Celado v. Sorrell et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
___________________________________________
JEURIN CELADO,
Plaintiff,
v. 	9:24-cv-00734 (AMN/MJK)
K. SORRELL et al.,
Defendants.
___________________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
JEURIN CELADO
100010901
Clinton County Correctional Facility
58 Pine Mountain Road
P.O. Box 419
McElhattan, Pennsylvania 17748
Plaintiff pro se
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY FOR THE 	FORREST T. YOUNG, ESQ.
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 	Assistant United States Attorney
100 South Clinton Street – Suite 900
Syracuse, New York 13261
Attorney for Defendants
Hon. Anne M. Nardacci, United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
On June 3, 2024, plaintiff pro se Jeurin Celado (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action against
numerous defendants in connection with alleged events during his incarceration at Federal
Correctional Institution Ray Brook (“FCI Ray Brook”). 	Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”). 	The Court
evaluated the sufficiency of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A and,
on August 16, 2024, dismissed numerous claims and defendants and determined that Plaintiff’s
Case 9:24-cv-00734-AMN-MJK Document 43 Filed 03/23/26 Page 1 of 6

2
Eighth Amendment claim against defendant federal officer Poirier (“Defendant”) was sufficient to
require a response. Dkt. No. 8 at 15-16.
On July 28, 2025, Defendant moved to dismiss, primarily on the basis that (i) Plaintiff had
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and (ii) Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim
constituted a new Bivens context and special factors weighed against extending Bivens to this
context. Dkt. No. 19 (“Motion”); see generally Goldey v. Fields, 606 U.S. 942, 942 (2025) (per
curiam) (“In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 . . . (1971), this Court
recognized an implied cause of action for damages against federal officers for certain alleged
violations of the Fourth Amendment. The Court subsequently recognized two additional contexts
where implied Bivens causes of action were permitted, neither of which was an Eighth Amendment
excessive-force claim. After 1980, we have declined more than 10 times to extend Bivens to cover
other constitutional violations. Those many post-1980 Bivens ‘cases have made clear that, in all
but the most unusual circumstances, prescribing a cause of action is a job for Congress, not the
courts.’”) (quoting Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 486 (2022)). The Motion was fully briefed on
September 30, 2025. Dkt. Nos. 26-27; see also Dkt. No. 29.
This matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Mitchell J. Katz, who
considered the parties’ submissions and, on February 17, 2026, issued a report-recommendation
and order recommending that Defendant’s Motion be granted.1 	Dkt. No. 40 (“Report-
Recommendation”); see also Dkt. No. 30. 	Magistrate Judge Katz advised that under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1), the parties had fourteen days within which to file written objections and that failure
1 In connection with Defendant’s exhaustion arguments, he requested that the Motion be converted
to summary judgment if necessary. Dkt. No. 19-1 at 7 n.3. Magistrate Judge Katz did so. Dkt.
No. 40 at 3. Citations to docket entries utilize the pagination generated by CM/ECF, the Court’s
electronic filing system, and not the document’s internal pagination.
Case 9:24-cv-00734-AMN-MJK Document 43 Filed 03/23/26 Page 2 of 6

3
to object to the Report-Recommendation within fourteen days would preclude appellate review.
Id. at 20. Neither party filed objections, and the time to do so has expired. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court adopts the Report-Recommendation in part.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
This Court reviews de novo those portions of a magistrate judge’s report-recommendation
that have been properly preserved with a specific objection. Petersen v. Astrue, 2 F. Supp. 3d 223,
228-29 (N.D.N.Y. 2012); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). If no specific objections have been filed, this
Court reviews a magistrate judge’s report-recommendation for clear error. 	See Petersen, 2 F.
Supp. 3d at 229 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes: 1983 Addition).
Similarly, if an objection simply rehashes arguments originally presented to the magistrate judge,
this Court reviews the relevant portions of the report-recommendation for clear error. 	See
Petersen, 2 F. Supp. 3d at 228-29 & n.6 (collecting cases). “When performing such a ‘clear error’
review, ‘the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in
order to accept the recommendation.’” 	Dezarea W. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-cv-01138,
2023 WL 2552452, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2023) (quoting Canady v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
17-cv-0367, 2017 WL 5484663, at *1 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2017)).
“[I]n a pro se case, the court must view the submissions by a more lenient standard than
that accorded to ‘formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Govan v. Campbell, 289 F. Supp. 2d 289,
295 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)) (additional citations
omitted). The Second Circuit has held that courts are obligated to “make reasonable allowances
to protect pro se litigants” from inadvertently forfeiting legal rights merely because they lack a
legal education. Id. (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)). That said, “even a
pro se party’s objections to a Report and Recommendation must be specific and clearly aimed at
Case 9:24-cv-00734-AMN-MJK Document 43 Filed 03/23/26 Page 3 of 6

