Francis v. Depuy et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
SHAWN FRANCIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEPUY, et al.,
Defendants.
9:25-CV-0016
(LEK/ML)
APPEARANCES:
SHAWN FRANCIS
Plaintiff, pro se
23-R-0323
Franklin Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 10
Malone, NY 12953
LAWRENCE E. KAHN
Senior United States District Judge
OF COUNSEL:
DECISION AND ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
On January 6, 2025, pro se plaintiff Shawn Francis ("plaintiff") commenced this action
by submitting a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), with an application
to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP"). Dkt. No. 1 ("Compl."); Dkt. No. 5 ("IFP Application").
The complaint asserts claims related to plaintiff's confinement at Washington Correctional
Facility ("Washington C.F."). See generally Compl.
By Memorandum-Decision and Order filed on April 25, 2025 (the "April 2025 Order"),
the Court granted plaintiff's IFP Application and reviewed the sufficiency of the complaint in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Dkt. No. 7. The Court
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found that the Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against Depuy and John Does 1-3
and the Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Hampton survived review. Id. at
10. The Court dismissed the remaining claims, without prejudice, for failure to state a claim.
See id. Plaintiff was permitted to file an amended complaint within forty-five (45) days of
the filing of the April 2025 Order. See id.
On July 25, 2025, having received no communication from plaintiff, the Court issued
an Order directing plaintiff to provide the documents for service within thirty days. Dkt. No. 9.
In lieu of documents for service, plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Dkt. No. 11
("Am. Compl.").
II. 	SUFFICIENCY OF AMENDED COMPLAINT
A. Legal Standard
The legal standard governing the dismissal of a pleading for failure to state a claim
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) was discussed at length in
the April 2025 Order and will not be restated in this Decision and Order. See Dkt. No. 7 at 3-
4.
B. Summary of Amended Complaint
With the amended complaint, plaintiff repeats and realleges the facts and causes of
actions asserted in the original complaint and includes additional facts related to events that
occurred at Washington C.F. See generally Am. Compl.
On or around June 30, 2024, defendant Correction Officer Dupuye1 ("Dupuye")
directed plaintiff to exit the bathroom and place his hands on the wall. Am. Compl. at 3.
Defendant Correction Sergeant Hampton ("Hampton") was also present and "disengage[d]"
1 In the original complaint, plaintiff referred to defendant as "Depuy." With the amended complaint, plaintiff
spells his name as "Dupuye." The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the Docket Report accordingly.
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her Body Worn Camera ("BWC"). Id. Plaintiff "did as instructed," and Dupuye "slammed []
plaintiff’s head into the dorm wall." Id. Hampton's BWC recorded the interaction in "passive
mode." Id.
Dupuye handcuffed plaintiff and told him to go with him, to a van waiting outside. Am.
Compl. at 3. Dupuye then "kicked and punched [plaintiff] in the head and body area." Id.
Dupuye told plaintiff that if he "told anybody about [the] assault, [he] would kill [] Plaintiff." Id.
Hampton was also present during the exchange. Id.
Plaintiff was taken to the facility infirmary. Id. While at the infirmary,
Dupuye said to plaintiff, "[i]f you report me assaulting you to the nurse or anyone[,] I will kill
you." Id. at 4. Hampton was present "outside of the room." Id. Plaintiff was treated by the
facility medical staff. Id.
Plaintiff was escorted to an isolation cell. Id. There, defendants Corrections Officer
John Doe #1, John Doe #2, and John Doe #3 entered the cell and "started to beat [] Plaintiff
about the head, face, and body area." Id. Defendants told plaintiff "if he screamed or called
for help[,] that they will kill him/Plaintiff and nobody would know." Id.
On July 1, 2024, plaintiff was transported to the Special Housing Unit ("SHU"). Id. Due
to his pain from the assaults, plaintiff submitted a sick call slip and was treated at the
infirmary. Id.
Construing the amended complaint liberally2, plaintiff alleges the following: (1)
excessive force claims; (2) failure to protect claims; (3) condition of confinement claims (4)
2 The Court is mindful of the Second Circuit's instruction that a pleading by a pro se litigant must be construed
liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that it suggests. See, e.g., Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed
Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) ("On occasions too numerous to count, we have reminded district
courts" that a pro se plaintiff's pleadings must be construed liberally); Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 130 (2d
Cir. 2005) ("We leave it for the district court to determine what other claims, if any, [plaintiff] has raised. In so
doing, the court's imagination should be limited only by [plaintiff's] factual allegations, not by the legal claims set
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due process claims; and (5) state law claims.3 See generally Compl. Plaintiff seeks
monetary damages. See id.
C. Analysis
1. Excessive Force
The law related to excessive force claims was discussed in the April 2025 Order and
will not be restated herein. See Dkt. No. 7 at 5-6. In the April 2025 Order, the Court found
that the excessive force claims against Dupuye and John Does 1-3 survived review and
required a response. See id. These claims are repeated and realleged in the amended
complaint. For the reasons set forth in the April 2025 Order, defendants are directed to
respond to these claims.
