Koehler v. Commissioner of Social Security

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________
CHRISTINE K.,
Plaintiff,
DECISION AND ORDER
v.
1:23-CV-00422 EAW
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
______________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Represented by counsel, plaintiff Christine K. (“Plaintiff”) brings this action
pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), seeking review of the
final 	decision 	of 	the 	Commissioner 	of 	Social 	Security 	(the 	“Commissioner,” 	or
“Defendant”) denying her applications for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and
supplemental security income (“SSI”). (Dkt. 1). This Court has jurisdiction over the matter
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Presently before the Court are the parties’ cross motions for judgment on the
pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). 	(Dkt. 6; Dkt. 10). 	For the
reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s motion (Dkt. 6) is granted to the extent that the matter
is remanded for further administrative proceedings, and the Commissioner’s motion (Dkt.
10) is denied.
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BACKGROUND
Plaintiff protectively filed her applications for DIB and SSI on October 30, 2020.
(Dkt. 5 at 21, 280-89, 290-96).1 In her applications, Plaintiff alleged disability beginning
Mach 17, 2020. 	(Id. at 21, 281, 290). 	Plaintiff’s applications were initially denied on
January 28, 2021, and on reconsideration on April 15, 2021. (Id. at 21, 157-58, 164-84).
At Plaintiff’s request, a telephone hearing was held before administrative law judge
(“ALJ”) Moises Penalver on August 24, 2021. (Id. at 42-82). On March 17, 2022, the ALJ
issued an unfavorable decision. (Id. at 21-36). Plaintiff requested Appeals Council review;
her 	request 	was 	denied 	on 	April 	6, 	2023, 	making 	the 	ALJ’s 	determination 	the
Commissioner’s final decision. (Id. at 6-12). This action followed.
LEGAL STANDARD
I. 	District Court Review
“In reviewing a final decision of the [Social Security Administration (“SSA”)], this
Court is limited to determining whether the SSA’s conclusions were supported by
substantial evidence in the record and were based on a correct legal standard.” Talavera
v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). 	The Act holds that a decision by the Commissioner is “conclusive” if it is
supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence means more
than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
1 	When referencing the page number(s) of docket citations in this Decision and Order,
the Court will cite to the CM/ECF-generated page numbers that appear in the upper
righthand corner of each document.
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as adequate to support a conclusion.” Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009)
(quotation omitted). 	It is not the Court’s function to “determine de novo whether [the
claimant] is disabled.” 	Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation
omitted); see also Wagner v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir.
1990) (holding that review of the Secretary’s decision is not de novo and that the
Secretary’s findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence). However, “[t]he
deferential 	standard 	of 	review 	for 	substantial 	evidence 	does 	not 	apply 	to 	the
Commissioner’s conclusions of law.” Byam v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2003)
(citing Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1984)).
II. 	Disability Determination
An ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether a claimant
is disabled within the meaning of the Act. See Bowen v. City of N.Y., 476 U.S. 467, 470-
71 (1986). At step one, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaged in substantial
gainful work activity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If so, the claimant is not
disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step two and determines whether the claimant has an
impairment, or combination of impairments, that is “severe” within the meaning of the Act,
in that it imposes significant restrictions on the claimant’s ability to perform basic work
activities. 	Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). 	If the claimant does not have a severe
impairment or combination of impairments, the analysis concludes with a finding of “not
disabled.” If the claimant does have at least one severe impairment, the ALJ continues to
step three.
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At step three, the ALJ examines whether a claimant’s impairment meets or
medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of
Regulation No. 4 (the “Listings”). Id. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the impairment meets
or medically equals the criteria of a Listing and meets the durational requirement (id.
§§ 404.1509, 416.909), the claimant is disabled. If not, the ALJ determines the claimant’s
residual functional capacity (“RFC”), which is the ability to perform physical or mental
work activities on a sustained basis, notwithstanding limitations for the collective
impairments. See id. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).
The ALJ then proceeds to step four and determines whether the claimant’s RFC
permits the claimant to perform the requirements of his or her past relevant work. 	Id.
§§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If the claimant can perform such requirements, then he or she
is not disabled. If he or she cannot, the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step, wherein
the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant is not disabled. 	Id.
§§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). 	To do so, the Commissioner must present evidence to
demonstrate that the claimant “retains a residual functional capacity to perform alternative
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy” in light of the claimant’s
age, education, and work experience. 	Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999)
(quotation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c).
