New York State Vegetable Growers Association Inc. et al v. James et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 1:23-cv-01044-JLS-MJR Document156_ Filed 12/09/25 Page 1 of 16
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FA. eae Eb ee og ye

DEC - 9 2025 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

444

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK Yb toewencutt Fy |
SERN DISTRIEL
NEW YORK STATE VEGETABLE 23-CV-01044 (JLS) MJR
GROWERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ef al., REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiffs,
Vv.

LETITA JAMES, in her official capacity
as Attorney General of New York et al.,

Defendants.

This case has been referred to the undersigned pursuant to Section 636(b)(1) of
Title 28 of the United States Code, by the Honorable John L. Sinatra, Jr. (Dkt. No. 126)
Before the Court is a motion to intervene in this lawsuit as plaintiffs by Ricardo Bell and
Jean Fenel Estrame. (Dkt. No. 131) For the following reasons, it is recommended that the

motion to intervene be granted."

' Motions to intervene are not among those enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) as dispositive when
referred to a magistrate judge. However, that list is non-exhaustive, and other motions may be dispositive
depending upon their “practical effect of the challenged action on the instant litigation.” Williams v.
Beemiller, Inc., 527 F.3d 259, 265 (2d Cir. 2008). "There is authority within the Second Circuit holding that
a motion to intervene is dispositive, at least insofar as it is brought as of right under Rule 24(a)." Global
Auto Inc. v. Hitrinov, 13 Civ. 2479, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63668 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2021); Medina v.
Fischer, 11 Civ. 0176, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46435 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2013) (finding motion to intervene
as of right to be dispositive). Conversely, some courts in this Circuit have held that motions to intervene
are non-dispositive. See Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 10-CV-6950, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
197579 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2016) (collecting district court cases which affirm magistrate judge orders
granting permissive intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b) as not clearly erroneous); Int'l Chem. Corp. v.
Nautilus Ins. Co., 09 Civ. 3595S, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77913 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2010) ("Motions to
intervene are considered as non-dispositive."); Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Rubin, 170
F.R.D. 93, 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (same). The Second Circuit has not definitively ruled on this issue, but has
suggested that motions to intervene may be dispositive. See Stackhouse v. McKnight, 168 F. App’x 464,
466 (2d Cir. 2006) (summary order). Out of an abundance of caution, the Court treats the motion to
intervene as dispositive and issues a report and recommendation.

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
GPO

Case 1:23-cv-01044-JLS-MJR Document156- Filed 12/09/25 Page 2 of 16

BACKGROUND

On October 2, 2023, plaintiffs, New York State Vegetable Growers Association,
Inc. and five New York State farms (collectively “plaintiffs”), commenced this lawsuit
against defendants New York State Attorney General Letitia James and three officials
from the New York State Public Employment Relations Board (“PERB”) (collectively
“defendants”). (Dkt. No. 1) Plaintiffs claim that certain 2020 amendments to the State
Employment Relations Act (“SERA”), enacted as part of the Farm Laborers Fair Labor
Practices Act (“FLFLPA”), violate the United States Constitution in various ways. (/d.) At
the time the complaint was filed, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction (“PI”).? (Dkt.
No. 2) On February 21, 2024, Judge Sinatra granted in part and denied in part plaintiffs’
motion for a PI. (Dkt. No. 116) The District Court’s PI order was affirmed by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals on March 12, 2025. (Dkt. No. 124) The matter was then referred
to this Court on March 13, 2025. (Dkt. No. 126)

Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on April 16, 2025. (Dkt. No. 129) Ricardo Bell
and Jean Fenel Estrame (collectively “interventor-plaintiffs”) filed the instant motion to
intervene on May 21, 2025, and included a proposed intervenor complaint. (Dkt. No. 131)
Bell and Estrame seek to intervene in this action as of right, or alternatively, by permission
of the Court. Upon the filing of the motion to intervene, the Court entered a briefing
schedule and scheduled a date for oral argument. Plaintiffs submitted a response in
support of the motion to intervene. (Dkt. No. 134) Defendants did not file a response.

