Guzzetta v. Strong Memorial Hospital et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
KESTANY BEVERLY LYNDSY GUZZETTA,
Plaintiff 	25-CV-6105-FPG
v.
DECISION & ORDER
STRONG MEMORIAL HOSPITAL &
ANDREA ROSE LYNN, R.N.,
Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Kestany Beverly Lyndsy Guzzetta brings this civil rights action against
Defendants Strong Memorial Hospital and Andrea Rose Lynn. ECF No. 3. Defendants move to
dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF No.
5. Plaintiff opposes the motion. ECF No. 10. Additionally, Plaintiff has moved to amend her
complaint, ECF No. 12, for summary judgment, ECF No. 14, to strike her medical records from
the record, ECF No. 13, and for sanctions against Defendants’ attorney, ECF Nos. 16, 27. In
response to Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions, Defendants filed a cross-motion seeking fees and
costs. ECF No. 20. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 5) is
GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint (ECF No. 12) is GRANTED as to her
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. All other motions (ECF Nos. 13, 14, 16, 20, 27) are DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that on September 11, 2024, she gave birth to a daughter at Strong
Memorial Hospital in Rochester, New York.1 ECF No. 10 at 1. She claims that while she was in
1 The facts in this section are taken from Plaintiff’s amended complaint (ECF No. 3) and Plaintiff’s opposition to the
motion to dismiss (ECF No. 10). See Planck v. Schenectady Cnty., No. 12-CV-0336, 2012 WL 1977972, at *5
Case 6:25-cv-06105-FPG Document 29 Filed 10/15/25 Page 1 of 14

2
the middle of intense labor, Defendant Andrea Rose Lynn, a registered nurse employed by the
hospital, took urine out of her catheter bag to test it for drugs. ECF No. 3 at 3–4. Plaintiff maintains
that the urine was taken against her wishes and without her consent. Id. at 4. Plaintiff further
maintains that she specifically denied any urine screens and made a plan of care with her doctor
that stated that no urine screens were required for Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Lynn colluded
with a social worker and performed the urine screen to have Plaintiff’s newborn daughter removed
from her care. Id. Plaintiff also alleges that Lynn told the social worker that Plaintiff and her
newborn baby had tested positive for cocaine, which was untrue. ECF No. 10 at 1.
On February 18, 2025, Plaintiff brought the present action in this Court. ECF No. 1. She
then amended her complaint on February 28, 2025. ECF No. 3. In her amended complaint, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants violated her constitutional rights by (1) informing a social worker and
Monroe County Child Protective Services (“CPS”) that Plaintiff and her baby tested positive for
cocaine; (2) colluding with a social worker to perform a urine screen to have Plaintiff’s baby
removed from her care; and (3) drug testing her without her consent. ECF No. 3.
DISCUSSION
Defendants move to dismiss. ECF No. 5. Plaintiff moves to amend her complaint, ECF No.
12, for summary judgment, ECF No. 14, to strike her medical records from the record, ECF No.
13, and for sanctions against Defendants’ attorney, ECF Nos. 16, 27. In response to Plaintiff’s
motion for sanctions (ECF No. 16), Defendants filed a cross-motion seeking fees and costs. ECF
No. 20. The Court discusses each of the pending motions below.
(N.D.N.Y. June 1, 2012) (explaining that a pro se plaintiff’s response to a defendant’s motion to dismiss may be
considered as effectively amending the allegations of the complaint so long as it is consistent with the allegations in
the complaint).
Case 6:25-cv-06105-FPG Document 29 Filed 10/15/25 Page 2 of 14

3
I. 	Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
a. 	Legal Standard
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant may move to
dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). A court deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) “must accept as true all
of the allegations contained in a complaint.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In order
“[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
The determination regarding “whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . .
[is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.” Id. at 679. Under this plausibility standard, a complaint must allege “more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. “[W]ell-pleaded factual
allegations” permit a court to “assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly
give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. Although Plaintiff’s factual allegations set forth in
the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. at 678.
If a plaintiff “ha[s] not nudged [his/her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,
[his/her] complaint must be dismissed.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
The Second Circuit has recognized that “this plausibility standard governs claims brought
even by pro se litigants.” Robles v. Bleau, No. 07-CV-0464, 2008 WL 4693153, at *5 (N.D.N.Y.
Oct. 22, 2008) (citing, e.g., Jacobs v. Mostow, 271 F. App’x 85, 87 (2d Cir. 2008), and Boykin v.
Case 6:25-cv-06105-FPG Document 29 Filed 10/15/25 Page 3 of 14

