Johnson v. Rickard

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
JAMAL JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
v. 	9:24-CV-1170
(GTS)
E. RICKARD,
Respondent.
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
JAMAL JOHNSON
Petitioner pro se
72450-050
Ray Brook Federal Correctional Institution
P.O. Box 900
Ray Brook, New York 12977
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 	EMER M. STACK, ESQ.
100 S. Clinton Street – Suite 9000 	Asst. United States Attorney
Syracuse, New York 13261
Attorney for Respondent
GLENN T. SUDDABY
United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Jamal Johnson ("Petitioner") seeks federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241. Dkt. No. 1, Petition ("Pet."). Respondent opposed the Petition. Dkt. No.
8, Response to Petition ("Resp. Memo."); Dkt. No. 8-1, Declaration of Cheryl Magnusson
("Magnusson Decl."); Dkt. No. 8-2, Exhibits in Support of Magnusson Decl. Petitioner then
filed a reply. Dkt. No. 11, Traverse.
For the reasons outlined below, the petition should be denied and dismissed.
Case 9:24-cv-01170-GTS Document 12 Filed 05/27/26 Page 1 of 12

2
II. 	BACKGROUND
On March 2, 2022, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
sentenced Petitioner to a 100-month term of imprisonment, followed by three years of
supervised release, for being a convicted felon in possession of a stolen firearm in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Pet. at 1; see U.S. v Johnson, No. 2:19-CR-0645, Dkt. No. 73 (Mar. 2,
2022 D.N.J.). Currently, Petitioner is a prisoner at Ray Brook Federal Correctional Institute
("Ray Brook FCI"). Pet. at 1.
On March 21, 2024, Petitioner received a First Step Act ("FSA") Recidivism Risk
Assessment (PATTERN)1, which determined that his risk level was Medium. See Pet. at 31-
32. Petitioner's score included five points for a "violent offense." Id.
On April 10, 2024, while confined at Ray Brook FCI, Petitioner filed a Request for
Administrative Remedy claiming that his § 922(g) offense should not be considered a violent
offense. Pet. at 22. Petitioner further noted that the categorization impacted his PATTERN
score, good time credits ("GTC"), and opportunity for Residential Reentry Center ("RRC")
placement. Id. The Administrative Remedy Coordinator acknowledged receipt of the request
on April 19, 2024 and noted that a response was due on May 9, 2024. Id. at 25. After the
Warden failed to respond, on May 15, 2024, Petitioner filed a Regional Administrative
Remedy Appeal noting, "I accept the Warden's failure to respond to the grievance upon due
date, May 9, 2024, as a denial thereof." Id. at 23. The Administrative Remedy Coordinator
acknowledged that the appeal was received on May 20, 2024 and noted that a response was
due on July 19, 2024. Pet. at 26.
On June 3, 2024, the Warden issued a denial and explained that
1 PATTERN is an acronym for "Prisoner Assessment Tool Targeting Estimated Risk and Needs." See
https://www.bop.gov/inmates/fsa/pattern.jsp (last visited May 14, 2026).
Case 9:24-cv-01170-GTS Document 12 Filed 05/27/26 Page 2 of 12

3
18:922(G)(1) Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon is
one of the offenses included on the Violent Offense Codes for
PATTERN Assessment. Therefore, PATTERN is programmed to
automatically score this offense as violent. This process is
managed by an outside entity apart of the Bureau of Prisons.
Pet. at 15.
In the Regional Director’s response, dated July 11, 2024, she explained that
Under 	the 	First 	Step 	Act 	of 	2018 	(FSA), 	PATTERN 	is 	an
assessment tool designed to predict the likelihood of general and
violent recidivism for all BOP inmates over a three-year follow-up
period. 	PATTERN contains static factors, such as age and crime
of 	conviction, 	as 	well 	as 	dynamic 	factors, 	such 	as 	program
participation or lack of participation. These factors are associated
with either an increase or a reduction in risk of recidivism. Upon the
initial assessment, staff will assign each inmate an initial recidivism
risk level of Minimum, Low, Medium, or High. The BOP reassesses
the needs and risk of all inmates on an ongoing basis, ordinarily in
conjunction with their regularly scheduled Program Review.
Your appeal has been reviewed. 	The record reveals you are
serving a sentence for Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted
Felon, 18 USC § 922(g). As such, you instant offense is classified
as a violent offence. 	This matter has been reviewed. 	Your
PATTERN assessment is correct. 	Accordingly, your appeal is
denied.
Pet. at 16. The response was marked "received" in the Ray Brook FCI Mail Room on July 29,
2024. Id.
On July 25, 2024, Petitioner filed an appeal to the Central Office noting, "I accept the
Northeast Regional Office Admin. Rem. Coordinator's failure to respond within the allotted
extension of time dated July 19, 2024, to my grievance [. . . ] as a denial thereof." Pet. at 18.
Petitioner's appeal was received by the BOP on August 1, 2024. Id. Petitioner's appeal to
the Central Office was rejected on August 5, 2024, for failing to include a copy of the
Institutional Request and Response and Regional Office Appeal and Response. Id. at 17.
Petitioner was advised that he "may resubmit [his] appeal in the proper form within 15 days of
Case 9:24-cv-01170-GTS Document 12 Filed 05/27/26 Page 3 of 12