4
particular findings in the magistrate’s proposal . . . .” Machicote v. Ercole, No. 06-cv-13320, 2011
WL 3809920, at *2, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2011) (citation omitted); accord Caldwell v. Petros, No.
22-cv-567, 2022 WL 16918287, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2022). After appropriate review, “the
court may accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by
the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
III. 	DISCUSSION
The Court adopts the background and the legal framework set forth in the Report-
Recommendation, finding no clear error therein, and presumes familiarity with each for purposes
of this decision.
As relevant here,2 Magistrate Judge Katz first observed that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment
claim could be liberally construed “as either an excessive-force or a failure-to-protect claim.” Dkt.
No. 40 at 3 (citing Dkt. No. 8 at 13-14). Magistrate Judge Katz then proceeded with the Bivens
analysis. 	See generally Hernandez v. Mesa, 589 U.S. 93, 102 (2020) (“When asked to extend
Bivens, we engage in a two-step inquiry. We first inquire whether the request involves a claim
that arises in a ‘new context’ or involves a ‘new category of defendants.’. . . When we find that a
claim arises in a new context, we proceed to the second step and ask whether there are any ‘special
factors [that] counse[l] hesitation’ about granting the extension.”) (second and third alterations in
original) (citations omitted) (quotations omitted).
At step one, Magistrate Judge Katz determined that Plaintiff’s Eight Amendment claim
constituted a new Bivens context, whether construed as excessive force or failure to protect. Dkt.
No. 40 at 13-16; see also Ballard v. Dutton, No. 23-6416-pr, 2024 WL 4039606, at *1 (2d Cir.
2 The Report-Recommendation also included alternative findings with respect to Defendant’s other
arguments. Dkt. No. 40 at 6-12, 19. The Court finds it unnecessary to reach, or adopt, the Report-
Recommendation’s alternative findings for the reasons that follow.
Case 9:24-cv-00734-AMN-MJK Document 43 Filed 03/23/26 Page 4 of 6

5
Sept. 4, 2024) (summary order) (“The Supreme Court has expressly recognized only three contexts
in which a Bivens remedy is available: unreasonable search and seizure by federal officials in
violation 	of 	the 	Fourth 	Amendment, 	Bivens, 	403 	U.S. 	388; 	gender-based 	employment
discrimination by a United States Congressman in violation of the Fifth Amendment, Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); and federal prison officials’ deliberate indifference to an inmate’s
serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14
(1980).”)3 (citing Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 130-31 (2017)) (reversing district court’s denial
of motion to dismiss Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim by defendant FCI Ray Brook
officer); see also Goldey, 606 U.S. at 944 (“This case arises in a new context, and ‘special factors’
counsel against recognizing an implied Bivens cause of action for Eighth Amendment excessive-
force violations.”).
At step two, Magistrate Judge Katz determined that an extension of Bivens was
unwarranted because Plaintiff had access to an alternative remedial structure. Dkt. No. 40 at 17-
19; see also Ballard, 2024 WL 4039606, at *2 (“[T]he Executive branch, through the Bureau of
Prisons, provides an administrative grievance process for inmates to lodge complaints about their
confinement. This grievance process, which did not exist at the time Carlson was decided, is the
type of ‘alternative remedial structure[ ]’ that prevents us from fashioning a Bivens cause of action
here.”) (second alteration in original) (citations omitted). 	As a result, Magistrate Judge Katz
recommended dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim. Dkt. No. 40 at 19.
The Court discerns no clear error in this analysis and agrees with Magistrate Judge Katz
that Defendant’s Motion should be granted as a result. The Court accordingly adopts the Report-
3 Magistrate Judge Katz also determined that Plaintiff’s allegations were readily distinguishable
from the facts in Carlson. Dkt. No. 40 at 15-16.
Case 9:24-cv-00734-AMN-MJK Document 43 Filed 03/23/26 Page 5 of 6

6
Recommendation to this extent.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court hereby
ORDERS that the Report-Recommendation, Dkt. No. 40, is ADOPTED in part, as set
forth in Section III of this Memorandum-Decision and Order; and the Court further
ORDERS that Defendant’s motion, Dkt. No. 19, is GRANTED in part, as set forth in
Section III of this Memorandum-Decision and Order; and the Court further
ORDERS that that Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED; and the Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff’s pending request, Dkt. No. 29, is TERMINATED as moot; and
the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk serve a copy of this Order on the parties in accordance with the
Local Rules and close the case.4
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 23, 2026
Albany, New York
4 The Clerk shall also provide Plaintiff with copies of all unreported decisions cited herein.
Case 9:24-cv-00734-AMN-MJK Document 43 Filed 03/23/26 Page 6 of 6