USA v. Marseet

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
AKRAM MARSEET,
Defendant.
6:24-cr-6032 (BKS)
Appearances:
For the United States of America:
Michael DiGiacomo
United States Attorney
Everardo A. Rodriguez
Assistant United States Attorney
100 State Street, Suite 500
Rochester, New York 14614
Defendant pro se:
Akram Marseet
603979
Monroe County Jail
130 South Plymouth Avenue
Rochester, New York 14614
Standby Counsel for Defendant Akram Marseet:
David C. Pilato
Pilato Law, PLCC
30 West Broad Street, Suite 100
Rochester, New York 14614
Hon. Brenda K. Sannes, Chief United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
On February 27, 2024, Defendant Akram Marseet was indicted on two counts of
threatening a United States judge in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 115(b)(4). (Dkt. No. 7). On July 30, 2024, in a superseding indictment, Defendant was indicted
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on those same two counts as well as a third count of transmitting an interstate threatening
communication in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). (Dkt. No. 22). Defendant moves to dismiss
the indictment on various grounds.1 (Dkt. No. 58). The motion is fully briefed. (Dkt. Nos. 58, 76,
145, 146). Defendant later filed a motion to stay ruling on his motion to dismiss pending the
Court’s decision on other pending motions. (Dkt. No. 174). For the following reasons,
Defendant’s motions are denied.
II. 	INDICTMENT
The superseding indictment alleges two counts of threatening to murder a United States
judge on January 10, 2024, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 115(a)(1)(B) and 115(b)(4). (Dkt. No.
22). Count one alleges that Defendant threatened to murder United States Judge Frank P. Geraci
and Count two alleges that Defendant threatened to murder United States Judge Marian W.
Payson. (Dkt. No. 22). According to the superseding indictment, Defendant did so “with intent to
impede, intimidate and interfere with” the judges while they were “engaged in the performance
of [their] official duties” and “with intent to retaliate against [the judges] on account of the
performance of [their] official duties. (Id. at 1–2). The superseding indictment further alleges that
on January 10, 2024, Defendant “knowingly, willfully, and unlawfully, and for the purpose of
issuing a threat and with knowledge that the communication would be viewed as a threat,
transmit a communication in interstate or foreign commerce,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).
(Id. at 2–3). Specifically, the superseding indictment alleges that Defendant placed a telephone
1 Defendant moves to dismiss “the indictments dated 02-27-2024 and 05-30-2024.” (Dkt. No. 58, at 1). The Court
notes that the February 27, 2024 indictment was superseded by the July 30, 2024 superseding indictment. (Dkt. Nos.
7, 22). The Court assumes that Defendant’s references to the “05-30-2024” indictment are to the July 30, 2024
superseding indictment.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on October 18, 2024 (Dkt. No. 37), but then filed an amended motion to dismiss
on December 11, 2024, (Dkt. No. 58) and requested that the Court consider the amended motion to dismiss as the
complete motion to dismiss, (Dkt. No. 58, at 1; Dkt. No. 112, at 3). The Court has done so.
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call from Colorado to New York, “which contained threats to kill other persons, specifically
Frank P. Geraci, Marian W. Payson and “D.F.” an employee of the Clerk’s Office for the
Western District of New York. (Id.).
In order to provide context for some of Defendant’s arguments, the Court has taken
judicial notice of the fact that Defendant had previously filed a complaint in a civil action in the
Western District of New York which was dismissed. Specifically, on December 17, 2020,
Defendant filed a lawsuit against Rochester Institute of Technology. Marseet v. Rochester
Institute of Technology, Case No. 6:20-cv-7096 (Dkt. No. 1) (“Marseet v. RIT”). The case was
assigned to United States District Court Judge Frank P. Geraci and Magistrate Judge Marian W.
