Foster v. North East Correctional

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER FOSTER, ) CASE NO. 4:25-cv-295
)
)
Plaintiff, ) CHIEF JUDGE SARA LIOI
)
vs. )
)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
NORTHEAST OHIO CORRECTIONAL
CENTER,
)
)
)
Defendant. )
Before the Court are multiple motions filed by plaintiff Christopher Foster (“Foster”). First,
Foster filed three motions which the Court construes as requesting leave to amend Foster’s
complaint and serve it upon the State of Ohio. (Doc. Nos. 35–37 (Motions for Leave).)1 Second,
Foster moves to reopen this case under Rule 60(b)(3). (Doc. No. 40 (Rule 60(b)(3) Motion).)
Briefing on all motions has now closed. For the reasons stated below, the motions are DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND2
On February 14, 2025, Foster filed the complaint in this action against defendant Northeast
Ohio Correctional Center (“NEOCC” or “defendant”), asserting a claim for breach of contract and
claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Rehabilitation Act (“RA”). (Doc.
1 Foster also filed a motion for leave to reply in support of Doc. No. 36. (Doc. No. 41.) Because Foster does not require
leave to reply, and because the motion for leave to reply contains the substance of Foster’s proposed reply, the Court
construes the motion as a reply in support of Doc. No. 36.
2 The factual background of this case is more fully set out in the Court’s opinion and order dismissing Foster’s
complaint (Doc. No. 25 (Dismissal Opinion and Order)) and the Court’s opinion and order denying Foster’s Rule
60(b)(1) motion. (Doc. No. 34 (Opinion and Order on Rule 60(b)(1) Motion).) Herein, the Court provides only the
relevant procedural history.
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No. 1 (Complaint); Doc. No. 13 (Supplement to Complaint).) The complaint sought wide ranging
relief, including $5.4 billion in damages for the alleged contract breach, $2,222,222,222 in
additional damages, and various forms of equitable relief. (Doc. No. 1, at 12–14.)3
The Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice on August 8, 2025. (Doc. No. 25, at 8.)
The Court held that Foster could not maintain any claim against NEOCC because it is a non-jural
entity. (Id. at 5–6.) Next, the Court held that, even if NEOCC were a jural entity, the complaint
failed to state a facially plausible claim. (Id. at 6–8.) The court then entered final judgment. (Doc.
No. 26 (Judgment Entry).)
Shortly after, Foster moved under Rule 60(b)(1) to reopen the case. (Doc. No. 27 (Rule
60(b)(1) Motion).) In his Rule 60(b)(1) motion, Foster argued primarily that (1) he had sued the
State of Ohio, not NEOCC (id. at 2–4), and (2) that he had adequately stated claims for relief. (Id.
at 5–6.) The Court rejected both arguments. (See generally Doc. No. 34.)
Foster now moves to reopen this case under Rule 60(b)(3), arguing that “[d]efendant’s
lawyer did not give true information to this Court[.]” (Doc. No. 40, at 1.) Foster further moves to
add Ohio as a party and serve Ohio, arguing once again that “[t]he State [of Ohio] [] has always
been the only [d]efendant” (Doc. No. 37, at 2 (record citation omitted)) and that his failure to name
and serve Ohio as a defendant was a mistake the Court should allow him to correct. (Doc. No. 35,
at 1, 3; Doc. No. 36, at 1, 4.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
To obtain relief from a final judgment under Rule 60(b)(3), a movant must establish “by
3 All page number references to the record herein are to the consecutive page numbers applied to each individual
document by the Court’s electronic filing system.
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clear and convincing evidence that [the nonmovant] deliberately engaged in some act of fraud,
misrepresentation or other misconduct that adversely affected the fairness of the proceedings.”
Thurmond v. Wayne Cnty. Sheriff Dep't, 564 F. App'x 823, 827 (6th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
“Fraud is the knowing misrepresentation of a material fact, or concealment of the same when there
is a duty to disclose, done to induce another to act to his or her detriment.” Info-Hold, Inc. v. Sound
Merch., Inc., 538 F.3d 448, 456 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). A “misrepresentation” is an
affirmative misstatement. See Jordan v. Paccar, Inc., 97 F.3d 1452, 1996 WL 528950, at *6 (6th
Cir. 1996) (citing Platsis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 946 F.2d 38, 41–42 (6th Cir. 1991)). Finally,
“misconduct” reaches “questionable behavior affecting the fairness of litigation[.]” Id. At bottom,
Rule 60(b)(3) requires “a deliberate act that adversely impacted the fairness of the relevant legal
proceeding[.]” Info-Hold, Inc., 538 F.3d at 455 (quoting Jordan, 1996 WL 528950, at *6).
Generally, leave to amend should be freely given when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(2). But it “is a different story” when a motion for leave to amend comes after entry of final
judgment. See Leisure Caviar, LLC v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616 F.3d 612, 615 (6th Cir.