Thus, the motion to intervene is unopposed.?

2 Plaintiffs also moved for a TRO. (Dkt. No. 2) Following a status conference before the District Court, the
parties reached a stipulation regarding the TRO portion of plaintiffs’ motion. (Dkt. Nos. 22, 23)

3 On October 29, 2025, plaintiffs filed a second motion for a preliminary injunction. (Dkt. No. 138)
Intervenor-plaintiffs have submitted a response in support of the second PI request. (Dkt. No. 144)

2

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DISCUSSION

Intervention is governed by Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under
Rule 24(a), a court “must permit” intervention when a party makes a timely motion and
“claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action,
and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede
the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent
that interest.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).4 Under Rule 24(b), a court “may permit”
intervention when a party “has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a
common question of law or fact.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B).

In order to prevail on a motion to intervene as of right pursuant to Rule 24(a),
prospective intervenors must: (1) timely file an application, (2) show an interest in the
action, (3) demonstrate that the interest may be impaired by the disposition of the action,
and (4) show that the interest is not protected adequately by the parties to the action. See
In re N.Y.C. Policing During Summer 2020 Demonstrations, 27 F.4th 792, 799 (2d Cir.
2022) (quoting “R” Best Produce, Inc. v. Shulman-Rabin Mktg. Corp., 467 F.3d 238, 241
(2d Cir. 2006). The proposed intervenor bears the burden of demonstrating that it meets
the requirements for intervention, Kamdem—Ouaffo v. Pepsico, Inc., 314 F.R.D. 130, 134
(S.D.N.Y. 2016), and a “[flailure to satisfy any one of these four requirements is a
sufficient ground to deny the application.” “R” Best Produce, 467 F.3d at 241.

In contrast, permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) “is discretionary and should

be construed liberally.” Cont’! Indem. Co. v. Bulson Mgmt., LLC, 20 Civ. 3479, 2020 U.S.

4 Rule 24(a)(1) provides that a court must permit intervention when the party seeking to intervene “is
given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1). That provision does
not apply here.

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Dist. LEXIS 210332 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2020). “Courts typically consider the same four
factors to determine permissive intervention as they would for mandatory intervention.”
Rocano Gen. Constr. Inc. v. US Underwriters Ins. Co., 22 Civ. 6293, 2024 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21635 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2024). However, courts in this Circuit have recognized
that, in the context of permissive intervention, “the four factors should be considered as
a whole, rather than focusing narrowly on any one of the criteria, and that application of
the factors is flexible and discretionary.” Granite State Ins. Co. v. JK Tactical, LLC, 23
Civ. 7769, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100017 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2025) (internal citations
omitted); Red Rock Sourcing LLC v. LGX, LLC, 21 Civ. 1054, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17948 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2023) (“In contrast to the more stringent test for mandatory
intervention, courts conduct a holistic review of the totality of circumstances when
assessing permissive intervention.”).

In assessing a motion for permissive intervention, a court also “must consider
whether granting permissive intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication
of the rights of the existing parties.” Jn re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 225 F.3d 191,
202 (2d Cir. 2000); Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3). Finally, an "application to intervene cannot
be resolved by reference to the ultimate merits of the claims which the intervenor wishes
to assert following intervention." Brennan v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 260 F.3d 123, 129 (2d
Cir. 2001).

Because the Court finds, for the reasons discussed below, that Ricardo Bell and
Jean Fenel Estrame’s request for permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) should be
granted, the Court “need not determine whether intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)

is warranted.” /nt’) Design Concepts, LLC v. Saks, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 229 (S.D.N.Y.