4
KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 215–16 (2d Cir. 2008)). However, the Court remains mindful that a
“document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully
pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Boykin, 521 F.3d at 214. Nevertheless, all pleadings, pro se or otherwise, must contain enough
factual allegations to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (additional internal
quotation marks omitted)).
For purposes of a motion to dismiss, a complaint is deemed to include “any written
instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by
reference.” Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2000). The Court may also review any
“documents that plaintiff[ ] either possessed or knew about and upon which [she] relied in bringing
the [action].” Id.
b. 	Defendants’ Motion
Defendants make four arguments as to why Plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed. The
Court discusses each below.
i. 	Subject Matter Jurisdiction
First, Defendants argue that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the
action. ECF No. 5-2 at 3. Defendants maintain that Plaintiff has failed to identify a federal question
that can be the basis for subject matter jurisdiction and that there is no diversity of citizenship. Id.
The Court rejects this argument. While Plaintiff does not explicitly cite 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the
basis for her claim, liberally construing her complaint—as the Court must do for all documents
field by pro se litigants—Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See
Boykin, 521 F.3d at 214. Specifically, the Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint as alleging that
Case 6:25-cv-06105-FPG Document 29 Filed 10/15/25 Page 4 of 14

5
Defendants (1) violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution by drug testing
her without her consent in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and (2) violated her constitutional rights
by contributing to the detention of her daughter by CPS in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See ECF
No. 3. Because the Court construes Plaintiff’s claim as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—a federal
law—it concludes that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. See 28 U.S. Code § 1331.
ii. 	18 U.S.C. § 2702 and HIPPA
Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim because she has brought
the claims pursuant to two statutes that cannot provide a basis for relief. ECF No. 5-2 at 4.
Specifically, they argue that if she brought this claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2702, which she
suggested in her original complaint, then that statute is not applicable because it is only relevant
for the disclosure of electronic communications of customers. Id. Defendants also argue that to the
extent Plaintiff is alleging that Defendants violated her rights under the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPPA”), she has failed to state claim because HIPPA
provides no provide right of recovery. Id.
The Court agrees with Defendants that to the extent that Plaintiff is raising claims under
18 U.S.C. § 2702 or HIPPA, those claims must be dismissed with prejudice. As for 18 U.S.C. §
2702, that statute relates to voluntary disclosure of electronic communications or records by
persons or entities who provide electronic communications services to the public. Plaintiff’s
allegations do not relate to disclosure of electronic communications by such a person or entity and
thus, 18 U.S.C. § 2702 is not applicable for her claim. As for HIPPA, the statute does not create a
private right of action, meaning that this Court cannot provide any relief or monetary compensation
for HIPPA violations. Meadows v. United Services, Inc., 963 F.3d 240, 244 (2d Cir. 2020).
Consequently, Plaintiff cannot assert a claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2702 or HIPPA.
Case 6:25-cv-06105-FPG Document 29 Filed 10/15/25 Page 5 of 14

6
iii. 	State Law Immunity
Third, Defendants argue that they are entitled to immunity for their good faith compliance
with the reporting requirements of New York State Social Services Law § 413 pursuant to New
York State Social Services Law § 419. However, “the determination of the immunity to be
accorded in a section 1983 suit is entirely a question of federal law.” Bellet v. City of Buffalo, No.
03-CV-27, 2009 WL 2930464, at *6 (Sept. 11, 2009) (quotation omitted). Therefore, the immunity
afforded by § 419 does not apply to federal claims pursuant to § 1983. Id.; see also Howlett by and
through Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 376 (1990) (“Conduct by persons acting under color of
state law which is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . cannot be immunized by state law.”). As
such, there is no merit to Defendant’s argument that § 419 shields them from liability in this case.
iv. 	42 U.S.C. § 1983
Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
ECF No. 5-2 at 4. Specifically, they argue that both Defendants are private actors and that there is
no allegation that they acted under color of state law. Id. at 5.
To state a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “the plaintiff must allege that the challenged
conduct (1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state law, and (2) deprived the
plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”
Whalen v. County of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1997). Therefore, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
generally applies to public officers, not private citizens. Kurtz v. Hansell, No. 20 Civ. 3401, 2021
WL 1143619, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2021). Nevertheless, “in certain circumstances, private
actors can be considered to have acted ‘under color of state law.’” Id. One such circumstance is
when a traditionally private entity is acting as “reporting and enforcement machinery for [ ] a
government agency charged with detection and prevention of child abuse and neglect.” Kia P. v.
Case 6:25-cv-06105-FPG Document 29 Filed 10/15/25 Page 6 of 14