DISCUSSION
I. 	The ALJ’s Decision
In determining whether Plaintiff was disabled, the ALJ applied the five-step
sequential evaluation set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920. 	Initially, the ALJ
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determined that Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the Act through
December 31, 2022. (Dkt. 5 at 24). At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not
engaged in substantial gainful work activity since March 17, 2020, the alleged onset date.
(Id.).
At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of
cervical degenerative disc disease without cord compression; lumbar degenerative disc
disease without central stenosis or nerve root impingement; left shoulder derangement;
obesity (level II); and adjustment disorder with mixed depressed and anxious mood. (Id.).
The ALJ also found that Plaintiff suffered from the non-severe impairments of mild left
foot degenerative joint disease, gastroesophageal reflux disease, hyperlipidemia, and mild
intermittent asthma. (Id.). He also concluded that her impairment of chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease was not a medically determinable impairment. (Id. at 25).
At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of any Listing.
(Id.). In particular, the ALJ considered the requirements of Listings 1.15, 1.16, 1.18, 12.04,
and 12.06 in reaching his conclusion. (Id. at 25-26).
Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the RFC
to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a), with
the following non-exertional limitations:
[Plaintiff] can: lift or carry up to 10 pounds occasionally; stand or walk up to
two hours total in an eight-hour workday; sit up to six hours in a workday,
with regularly scheduled breaks; push or pull occasionally with the left upper
extremity; 	never 	climb 	ladders, 	ropes 	or 	scaffolds 	and 	never 	crawl;
occasionally climb ramps/stairs and occasionally stoop, crouch and kneel. In
addition, [Plaintiff]: must avoid constant rotation, flexion and extension of
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the neck; is limited to frequent reaching, with the non-dominant left upper
extremity; must avoid concentrated and frequent exposure to extreme heat;
and must avoid concentrated and frequent exposure to dangerous moving
machinery and unprotected heights. 	Further, [Plaintiff]: is limited to low
stress jobs, defined as positions with no more than occasional changes in the
work setting; must avoid fast-paced work environments (defined as constant
activity with work tasks performed sequentially in rapid succession); and
would be off task up to 10% of the workday, in addition to regularly
scheduled breaks.
(Id. at 26-27). At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past
relevant work. (Id. at 34).
At step five, the ALJ relied on the testimony of a vocational expert to conclude that,
considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, there were jobs that exist
in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, including the
representative occupations of identification clerk, appointment clerk, and receptionist. (Id.
at 35). Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Act.
(Id. at 36).
II. 	Remand for Further Administrative Proceedings is Required
Plaintiff asks the Court to reverse the Commissioner’s decision, or in the alternative
remand the matter for further administrative proceedings, arguing that: (1) the ALJ’s step
five finding failed to show transferable skills; (2) the RFC was not supported by substantial
evidence because it contained a highly specific limitation unsupported by medical
evidence; and (3) the ALJ’s assessment of the medical opinion evidence did not comport
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with the regulations. 	(Dkt. 6-1 at 12-26). 	For the following reasons, remand for further
administrative proceedings on the second ground is required.
In deciding a disability claim, an ALJ is tasked with “weigh[ing] all of the evidence
available to make an RFC finding that [is] consistent with the record as a whole.” Matta
v. Astrue, 508 F. App’x 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2013). It is well-settled that an ALJ’s conclusion
need not “perfectly correspond with any of the opinions of medical sources cited in his
decision.” 	Id. 	However, an ALJ is not a medical professional, and “is not qualified to
assess a claimant’s RFC on the basis of bare medical findings.” 	Ortiz v. Colvin, 298 F.
Supp. 3d 581, 586 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) (quotation omitted). In other words:
An ALJ is prohibited from ‘playing doctor’ in the sense that ‘an ALJ may
not substitute his own judgment for competent medical opinion. . . .’ 	This
rule is most often employed in the context of the RFC determination when
the claimant argues either that the RFC is not supported by substantial
evidence or that the ALJ has erred by failing to develop the record with a
medical opinion on the RFC.
Quinto v. Berryhill, No. 3:17-cv-00024 (JCH), 2017 WL 6017931, at *12 (D. Conn. Dec.
1, 2017) (citations omitted). 	“[A]s a result[,] an ALJ’s determination of RFC without a
medical advisor’s assessment is not supported by substantial evidence.” Dennis v. Colvin,
195 F. Supp. 3d 469, 474 (W.D.N.Y. 2016) (quotation and citation omitted). However, at
bottom, “[a]n RFC finding is administrative in nature, not medical, and its determination
is within the province of the ALJ, as the Commissioner’s regulations make clear.” Curry
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 855 F. App’x 46, 48 n.3 (2d Cir. 2021).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform a reduced range of
sedentary work that included time off-task of up to 10 percent of the workday in addition
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to normal breaks. Plaintiff argues this highly specific RFC was not adequately tied to the
evidence of record. On these facts, the Court agrees.