Payson. (Marseet v. RIT, Text Orders dated December 29, 2020 and March 16, 2021). On
January 10, 2024 Judge Geraci dismissed the complaint with prejudice and directed that the case
be closed. (Marseet v. RIT, Dkt. No. 224). The threats charged in the superseding indictment are
alleged to have occurred that same day. (Dkt. No. 22). The Court has considered these facts not
for the truth of any matters asserted in the documents but simply to establish the facts of such
litigation in order to provide context for Defendant’s arguments. See United States v. Velentzas,
No. 15-cr-213, 2019 WL 3252961, at *1, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124092, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July
16, 2019) (taking judicial notice of other judicial opinions in evaluating criminal defendants’
motion to dismiss); see also United States v. Marsalis, 314 F. Supp. 3d 462, 464 n.2 (E.D.N.Y.
2018) (taking judicial notice of prior convictions in evaluating a criminal defendant’s motion to
dismiss (citing cases)).
III. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[a] party may raise by
pretrial motion any defense, objection, or request that the court can determine without a trial on
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the merits.” Such motions include pretrial motions alleging “a defect in the indictment or
information[,] including . . . failure to state an offense.” Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 12(b)(3)(B)(v).
Under Rule 12, “[a]n indictment is sufficient as long as it (1) contains the elements of the
offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and
(2) enables the defendant to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the
same offense.” United States v. Aiyer, 33 F.4th 97, 116 (2d Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting United States v. Dawkins, 999 F.3d 767, 779 (2d Cir. 2021)). In general, “[a]
court should not look beyond the face of the indictment and draw inferences as to proof to be
adduced at trial, for ‘the sufficiency of the evidence is not appropriately addressed on a pretrial
motion to dismiss an indictment.’” United States v. Scully, 108 F. Supp. 3d 59, 117 (E.D.N.Y.
2015) (quoting United States v. Alfonso, 143 F.3d 772, 777 (2d Cir. 1998)); see also Alfonso, 143
F.3d at 776–77 (explaining that “an inquiry into the sufficiency of the evidence is premature,”
“[u]nless the government has made what can fairly be described as a full proffer of the evidence
it intends to present at trial to satisfy the . . . element[s] of the offense”).
IV. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Charging Statutes
Defendant was indicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 115(a)(1)(B) and (b)(4) as well as 18 U.S.C.
§ 875(c). (Dkt. No. 22). Under § 115(a)(1)(B):
Whoever . . . threatens to assault, kidnap, or murder, a United States
official, a United States judge, a Federal law enforcement officer, or
an official whose killing would be a crime under such section, with
intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with such official, judge, or
law enforcement officer while engaged in the performance of
official duties, or with intent to retaliate against such official, judge,
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or law enforcement officer on account of the performance of official
duties, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).2
Under § 875(c):
Whoever 	transmits 	in 	interstate 	or 	foreign 	commerce 	any
communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any
threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
B. 	Discussion
Defendant raises the following grounds to dismiss: (1) “the bad causes by this venue for
the criminal charge”; (2) an “incredible, unreasonable, and unqualified witness”; (3) “insufficient
falsified evidence”; (4) “violation of due process because of prosecution misconduct and defense
misconduct”; (5) improper venue; (6) lack of jurisdiction; (7) “probable judicial conflict of
interest”; and (8) “Defendant’s mental capacity during the false allegation.” (Dkt. No. 58, at 4).3
The Court construes Defendant’s first argument about the “bad causes by this venue for
the criminal charge” (Dkt. No. 58, at 4),4 as a motion to dismiss on the basis of vindictive
prosecution. Under Rule 12(b)(3)(A)(iv) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant
may allege “selective or vindictive prosecution.” To state a claim for vindictive prosecution, a
defendant must show that “(1) the prosecutor harbored genuine animus toward the defendant, or
was prevailed upon to bring the charges by another with animus such that the prosecutor could
be considered a ‘stalking horse,’ and (2) the defendant would not have been prosecuted but for
2 Under § 115(b)(4), “[a] threat made in violation of this section shall be punished by a fine under this title or
imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years, or both, except that imprisonment for a threatened assault shall
not exceed 6 years.”
