Ruiz v. Rensselear County Correctional Facility

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________
NAQUAN RUIZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
No. 9:24-CV-0179
OFFICER MARK, et al., 	(LEK/PJE)
Defendants.
_____________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
Naquan Ruiz
c/o Priscilla Ruiz
70 Delaware Avenue
Apt. 111
Cohoes, New York 12047
Plaintiff pro se
Murphy Burns Groudine LLP 	STEPHEN M. GROUDINE, ESQ.
407 Albany Shaker Road
Loudonville, New York 12211
Attorney for defendant
PAUL J. EVANGELISTA
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REPORT - RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER1
Plaintiff pro se Naquan Ruiz (“plaintiff”), an inmate who was, at the time this action
was commenced, in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and
Community Supervision (“DOCCS”), brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2
1 This matter was referred to the undersigned for Report-Recommendation and Order pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b) and N.D.N.Y. L.R. 72.3(c).
2 On September 3, 2024, plaintiff filed a Notice of Change of Address after his release from the Renssalaer
County Jail. See Dkt. No. 10.
Case 9:24-cv-00179-LEK-PJE Document 26 Filed 02/13/26 Page 1 of 20

2
Plaintiff alleges that defendants Officer Mark, Kitchen Staff Worker Arthur, and Renssalaer
County violated his constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See
Dkt. No. 9 at 1-6.3 Presently before the Court is defendant Renssalaer County’s motion
for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”) 56.
See Dkt. No. 20.4 For the following reasons, it is recommended that defendant’s motion
be granted.
I. Facts
In support of their motion, Renssalaer County filed a Statement of Material Facts.
See Dkt. No. 20-8. 	As will be discussed below, plaintiff failed to properly respond to
Renssalaer County’s Statement of Material Facts. See Dkt. No. 24.
A. N.D.N.Y. Local Rule 56.1
N.D.N.Y. Local Rule 56.1(b) requires that a party opposing summary judgment file
a response to the movant's Statement of Material Facts, “admitting and/or denying each
of the movant's assertions in a short and concise statement, in matching numbered
paragraphs.” “The Court may deem admitted any properly supported facts set forth in the
Statement of Material Facts that the opposing party does not specifically controvert.” Id.
(emphasis omitted). 	Here, plaintiff filed a response to Renssalaer County’s motion for
summary judgment. 	See generally Dkt. No. 24. 	However, plaintiff’s submission is not
properly responsive to Renssalaer County’s Statement of Material Facts. 	Although
3 Plaintiff initially sought to bring this complaint against the Renssalaer County Correctional Facility
(“Renssalaer County CF”), Sheriff Kyle Bourgault, Chief Higgitt, Lt. Morin, Lt. Sauer, Kitchen Staff Worker
Alex, Kitchen Staff Worker Jess, and Kitchen Staff Worker Lauren, however, on initial review, the Court sua
sponte dismissed numerous claims against these defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). See Dkt. No. 11.
4 The undersigned notes that as of the time of defendant’s filing, plaintiff has not identified Officer Mark or
Kitchen Staff Worker Arthur. See Dkt. No. 11 at 7-8. To date, neither Officer Mark or Kitchen Staff Worker
Arthur have appeared in this action.
Case 9:24-cv-00179-LEK-PJE Document 26 Filed 02/13/26 Page 2 of 20

3
plaintiff’s response does admit or deny Renssalaer County’s “assertions in a short and
concise statement, in matching numbered paragraphs,” plaintiff also reiterates the facts
from the complaint and disputes the factual contentions contained in Renssalaer County’s
declarations. 	N.D.N.Y. L.R. 56.1(b); see Dkt. No. 24 at 3-7. 	Further, in other parts of
plaintiff’s response, he does not cite to the record for the facts he sets forth, in violation
of Local Rule 56.1(a). See Dkt. No. 24 at 3-7; see also N.D.N.Y. L.R. 56.1(a)(“Each fact
listed shall set forth a specific citation to the record where the fact is established.).
The Court is not required to “perform an independent review of the record to find
proof of a factual dispute.” 	Prestopnik v. Whelan, 253 F. Supp. 2d 369, 371 (N.D.N.Y.
2003) (citing Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 288 F.3d 467, 470-71 (2d Cir. 2002)).
Although the Local Rules provide that the undersigned shall deem admitted any facts that
the nonmoving party fails to “specifically controvert,” and pro se plaintiffs are expected to
abide by the Local Rules, pro se plaintiffs are also afforded special solicitude in this District
and Circuit. 	See N.D.N.Y. L.R. 56.1(b); see also Treistman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
470 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Accordingly, in deference to plaintiff's pro
se status, the Court will independently review the record when evaluating Renssalaer
County’s motion for summary judgment, and “treat [plaintiff’s] opposition as a response
to” Renssalaer County’s Statement of Material Facts. Robinson v. Mirza, No. 9:21-CV-
1322 (DNH/CFH), 2024 WL 4464280, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. July 30, 2024), report and
recommendation adopted sub nom. Robinson v. Mizra, No. 9:21-CV-1322, 2024 WL
4249222 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2024) (citing Johnson v. Lew, No. 1:13-CV-1072 (GTS/CFH),
2017 WL 3822047, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2017)) (“Out of special solicitude to [the
p]laintiff as a pro se civil rights litigant . . . the Court will treat his opposition as a response
Case 9:24-cv-00179-LEK-PJE Document 26 Filed 02/13/26 Page 3 of 20