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Mar. 27, 2007); Pike Co. v. Universal Concrete Prods., 284 F. Supp. 3d 376 (W.D.N.Y.
2018). See also Gulf Underwriters Ins. Co. v. The Hurd Ins. Agency, 3:03-CV-1277, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25439 (D. Conn. Dec. 16, 2004) (concluding that permissive intervention
was warranted and determining that “the more difficult question” of intervention as a
matter of right need not be addressed).

Common Question of Law or Fact

In April of 2020, SERA was amended, through the FLFLPA, to apply to farm
employers and farmworkers. See N.Y. Law. Law §§ 701(2)(b), 701(3)(c). In the main
action here, plaintiffs, an association of growers and individual farms, allege fourteen
counts consisting of various constitutional challenges to the FLFLPA. (Dkt. No. 129)
Plaintiffs contend, inter alia, that the union certification and compulsory interest arbitration
provisions of the FLFLPA violate their due process and equal protection rights. (/d.)
Plaintiffs allege that Section 704-b(2)(c) of SERA, which makes it an unfair labor practice
for an employer to discourage union representation, constitutes impermissible viewpoint
discrimination and violates plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. (/d.) Plaintiffs contend that
the lack of a union decertification mechanism in the FLFLPA also violates their First
Amendment right. (/d.) Plaintiffs contend that the FLFLPA amendments violate the
Supremacy Clause and the Contracts Clause, in that their application to non-citizen farm
workers employed through the H-2A visa program conflicts with, and is preempted by, the
federal Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). (/d.) Plaintiffs further allege the FLFLPA’s
dues deduction provisions constitute compelled speech in violation of both farm

employers and farmworkers’ First Amendment rights. (/d.)

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Intervenor-plaintiffs are farmworkers subject to the FLFLPA. Like plaintiff farm
employers, the intervenor farmworkers also allege that the FLFLPA is unconstitutional in
various ways. (Dkt. No. 131) Specifically, the intervenor complaint alleges that (1) the
FLFLPA violates the Supremacy Clause and the Contracts Clause of the United States
Constitution, in so far as it applies to non-citizen seasonal farm employees enrolled in the
H-2A visa program pursuant to the INA; (2) the FLFLPA’s union certification process and
compulsory interest arbitration provisions violate farmworkers’ due process rights; and (3)
compulsory union participation, as required by the FLFLPA, violates farmworkers’ First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Dkt. No. 131-4) Thus, the intervenor complaint
asserts many of the same or similar constitutional challenges to the FLFLPA as asserted
in the complaint in the main action, only with respect to the rights of farmworkers as
opposed to the rights of farm employers.

"The purpose of the rule allowing intervention is to prevent a multiplicity of suits
where common questions of law or fact are involved." Wash. Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Mass.
Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 922 F.2d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1990). Here, the main action and the
intervenor complaint share common questions of law and fact, namely whether enactment
and enforcement of the FLFLPA violates the United States Constitution. See Chamber of
Commerce v. Moore, 2:24-CV-01513, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125518 (D. Vt. June 27,
2025) (granting permissive intervention where “[mJovants intended to address the
fundamental legal question presented by [p]laintiffs, by showing that the [challenged
statute] is constitutional and not preempted.”) (internal citations omitted). Indeed,
intervention will promote judicial economy and efficiency by allowing the Court to

adjudicate the overlapping constitutional challenges in a single proceeding. See Golden

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Ins. Co. v. PCF State Restorations Inc., 17-CV-5390, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 235817
(S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2018) (noting that where the intervenor’s interest arises from the same
“core legal and factual issues” raised by the underlying lawsuit, intervention is frequently
granted); Medequa LLC v. O’Neill & Partners LLC, 21 Civ. 6135, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
132901 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2022) (allowing intervention where it “will promote judicial
economy by enabling [the court] to resolve any claims in one proceeding’).