2010). “Following entry of final judgment, a party may not seek to amend their complaint without
first moving to alter, set aside or vacate judgment pursuant to either Rule 59 or 60.” Pond v. Haas,
674 F. App'x 466, 472 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Morse v. McWhorter, 290 F.3d 795, 799 (6th Cir.
2002)). In other words, a movant seeking post-judgment leave to amend “must meet the
requirements for reopening a case established by Rules 59 or 60.” Leisure Caviar, LLC, 616 F.3d
at 616 (citations omitted).
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III. DISCUSSION
a. Foster’s Rule 60(b)(3) Motion is Denied
While his filings are difficult to follow, Foster appears to base his Rule 60(b)(3) motion on
three grounds. First, Foster repeats his argument that Ohio has been the defendant in this case since
its inception. (Doc. No. 40, at 2–3; Doc. No. 46, at 5.) Second, he appears to allege that he was
retaliated against because of his actions related to this litigation. (Doc. No. 40, at 3–4.) Finally,
Foster alleges that defendant’s lawyers failed to provide truthful information to this Court. (Id. at
4; Doc. No. 46, at 1–3.) Each argument fails.
First, the Court will not consider the argument that Ohio is a defendant in this case. “A
Rule 60(b) motion may be denied if it is merely an attempt to relitigate previously decided issues.”
McNeil v. United States, 113 F. App'x 95, 98–99 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). The Court has
already decided the identity of the defendant here. (See Doc. No. 34, at 4–5.) That Foster cites
purportedly “new” evidence and case law on the issue (see e.g., Doc. No. 40, at 2) makes no
difference. See Jinks v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 250 F.3d 381, 385 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Rule 60(b) does not
allow a defeated litigant a second chance to convince the court to rule in his or her favor by
presenting new explanations, legal theories, or proof.” (citation omitted)). The Court accordingly
denies Foster’s Rule 60(b)(3) motion to the extent it seeks to relitigate the identity of the defendant.
Second, even assuming that Rule 60(b)(3) covers the retaliation Foster alleges, Foster fails
to support his allegations with clear and convincing evidence. Foster alleges that NEOCC “used
force on” him for refusing to abandon this suit. (Doc. No. 40, at 3.) In support of his allegations,
Foster provides only communications vaguely referencing some “use of force” in March of 2025
(Doc. Nos. 36-1; 37-3; 40-3) and conduct reports indicating that Foster was written up for making
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a disturbance. (Doc. Nos. 37-2; 40-4.) At most, this evidence could support a finding that force
was used against Foster. But there are any number of permissible reasons prison staff may use
force. See e.g., Weaver v. Altiere, No. 4:14-cv-2399, 2016 WL 1618146, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Apr.
22, 2016) (prison staff may use force “in a good faith effort for valid penological purposes.”
(citations omitted)). Foster fails to provide evidence indicating that force was used against him in
bad faith or for any impermissible purpose such as retaliation. Foster thus fails to provide sufficient
evidence to support his allegations of misconduct.
Finally, Foster argues that “the [d]efendant’s lawyer did not give true information to this
Court[.]” (Doc. No. 40, at 1.) Foster appears to allege that NEOCC’s lawyers (1) failed to disclose
NEOCC’s alleged copying of Foster’s mail (id. at 4); (2) failed to disclose some “implied in fact
contract” they had with Foster (id.; Doc. No. 46, at 1); and (3) falsely argued that NEOCC is not
a “State agency[.]” (Doc. No. 46, at 3.) Even if Foster provided clear and convincing evidence to
support these allegations, they fail to justify any relief under Rule 60(b)(3).
First, Foster fails to establish that the alleged failures to disclose are actionable under Rule
60(b)(3). To constitute fraud for the purposes of Rule 60(b)(3), a failure to disclose must be
accompanied by a duty to disclose. See Info-Hold, Inc., 538 F.3d at 456 (“Fraud is the knowing
misrepresentation of a material fact, or concealment of the same when there is a duty to disclose,
done to induce another to act to his or her detriment.” (citation omitted) (emphasis added)). Foster
fails to even allege that NEOCC’s counsel had any duty to disclose. He thus fails to establish any
fraud via a failure to disclose. See Anderson v. Berghuis, No. 2:08-cv-10515, 2012 WL 5493598,
at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 31, 2012) (denying Rule 60(b)(3) motion where nonmovant had no duty to
disclose), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 5493587 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 13, 2012).
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Second, Foster’s argument that NEOCC’s lawyers falsely stated that NEOCC is not a state
agency fails for two reasons. First, the argument is another attempt to relitigate the issue of whether
Ohio is a defendant in this case—an issue the Court has decided and will not revisit. (See supra,
at 4.) Second, Foster fails to establish that NEOCC’s argument was false. Obtaining relief under
Rule 60(b)(3) based on an affirmative statement requires that the affirmative statement be false.