4
the date of this rejection notice." Id. The notice was marked "received" by the Ray Brook FCI
Mail Room on August 29, 2024. Pet. at 17. Petitioner did not resubmit his appeal. Dkt. No.
8-1 at ¶ 12.
III. 	PETITION
Petitioner seeks federal habeas corpus relief due to the Federal Bureau of Prison
("BOP") unlawfully classifying his criminal conviction as a crime of violence, resulting in an
adverse security classification and miscalculations related to his rate of recidivism, accrual of
federal time credits ("FTC") and opportunity for RRC placement. See generally Pet.
Petitioner seeks an order "hold[ing] as a matter of [ ] law it is unlawful for the BOP to classify"
Petitioner's current offense as a "violent offense." Id. at 8. Respondent contends the petition
is procedurally barred due to plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Resp.
Memo at 9. In support of this assertion, Respondent supplied the Court with the Declaration
of BOP Legal Assistant Cheryl Magnusson, in which she has provided detailed testimony
concerning her search of the BOP's records regarding grievances filed by Petitioner. See
Dkt. No. 8-1. Respondent further argues that the petition lacks merit because petitioner has
no liberty interest in his custody classification. Resp. Memo. at 12-15.
IV. 	DISCUSSION
A federal prisoner may challenge his detention under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2255.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; Adams v. United States, 372 F.3d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 2004); Chambers
v. United States, 106 F.3d 472, 474 (2d Cir. 1997). Section 2241 is the proper vehicle to
challenge the execution of a sentence. Adams, 372 F.3d at 135; 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For
example, a petitioner may use a section 2241 petition to challenge a federal official's
Case 9:24-cv-01170-GTS Document 12 Filed 05/27/26 Page 4 of 12

5
computation of a sentence, parole decisions, or prison disciplinary actions. Cook v. N.Y.S. iv.
of Parole, 321 F.3d 274, 278 (2d Cir. 2003); Jiminian v. Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cir.
2001). Petitions filed under section 2241 must name the petitioner's warden as respondent
and be filed in the district of the petitioner's confinement. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a); Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435, 447 (2004).
Here, Petitioner is a federal inmate, confined at Ray Brook FCI, seeking to challenge
the execution of his sentence. Therefore, the habeas petition is brought properly through
section 2241.
A. Exhaustion of Remedies
A petitioner seeking relief pursuant to § 2241 must exhaust his or her administrative
remedies. Carmona v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 243 F.3d 629, 630 (2d Cir. 2001); accord
Lallave v. Martinez, 609 F.Supp.3d 164, 179 (E.D.N.Y. 2022). "This requires compliance with
the BOP's four-step Administrative Remedy Program." Lallave, 609 F.Supp.3d at 179 (citing
28 C.F.R. § 542.10(a)).
This Court has previously outlined how exhaustion must occur:
Available to all federal prison inmates is an internal, four-step
administrative grievance procedure adopted by the BOP for the
stated purpose of "allow[ing] 	an inmate to seek formal review
of an issue relating to any aspect of his/her own confinement." ...
The first step of the prescribed process entails making an effort to
obtain an early resolution of the matter by raising the issue
informally to staff.... In the event this avenue does not lead to a
successful resolution, the inmate next may submit a formal written
[Administrative Remedy ("AR")] to the warden of the particular
facility involved, utilizing a designated BP–9 form, within twenty
days of the relevant event.... If the AR is denied, an appeal may be
taken to the appropriate BOP Regional Director within twenty
calendar days of the date of denial.... As a fourth and final step, an
unfavorable decision from the Regional Director may be appealed
to the General Counsel's office (also referred to as the "Central
Case 9:24-cv-01170-GTS Document 12 Filed 05/27/26 Page 5 of 12