Moreover, if Bell and Estrame are not permitted to intervene, they are likely to file
their own separate lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the FLFLPA on behalf of
farmworkers.®° Thus, intervention will also ensure consistent results regarding the parallel
factual and legal arguments presented here. See Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.,
10 Civ. 6950, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100852 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2015) (permitting
intervention where there would be risk of inconsistent determinations if multiple cases
were assigned to different judges); Tomassini v. FCA US LLC, 3:14-CV-1226, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 209097 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2018) (granting intervention where litigating cases
separately could result in piecemeal litigation and inconsistent judgments).

Timeliness

District courts have “broad discretion in assessing the timeliness of a motion to
intervene.” In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 225 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2000). “Among
the most important factors in a timeliness decision is the length of time the applicant knew
or should have known of his interest before making the motion." Catanzano by Catanzano

v. Wing, 103 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Courts

5 In their motion, intervenor-plaintiffs note that “[i]f the Court denies intervention, [mJovants could (and
almost certainly would) later file their complaint as a separate, standalone lawsuit.” (Dkt. No. 131-3, pg.
11)

7

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measure timeliness from the moment the proposed intervenor had actual or constructive
notice of their unrepresented interest. Kamden-Ouaffo v. PepsiCo., Inc., 314 F.R.D. 130
(S.D.N.Y. 2016).

Here, the initial complaint asserted challenges to the FLFLPA based upon the
constitutional rights of both farm employers and farmworkers. (Dkt. No. 1) The claims
originally asserted by plaintiff farm employers on behalf of farmworkers included, inter
alia, (1) a First Amendment and equal protection challenge to FLFLPA’s compulsory
interest arbitration provisions; (2) a First Amendment challenge to the card checks and
dues deductions as well as the lack of union decertification options; and (3) a disparate
treatment claim as to both agricultural employers and employees. (/d. at pgs. 81-84, 86-
95) However, in the PI order, Judge Sinatra found that plaintiffs did not have standing to
raise these constitutional claims on behalf of farmworkers. (Dkt. No. 116, pg. 5)
Specifically, Judge Sinatra concluded that farm employers and farmworkers were not
“sufficiently aligned to make the employers as effective a proponent for the farmworkers’
rights as the farmworkers’ themselves.” (/d.) Judge Sinatra further found that plaintiff farm
employers “did not demonstrate that some obstacle exists to inhibit farmworkers from
asserting these constitutional claims in state or federal court on their own behalf.” (/d.)
Consistent with the District Court’s ruling as to plaintiffs’ lack of standing to assert claims
on behalf of farmworkers, plaintiff farm employers’ amended complaint omits almost all

of the previously asserted claims regarding the constitutional rights of farmworkers.®

8 Count Ten of the amended complaint continues to assert a claim on behalf of farm employees with
respect to the FLFLPA’s dues deduction authorization provisions. (Dkt. No. 116, pgs. 135-41) Thus, while
the majority of the original claims asserted on behalf of farmworkers have been removed from the
amended complaint, plaintiff farm employers are still asserting one challenge to the FLFLPA based on the
constitutional rights of farm workers.

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A little over a month after the filing of the amended complaint, intervenor plaintiffs
filed the instant motion, seeking to assert their own constitutional challenges to the
FLFLPA as additional parties to this lawsuit. Thus, Bell and Estrame sought to intervene
shortly after it became clear that plaintiff farm employers were no longer asserting a
number of claims on behalf of farmworkers, and that farmworkers had an interest in
separately pursuing their claims.

Thus, the Court finds the motion to intervene to be timely. See Chen-Oster, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100852 (“In cases where the potential intervenor's interest is, at least at
the outset, subsumed by that of a representative litigant, the trigger requiring intervention
does not occur until it is apparent that the representative no longer protects the
intervenor's interest."); In re Coffee, 14-MD-2542, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71323 (S.D.N.Y.
April 13, 2021) (finding intervenor’s motion timely where it was filed less than two months
after intervenor received definitive notice of their interest in pursing the claim); Werbungs
Und Commerz Union Austalt v. Collectors' Guild, Ltd., 782 F. Supp. 870, 874 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (finding motion to intervene timely despite the fact that it was filed almost two years
after intervenors were made aware of their potential interest, because the motion was
filed when that interest became direct).