See e.g., CJPS Healthcare Supplies & Equip. v. Ansar Med. Techs., Inc., No. 12-cv-14885, 2014
WL 3708612, at *4 (E.D. Mich. July 28, 2014) (denying relief under Rule 60(b)(3) where movant
provided no evidence that complained-of statement was false); Othman v. City of Chicago, No.
11-cv-5777, 2016 WL 612809, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 2016) (denying relief under Rule 60(b)(3)
“absent any proof that the [complained-of] trial testimony was actually false[.]”). Here, Foster
provides no evidence that NEOCC is a state agency. Indeed, far from being a state agency,
“NEOCC is a private prison owned and operated by CoreCivic.” Carey v. CoreCivic, No. 4:23-
cv-1386, 2024 WL 2115077, at *2 (N.D. Ohio May 10, 2024). Foster thus fails to identify any
false statement made by NEOCC’s counsel.
Foster fails to allege—much less establish by clear and convincing evidence—the type of
misbehavior covered by Rule 60(b)(3). His Rule 60(b)(3) motion is DENIED.
b. Leave to Amend is Denied
In support of his motion for leave to amend, Foster makes various arguments, many of
which the Court previously rejected. The Court need not retread or parse through these arguments
because, in light of the above analysis, this case remains closed. Accordingly, to obtain leave to
amend, Foster must satisfy the requirements for reopening a case under Rules 59 or 60. Leisure
Caviar, LLC, 616 F.3d at 616. Foster satisfies neither.
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First, this Court has now twice held that Foster fails to establish entitlement to relief under
Rule 60. (Doc. No. 34; supra § III(a).) That avenue is thus unavailable to him. See C.H. Raches,
Inc. v. Gen. Aluminum Mfg. Co., 807 F. App'x 534, 540 (6th Cir. 2020) (affirming denial of post-
judgment leave to amend where movant’s Rule 60 motion failed (citing, among authority, Leisure
Caviar, LLC, 616 F.3d at 615)); Zank Payment Processing, Inc. v. Custom Payment Consulting,
Inc., No. 3:24-cv-314, 2025 WL 2405612, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 19, 2025) (denying post-
judgment amendment based on prior denial of motions under Rules 59 and 60).
Neither can Foster obtain a post-judgment amendment via Rule 59. A Rule 59 motion must
be filed within 28 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. Judgement in this case was
entered in August of 2025 (Doc. No. 26), and the present motions were filed in October and
November of 2025 (Doc. Nos. 35–37, 40.) Foster thus fails to establish entitlement to a post-
judgment amendment via Rule 59. See Epps v. Linder, No. 1:19-cv-968, 2020 WL 6736833, at *1
(S.D. Ohio Nov. 17, 2020) (denying post-judgment motion to amend where movant failed to meet
Rule 59’s 28-day deadline), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 7585605 (S.D. Ohio
Dec. 22, 2020). Foster’s motion for leave to amend is DENIED.
c. Leave to Serve Ohio is Denied
The final relief sought by Foster is leave to serve his complaint upon the State of Ohio.
(Doc. Nos. 35–36.) In light of this Court’s prior analyses (Doc. No. 34; supra § III(a)), this case is
closed, and Ohio is not a party to it. Foster provides no authority—and the Court is unable to locate
any authority—for the proposition that a litigant in a closed case may serve a complaint upon a
non-party, or that such service would have any legal effect. Accordingly, the Court DENIES
Foster leave to serve the complaint upon Ohio.
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d. Foster is Admonished
Foster has now filed seven failed post-judgment motions. (Doc. Nos. 27, 29–30, 35–37,
40.) Foster’s repeated filing of meritless post-judgment motions diverts judicial resources and
interferes with the orderly administration of justice. See In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184, 109
S. Ct. 993, 103 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1989) (“Every paper filed with the Clerk of [] Court, no matter how
repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the [Court’s] limited resources.”) “[F]ederal
courts have the inherent power to . . .[restrict] future access to the judicial system, to deter future
frivolous . . . or duplicative [filings].” Lawrence v. Bevin, No. 1:16-cv-P161, 2017 WL 1103616,
at *3 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 24, 2017) (citing Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-45, 111 S. Ct.
2123, 115 L. Ed. 2d 27 (1991); Futernick v. Sumpter Twp., 207 F.3d 305, 314 (6th Cir. 2000);
Filipas v. Lemons, 835 F.2d 1145, 1146 (6th Cir. 1987)). The Court admonishes Foster to avoid
filing further frivolous or duplicative documents. Otherwise, the Court will consider imposing
sanctions, including designating Foster a restricted filer.
IV. CONCLUSION
Foster fails to establish entitlement to relief from judgment under Rule 60, to leave to
amend his pleading, or to any other relief. Accordingly, Foster’s motions (Doc. Nos. 35–37, 40)
are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 23, 2025
HONORABLE SARA LIOI
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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