6
Office" [or "CORC"]) within thirty days of the date on which the
Regional Director rejects the inmate's appeal.
Barber v. Perdue, No. 9:11-CV-0127 (NAM/DEP), 2012 WL 5996342, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 9,
2012) (citing cases and 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10(a), 542.13(a), 542.14(a), & 542.15(a)) (internal
citations omitted). "Until the BOP's Central Office considers the appeal, no administrative
remedy is considered to be fully exhausted." Strong v. Lappin, No. 1:09-CV-3522, 2010 WL
276206, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010); accord, Barber, 2012 WL 5996342, at *4. "Courts
have required an inmate to proceed with the next step in the grievance procedure, even in
the absence of a BOP official's response to the prior step, in order to properly exhaust the
available administrative remedies." Thai v. Pullen, No. 3:22-CV-605, 2022 WL 17355189, at
*5 (D. Conn. Dec. 1, 2022) (citations omitted).
"In order to file an appeal to the Central Office, the prisoner is required to submit
appeals to the Regional Director and Central Office on specific forms, and to attach a
complete copy of the request and response from the previous levels." Flete-Garcia v. Nash,
No. 3:23-CV-195, 2023 WL 8358066, at *2 (D. Conn. Dec. 1, 2023) (citing 28 C.F.R. §
542.15(b)(1)); Stokes v. Warden of FCI-Allenwood Low, No. 1:24-CV-571, 2024 WL
4567283, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2024) (§ 542.15(b)(1) requires the petitioner to "include one
complete copy or duplicate original of the institution and regional filings and their responses"
with the Appeals to the General Counsel), appeal dismissed as moot sub nom. Stokes v.
Warden Allenwood FCI Low, No. 24-3079, 2025 WL 3191903 (3d Cir. July 11, 2025). If the
inmate does not comply with this requirement, their appeal may be rejected and returned to
them. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.17(a).
Here, Petitioner asserts that he provided photocopies of his "BP(9) and BP(10)" with
his appeal to the Central Office but explains that he did not include photocopies of the
Case 9:24-cv-01170-GTS Document 12 Filed 05/27/26 Page 6 of 12

7
Warden's reply or the Regional Office's reply because he "did not receive them until after he
had filed [his] BP-11 Central Office Administrative Appeal.2 Pet. at 11-12. Respondent
presents a slightly different account and asserts that Petitioner failed to include copies of his
request to the Warden, his appeal to the Regional Director, and the responses thereto. See
Resp. Memo. at 11. While the Court acknowledges this discrepancy and even assuming
Petitioner's account of the facts, the Court finds that Petitioner failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies.
The record before the Court clearly demonstrates that Petitioner continued to pursue
his administrative remedies despite the Warden's delay in responding to his request and the
delay in receiving the Regional Director's response from the mail room. See Thai, 2022 WL
17355189, at *5 ("In other words, the fact that he did not timely receive the Regional
Director's response to his third-level appeal did not prevent Petitioner from filing a fourth-level
appeal to the General Counsel."). The record also establishes that, on August 5, 2024, the
Central Office rejected Petitioner's appeal for failure to provide copies of documents from
previous levels and provided him with an opportunity to resubmit his appeal in proper form.
See Pet. at 17. However, Petitioner concedes that he failed to do so and provides no
explanation as to why. Moreover, even assuming that the aforementioned delays "somehow
prevented" Petitioner from attaching the necessary documents to his Central Office appeal,
he could have requested an extension of time, which he did not do. See Stokes, 2024 WL
4567283, at *3. Accordingly, Petitioner failed to properly exhaust his administrative
2 The record however, does not support Petitioner's claim. Petitioner received the Warden's response on June
3, 2025, see Pet. at 15, yet he filed his Central Office Appeal on July 25, 2025. See id. at 18. Therefore,
Petitioner could have included the Warden's response with his Central Office Appeal.
Case 9:24-cv-01170-GTS Document 12 Filed 05/27/26 Page 7 of 12