In the decision, the ALJ considered medical opinion evidence from several sources.
Specifically, he addressed a January 2021 consultative examination by Abrar Siddiqui,
M.D., who assessed Plaintiff with mild limitations in her ability to stand, bend, lift, push,
pull, and carry heavy objects. (Dkt. 5 at 948-51). The ALJ found Plaintiff somewhat more
limited than Dr. Siddiqui opined in light of other information in the record but concluded
that the opinion was partially persuasive because it was reasonably supported and
consistent with the record in concluding that while strenuous physical activity would be
challenging, Plaintiff remains capable of performing a meaningful range of sedentary work
activity. (Id. at 32).
The ALJ also considered the physical assessment opinions of the State agency
medical consultants who concluded that Plaintiff has a capacity for a reduced range of work
between the light and sedentary levels with postural limitations. 	(Id. at 85-101, 102-18,
119-37, 138-56). 	The ALJ found these opinions partially persuasive, reasoning that the
opinions were somewhat supported and fairly consistent with the record, but that “the
substantial evidence of record detailed above demonstrates a somewhat higher degree of
limitation, particularly with respect to head movements, reaching with the left arm,
environmental precautions, and the impact of the claimant’s symptoms on her ability to
remain on task, than determined by the State agency consultants.” (Id. at 32).
The ALJ considered the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physician’s assistant Amy
Albert, PA-C, and other providers at Sherban Orthopedics, who indicated that Plaintiff was
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limited to lifting 10 pounds. 	The ALJ found these opinions partially persuasive to the
extent consistent with the RFC, but otherwise somewhat vague and lacking in specificity.
He also addressed PA Albert’s July 2021 questionnaire. (Id. at 1114-18). In it, PA Albert
noted that she had been treating Plaintiff every 1-3 months since December 2017. (Id. at
1114). PA Albert noted that Plaintiff suffered from pain, burning, numbness, and tingling
in her neck, low back, and upper and lower extremities that is constant but worse with
activity. (Id.). She indicated that the clinical findings and objective signs supporting her
opinions included cervical and lumbar MRIs which revealed disc herniations, sensory
deficits in Plaintiff’s bilateral upper extremities, and motor deficits in her bilateral upper
and lower extremities. 	(Id.). 	PA Albert opined that Plaintiff’s pain or other symptoms
could be expected to interfere with her attention and concentration frequently, which is
specifically defined in the form as 34% to 66% of an 8-hour workday. (Id. at 1115). She
found Plaintiff incapable of even low stress jobs based on her 10 out of 10 pain level. (Id.).
PA Albert opined that Plaintiff would need unscheduled breaks four times per hour of a
five-minute duration and would likely be absent from work more than four days per month
due to her impairments or treatment. 	(Id. at 1116-117). 	The ALJ found PA Albert’s
opinions only partially persuasive, reasoning that “[t]he rather extreme degree of functional
restriction indicated by Ms. Albert is simply not fully supported by, or consistent with, the
substantial evidence of record detailed above, including progress records from her own
facility, Sherban Orthopedics, showing overall moderate findings, as well as slow but
steady gait, negative straight leg raising bilaterally, and fairly intact strength and sensation,
particularly on the right side. Thus, Ms. Albert’s opinion is found only partially persuasive,
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to the extent consistent with the findings herein in indicating the claimant would likely be
unable to sustain work activities more than a relatively modest degree of physical activity.”
(Id. at 33).
The ALJ also addressed the opinion of consultative examiner Susan Santarpia,
Ph.D. (Id. at 953-56). Dr. Santarpia opined that Plaintiff “presents as able to understand,
remember, or apply simple, as well as complex directions and instructions, use reason and
judgment to make work-related decisions, interact adequately with supervisors, coworkers,
and the public, and maintain personal hygiene and appropriate attire within normal limits.
