Stewart v. Castine et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
CHAUNCEY STEWART, a/k/a CHONICE
STEWART,
Plaintiff,
v.
EDWARD CASTINE, individually, DEAN
LACLAIR, individually, MATTHEW
GRAVELLE, individually, KEVIN SANTO,
individually, TODD STRACK, individually, N.
JOHNSON, individually, N. YOUNG,
individually, BENJAMIN DARRAH,
individually, and JOHN and JANE DOE 1
through 10, (the names John and Jane Doe being
fictitious, as the true names are presently
unknown),
Defendants.
9:25-cv-486
(ECC/ML)
Brett H. Klein, Esq., for Plaintiff
Elizabeth V. Lombardi, Assistant United States Attorney, for Named Defendants
Hon. Elizabeth C. Coombe, United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Chauncey Stewart initiated this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
asserting claims for the violation of his constitution rights arising out of an altercation while he
was incarcerated at the Clinton County Correctional Facility and his subsequent criminal
prosecution against Defendants Edward Castine, Dean Laclair, Matthew Gravelle, Kevin Santo,
Todd Strack, N. Johnson, N. Young, Benjamin Darrah (Named Defendants), and unnamed
Defendants. 	Dkt. Nos. 1, 21. 	Specifically, he asserts five claims: excessive force, malicious
prosecution, fair trial, failure to intervene, and supervisory liability. 	Am. Compl. ¶¶ 39-63.
Presently before the Court is the Named Defendants’ motion to dismiss the malicious prosecution,
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fair trial, and supervisory liability claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 	Dkt.
No. 26. The motion is fully briefed. Dkt. Nos. 26-2, 32, 33. For the following reasons, the motion
to dismiss Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution, fair trial claims, and supervisory liability claims is
granted.
I. 	FACTS1
At all times, relevant to this dispute, Plaintiff Chauncey Stewart was incarcerated at Clinton
Correctional Facility, and the Named Defendants were corrections officers who worked at that
facility. Amended Complaint (Am. Compl.) ¶¶ 6, 7, Dkt. No. 21.
On April 19, 2022, Defendants Castine and Gravelle “were escorting plaintiff and a number
of other incarcerated individuals to the prison bathhouse,” and Castine “bumped into plaintiff,
almost causing plaintiff to fall down.” 	Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9-10. Plaintiff asked Castine to apologize,
and Castine ordered him to return to his cell. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12. While escorting Plaintiff to his cell,
Castine and Gravelle “subjected plaintiff to unreasonable and otherwise wanton force in retaliation
for plaintiff asking for an apology, and not for any proper penological purpose.” 	Id. at ¶ 13.
Plaintiff “was not engaged in any behavior warranting the use of force.” Id. at ¶ 14.
Castine “punched and choked” Plaintiff, and Gravelle “joined in the unlawful conduct by,
inter alia, needlessly kneeing and punching plaintiff in the ribs.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15-16. Gravelle
and Castine handcuffed Plaintiff. 	Id. at ¶ 17. 	While Plaintiff was in handcuffs and “still not
engaged in any behavior warranting the use of force,” Laclair “responded to the incident and also
participated . . . by kicking and stepping on plaintiff’s legs and kicking plaintiff in the groin area.”
1 These facts are drawn from the Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 21. The Court assumes the truth
of, and draws reasonable inferences from, the well-pleaded factual allegations, see Lynch v. City
of New York, 952 F.3d 67, 74–75 (2d Cir. 2020), but does not accept as true any legal conclusions,
see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
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Id. at ¶ 18. While Plaintiff was still in handcuffs, Castine punched Plaintiff in his head, put his
knee on Plaintiff’s neck, and “pulled his dreads with such force that plaintiff felt some of his dreads
were pulled from his head.” Id. at ¶ 19. Santo was present but did not intervene. Id. at ¶ 20.
Strack, Johnson, and Young escorted Plaintiff to the medical clinic, and while Plaintiff was
in the medical clinic, he “was subjected to further acts of excessive force” by Strack, Johnson and
Young in the presence of Darrah. 	Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21-22. 	While Plaintiff was still handcuffed,
Strack choked Plaintiff and put a plastic bag over his head, while Johnson and Young punched
Plaintiff “in the stomach and ribs.” Id. at ¶ 23. Darrah “was supposed to be recording plaintiff’s
escort but instead stood by and did nothing to intervene” and only turned on the video camera after
Strack, Johnson, and Young used force. Id. at ¶¶ 23-24.
