neither Petitioners’ likelihood of success at the
administrative level, nor the fact that they are detained, “has any bearing on the exhaustion analysis.”
(Doc. No. 12-1 at PageID# 222.) Respondents further assert that the risk of irreparable harm due to
continued detention does not outweigh the importance of administrative exhaustion. (Id.)
Upon careful consideration, the Court declines to waive the administrative exhaustion
requirement. 	As an initial matter, the Court is not persuaded that it would be futile to require
exhaustion under the circumstances presented. 	As discussed above, Petitioners raise numerous
grounds for appeal before the BIA that are distinct from the statutory interpretation issue that they
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maintain has been “predetermined” by the BIA in Hurtado, i.e., whether Petitioners are subject to
mandatory detention under Section 1225 or the discretionary detention framework in Section 1226.
Specifically, Petitioners argue that Hurtado is not retroactive and, further, that it is distinguishable
because it involved an individual who had been granted TPS, rather than an individual that (like
Petitioners herein) have applied for asylum. (Doc. No. 2-7 at PageID# 95; Doc. No. 4-2 at PageID#
176.) 	Petitioners also raise a host of other arguments on appeal, including that (1) they were not
“applicants for admission” but, rather, “applicants for asylum,” and that “a grant of asylum is not an
‘admission’ to the United States;” and (2) their “‘applicant for admission’ status was not
administratively final because [they] had not admitted or conceded any additional charges.” (Id.)
This Court cannot say that the BIA has “predetermined” each and every one of the six (6)
arguments raised by Petitioners in their Notices of Appeal or that it is otherwise futile to raise them
before the BIA. And, indeed, Petitioners do not make any specific argument to the contrary.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the BIA is unlikely to agree with Petitioners, the Court finds
that the allegedly “high probability of denial” of their bond appeals does not weigh in favor of waiving
exhaustion. Indeed, several courts (including this Court) have found that “the alleged probability that
a petitioner's argument in administrative proceedings may fail is ‘not tantamount to stating that it
would be futile to raise it.’” Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2025
WL 2444114 at * 11 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025) (quoting Beharry, 329 F.3d at 62.) See also Laguna
Espinoza, 2025 WL 2878173 at * 3. Indeed, to the contrary, “’many of the purposes for requiring
exhaustion’ may be served by permitting agency review in the first instance.” Hernandez Torrealba,
2025 WL 2444114 at * 11 (quoting Beharry, 329 F.3d at 62.) Thus, even assuming that there is a
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23
high probability that Petitioners’ bond appeals to the BIA will fail, the Court finds that this is not a
proper basis for waiving the exhaustion requirement.
The Court also rejects the argument that exhaustion should be waived because Petitioners
raise a “non-frivolous” constitutional question. In support of this argument, Petitioners rely
principally on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Bangura v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 487 (6th Cir. 2006). In
that case, Plaintiff and her husband argued that the BIA’s denial of Plaintiff’s spousal immigration
petition violated the Due Process Clause, the INA, and the APA. Id. at 491. Defendants moved to
dismiss on the basis of lack of subject matter exhaustion because Plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies, as well as for failure to state a claim. Id. at 493. The district court dismissed
Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim on the basis of failure to exhaust, and rejected Plaintiffs’
substantive due process claim for failure to state a claim. Id.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit found that the district court had erred in dismissing Plaintiffs’
procedural due process claim for failure to exhaust. The court explained as follows:
[T]he Supreme Court has long held that ... the exhaustion requirement is far from
absolute. *** Exhaustion of administrative remedies may not be required in cases
of non-frivolous constitutional challenges to an agency's procedures. *** In the
immigration context, several circuits have indicated that “constitutional challenges to
the INA and INS procedures and some due process claims do not require exhaustion
because the BIA does not have the power to adjudicate these claims.” Sundar v. INS,
328 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir.2003) ***
In this case, the district court erred in holding that Plaintiffs were required to exhaust
their administrative remedies before filing in federal court. It is undisputed that no
statute or administrative rule required Plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative
remedies. *** Thus, whether Plaintiffs should be required to exhaust their
administrative remedies is a matter of sound judicial discretion. *** Here,
requiring Plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies does not serve the
interests of judicial economy. Although the BIA undoubtedly could grant Plaintiffs
some relief and possibly render Plaintiffs' procedural due process claim moot, it does
not have the authority to adjudicate Plaintiffs' substantive due process claim. ***
Moreover, as discussed infra at Section II, this Court must address the merits of one
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of Plaintiffs' APA claims. It does not serve the interests of judicial economy to dismiss
Plaintiffs' claims for failure to exhaust when the federal courts must nonetheless hear
other claims that are integrally related to the dismissed claims. Therefore, the district
court abused its discretion in dismissing Plaintiffs' procedural due process claim for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Id. at 493-494 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The Court finds that Bangura does not require district courts to waive exhaustion in every
instance where a non-frivolous constitutional claim is raised. Rather, in Bangura, the Sixth Circuit
emphasized that, while district courts may elect to waive exhaustion where a petitioner raises a non-
frivolous constitutional questions, the decision of whether to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies is ultimately committed to the district court’s “sound judicial discretion.” 	Id. at 494.