7
McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749, 756 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, Kia P. ex rel. Mora P. v. New York City,
534 U.S. 820 (2001).
In Kia P., the parents of a newborn baby brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
a private hospital for retaining their newborn after the baby’s mother was released. Id. at 751–53.
In that case, the baby had tested positive for methadone and exhibited methadone withdrawal
symptoms. Id. at 752. As a result, a hospital social worker notified the local Child Welfare
Administration (“CWA”), which began an investigation. Id. Approximately one week later, the
hospital received negative test results from a second methadone test and that same day, the baby
was medically cleared for release. Id. at 753. Nevertheless, the hospital did not release the baby
until a few days later, when it learned that CWA was not going to seek custody of the newborn.
Id. In that case, the Second Circuit concluded that retaining the baby when she was not medically
cleared to be released did not render the hospital a state actor. Id. at 756–57. However, once the
baby received medical clearance and was not released, the hospital was acting as both “reporting
and enforcement machinery for CWA” and thus was a state actor subject to § 1983 liability. Id.
As other courts have noted, Kia P. “turns on the pivotal fact that the hospital retained the
newborn even after the newborn received medical clearance for release.” J.C. v. Mark Country
Day Sch., No. 03 Civ. 1414, 2007 WL 201163, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2007). Therefore, when a
hospital 	and 	its 	employees 	become 	both 	“reporting 	and 	[emphasis 	added] 	enforcement
machinery,” they are state actors for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. (quotation omitted).
However, where private actors have done nothing more than report suspected abuse to authorities,
courts have repeatedly found that such reports do not constitute state action. Id. at *3 (holding that
there was no state action where doctors did nothing more than report an incident to CPS); Deckon
v. Chidebere, No. 93 Civ. 7965, 1995 WL 555684, at * 3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1995) (holding
Case 6:25-cv-06105-FPG Document 29 Filed 10/15/25 Page 7 of 14

8
that there was no state action where a hospital reported suspected child abuse to a government
agency after a newborn baby tested positive for cocaine and retained the baby because she did not
meet minimum weight requirements for discharge); Kurt, 2021 WL 1143619, at *9 (holding that
reporting suspected child abuse alone does not constitute state action). This remains true even if a
private actor makes a report that she knows to be false. Kurt, 2021 WL 1143619, at *11 (collecting
cases).
In this case, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated her Fourth Amendment rights by
drug testing her without her consent. ECF No. 3 at 4. This claim fails because Plaintiff has failed
to allege state action, which is an essential element of any claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff
cites to Ferguson v. City of Charleston to support her claim. 532 U.S. 67 (2001). In Ferguson, the
Supreme Court held that a hospital’s policy of drug testing pregnant women and reporting the
results to law enforcement constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 76. In that
case, the hospital was subject to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment because it was a state
hospital. Id. Here, Defendants are a private hospital and its employee. Therefore, in the context of
the instant case, to plead state action, Plaintiff would need to plausibly allege that Defendants took
actions, which made them a part of both the “reporting and enforcement machinery” for CPS. See
Kia P., 235 F.3d at 756–57. In Kia P., that action was detaining the baby when there was no
medical reason to do so, which the Second Circuit concluded was sufficient to allege state action.
Id. Thus, in this case, to satisfy the state action requirement, Plaintiff would need to allege facts
that demonstrate that the drug test was done solely for the purpose of reporting the results to CPS
and not for any medical reason. See id. Plaintiff has failed to do so in her complaint and thus has
failed to state a claim.
Case 6:25-cv-06105-FPG Document 29 Filed 10/15/25 Page 8 of 14