2. Failure to Protect
The law related to failure to protect claims was discussed in the April 2025 Order and
will not be restated herein. See Dkt. No. 7 at 7-8. In the April 2025 Order, the Court found
that the failure to protect claims against Hampton survived review and required a response.
See id. These claims are repeated and realleged in the amended complaint. For the
reasons set forth in the April 2025 Order, defendant is directed to respond to these claims.
3. Conditions of Confinement - SHU Confinement
With the amended complaint, plaintiff claims that Dupuye denied him "food, medical
treatment, religious consultation, phone calls, bedding, and showers for the duration of his
confinement" in the SHU. Am. Compl. at 5.
out in his pleadings."); Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[W]e read [a pro se litigant's]
supporting papers liberally, and will interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.").
3 With the amended complaint, plaintiff asserts an equal protection claim. See Am. Compl. at 5. The pleading
however, is devoid of any factual allegations in support of an equal protection claim. Due to the conclusory
nature of this claim and lack of supporting facts, the Court cannot engage in any meaningful analysis of a
potential Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim.
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"To demonstrate that the conditions of his confinement constitute cruel and unusual
punishment, the plaintiff must satisfy both an objective test and a subjective test." Jolly v.
Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468,480 (2d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). To satisfy the objective element,
"the plaintiff must demonstrate that the conditions of his confinement result 'in unquestioned
and serious deprivations of basic human needs.' " Id. (citation omitted). "[T]he inmate must
show that the conditions, either alone or in combination, pose an unreasonable risk of serious
damage to his health." Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
With respect to the subjective element, plaintiff must "demonstrate that the defendants
imposed those conditions with 'deliberate indifference.' " Jolly, 76 F.3d at 480 (citation
omitted). To constitute deliberate indifference, "[t]he prison official must know of, and
disregard, an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Walker, 717 F.3d at 125.
Even assuming, for the purposes of this review, that the conditions plaintiff endured in
the SHU satisfied the objective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim, the complaint lacks
facts suggesting that Dupuye or any named defendant was personally involved in any
decisions related to plaintiff's confinement in the SHU. Plaintiff does not allege that he
complained to Depuye or any named defendant about the conditions and he failed to assert
any facts related to how or when any named defendant became aware of the conditions.
Because plaintiff has not plead that any named defendant took any individual action
with respect to these conditions of confinement, there is no basis for liability under § 1983.
Accordingly, plaintiff's condition-of-confinement claims are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim.
4. Fourteenth Amendment – Due Process
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Plaintiff claims he was denied due process when he was placed in the SHU for two
weeks. Am. Compl. at 5.
To successfully state a claim under Section 1983 for denial of due process, a plaintiff
must show that he both (1) possessed an actual liberty interest, and (2) was deprived of that
interest without being afforded sufficient process. See Ortiz v. McBride, 380 F.3d 649, 654
(2d Cir. 2004); Tellier v. Fields, 280 F.3d 69, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2000); Hynes v. Squillace, 143
F.3d 653, 658 (2d Cir. 1998); Bedoya v. Coughlin, 91 F.3d 349, 351-52 (2d Cir. 1996).
In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the United States Supreme Court
determined that to establish a liberty interest, a plaintiff must sufficiently demonstrate that (1)
the State actually created a protected liberty interest in being free from segregation; and that
(2) the segregation would impose an "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84; Tellier, 280 F.3d
at 80; Hynes, 143 F.3d at 658. To determine whether an inmate has suffered an "atypical
and significant hardship," the conditions imposed upon the inmate must be compared with
those imposed upon the rest of the general population of the facility as well as those in
administrative and protective confinement. See Welch v. Bartlett, 196 F.3d 389, 393 (2d Cir.
1999); see also Vega v. Lantz, 596 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2010) ("To be actionable, the liberty
interest must subject the prisoner to ‘atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.' ") (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484).
While not the only factor to be considered, the duration of a disciplinary confinement
remains significant under Sandin. Colon v. Howard, 215 F.3d 227, 231 (2d Cir. 2000).
Specifically, while under certain circumstances confinement of less than 101 days could be
shown to meet the atypicality standard under Sandin (see Colon, 215 F.3d at 232 n.5), the
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Second Circuit generally takes the position that disciplinary confinement, without unusual
conditions, for a period of up to 101 days will generally not constitute an atypical hardship,
while confinement for a period of more than 305 days has been held to be atypical even if
under "normal conditions." Ortiz, 380 F.3d at 654; Colon, 215 F.3d at 231.
The due process protections afforded inmates facing disciplinary hearings that affect a
liberty or property interest include advance written notice of the charges, a fair and impartial
hearing officer, a hearing that affords the inmate the opportunity to call witnesses and present
documentary evidence, and a written statement of the evidence upon which the hearing
officer relied in making his determination. Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d 57, 69 (2d Cir. 2004)
(citing, inter alia, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-67 (1974)). The hearing officer's
findings must be supported by "some" "reliable evidence." Id. (citing, inter alia,
Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985)).