8
remedies. See Flete-Garcia, 2023 WL 8358066, at *2; see also Fan v. Williams, No. 3:17-
CV-630, 2017 WL 1652647, at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 28, 2017).
In an attempt to explain his failure to exhaust, Petitioner asserts that his counselor,
"obstructed [his] possession of the administrative remedies receipts" and noted that he
received the responses, "much after the date the BP(9) and (10) replies had been dated."
Pet. at 12.
"The Second Circuit has held that a petitioner may pursue a request for habeas corpus
relief, including pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, even where he has failed to exhaust
administrative remedies prior to filing the action in district court, only upon a showing of cause
and prejudice." Barber, 2012 WL 5996342, at *5 (citing Carmona, 243 F.3d at 634) ("[T]he
interests of judicial economy and accuracy are served by requiring that, absent a showing of
cause and prejudice, appeals proceed in the first instance through the agency review
process."). "To establish legal 'cause' in this context, [petitioner] must demonstrate that
'something external to the petitioner, something that cannot be fairly attributed to him'
prevented him from fully exhausting his administrative remedies." Spring v. Schult, No. 908-
CV-0531 (LEK), 2009 WL 3232183, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2009) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). "Objective factors constituting cause in this context includes
interference by officials which made compliance with the relevant procedural rules
impractical." Id.
Here, although Petitioner provided the name of his counselor, the petition lacks any
other information related to the counselor’s alleged "obstruction" including why or when she
obstructed Petitioner's mail. Petitioner's "generalities and conclusory assertions" related to
difficulties he experienced with his mail do not excuse him from exhausting his administrative
Case 9:24-cv-01170-GTS Document 12 Filed 05/27/26 Page 8 of 12

9
remedies. See Strouse v. Wilson, No. 3:12-CV-653, 2014 WL 843276, at *5 (E.D. Va. Mar. 4,
2014) (rejecting the petitioner's suggestion that he was excused him from complying with the
exhaustion requirement "because the prison mailroom conspired to cause action of delay or
dismissal of plaintiff's administrative remedies" as insufficient), aff'd, 575 Fed. App'x 115 (4th
Cir. 2014).
Therefore, Petitioner has failed to establish cause to excuse his failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies. Accordingly, the Court need not decide whether he suffered
prejudice. See Stepney v. Lopez, 760 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1985).
B. Merits
Even assuming Petitioner could overcome the procedural bar his failure to exhaust
imposes, his claim fails on the merits. Petitioner claims that the BOP's classification of §
922(g) as a violent crime "unfairly restrict[s] nonviolent offenders' access to FSA benefits,
infringing on [ ] due process protections." Dkt. No. 11 at 3. Petitioner also contends that the
classification is "keeping him incarcerated longer than lawful." Id. at 4.
The FSA "modified prior sentencing law and expanded vocational training, early-
release programs, and other programing designed to reduce recidivism." United States v.
Simons, No. 1:07-CR-0874, 2019 WL 1760840, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2019). The FSA
required that the Attorney General create a "risk and needs assessment system," to
"determine the recidivism risk of each prisoner . . . and classify each prisoner as having
minimum, low, medium, or high risk for recidivism[.]" 	See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(a). In response,
the BOP created PATTERN, which assesses an incarcerated person's recidivism risk by
examining fifteen risk factors and assigning each factor a certain point value. Rosenberg v.
Pliler, No. 21-CV-5321, 2021 WL 6014938, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2021); Hueston v.
Case 9:24-cv-01170-GTS Document 12 Filed 05/27/26 Page 9 of 12