3 Defendant devotes considerable time in his 102-page brief to the details of his civil case and its management in the
court. (Dkt. No. 58, at 8–27). The Court has done its best to discern and address the claims that appear to be relevant
to Defendant’s motion to dismiss this criminal prosecution, and does not address Defendant’s complaints about his
civil action.
4 Defendant refers to “[a]busive, offensive, inappropriate, and inflammatory language by this [v]enue,” (Dkt. No. 58,
at 86), but Defendant has not cited to any “abusive, offensive, inappropriate, and inflammatory” language in this
prosecution.
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the animus.” United States v. Chalmers, 474 F. Supp. 2d 555, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing
United States v. Sanders, 211 F.3d 711, 717 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Here, Defendant argues that he has been falsely charged to, inter alia, prevent him from
appealing the dismissal order in his civil case, to prevent him from filing judicial misconduct
complaints, and to prevent him from exposing the sexual scandals and discriminatory and
retaliatory practices at RIT. (Dkt. No. 58, at 4–5). Defendant asserts that the “venue” as a whole
has falsely charged him. (Id. at 4). However, “only a prosecutor can bring charges,” United
States v. Romanello, No. 22-cr-194, 2023 WL 4405667, at *4, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117019, at
*9 (E.D.N.Y. July 7, 2023). Defendant has presented no evidence of vindictiveness on behalf of
the instant prosecutor, see id., so to the extent that he moves to dismiss the indictment on the
basis of vindictive prosecution, the Court denies that motion.
Defendant’s next two arguments—that the indictment should be dismissed because the
Government relies on an “incredible, unreasonable, and unqualified witness” and has
“insufficient falsified evidence”—focus on credibility. (Dkt. No. 58, at 4, 29, 34, 65–68).
However, “the sufficiency of the evidence is not appropriately addressed on a pretrial motion to
dismiss an indictment.” Alfonso, 143 F.3d at 777; see also United States v. Mazzariello, No. 13-
cr-211, 2015 WL 9244602, at *4, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168874, at *17 (W.D.N.Y Dec. 17,
2015) (“Defendants' arguments in this regard, which relate to the sufficiency of the evidence, the
elements of the charges, the credibility of the witnesses, and potential affirmative defenses, are
exclusively issues for trial and are not appropriately raised on a motion to dismiss.”); see also
United States v. Ramos, No. 12-cr-556, 2013 WL 1932110, at *3, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67030,
at *12 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2013) (“[T]here is no summary judgment procedure in criminal cases.
Nor do the rules provide for a pre-trial determination of sufficiency of the evidence.”). This is
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not a motion that the Court can consider as a pretrial motion. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(1) (“A
party may raise by pretrial motion any defense, objection, or request that the court can determine
without a trial on the merits.”). As the Government has argued, (see Dkt. No. 76, at 8–10),
Defendant’s arguments are for trial.
To the extent Defendant argues that there is insufficient evidence because the alleged
threat was not a true threat, (Dkt. No. 58, at 68–73, 78–86), the Court notes that it is well settled
that such a determination is factual and best left to a jury, see United States v. Carrier, 672 F.2d
300, 306 (2d Cir. 1982) (explaining in prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 871 for threat against
President of the United States, “whether words used are a true threat is generally best left to the
triers of fact”); see also United States v. Hunt, 82 F.4th 129, 136–37 (2d Cir. 2023) (evaluating
sufficiency of evidence for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 115 and explaining that “the true threat
determination involves no legal principles warranting independent review of the jury’s
conclusion,” explaining that “[t]his holding aligns with our well-established view that ‘whether
words used are a true threat’ is ‘a question of fact’ for the jury” (quoting United States v. Amor,
24 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 1994))); (see also Dkt. No. 76, at 9–10). Accordingly, Defendants’
motion to dismiss on this ground is denied.
As his next ground, Defendant asserts that his due process rights have been violated,
including his right to discovery, his right to a speedy trial, and his right to pretrial release. (Dkt.