Santo, Castine, and Gravelle forwarded “false evidence”—that Plaintiff punched Castine
to start the altercation—to the Clinton County District Attorney’s office to initiate a criminal
proceeding against Plaintiff. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25-27. After Santo, Castine, and Gravelle testified
before a grand jury, the grand jury returned an indictment and Plaintiff was arrested. Id. at ¶¶ 28-
29. In addition to his arraignment, Plaintiff attended five pre-trial criminal court appearances. Id.
at ¶ 30. During the trial, Castine, Gravelle, and Santo testified that Plaintiff punched Castine, and
Laclair testified that Plaintiff was “struggling on the ground” with Castine and Gravelle, and he
resisted being handcuffed. Id. at ¶¶ 32-33. The jury acquitted Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 36.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
“a complaint must provide ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Citigroup, Inc., 709 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 	“Although a complaint need not contain
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detailed factual allegations, it may not rest on mere labels, conclusions, or a formulaic recitation
of the elements of the cause of action, and the factual allegations ‘must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.’” Lawtone-Bowles v. City of New York, No. 16-cv-4240, 2017
WL 4250513, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2017) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A court must
accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. 	See EEOC v. Port Auth., 768 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 2014)
(citing ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007)). However, “the
tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable
to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
III. 	DISCUSSION
Defendants move to dismiss the supervisory liability, malicious prosecution, and fair trial
claims. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Def. Mot.) at 4, 7, 10, Dkt. No. 26-2.2
A. 	Malicious Prosecution
Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to allege a malicious prosecution claim because
Plaintiff—who was incarcerated on separate charges throughout the prosecution—did not suffer a
loss of liberty. Def. Mot. at 13. Plaintiff responds that an individual who is taken to court during
a criminal prosecution suffers a loss of liberty regardless of any pre-existing incarceration.
Plaintiff’s Response Memorandum of Law (Pl. Mem.) at 10-11, Dkt. No. 32.
“To state a Section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must allege that: ‘(1)
the defendant either commenced or continued a criminal proceeding against him; (2) that the
proceeding terminated in his favor; (3) that there was no probable cause for the criminal
proceeding; and (4) that the criminal proceeding was instituted with actual malice.’” 	Jeanty v.
2 Page numbers refer to the pagination generated by ECF, unless otherwise noted.
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City of New York, 23-cv-9472, 2024 WL 5236462, at *23 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2024) (quoting Posr
v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 100 (2d Cir. 1991)). 	“Because a malicious prosecution claim brought
under § 1983 is grounded in the Fourth Amendment, . . . the plaintiff must also establish another
element in addition to the state tort requirements: a post-arraignment deprivation of liberty that
rises to the level of a constitutional ‘seizure.’” Coleman v. City of New York, 688 F. App’x 56,
57-58 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274-75 (1994) and Singer v. Fulton
County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1995)).
“[A] plaintiff does not allege a deprivation of liberty when he was already incarcerated for
an unrelated crime before the contested charges were brought and would have remained
incarcerated for that crime regardless of the contested charges.” Poulos v. Cnty. of Warren, No.
21-2656, 2023 WL 4004692, at *2 (2d Cir. June 15, 2023) (citing Singer, 63 F.3d at 116). “Where
a plaintiff is already in custody, and remained in custody, for a completely separate charge, the
plaintiff could not have suffered a deprivation of liberty as a result of the charges at issue.” Coffey
v. Broome Cnty., No. 9:23-cv-236 (AMN), 2025 WL 2391724, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2025)
(cleaned up) (quoting Walker v. Sankhi, 494 F. App’x. 140, 143 (2d Cir. 2012)); see also Cisse v.
Annucci, No. 9:22-cv-0156 (TJM), 2022 WL 1183274, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2022) (“A
plaintiff does not have a claim for . . . malicious prosecution under section 1983 if, at the time of
his arrest and prosecution, he already is in custody on other charges, because there is no deprivation
of liberty interests.”) (quoting Doe v. Selsky, 841 F. Supp. 2d 730, 732 (W.D.N.Y. 2012) and citing
Walker v. Sankhi, 494 F. App’x 140, 142-43 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[Plaintiff's] federal . . . malicious
prosecution claims must fail because . . . [plaintiff] could not have suffered a deprivation of liberty
as a result of [one] burglary charge because, throughout the pendency of that charge, he was
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already in custody, and remained in custody, for a completely separate burglary charge, of which
he was ultimately convicted.”)).
Here, Plaintiff was incarcerated on unrelated charges during the prosecution arising out of
the April 19, 2022 altercation. 	Am. Compl. ¶ 6. 	He therefore did not suffer an actionable
deprivation of liberty when he was compelled to attend criminal proceedings because he was
already incarcerated on an unrelated crime. Polous, 2023 WL 4004692, at *2; Coffey, 2025 WL
2391724, at *10.
Plaintiff relies on several cases to argue that “being forced to appear in court over a period
of several months, and subjected to the risks, stress, and potential costs of being bound over for
trial . . . support a finding that plaintiff can maintain a valid malicious prosecution claim.” 	Pl.