10
Rickard, No. 1:25-CV-05600, 2026 WL 880509, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2026). "Scores are
assigned based on an inmate's age, criminal history, history of escapes, history of violence,
education level, need for drug rehabilitation, prison incidents, and programs completed in
prison." Gallicchio v. Pliler, No. 22-CV-06643, 2025 WL 4679000, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 12,
2025) (citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. 2026 WL 976544
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2026). Based on the total score, an inmate receives a high, medium, low, or
minimum risk designation. Id.
"One of the criteria that the BOP considers in calculating a PATTERN score is whether
the inmate committed a 'violent offense.' " Stewart v. Warden, FCI Danbury, No. 24-CV-1553,
2025 WL 3180503, at *2 (D. Conn. Nov. 14, 2025). "The BOP has developed a list of
offenses that it considers violent, and convictions under Section 922(g), [. . . ] appear[] on that
list". Id.; see also Violent Offense Codes for PATTERN Risk Assessment,
www.bop.gov/inmates/fsa/docs/fsa_pattern_violent_offense_codes.pdf (last visited May 14,
2026).
While the Second Circuit has not "addressed the question of whether the BOP may
classify a conviction as a 'crime of violence' for PATTERN scoring purposes," "numerous
other courts have concluded that the parameters used to determine a PATTERN risk
assessment score fall entirely within the BOP's discretion and are not subject to judicial
review." Stewart, 2025 WL 3180503, at *2 (noting that the FSA "expressly delegates to the
Attorney General—and, by extension, to the BOP—the authority to develop and implement a
risk and needs assessment system to determine and classify each prisoner's recidivism risk")
(citations omitted); see also White v. Birkholtz, No. 3:25-CV-00606, 2025 WL 3496684, at *2
(D. Or. Dec. 5, 2025) (denying petition because "the BOP retains broad discretion to
Case 9:24-cv-01170-GTS Document 12 Filed 05/27/26 Page 10 of 12

11
determine which [inmates] meet the PATTERN eligibility standards for minimum and low risk
designations, including defining what constitutes a violent offense").
In Stewart, the District Court reasoned
. . . the BOP has discretion to determine how to calculate PATTERN
scores and to decide which crimes are categorized as "violent
offenses" for that limited purpose. The Court's role does not extend
to second-guessing or revising those determinations. To do so
would impermissibly intrude upon the agency's delegated authority.
The Court finds particularly persuasive the long line of cases, from
many district courts across the country, denying habeas relief
based on similar grounds. 	See Harris, 2025 WL 769606, at *7
(finding 	that 	habeas 	petitioner's 	claim 	that 	the 	BOP 	was
mischaracterizing his § 922 (g) conviction as a “crime of violence”
was not subject to judicial review), R&R adopted, 2025 WL 757827
(S.D.W. Va. Mar. 10, 2025); Sampson v. Lillard, No. 23-CV-1792,
2024 WL 4040350 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 2024) (distinguishing the
definitions of "crime of violence" for the purposes of sentencing and
for PATTERN scoring pursuant to the First Step Act, and concluding
that the BOP's determination that an offense under 18 U.S.C. §
922(g) was a "crime of violence" for PATTERN scoring was within
its discretion). This case is no different.
Accordingly, 	because 	the 	parameters 	used 	to 	determine 	an
inmate's PATTERN risk assessment score are committed to the
BOP's discretion, and because Stewart's petition identifies no other
violation of federal law or the Constitution, his claim fails as a matter
of law.
Stewart, 2025 WL 3180503, at * 3.
This Court adopts the reasoning of the Stewart court and finds that Petitioner's claim
that the BOP's decision to treat his conviction as a "crime of violence" in calculating his
PATTERN score is unlawful is not reviewable. Accordingly, the petition is denied on the
merits.3
V. 	CONCLUSION
3 To the extent that Petitioner's Traverse could be construed to include a motion for reconsideration of the
decision to deny Petitioner's motion for counsel, see Dkt. No. 11 at 5, that request is denied.
Case 9:24-cv-01170-GTS Document 12 Filed 05/27/26 Page 11 of 12

12
WHEREFORE, it is
ORDERED that the petition, Dkt. No. 1, is DISMISSED AND DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that because the petition was brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a certificate
of appealability is not required for petitioner to appeal the denial of his petition. See Murphy
v. United States, 199 F.3d 599, 601 n.2 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act's certificate of appealability requirement does not apply to § 2241
petitions). However, to the extent one is required, the Court recommends that no certificate
of appealability be issued because reasonable jurists would not find it debatable that
petitioner has failed to demonstrate by a substantial showing that he was denied a
constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84
(2000); and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk serve a copy of this Decision and Order on the parties in
accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: May 27, 2026
Syracuse, NY
Case 9:24-cv-01170-GTS Document 12 Filed 05/27/26 Page 12 of 12