No. 58, at 50). A defendant may make a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule
12 to allege “a violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial” and requests for “discovery
under Rule 16.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(A)(iii) and (E). The Court addresses each argument in
turn.
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The Court has repeatedly addressed Defendant’s discovery concerns, (Dkt. No. 58, at 51–
61), and has found that the Government has complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
16. (See Nov. 5, 2024 Text Minute Entry; Jan. 13, 2025 Text Minute Entry; Apr. 1, 2025 Text
Minute Entry). The Government details its compliance in its response brief. (Dkt. No. 76, at 2–3;
Exh. 77). Defendant subsequently filed additional motions for discovery, (Dkt. Nos. 126, 135), to
which the Government responded, (Dkt. Nos. 131, 138, 164), and the Court addressed at the
hearings on August 11, 2025 and October 31, 2025. (See Aug. 11, 2025 Text Minute Entry, Oct.
31, 2025 Text Minute Entry.) Therefore, Defendant’s “complaints about discovery fail to justify
dismissal of the superseding indictment.” See United States v. Liburd, No. 17-cr-296, 2021 WL
4521964, at *5, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190390, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2021).
Defendant’s argument that his right to a speedy trial has been violated, (Dkt. No. 58, at
62–65) is also without merit. Under the Speedy Trial Act, “the trial of a defendant charged in an
information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence within seventy
days from the filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment.” 18 U.S.C. §
3161(c)(1). However, the delays resulting from the following are excluded in computing the time
within which the trial must commence: (1) “delay resulting from any proceeding, including any
examinations, to determine the mental competency or physical capacity of the defendant”; (2)
“delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of
the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion”; and (3) “delay resulting from a
continuance . . . on the basis of [the judge’s] findings that the ends of justice served by taking
such action outweigh[ed] the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id. §
3161(h)(1)(A), (1)(D), and (h)(7)(A). Here, as set forth in the Government’s response to
Defendant’s motion to dismiss, (Dkt. No. 76, at 4–8), time has been excluded as a result of
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Defendant’s myriad pretrial motions and requests for extensions of time, Defendant’s
competency examination, and the Court’s Orders excluding time under the Speedy Trial Act
(Dkt. Nos. 15, 19, 21, 29, 34, 42, 160), such that only approximately twenty days have run from
the seventy-day speedy trial clock. Accordingly, Defendant’s right to a speedy trial has not been
violated.
The Court has already ruled on Defendant’s motions for pretrial release and
reconsideration, (Dkt. Nos. 67, 99), and reiterates that the Government has shown by clear and
convincing evidence that Defendant poses a danger to the safety of any other person and the
community, and that there are no set of conditions sufficient to reasonably mitigate these risks.
Moreover, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 does not explicitly authorize a motion on this
ground. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant’s due process rights have not been violated
and declines to dismiss the indictment on this basis.
Defendant next moves to dismiss the indictment on the basis of improper venue and lack
of jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 58, at 88–100). The Court has already addressed this argument in ruling
on Defendant’s motion for pretrial release. (Dkt. No. 67, at 11). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a), “any
offense against the United States begun in one district and completed in another, or committed in
more than one district, may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district in which such offense
was begun, continued, or completed.” Therefore, although Defendant was in Colorado when he
allegedly made the threats, the threats were allegedly levied to a person in the Western District of
New York. (Dkt. No. 22). Accordingly, this Court is a proper venue and has jurisdiction to
prosecute. See United States v. Hagar, 822 F. App’x 361, 370-71 (6th Cir. 2020) (holding that
venue was proper in the Northern District of Ohio because even though the defendant conducted
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all of the alleged activity in Oregon, the victim received his threatening message in Ohio); (see
also Dkt. No. 76, at 11–12 (citing cases)).
Defendant’s next ground to dismiss is that “there could be a judicial conflict of interest
due to the fact that at least on [sic] of the falsely alleged victims Judge Geraci has handled cases
in the Northen [sic] District of New York which is the home courthouse of Hon. Sannes.” (Dkt.