4
to [the d]efendant’s []Statement . . . .” ); see also Perry v. Ogdensburg Corr. Fac., No.
9:10-CV-1033 (LEK/TWD), 2016 WL 3004658, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. May 24, 2016) (“[A]lthough
[p]laintiff failed to respond to the statement of material facts filed by [d]efendants as
required under Local Rule[s], the Court would invoke its discretion to review the entire
record when evaluating the parties’ respective [m]otions for summary judgment.”).5
B. Undisputed Facts
On or about, December 14, 2023, plaintiff learned that the Renssalaer County Jail
“had pork meatballs in the . . . kitchen from fellow inmates,” Tinsbee and McWhite, “who
worked in the kitchen.” Dkt. No. 20-8 at 1-2; see Dkt. No. 24 at 3-4. Upon realizing that
the jail was serving pork meatballs, Tinsbee and McWhite promptly informed then-Food
Service Manager Art Simard (“Simard”) “that Muslims could not eat pork meatballs for
religious reasons” and the kitchen could not serve this food. 	Id. (citing Dkt. No. 20-7 at
1); see Dkt. No. 24 at 5.
On December 21, 2023, plaintiff filed a “‘Grievance Step-1 Informal Resolution
Form’ . . . alleging that Muslim inmates were unknowingly served pork meatballs.” 	Dkt.
No. 20-8 at 3 (citing Dkt. No 20-4); see Dkt. No. 24 at 7. On December 22, 2023, plaintiff
filed a formal grievance. See id. (citing Dkt. No 20-5); see Dkt. No. 24 at 7. On December
21, 2023, “[a]fter receipt of the ‘Grievance Step-1 Informal Resolution Form’ . . . then-
Lieutenant Eric Morin initiated an investigation into the animal composition of the
meatballs served to the inmates.” Id. (citing Dkt. No 20-3 at 1); see Dkt. No. 24 at 7.
Richard Tutunjian (“Tutunjian”) has worked in the Rensselaer County Jail kitchen
for the past twenty-five years and is “the current food service manager.” Dkt. No. 20-8 at
5 The Court has provided plaintiff with copies of all unpublished cases cited within this Report-
Recommendation and Order.
Case 9:24-cv-00179-LEK-PJE Document 26 Filed 02/13/26 Page 4 of 20