9
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants violated her rights by informing a social worker and
CPS that Plaintiff and the baby tested positive for cocaine, which she alleges was untrue, and by
colluding with a social worker to perform a urine screen to have Plaintiff’s baby removed from
her care. ECF No. 3 at 4; ECF No. 10 at 1. It is unclear to the Court what constitutional amendment
Plaintiff is alleging Defendants violated as to these claims, and in any amended complaint, Plaintiff
must identify which of her constitutional rights Defendants allegedly violated.2 Nevertheless, for
the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff has failed to state claim as to these allegations as well.
Regarding Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants lied to a social worker and CPS by
reporting that Plaintiff and the baby tested positive for cocaine, Plaintiff’s claim fails because she
has failed to allege state action. As the Court explained above, for Plaintiff to satisfy the state
action requirement, Plaintiff must plausibly allege that Defendants took action beyond merely
reporting the results of the urine screen, which would make them a part of both the “reporting and
enforcement machinery” for CPS. See Kia P., 235 F.3d at 756–57. Here, Plaintiff simply alleges
that Defendants reported the results of the urine screen to a social worker and CPS and that the
report was untrue. See ECF No. 10 at 1. Such allegations are insufficient to plead state action. See
Kurt, 2021 WL 1143619, at *11. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim as pleaded fails to state a claim.
As for her final claim, Plaintiff alleges nothing more than that “Andrea Rose Lynn colluded
with a social worker and performed said urine screen to have plaintiff’s newborn baby removed
from care.” ECF No. 3 at 4. This conclusory statement is insufficient to state claim. Alfaro Motors,
2 The Court has construed these claims as alleging that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by
contributing to the detention of her daughter by CPS. To the extent that Plaintiff is alleging that Defendants violated
her rights by contributing to the detention of her child in the absence of adequate procedural safeguards, that would
constitute a procedural due process claim under the Fifth Amendment. See Kia P., 235 F.3d at 759. To the extent that
Plaintiff is alleging that Defendants violated her constitutionally protected liberty interest in having custody of her
daughter by contributing to the detention of her newborn without a “reasonable basis” or “without any reasonable
justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective,” that would constitute a substantive due process
claim brought pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
Case 6:25-cv-06105-FPG Document 29 Filed 10/15/25 Page 9 of 14

10
Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 887 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that allegations that amount to “nothing
more than broad, simple, and conclusory statements are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983”).
In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, instead of stating that Defendants colluded with
a social worker, Plaintiff would need to allege facts that demonstrate that Defendants colluded
with a social worker. Further, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege state action as to this claim as
well. As explained in Kia P., for Plaintiff’s specific claim, to satisfy the state action requirement,
she would need to allege facts that demonstrate that the urine screen was done solely for the
purpose of causing CPS to remove Plaintiff’s child and not for any medical reason. See Kia P.,
235 F.3d at 756–57. As such, this claim as pleaded fails to state a claim.
c. 	Leave to Amend
In this case, Plaintiff has moved to amend her complaint. ECF No. 12. Generally, the court
will afford a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend or to be heard prior to dismissal “unless the
court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would
succeed in stating a claim.” Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Court, however, is not required to grant Plaintiff leave to amend if amendment
would be futile, in that “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can plead no set of facts that
would entitle [her] to relief.” Moss v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A., 258 F. Supp. 3d 289, 312 (E.D.N.Y.
2017) (quoting Milanese v. Rust-Oleum Corp., 244 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 2001)).
Here, as the Court explained above, Plaintiff’s complaint as pleaded fails to state a claim.
To the extent Plaintiff is raising claims under 18 U.S.C. § 2702 or HIPPA, those claims are
dismissed with prejudice because Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under those statutes and any
amendment as to those claims would be futile. However, as to Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, the Court cannot conclude that it is beyond a doubt that Plaintiff would be unable to plead
Case 6:25-cv-06105-FPG Document 29 Filed 10/15/25 Page 10 of 14

11
a set of facts that would entitle her to relief. As such, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 without prejudice and grants her leave to amend her complaint as to those claims.
Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint completely replaces the prior complaint in the
action, and thus it “renders [any prior complaint] of no legal effect.” Int’l Controls Corp. v. Vesco,
556 F.2d 665, 668 (2d Cir. 1977); see also Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128
(2d Cir. 1994). Thus, any amended complaint must include all allegations against each
Defendant so that the amended complaint stands alone as the only complaint that Defendants
must answer in this action. Additionally, in any amended complaint, Plaintiff must identify the
constitutional amendment that she alleges Defendants violated as to each claim.
II. 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Because the Court has granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment (ECF No. 14) is denied as moot.
III. 	Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Medical Records
Plaintiff moves to strike her medical records from Defendant’s motion to dismiss on the
basis that 42 U.S.C. 220dd-2 and 42 C.F.R. 2 prevent Defendants from disclosing her substance
abuse records without her consent. ECF No. 13 at 1. The provisions cited by Plaintiff only prevent
the disclosure of records maintained in connection “with the performance of any program or
activity relating to substance use disorder education, prevention, training, treatment, rehabilitation,
or research, which is conducted, regulated, or directly or indirectly assisted by any department or
agency of the United States.” 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(a). Therefore, they do not prevent Defendants
from disclosing such records in this case. As such, Plaintiff’s motion to strike is denied.
Case 6:25-cv-06105-FPG Document 29 Filed 10/15/25 Page 11 of 14