Moderate impairment is demonstrated in sustaining concentration and performing a task at
a consistent pace, sustaining an ordinary routine and regular attendance at work, regulating
emotion, controlling behavior, and maintaining well-being, being aware of normal hazards
and taking appropriate precautions.” (Id. at 955). The ALJ found Dr. Santarpia’s opinions
partially persuasive, explaining that “Dr. Santarpia’s assessment is expressed in somewhat
vocationally vague terms and suggests a somewhat higher degree of restriction in some
respects, such as sustaining ordinary routine and regular attendance, than supported by the
overall record, including a lack of specialized mental health treatment and the largely
benign mental status exam findings of Dr. Santarpia’s own evaluation and primary care
treatment records. Nonetheless, Dr. Santarpia’s assessment overall is fairly supported and
consistent with the substantial evidence of record in suggesting a meaningful, but not
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profound, degree of mental limitation, with an adequate capacity for basic mental work-
related activities.” (Id. at 33).
In summary, the ALJ noted that:
the longitudinal record also contains various instances of examining or
treating providers expressing their assessments of the claimant’s disability in
terms of percentages or conclusory phrases (i.e., 50% disabled 100%
disabled, etc.) (Exhs. 2F-3F; 6F; 14F; 16F; 19F; 22F). 	However, such
statements are inherently neither valuable nor persuasive, as they are vague,
lacking specific function-by-function assessments, and conclusory, relating
to the issue of disability reserved to the Commissioner.
(Id. at 33-34).
As noted, in the RFC, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “would be off task up to
10% of the workday, in addition to regularly scheduled breaks.” 	(Id. at 27). 	The only
explanation offered by the ALJ relating to off-task time was as follows:
The record also establishes that, along with physical symptoms of pain, the
claimant’s mental impairments would limit her to work activities with a
reduced degree of work setting changes she might find stressful and to work
activities that do not involve fast-paced demands, while also contributing to
a need to be off-task for a portion of the workday, to account for periods of
particularly intense symptomatology. These limitations are accommodated
by the above residual functional capacity, to the degree established by the
substantial evidence of record.
(Id. at 28). But while this explanation may account for the ALJ’s determination that off-
task time was warranted, it does not explain how he reached the 10% off-task limitation,
nor is it otherwise apparent from the record.
It is well-settled that an RFC finding is administrative in nature and, for that reason,
the ALJ is not required to adopt any one medical opinion in its entirety; rather, the ALJ’s
RFC finding must be supported by substantial evidence in the record. 	See Matta, 508 F.
App’x at 56. 	Further, because Plaintiff’s claim was filed after March 27, 2017, the new
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regulations—which 	provide 	new 	guidelines 	for 	the 	ALJ’s 	evaluation 	of 	opinion
evidence—apply to Plaintiff’s disability claim. 	See Revisions to Rules Regarding the
Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 2017 WL 168819, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01, at *5844 (Jan.
18, 2017). 	For example, the ALJ is no longer required to give “controlling weight” to a
treating physician’s opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). However, the
new regulations did not relieve the ALJ of his general duty to develop the medical record,
or otherwise abrogate the general principle that an administrative hearing is not adversarial
in nature.
As noted, the only medical opinion in the record expressly relating to time off-task
was from PA Albert, who opined that Plaintiff would need to be off-task frequently,
defined as 34% to 66% of an 8-hour workday. 	(Dkt. 5 at 1115). 	Although the ALJ
concluded that PA Albert’s opinions were not fully supported by other evidence of record,
he did not specifically address PA’s Albert’s opinion as to time off-task in crafting the
RFC. That said, “an RFC determination, even one containing highly specific limitations,
is not fatally flawed merely because it was formulated absent a medical opinion or specific
limitation.” 	Tiffany L. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:20-CV-0677 (WBC), 2021 WL
3145694, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. July 26, 2021) (citing Cook v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 818 F.
App’x 108, 109-10 (2d Cir. 2020)); see also Michael K. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:20-
cv-1467-DB, 2022 WL 3346930, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2022) (“[J]ust because there
is no explicit opinion or subjective complaint that mirrors an RFC limitation does not mean
there was an error.”); Jennifer O. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:20-CV-1474 (WBC), 2022
WL 2718510, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. July 13, 2022) (“[A]n RFC determination, even one
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containing highly specific limitations, is not fatally flawed merely because it was
formulated absent a medical opinion.”).