5
2 (citing Dkt. No. 20-7 at 1); see Dkt. No. 24 at 4. On December 14, 2023, Tutunjian was
working in the Rensselaer County Jail kitchen as a cook. See id. (citing Dkt. No. 20-7 at
1); Dkt. No. 24 at 4. 	Tinsbee and McWhite were also working on the kitchen staff that
day. See id. (citing Dkt. No. 20-7 at 1); Dkt. No. 24 at 5.
“[P]laintiff did not, and still does not, have any personal knowledge as to the
workings of the kitchen at the Rensselaer County Jail or what is served to the inmates.”
Dkt. No. 20-8 at 1 (citing Dkt. No. 20-2 at 80, 82, 127); see Dkt. No. 24 at 3. Plaintiff has
never worked in the Rensselaer County Jail kitchen. See Dkt. No. 24 at 3. “Other than
this one reported allegation of pork-based meatballs allegedly being served in December
2023, no inmate has ever filed a formal grievance or complaint about the animal content
of the meatballs served at the Rensselaer County Jail.” Dkt. No. 20-8 at 3 (first citing Dkt.
No. 20-7 at 2, then citing Dkt. No. 20-3 at 2); see Dkt. No. 24 at 6.
C. Plaintiff’s Facts
Plaintiff is of Mulsim faith. 	See Dkt. No. 20-2 at 29-32. The Koran provides that
Muslims are “not supposed to consume [pork], touch or assist anybody in consuming or
touching [pork]. 	And that the only way to consume [pork] is if you’re on the brink of
starvation and you have no livestock. Other than that it’s not to be consumed.” Id. at 74.
Plaintiff asserts that all correctional facilities are prohibited from serving pork or
food with pork additives. 	See Dkt. No. 20-2 at 61-62. 	However, Muslim inmates at the
Renssalaer County Jail are not provided specific meals or a special diet; rather, all
inmates are served the same food. See id. at 62-63, 84-85. The Rensselaer County Jail
only provides special meals to inmates that suffer from diabetes or request Kosher meals.
See id. at 63, 97. Plaintiff claims that there were no standards or policies as to whether
Case 9:24-cv-00179-LEK-PJE Document 26 Filed 02/13/26 Page 5 of 20

6
pork would or would not be served to the inmates at the Rensselaer County Jail. See id.
at 98.
On December 15, 2023,6 Tinsbee and McWhite, informed plaintiff that the
Rensselaer County Jail kitchen was ordering and “serving pork-based meatballs in
substitution of chicken and beef meatballs when the stock got low.” Dkt. No. 9 at 3; Dkt.
No. 20-2 at 80-83. Plaintiff believes that as of December 15, 2023, the Renssalaer County
Jail had been serving pork meatballs for four months. 	See id. 	Dkt. No. 20-2 at 80-83;
Dkt. No. 24 at 10. 	Contradictorily, plaintiff testified that Tinsbee and McWhite told him
they didn’t know how long the Rensselaer County Jail served pork meatballs prior to
December 15, 2023. See Dkt. No. 20-2 at 82-83. However, plaintiff claims that Tinsbee
and McWhite told him that pork meatballs were served for as long as they had been
working in the kitchen. See id. Plaintiff also testified that Tinsbee and McWhite told him
that the officer working in the kitchen on December 14, 2023, was “threatened to - - either
cook it or get . . . fired.” Id. at 129. Plaintiff claims that after Tinsbee and McWhite learned
of the pork meatballs, Kitchen Staff Worker Arthur (“Arthur”) was “confronted about
inmates having religious beliefs and that the consumption of pork was against their
religious beliefs,” to which Aurthur replied, “[w]hat they don’t know won’t hurt them.” Dkt.
No. 9 at 3; Dkt. No. 24 at 10.
Plaintiff requested to file a grievance with Officer Mark but was denied. See Dkt.
No. 9 at 3; Dkt. No. 24 at 10. Officer Mark told plaintiff, “I eat in the kitchen here and they
don’t serve no pork here.” Id.; see Dkt. No. 20-2 at 101; Dkt. No. 24 at 10. Plaintiff then
6 The parties motion papers, plaintiff’s deposition testimony, and the record generally refers to the “pork
meatball incident” as having occurred on either December 14, 2023, or December 15, 2023. 	The
undersigned notes that regardless of the date used, the parties are referring to the same incident giving
rise to this lawsuit.
Case 9:24-cv-00179-LEK-PJE Document 26 Filed 02/13/26 Page 6 of 20