12
IV. 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions
Plaintiff has moved for sanctions, arguing that Defendants’ counsel acquired and disclosed
her medical records in violation of New York Public Health Law § 2782 and § 2135, NY HIPA,
HIPPA, and her fundamental right to privacy. ECF No. 27 at 1; ECF No. 16 at 2. Defendants
submitted Plaintiff’s medical records related to the delivery of her baby as an exhibit to their
motion to dismiss. See ECF No. 5-4. Because Plaintiff’s motion relates to the care she received at
the hospital and what happened at the hospital during the delivery of her baby, those records are
relevant to the case. Further, on a motion to dismiss, the Court may review any “documents that
plaintiff[ ] either possessed or knew about and upon which [she] relied in bringing the [action].”
Rothman, 220 F.3d at 88. Here, Plaintiff at least knew about the existence of these records and
relied upon them in bringing this action. As the medical records are relevant to the case and can
be properly considered as part of Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court declines to impose
sanctions.
Nevertheless, the Court understands why Plaintiff would not want her medical records filed
on the publicly available docket. Accordingly, the Court has sealed those records, making them
inaccessible to the public. Additionally, in any future filing in which Defendants wish to submit
Plaintiff’s medical records, the Court orders that Defendants submit such records under seal. The
Court believes that sealing these records adequately addresses the concerns raised by Plaintiff, and
therefore, Plaintiff’s motions for sanctions are denied.
V. 	Defendants’ Cross-motion for Fees and Costs
Finally, Defendants have filed a cross-motion for fees and costs pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 11. ECF No. 20. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions (ECF
No. 16) is frivolous and thus sanctionable under Rule 11. Id. at 1. “When deciding whether to grant
Case 6:25-cv-06105-FPG Document 29 Filed 10/15/25 Page 12 of 14

13
Rule 11 sanctions, the Court applies an objective standard of reasonableness, and looks to, among
other factors, whether the party acted in bad faith; whether they relied on a direct falsehood; and
whether the claim was utterly lacking in support.” Benitez v. King, 298 F. Supp. 3d 530, 539
(W.D.N.Y. 2018) (quotation omitted). When assessing a motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11
against a pro se litigant, “courts generally apply a more lenient standard than would be applicable
where a party is represented by learned counsel.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Ultimately, the decision
to impose Rule 11 sanctions rests in the sound discretion of the court, and should be imposed with
caution.” Id. (quotation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, there is no indication that Plaintiff acted in bad faith or that Plaintiff relied on
a direct falsehood. To the extent Defendants are arguing that Plaintiff’s claim is utterly lacking in
support, the Court rejects this argument. It appears that Plaintiff simply misunderstood the
applicable law and the role of this Court in enforcing the applicable law. The Court does not believe
that such a misunderstanding is sanctionable conduct, especially in light of the leniency afforded
pro se litigants. Consequently, Defendants’ cross-motion for fees and costs is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 5) is GRANTED, and
Plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint (ECF No. 12) is GRANTED as to her claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. All other motions (ECF Nos. 13, 14, 16, 20, 27) are DENIED. Plaintiff may file an
amended complaint by November 17, 2025. Any amended complaint must include all allegations
against each Defendant so that the amended complaint stands alone as the only complaint
that Defendants must answer in this action. Additionally, in any amended complaint, Plaintiff
must identify the constitutional amendment that she alleges Defendants violated as to each claim.
Case 6:25-cv-06105-FPG Document 29 Filed 10/15/25 Page 13 of 14

14
If after November 17, 2025, Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint, the complaint
will be dismissed with prejudice as to both Defendants, and the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment
and close this case without further order of the Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 15, 2025
Rochester, New York
_____________________________
HON. FRANK P. GERACI, JR.
United States District Judge
Western District of New York
Case 6:25-cv-06105-FPG Document 29 Filed 10/15/25 Page 14 of 14