No. 58, at 100–01).5 The Government responds that “Defendant has not and cannot show that
Judge Sannes has a conflict of interest in presiding over this prosecution.” (Dkt. No. 76, at 13).
To evaluate whether a judge has a conflict of interest: a judge “shall disqualify [her]self in any
proceeding in which [her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). This
standard is not necessarily met just because a judge or someone close to the judge has been
threatened. In re Basciano, 542 F.3d 950, 956 (2d Cir. 2008). The critical question is whether
“an objective, disinterested observer fully informed of the underlying facts [would] entertain
significant doubt that justice would be done absent recusal.” United States v. Amico, 486 F.3d
764, 775 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir. 1992)). In
this case the Court is not aware of any facts that would lead an objective observer to question the
Court’s impartiality. Disagreement with the Court’s rulings is an insufficient basis for recusal.
See Chen v. Chen Qualified Settlement Fund, 552 F.3d 218, 227 (2d Cir. 2009). Furthermore,
Defendant does not point to any specific actions by the Court that might be viewed by “an
objective, disinterested observer” as evidencing bias. In re Basciano, 542 F.3d at 957–58. To the
extent Defendant is seeking recusal, the motion is denied. And Defendant has failed to identify
any basis for dismissing the indictment.
5 The undersigned Chief District Court Judge in the Northern District of New York, has been designated to sit in the
Western District of New York for the purpose of presiding over this case.
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Defendant also argues that the indictment should be dismissed under the “mental capacity
defense.” (Dkt. No. 58, at 101). The Government responds that “Marseet has offered no evidence
supporting a defense of lack of mental capacity” and that “[h]is motion to dismiss on such
grounds should therefore be denied.” (Dkt. No. 76, at 13). Lack of mental capacity is not a basis
for a pretrial motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b). Accordingly,
Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment on this basis is denied.
Defendant argues in his reply brief that the superseding indictment is multiplicitous,
citing to United States v. Haas, 37 F.4th 1256 (7th Cir. 2022) (Dkt. No. 145, at 87-88).
Defendant argues that he first raised this issue in his motion to dismiss, and the Government did
not respond. Although Defendant did not clearly raise this issue in his 102-page motion to
dismiss, (Dkt. No. 58, at 78), he has clearly raised it in his reply brief and, in the interest of
justice, the Court directed the Government to respond to this argument. (Dkt. No. 202).
“An indictment is multiplicitous when it charges a single offense as an offense multiple
times, in separate counts, when, in law and in fact, only one crime has been committed.” United
States v. Kerley, 544 F.3d 172, 178 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Chacko, 169 F.3d
140, 145 (2d Cir. 1999)). When one statutory offense is charged as two separate counts, the court
“must determine ‘whether Congress intended the counts to constitute separate ‘units of
prosecution.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 2002); see also
United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 904 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting that “[a] typical multiplicity
problem involves a statute which either creates a single offense for an act involving multiple
victims or describes several means by which a single offense may be committed”) (cleaned up).
“[A]s a matter of statutory construction” the Second Circuit is “reluctant to turn a single
transaction into multiple offenses,” and “therefore will impute to Congress the intent to impose
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separate punishments for the same underlying conduct only when Congress has clearly
articulated that intent.” Kerley, 544 F.3d at 179; see Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955)
(finding that ambiguity of whether Congress intended for multiple punishments under the Mann
Act for interstate transportation of “two women on the same trip and in the same vehicle” must
be resolved in favor of defendant and it was therefore one offense). In Kerley, the Second Circuit
held that because a statute making it a crime to failure to pay a support obligation did not clearly
authorize cumulative punishments for each child covered by the support order, the rule of lenity
required that the defendant’s failure to pay a support obligation for two children was a single
offense. Kerley, 544 F.3d at 179.