7
requested to speak to a sergeant. See id. Upon this request, Officer Mark ordered plaintiff
to “lock-in or [he] [would] call a code and plaintiff would receive a misbehavior report.” Id.;
see Dkt. No. 20-2 at 99-102; Dkt. No. 24 at 10. 	Shortly thereafter, a fellow inmate and
the sergeant provided plaintiff with grievance forms. 	See Dkt. No. 9 at 3; Dkt. No. 20-2
at 103-04. 	Plaintiff filled out the grievance form and placed one copy in the grievance
mailbox and mailed a second copy to Lt. Morin. 	See id. 	On December 22, 2023, Lt.
Morin responded to plaintiff’s grievance and acknowledged that pork was ordered and
served by the Rensselaer County Jail kitchen. 	See id; Dkt. No. 20-2 at 85-86; Dkt. No.
24 at 10. Plaintiff claims that Lt. Morin apologized and stated, “We’re sorry. We’re going
to change . . . the menu, and it won’t happen again.” 	Dkt. No. 20-2 at 86; see Dkt. No.
20-2 at 92-95.
Plaintiff also states that he knew the meatballs being served were pork because
there were two kinds of meatballs, identifiable by their size and color, and one kind of
meatball gave him a stomachache. See id. at 90-91. After this issue was brought to the
prison’s attention, the Rensselaer County Jail kitchen changed the meatballs that they
served to the inmates. 	See Dkt. No. 20-2 at 84. 	Plaintiff knows the kind of meatballs
being served changed based on the color of the meatballs and that the prison staff gave
him “new forms that said they were ordering . . . soy meatballs with turkey and chicken
and no pork in it.” Id.
Plaintiff explains that consuming pork meatballs violated his Muslim beliefs. See
Dkt. No. 9 at 2. 	Each time a Muslim individual consumes pork, their prayers are
invalidated for forty days. 	See id.; Dkt. No. 2 at 5. Plaintiff asserts that meatballs were
served in the Rensselaer County Jail twice every ten days. See Dkt. No. 20-2 at 75, 79-
Case 9:24-cv-00179-LEK-PJE Document 26 Filed 02/13/26 Page 7 of 20

8
80. Plaintiff states that he was served the same kind of meatballs the entire time he was
incarcerated at the Rensselaer County Jail. See id. at 130. By his math, plaintiff claims
he was served pork meatballs twenty-four times over the course of four months, and as
a result, plaintiff’s prayers were invalidated for 960 days. See id. at 75; Dkt. No. 9 at 2.
Plaintiff has no additional knowledge of how the Rensselaer County Jail kitchen
operates or how the jail orders food. See Dkt. No. 20-2 at 127-28. He has “never been
in the mess hall.” 	Id. at 127. 	No other individuals told him how long they were serving
pork meatballs in the Rensselaer County Jail. 	See id. at 131. 	He is not aware of any
other incidents where pork meatballs were served at the Rensselaer County Jail. See id.
at 128. 	However, he was told that the Rensselaer County Jail ordered pork meatballs
and had them in the kitchen freezer as of the December 14, 2023, incident. 	See id. at
132.
Attached to plaintiff’s amended complaint are the labels from three packages of
meatballs that he claims came from the Rensselaer County Jail kitchen and contain pork
or pork additives. See Dkt. No. 9 at 8-10. The third food label has markings stating, “10
LB. MEATBALL BF PORK” and “RENSSALAER COUNTY JAIL.” Id. at 10.
D. Defendant’s Facts
“On or about December 14, 2023, the [Rensselaer County] Jail ran out of non-
pork-based meatballs.” Dkt. No. 20-8 at 2 (citing Dkt. No. 20-7 at 1). Upon running out
of non-pork-based meatballs, Simard “suggested that the kitchen use the employee-only
pork-based meatballs to serve the inmates their meal.” 	Id. (citing Dkt. No. 20-7 at 1).
Tinsbee and McWhite “promptly informed [] Simard that Muslims could not eat pork for
religious reasons.” 	Id. (citing Dkt. No. 20-7 at 1). 	“In response to this information, Mr.
Case 9:24-cv-00179-LEK-PJE Document 26 Filed 02/13/26 Page 8 of 20

9
Simard immediately rejected his initial idea of serving the pork meatballs and instead left
the Rensselaer County Jail and purchased meatballs that did not contain pork from US
Foods in Clifton Park, New York.” 	Id. (citing Dkt. No. 20-7 at 1). 	“Tutunjian personally
observed and participated in the preparation of the newly purchased non-pork meatballs
for the ‘non-pork’ eating inmates, including the plaintiff, on December 14, 2023.” Id. (citing
Dkt. No. 20-7 at 2).
“There is no pattern, practice, procedure, or custom at the Rensselaer County Jail
of serving Muslim inmates pork-based meatballs.” Dkt. No. 20-8 at 3 (first citing Dkt. No.
20-7 at 2, then citing Dkt. No. 20-3 at 2). “Simard’s one-time idea to serve pork meatballs
to the inmate population was rejected before any known non-pork-eating inmates were
ever served pork meatballs, including the plaintiff.” Id. (first citing Dkt. No. 20-7 at 2, then
citing Dkt. No. 20-3 at 2). Tinsbee, McWhite, and plaintiff do not “know of any other prior
suggestion by the kitchen staff to serve pork meatballs to the inmate population besides
the one instance on December 14, 2023.” Id. at 1 (citing Dkt. No. 20-2 at 81-83). “At no
point in his 25-year career with the County [did Tutunjian] ever observe[] any employee
of the Rensselaer County Jail's kitchen knowingly serve inmates, who are known not to
eat pork for religious reasons, pork-based meatballs.” Id. at 2 (citing Dkt. No. 20-7 at 1).
Lt. Morin’s “investigation resulted in a finding that no pork products had been
served to the plaintiff or any other Muslim inmates. The results of that investigation were
memorialized in a Grievance Investigation Form Part I and Part II that were completed by
[Lt. Morin].” Dkt. No. 20-8 at 3-4 (citing Dkt. No. 20-3 at 2).
II. Arguments
A. Defendant’s Arguments
Case 9:24-cv-00179-LEK-PJE Document 26 Filed 02/13/26 Page 9 of 20