Mem. at 11 (citing Swartz v. Insogna, 704 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2013); Hoyos v. City of New
York, 999 F. Supp. 2d 375, 389 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Genia v. New York State Troopers, No. 03-cv-
0870, 2007 WL 869594, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2007)). But these cases are all distinguishable
because the plaintiffs were not already incarcerated for unrelated crimes. See Swartz, 704 F. 3d at
108-09 (involving a traffic stop); Hoyos, 999 F. Supp. 2d at 382-84 (same); Genia, 2007 WL
869594 at *1-2 (involving a protest).
Plaintiff has not pled a deprivation of liberty for his malicious prosecution, and therefore
the motion to dismiss the malicious prosecution claims is granted.3
3 Plaintiff suggests that, in the alternative, he may be able to plead a deprivation of liberty because
he was placed in the Segregated Housing Unit. Pl. Mem. at 11-12. Given that these allegations
are not in the Amended Complaint, the Court will not address this argument at this time. If Plaintiff
wants to amend the Amended Complaint, he may file a motion to amend the pleadings pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 and N.D.N.Y. Local Rule 15.1. Nothing in this decision should be interpreted
as an indication of how the Court may rule on such a motion.
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B. Fair Trial
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s fair trial claim fails for the same reason that the malicious
prosecution claim fails: Plaintiff did not suffer a deprivation of liberty. 	Def. Mot. at 15-16.
Plaintiff responds that there was an actionable deprivation of liberty. Pl. Mem. at 12-13.
“To state a fair trial right claim, a plaintiff must plausibly plead the following elements:
‘(1) investigating official (2) fabricates information (3) that is likely to influence a jury’s verdict,
(4) forwards that information to prosecutors, and (5) the plaintiff suffers a deprivation of life,
liberty, or property as a result.” 	Hutchins v. Solomon, No. 16-cv-10029 (KMK), 2018 WL
4757970, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2018) (quoting Garnett v. Undercover Officer C0039, 838
F.3d 265, 279 (2d Cir. 2016) (additional citation omitted)).
Courts use the same analysis for a deprivation of liberty in the context of fair trial claims
as they do in malicious prosecution claims. See, e.g., Seabrook v. City of New York, No. 14-cv-
3059, 2016 WL 554823, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2016) (explaining that for both fair trial and
malicious prosecution claims, “the plaintiff must establish a ‘deprivation of liberty consistent with
the concept of ‘seizure.’”) (quoting Singer, 63 F.3d at 116) (malicious prosecution) and citing
Lopez v. City of N.Y., 105 F. Supp.3d 242, 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (fair trial)). For the same reasons
explained above, Plaintiff has not alleged an actionable deprivation of liberty in connection with
the criminal prosecution because he was already incarcerated on unrelated charges. Defendants’
motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s fair trial claims is therefore granted.
C. Supervisory Liability
Defendants argue that the claims for supervisory liability against Santo and Strack are
duplicative of the direct liability claims. Def. Mot. at 9-12. Plaintiff responds that the supervisory
liability claims survive as alternative theory of liability. Pl. Mem. at 9-10.
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“[T]here is no special rule for supervisory liability. 	Instead, a plaintiff must plead and
prove ‘that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution.’” 	Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676). 	“A supervisor’s ‘mere knowledge . . .’ is not sufficient because that
knowledge does not ‘amount[ ] to the supervisor’s violating the Constitution.’” Sellers v. Andrea,
No. 3:22-cv-585, 2022 WL 17830715, at *4 (D. Conn. Dec. 21, 2022) (quoting Tangretti, 983 F.
3d at 616-17) (additional quotation omitted). “The focus is on what the supervisor did or caused
to be done, ‘the resulting injury attributable to his conduct, and the mens rea required of him to be
held liable, which can be no less than the mens rea required of anyone else.’” Tangreti, 983 F.3d
at 618 (quoting Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 1327–28 (10th Cir. 2010) (Gorsuch, J.)) (emphasis
in original).
Following 	Tangretti, 	standalone 	claims 	for 	supervisory 	liability 	are 	“no 	longer
cognizable.” 	Kweller v. Cnty. of Broome, No. 3:25-cv-343 (AJB), 2025 WL 3280821, at *16
(N.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2025); see also Kistner v. City of Buffalo, No. 21-cv-526, 2023 WL 144915,
at *15 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2023) (“since Tangreti, section 1983 claimants can no longer rely on
the theories of supervisory liability or failure to discipline to establish a supervisor’s personal
involvement in a constitutional violation.”).
Because the Second Circuit no longer recognizes supervisory liability as an independent
claim under § 1983, Plaintiff’s claims for supervisory liability are dismissed, but evidence that
Defendants acted in a supervisory capacity may be used to establish direct liability for other claims.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is hereby
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ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Dkt. No. 26, is
GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution and fair trial claims are DISMISSED
without prejudice, and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claim is DISMISSED with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 19, 2026
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