Here, even assuming plaintiff's two-week confinement in the SHU and the conditions
he endured constitute an atypical or significant hardship, as discussed supra, the amended
complaint lacks facts suggesting that any named defendant was personally involved in the
decision to confine plaintiff to the SHU. The pleading is devoid of any information related to
who ordered plaintiff transferred or why plaintiff was transferred to the SHU. While plaintiff
claims that "Dupuye and multiple officers" denied him food, medical, etc., the amended
complaint does not include any dates and plaintiff has not explained how or when he
complained to Dupuye or any other named defendant about his conditions and what
response, if any, he received to his complaints.
Because plaintiff has not plead that any named defendant took any individual action
with respect to his SHU confinement, there is no basis for liability under § 1983. Accordingly,
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plaintiff's due process claims are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim.
5. State Law Claims
Plaintiff asserts assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.
See Am. Compl. at 6.
"[A] cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may not be premised solely on a violation
of state law." O'Neil v. Bebee, No. 5:09-CV-1133 (GTS/DEP), 2010 WL 502948, at *7 n.15
(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2010). However, a court may choose to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over pendent state law causes of action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 where the
state law causes of action "are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United
States Constitution." See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Here, plaintiff's assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims
are based on the same allegations that give rise to the excessive force claims, which have
survived sua sponte review. As a result, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over plaintiff's related state law claims, which also survive sua sponte review and require a
response. In so ruling, the Court expresses no opinion as to whether these claims can
withstand a properly filed dispositive motion.
III. 	CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, it is hereby
ORDERED that the amended complaint (Dkt. No. 11) is ACCEPTED for filing and is
the operative pleading in this action; and it is further
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ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall amend the Docket Report in accordance
with this Order; and it is further
ORDERED that the following claims are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted: (1) Eighth Amendment condition of confinement claims; and (2) Fourteenth
Amendment due process claims;4 and it is further
ORDERED that the following claims survive review and require a response: (1) Eighth
Amendment excessive force claims against Depuye and John Does 1-3; (2) Eighth
Amendment failure to protect claims against Hampton; and (3) state law claims; and it is
further
ORDERED that, upon receipt of the documents for service, the Clerk shall issue
summonses and forward them, along with copies of the amended complaint, to the United
States Marshal for service upon the defendants. The Clerk shall forward a copy of the
summons and amended complaint to the Office of the Attorney General, together with a copy
of this Decision and Order, by electronic mail only; and it is further
ORDERED that a response to the amended complaint be filed by the defendants, or
counsel, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and it is further
4 Generally, when a district court dismisses a pro se action sua sponte, the plaintiff will be allowed to amend his
action. See Gomez v. USAA Fed. Savings Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999). However, an opportunity to
amend is not required where the plaintiff has already been afforded the opportunity to amend. See Shuler v.
Brown, No. 9:07-CV-0937 (TJM/GHL), 2009 WL 790973, at *5 & n.25 (N.D.N.Y. March 23, 2009) ("Of course,
an opportunity to amend is not required where the plaintiff has already amended his complaint."), accord, Smith
v. Fischer, No. 9:07-CV-1264 (DNH/GHL), 2009 WL 632890, at *5 & n.20 (N.D.N.Y. March 9, 2009); Abascal v.
Hilton, No. 9:04-CV-1401 (LEK/GHL), 2008 WL 268366, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Jan.130 2008); see also Yang v. New
York City Trans. Auth., 01-CV-3933, 2002 WL 31399119, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2002) (denying leave to
amend where plaintiff had already amended complaint once); Advanced Marine Tech. v. Burnham Sec ., Inc.,
16 F. Supp.2d 375, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (denying leave to amend where plaintiff had already amended
complaint once); cf. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (denial of leave to amend not abuse of discretion
movant has repeatedly failed to cure deficiencies in pleading).
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ORDERED that plaintiff shall take reasonable steps through discovery to ascertain the
identity of defendant John Does 1-3. Plaintiff's failure to timely serve these defendants will
result in dismissal of the claims asserted against them and termination of the defendants from
the action; and it is further
ORDERED that all pleadings, motions, and other documents relating to this action
must bear the case number assigned to this action and be filed with the Clerk of the United
States District Court, Northern District of New York, 7th Floor, Federal Building, 100 S.
Clinton St., Syracuse, New York 13261-7367. Any paper sent by a party to the Court or
the Clerk must be accompanied by a certificate showing that a true and correct copy of
same was served on all opposing parties or their counsel. Any document received by
the Clerk or the Court which does not include a proper certificate of service will be
stricken from the docket. Plaintiff must comply with any requests by the Clerk’s Office for
any documents that are necessary to maintain this action. All parties must comply with Local
Rule 7.1 of the Northern District of New York in filing motions. Plaintiff is also required to
promptly notify the Clerk’s Office and all parties or their counsel, in writing, of any
change in his address; the failure to do so will result in the dismissal of his action; and
it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to serve a copy of this Decision and Order on
plaintiff in accordance with the Local Rules of Practice.
Dated: December 18, 2025
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