In its response in this case the Government did not address Kerley or the appropriate unit
of prosecution under § 115(a)(1)(B). The Government argues that the two counts under §
115(a)(1)(B) are not multiplicitous because they allege distinct judicial victims as to whom
Defendant is alleged to have acted with the requisite specific intent, and require proof of
different facts. (Dkt. No. 228 at 2).). However, the fact that each count “require[s] proof of
something that the other d[oes] not” is not determinative because “the question is whether the
facts underlying each count were intended by Congress to constitute separate ‘units’ of
prosecution.” United States v. Ansaldi, 372 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 2004), abrogated on other
grounds by McFadden v. United States, 576 U.S. 186 (2015).
The indictment charges one communication, threatening two different United States
judges, as two separate counts under 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B). Section 115(a)(1)(B), in relevant
part, makes it a crime to threaten “to assault, kidnap or murder” specified officials, including a
United States judge “with intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with such official . . . . while
engaged in the performance of official duties, or with intent to retaliate against such official . . .
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on account of the performance of official duties.” The penalty provision provides that “[a] threat
made in violation of this section shall be punished by a fine . . . or imprisonment for a term of not
more than 10 years, or both except that imprisonment for a threatened assault shall not exceed 6
years.” 18 U.S.C. § 115(b)(4).
In Haas, the defendant argued that an indictment charging three separate threats against
the same victim on three different days was multiplicitous because the unit of prosecution under
§ 115(a)(1)(B) is a “scheme of threatening one of the designated federal officials.” The Seventh
Circuit rejected that argument and found that each threat was individually indictable because "the
allowable unit of prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 115 is the individual threat." Haas, 37 F.4th at
1262. In this case, the Court is hesitant to opine on whether the single phone call, threatening two
United States judges, is properly charged as two counts or one, without any briefing from the
Government applying the analysis in Kerley.
In any event “[w]here there has been no prior conviction or acquittal, the Double
Jeopardy Clause does not protect against simultaneous prosecutions for the same offense, so long
as no more than one punishment is eventually imposed.” United States v. Josephberg, 459 F.3d
350, 355 (2006). Even if the two counts describe two different means by which a single offense
may be committed, the Government will be entitled to present that evidence. And “[i]f the jury
convicts on more than one multiplicitous count, the defendant’s right not to suffer multiple
punishments for the same offense will be protected by having the court enter judgment on only
one of the multiplicitous counts.” Id.6 Therefore, the Court declines to grant Defendant’s motion
to dismiss with respect to Counts 1 and 2 based on multiplicity at this time. See United States v.
6 Here, if the jury convicts Defendant of both Counts 1 and 2, the Government will be required to brief the application
of Kerley prior to sentencing.
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Maxwell, 534 F.Supp.3d 299, 322–23 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (denying pretrial motion to dismiss based
on multiplicity, noting that “[s]ince Josephberg, courts in this Circuit have routinely denied pre-
trial motions to dismiss potentially multiplicitous counts as premature.”).7
The Court has considered the remaining arguments for dismissal in Defendant’s motion
and found them to be without merit. Having reviewed Defendant’s submissions carefully, the
Court finds no basis to dismiss the indictment. Therefore, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is
denied.
With respect to Defendant’s motion to stay ruling on the motion to dismiss pending the
Court’s resolution of other motions by Defendant, (Dkt. No. 174), the Court has now decided
those motions and finds no reason to stay ruling on the motion to dismiss. That motion is
therefore denied.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant’s motion (Dkt. No. 58) to dismiss the indictment and
Defendant’s motion (Dkt. No. 174) to stay ruling on the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the
indictment are both DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Government submit a letter brief by December 22, 2025 addressing
the allowable unit of prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 4, 2025
7 To the extent Defendant raises a multiplicity challenge based on Count 3, the Court rejects that argument. Where
“the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions,” “the test to be applied to
determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the
other does not.” Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). The offense of making a threat against a
United States judge under 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B), charged in Counts 1 and 2 requires proof of facts that are not
elements of the offense of threatening interstate communications under 18 U.S.C. 875(c), thereby satisfying the
Blockburger test. See United States v. Miah, 546 F.Supp.3d 407, 425 (W.D. Penn. 2021).
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