Delay or Undue Prejudice

Next, the Court finds that there will be no prejudice or undue delay to the original
parties if intervention is permitted. While the case was commenced in October of 2023, it
remains in its preliminary stages. Neither answers nor motions to dismiss have been filed.
No discovery appears to have taken place, and a discovery schedule has not yet been

set. See Goldeneye Advisors, LLC v. Hanco Venture Cap., Ltd., 24-CV-9918, 2025 U.S.

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Dist. LEXIS 142110 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2025) (finding no prejudice or undue delay to
parties as a result of intervention since case was in its preliminary stages and no
scheduling order was in place); Stutts v. De Dietrich Grp., 03 Civ. 4058, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 31056 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2005) (although motion to intervene was filed almost
two years after the action was commenced, parties were not prejudiced because
discovery had not yet begun).

And, significantly, plaintiffs are in favor of intervention and defendants do not
oppose intervention. See Mortg. Lenders Network, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 218 F.R.D. 381,
384 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (concluding that there was no prejudice where parties failed to
oppose non-party's motion to intervene); Republic of the Phil. v. Abaya, 312 F.R.D. 119,
123 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) ("Any prejudice to the parties is further belied by the absence of
objections to [intervention] motion."); Stutts, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31056 (finding no
prejudice where the motion to intervene was unopposed).’

Additional Factors

The Court further finds that the totality of the remaining factors weighs in favor of
permitting intervention. First, a party seeking to intervene "must have a direct, substantial,
and legally protectable interest in the subject matter of the action." United States v. City
of New York, 198 F.3d 360, 365 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). This factor is weighed “toward inclusion rather than exclusion.” XL Specialty Ins.

Co. v. Lakian, 632 Fed. App’x 667, 669 (2d Cir. 2015).

7 The lack of prejudice or undue delay here also supports a finding that the motion to intervene is timely.
See BNP Paribs v. Kurt Orban Partners LLC, 19 Civ. 9616, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19938 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
2, 2021) (“Because granting the [motion to intervene] would not delay the case or prejudice the existing
parties, the Court deems it timely.”); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Mitlof, 193 F.R.D. 154, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 2000))
(“It is firmly established that the most significant criterion in determining timeliness is whether the delay in
moving for intervention has prejudiced any of the existing parties.”) (internal citations omitted).

10

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Plaintiff-intervenor Bell is a citizen of Jamacia and is employed by plaintiff Porpiglia
Farms (“Porpiglia”) pursuant to a temporary H2-A visa. (Dkt. No. 131-2, ] 2) Bell is subject
to the FLFLPA and is a member of a bargaining unit represented by United Farm Workers
of America (“UFW"”). (/d. at {{] 4-5) In 2024, Bell filed, with PERB, a petition signed by
employees in his bargaining unit seeking to remove UFW as their bargaining
representative. (/d. at {| 6) PERB dismissed the petition, and Bell’s bargaining unit is
currently subject to compulsory interest arbitration between Porpiglia and UFW. (Dkt. No.
131-3, pgs. 7-8; Dkt. No. 134, Jf] 35-38)

Plaintiff-intervenor Estrame is a permanent resident of the United States and is
employed as an agricultural worker by Cherry Lawn Fruit Farms (“Cherry Lawn”). (Dkt.
No. 131-1, {] 2) Estrame is subject to the FLFLPA and is a member of a bargaining unit
represented by UFW. (/d. at {] 3) In 2024, Estrame filed, with PERB, a petition signed by
himself and other bargaining unit employees seeking to remove UFW as their
representative. (/d. at 5) PERB dismissed the petition, and UFW has filed a declaration
of impasse with PERB as to its bargaining with Cherry Lawn. (Dkt. No. 131-3, pgs. 7-8)
A declaration of impasse is a precursor to interest arbitration. (Dkt. No. 131-4)

Like the amended complaint, the proposed intervenor-complaint alleges, inter alia,
that the FLFLPA’s union certification procedures, dues deduction requirements, and
compulsory interest arbitration provisions are unconstitutional. Thus, both Bell and
Estrame have an interest in the subject matter of the action. This interest encompasses
whether they are lawfully subject to union representation, and, more specifically, whether

the challenged provisions of the FLFLPA violate their constitutional rights.