Rather, what is important is that the written determination make clear how the ALJ
arrived at the specific limitation to ensure it was not the result of the ALJ’s speculation or
conjecture. For example, in Cosnyka v. Colvin, the ALJ found that the plaintiff would be
“off-task” for ten percent of the workday based on the orthopedic examiner’s opinion that
the plaintiff would need “regular comfort breaks,” but did not indicate the length of those
breaks. 576 F. App’x 43, 46 (2d Cir. 2014). The Second Circuit found that determination
was not supported by the record, and that a specific RFC assessment must be based on
evidence in the record, not on an “ALJ’s own surmise.” 	Id. 	As the Second Circuit
reiterated in Johnson v. Colvin, the error in Cosnyka was not that the ALJ assigned a
particular 	percentage 	range, 	but 	instead 	that 	there 	was 	no 	support 	for 	the 	ALJ’s
determination that the 10% off-task limitation translated to six minutes out of every hour
rather than some other amount of time that equaled 10% of the workday. See 669 F. App’x
44, 47 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order). 	In other words, while there must be evidentiary
support for the ALJ’s specific limitations, that support need not be in the form of a medical
opinion as long as the Court can glean the ALJ’s rationale from the written determination.
See Cook v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 818 F. App’x 108, 109 (2d Cir. 2020) (medical opinion
providing specific restrictions reflected in the RFC is not required if the record contains
sufficient evidence from which an ALJ can assess the RFC); see also Joshua K. v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., No. 19-cv-66-FPG, 2021 WL 235886, at *2-3 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2021)
(remand required where the ALJ did not “point to any evidence in the record suggesting
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why Plaintiff would be off task for this specific percentage of time,” and explaining that
“[s]pecific RFC assessments, like percentage of time off-task, must be based on evidence
in the record,” and further explaining that generalizations pointed to by the Commissioner,
including that the plaintiff had normal attention and concentration examination, engaged
in many activities, and attended college, “were [not] included in the ALJ’s decision as
support for the specific off task assessment nor do they translate into a finding that Plaintiff
would be off task five percent of the day”). 	This explanation is particularly important
where, as here, the limitation assessed by the ALJ is less restrictive than that contained in
the only medical opinion on point. 	See Kenneth H. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 23-CV-
6358-LJV, 2024 WL 5075613, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2024) (“And in contrast to cases
where the ALJ’s specific finding was not error because it was more generous to the
claimant than any medical opinion, . . . medical opinions here found greater limitations.”).
Here, it is unclear to the Court how the ALJ settled on a ten percent off-task
limitation. And not only that, but the determination of percentage in this case is particularly
problematic given that at the administrative hearing, when the ALJ presented several
hypotheticals to the VE, each of which contained a different off-task limitation (five
percent, ten percent, and more than ten percent), the VE explained that an off-task
limitation of more than ten percent would render Plaintiff unable to perform any jobs. (See
Dkt. 5 at 74-78 (“Based on my experience and knowledge on this topic, since this issue is
not addressed in the DOT, the generally accepted rate of time off task is up to and including
10% of the workday in addition to normal breaks or about six minutes per hour typically
in small increments, so up to and including 10% is acceptable. Anything above that would
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preclude competitive employment.”); see also Elder v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 18-CV-
1196, 2019 WL 6320355, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2019) (“At best . . . the ALJ’s
conclusion comes from whole cloth. At worst, the conclusion responds to the vocational
expert’s testimony that an off-task behavior restriction of six minutes per hour—that is,
one more minute of off-task behavior per hour—would be work preclusive.”). 	Thus, in
this case, the distinction between an off-task percentage of ten percent versus one of eleven
percent was outcome determinative as to Plaintiff’s disability status and warranted greater
explanation. 	On remand, should the ALJ again assess an off-task limitation, he should
identify evidence in the record supporting his conclusion in that respect.
B. 	Plaintiff’s Remaining Arguments
As set forth above, Plaintiff has identified additional reasons why she contends the
ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence. 	However, because the Court
has already determined, for the reasons previously discussed, that remand of this matter for
further administrative proceedings is necessary, the Court declines to reach these issues.
See, e.g., Bell v. Colvin, No. 5:15-CV-01160 (LEK), 2016 WL 7017395, at *10 (N.D.N.Y.
Dec. 1, 2016) (declining to reach arguments “devoted to the question whether substantial
evidence supports various determinations made by [the] ALJ” where the court had already
determined remand was warranted); Morales v. Colvin, No. 13cv06844 (LGS) (DF), 2015
WL 13774790, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2015) (the court need not reach additional
arguments regarding the ALJ’s factual determinations “given that the ALJ’s analysis may
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change on these points upon remand”), adopted, 2015 WL 2137776 (S.D.N.Y. May 4,
2015).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 6)
is granted to the extent that the matter is remanded for further administrative proceedings,
and the Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 10) is denied. 	The
Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment and close this case.
SO ORDERED.
________________________________
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD
Chief Judge
United States District Court
Dated: 	March 21, 2025
Rochester, New York
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