Indeed, in subsequent cases, the Sixth Circuit has continued to emphasize the discretionary nature of
the waiver of exhaustion, expressly noting that while “exhaustion need not be required for non-
frivolous questions,” “this does not mean that all non-frivolous constitutional challenges are free from
exhaustion requirements.” Shearson v. Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 594-595 (6th Cir. 2013).
Here, the Court finds that waiver is not required. 	While Petitioners raise a due process
challenge to the IJ’s denial of bond, this claim (like Petitioners’ INA claim) is predicated on the IJ’s
allegedly incorrect interpretation and application of Sections 1225 and 1226. 	See Doc. No. 1 at
PageID#22. This Court agrees with another District Judge in this District that, under these
circumstances, “any determination regarding detention here turns on an interpretation and application
of the governing removal regime” and “in the first instance, such review should proceed before the
[BIA] to ‘apply its experience and expertise without judicial interference.’” Laguna Espinoza, 2025
WL 2878173 at * 2 (internal quotation omitted.) See Ba, 2025 WL 2977712 at * 2 (same); Villalta,
2025 WL 2472886 at *2 (same). 	See also Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir.
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2003) (acknowledging that a “petitioner must exhaust administrative remedies before raising the
constitutional claims in a habeas petition when those claims are reviewable by the BIA on appeal”).
Accordingly, and for all the reasons set forth above, the Court declines to waive the exhaustion
requirement based on the alleged futility of Petitioners’ appeal to the BIA.
The Court also declines to waive the exhaustion requirement based on Petitioners’ argument
that they are suffering, and will continue to suffer, irreparable harm from their continued allegedly
unlawful detention. (Doc. No. 15 at PageID# 238.) Petitioners allege that Mendoza has been detained
since August 6, 2025 and Diaz has been detained since August 13, 2025 -- a total of 98 and 91 days,
respectively, as of the date of this Order. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 20, 21.) The IJ issued his written bond
decisions on September 25, 2025, and Petitioners filed their respective Notices of Appeal on October
7, 2025. (Id.) See also Doc. No. 2-7 at PageID# 95; Doc. No. 4-2 at PageID# 176. It is not clear
when the BIA will address their bond appeals, but Petitioners argue that, on average, the BIA “took
over six months to decide bond appeals in 2024.” (Doc. No. 15 at PageID# 238.) Thus, Petitioners
argue that it is possible that the BIA may not rule on their bond appeals until April 2026 (i.e., six
months after the filing of their October 7, 2025 Notices of Appeal).
The Court recognizes and appreciates Petitioners’ concerns. 	However, it is speculative to
make any assumptions regarding when the BIA will resolve Petitioners’ bond appeals. There is
insufficient information before the Court at this time to demonstrate that exhaustion of Petitioners’
administrative remedies will be unduly prolonged (and, indeed, it is possible that the BIA rulings may
be imminent.) Moreover, even assuming that there may be a period of additional delay associated
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with awaiting rulings from the BIA, the Court is not persuaded that the risk of irreparable harm to
Petitioners outweighs the importance of requiring exhaustion under the circumstances presented. 13
Accordingly, and for all of the above reasons, the Court finds that Petitioners must exhaust
their administrative remedies before obtaining federal district court review of the claims set forth in
the Petition. Thus, and because Petitioners have failed to demonstrate grounds for excusing
exhaustion, the Court dismisses the Petition without prejudice.
IV. 	Conclusion
For all the reasons set forth above, Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 12) is granted
as follows. Respondents Lyons, Noem, and Bondi are hereby dismissed, and the Petition (Doc. No.
1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Without a certificate of appealability, a habeas petitioner cannot appeal a final order in a
habeas proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Issuance of a certificate of appealability requires a
petitioner to make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). This means that the petitioner must show that reasonable jurists could find the district
court’s determination of the relevant constitutional claims debatable or incorrect. Tennard v. Dretke,
13 The Court notes that, in every habeas case under both 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254, habeas petitioners argue that they
are being detained or imprisoned in violation of their constitutional rights. Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit has made clear
that as a general rule, “[f]ederal prisoners must exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing a habeas petition.”
Fazzini, 473 F.3d at 231 (in context of § 2241 petition). See also Aron, 4 Fed. Appx. at 233 (§ 2241 petition); Rust v.
Zent, 17 F.3d 155, 160 (6th Cir. 1994) (§ 2254 petition); Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 414 (6th Cir. 2009) (§ 2254
petition).
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542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004). The petitioner need not show that the appeal would succeed to be eligible
for a certificate of appealability. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003).
Because of an absence of controlling precedent in this Circuit on the proper procedure on the
facts and circumstances presented, the Court acknowledges that reasonable jurists may disagree with
the application of prudential exhaustion herein. For these reasons, the Court GRANTS a Certificate
of Appealability on Counts One and Two of the Petition.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 12, 2025 	s/Pamela A. Barker
PAMELA A. BARKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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