11

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Next, the Court finds that plaintiff-intervenors’ interest may be impaired by
disposition of the lawsuit. Plaintiffs are raising a myriad of constitutional challenges to the
FLFLPA. Many of these claims are based on the same constitutional rights and legal
theories asserted by the intervenor-plaintiffs. For example, both plaintiffs and intervenor-
plaintiffs allege that the FLFLPA is preempted by federal immigration law. Both plaintiffs
and intervenor-plaintiffs allege that the FLFLPA’s union certification procedure violates
due process. And both plaintiffs and intervenor-plaintiffs allege that the dues deduction
authorization of the FLFLPA violates the First Amendment rights of both farm employers
and farm workers.® Should the Court rule against plaintiffs in the underlying action in
regard to some or all of these claims, those rulings could have a negative impact on
plaintiff-intervenors ability to raise similar constitutional challenges in a separate
proceeding. See Mortg. Lenders Network, Inc., 218 F.R.D. at 384 (finding that movant's
ability to protect its interest would be impeded if denied intervention because, inter alia,
there would be a risk of inconsistent rulings on the same issues); U.S. ex rel. Preferred
Masonry Restoration, Inc. v. Int'l. Fid. Ins. Co., 17-CV-1358, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
148583 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2019) (granting intervention where intervenor would be
prejudiced if application was denied because it could be subject to inconsistent rulings);
In re Pandora Media, Inc., 12-C\V-8035, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175800 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
13, 2013) (adverse rulings could be made without movant’s participation and could have

a negative effect on their independent lawsuit).

8 Plaintiff-intervenors maintain that this is an “important” claim for movants which they want to raise on
their own behalf, since it implicates whether they will be required to financially support the union. (Dkt. No.
131-3, pg. 16)

12

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Finally, courts assessing motions to intervene should consider whether the
movants have shown “inadequate representation of [their] interest by existing parties.”
Brennan, 579 F.2d at 191. While the “bar for showing inadequate representation is
minimal”, Harris-Clemons v. Charly Trademarks Ltd., 751 Fed. App’x 83, 85 (2d Cir. 2018)
(internal citations omitted), a movant seeking to intervene “must at least overcome the
presumption of adequate representation that arises when it has the same ultimate
objective as a party to the existing suit.” Brennan, 579 F.2d at 191. Here, both plaintiffs
and plaintiff-intervenors have the same overall objective, namely a finding that the
challenged provisions of the FLFLPA are unconstitutional. Thus, at first blush, this factor
appears to weigh against permitting intervention.

However, as noted above, Judge Sinatra found that plaintiff farm employers do not
have standing to challenge the FLFLPA based on the constitutional rights of farmworkers.
Therefore, while the ultimate goal of both sets of plaintiffs may be the same, not all of the
specific constitutional challenges and legal arguments raised by the intervenor-plaintiffs
can be pursued by plaintiffs in the underlying action. See Provencher v. Bimbo Bakeries
United States, Inc., 2:22-CV-198, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167385 (Dist. V. Aug. 7, 2023)
(intervenor met minimal burden of demonstrating that interest not adequately protected
because “though both seek to dismiss the counterclaim, they do so for different reasons,
and thus interests are not identical”); Citizens for an Orderly Energy Policy, Inc. v. Suffolk
County, 101 F.R.D. 497, 501-02 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (‘[I]t is clear that while [the] plaintiffs’
and [the intervenor]'s interests are not adverse, they are different."). And while plaintiff-
intervenors could bring their constitutional challenges to the FLFLAPA in a separate

lawsuit, an adverse ruling in the instant action could foreclose or impair those claims.

13

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For these reasons, and in light of the relaxed standard to be applied when granting
a motion for permissive intervention, the Court finds that intervenor-plaintiffs have met
their minimal burden of showing that their interests are not adequately represented by
plaintiffs. And even if they had not, the Court finds that permissive intervention would still
be appropriate here. See Moore, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125518 (noting that Rule 24(b)
does “not necessitate a finding that party representation be inadequate” and that the
“adequacy of party representation is only a minor factor at most”) (internal citations
omitted); New York v. Scalia, 1:20-CV-1689, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115415 (S.D.NLY.
June 29, 2020) (“Adequate representation weighs against permitting intervention, but a
court may still permit it if the intervenors will help resolve a dispute.”).°

Considering all relevant factors under the holistic approach required by Rule 24(b),
the Court concludes, in its discretion, that permissive intervention is warranted here to
facilitate the efficient resolution of disputes involving common questions of law or fact in
one proceeding. See also Brennan, 579 F.2d at 192 (noting that another relevant factor
to consider with regard to permissive intervention is whether the movant will “significantly
contribute to full development of the underlying factual issues in the suit and equitable

adjudication of the legal questions presented.”) (internal citations omitted).

2 On February 16, 2024, Judge Sinatra denied UFW’s motion to intervene in this lawsuit as of right or, in
the alternative, by permission. (Dkt. No. 111) Judge Sinatra concluded that because UFW’s interests
aligned with defendants, UFW did not demonstrate that its interest would suffer absent intervention, nor
could UFW demonstrate that its interests were not adequately represented by defendants. (/d.) Judge
Sinatra also found that UFW had not identified a claim or defense that shared a common issue of law or
fact. (Id.) Differently here, the intervenor complaint raises independent constitutional claims on behalf of
farmworkers that share common issues of law or fact with the underlying action. And because intervenor-
plaintiffs raise similar legal challenges to the FLFLPA, which cannot be asserted by farm employers on
behalf of farmworkers, plaintiff-intervenors have made a minimal showing that their interests may be
impaired if they are not permitted to intervene and that their interests may not be adequately represented
by plaintiffs.

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Case 1:23-cv-01044-JLS-MJR Document156- Filed 12/09/25 Page 15 of 16

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that plaintiff-intervenors Ricardo Bell
and Jean Fenerl Estrame’s motion for permissive intervention be granted. (Dkt. No. 131)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1), it is hereby ORDERED that this Report and
Recommendation be filed with the Clerk of Court.

Unless otherwise ordered by Judge Sinatra, any objections to this Report and
Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court within fourteen days of service of
this Report and Recommendation in accordance with the above statute, Rules 72(b), 6(a),
and 6(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and W.D.N.Y. L. R. Civ. P. 72. Any
requests for an extension of this deadline must be made to Judge Sinatra.

Failure to file objections, or to request an extension of time to file objections,
within fourteen days of service of this Report and Recommendation WAIVES THE
RIGHT TO APPEAL THE DISTRICT COURT’S ORDER. See Small v. Sec’y of Health
& Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989).

The District Court will ordinarily refuse to consider de novo arguments, case law

and/or evidentiary material which could have been, but were not, presented to the

Magistrate Judge in the first instance. See _Paterson—Leitch Co. v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale

Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 985, 990-91 (1st Cir. 1988).

Finally, the parties are reminded that, pursuant to W.D.N.Y. L.R.Civ.P. 72(b),
written objections “shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings and
recommendations to which objection is made and the basis for each objection, and shall
be supported by legal authority.” Failure to comply with these provisions may result

in the District Court's refusal to consider the objection.

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Case 1:23-cv-01044-JLS-MJR Document156- Filed 12/09/25 Page 16 of 16

SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 9, 2025
Buffalo, New York

Rett |? rmer

MICHAEL J. ROEMER
United States Magistrate Judge

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