10
Renssalaer County argues that they are entitled to summary judgment as matter
of law because plaintiff has failed to establish any constitutional violation or a factual basis
to assert a Monell claim. See Dkt. No. 20-9 at 2-6 (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978)). First, Renssalaer County argues that plaintiff has not demonstrated
his constitutional rights were violated. 	See Dkt. No. 20-9 at 3-4. 	Renssalaer County
asserts that “plaintiff has failed to come forward with any specific evidence of when he
was allegedly served and ingested meatballs he claims contained pork in violation of his
religious beliefs.” 	Dkt. No. 20-9 at 3. 	Renssalaer County contends that plaintiff’s
allegations are “speculative.” 	Id. at 4. 	Renssalaer County further states that plaintiff
“conceded at his deposition that he had no personal knowledge as to what occurred in
the Jail’s kitchen” and fails to submit any admissible evidence to refute the sworn
declarations of Chief of Corrections Eric Morin or Food Service Manager Richard
Tutunjian. Id. at 3-4 (citing Dkt Nos. 20-2, 20-3, 20-7); see Dkt. No. 25 at 2-3.
Second, Renssalaer County argues that plaintiff has not satisfied Monell because
“there is no evidence of a policy, practice, procedure, or custom implemented by the
County that resulted in the plaintiff being served pork meatballs during his stay at
Rensselaer County Jail because no such policy, practice, procedure, or custom ever
existed.” Dkt. No. 20-9 at 5; see Dkt. No. 25 at 3.
B. Plaintiff’s Arguments
In opposition to Renssalaer County’s motion, plaintiff reasserts that his First
Amendment right to freedom of assembly was violated because he was served pork
meatballs while incarcerated at the Renssalaer County Jail. see Dkt. No. 24 at 10.
III. Legal Standards
Case 9:24-cv-00179-LEK-PJE Document 26 Filed 02/13/26 Page 10 of 20

11
On review of defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the facts will be related in
the light most favorable to plaintiff as the nonmoving party. See Rattner v. Netburn, 930
F.2d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 1991) (“In assessing the record . . . to determine whether there is
a genuine issue as to any material fact, the court is required to resolve all ambiguities and
draw all factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is
sought.”).
A motion for summary judgment may be granted “if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” FED. R. CIV . P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating
the absence of disputed material facts by citing to “the record, including depositions,
documents, 	electronically 	stored 	information, 	affidavits 	or 	declarations, 	stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory
answers, or other materials.” FED. R. CIV . P. 56(c). A fact is material if it “might affect the
outcome of the suit,” as determined by the governing substantive law; a “dispute about a
material fact is ‘genuine’ . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” 	Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986).
If the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party “must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (citation
omitted); see Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009). 	“When ruling on a
summary judgment motion, the district court . . . must resolve all ambiguities and draw all
reasonable inferences against the movant.” Dallas Aerospace, Inc. v. CIS Air Corp., 352
F.3d 775, 780 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Still, the nonmoving party cannot rely on
Case 9:24-cv-00179-LEK-PJE Document 26 Filed 02/13/26 Page 11 of 20

12
“mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion
for summary judgment.” Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing
Quarles v. Gen. Motors Corp., 758 F.2d 839, 840 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam)); see also
Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[M]ere conclusory allegations or
denials . . . cannot by themselves create a genuine issue of material fact where none
would otherwise exist.”) (citation omitted).
Where a party seeks judgment against a pro se litigant, or a pro se litigant moves
for summary judgment, the Court must afford the pro se litigant special solicitude. 	See
Treistman, 470 F.3d at 477. As the Second Circuit explained,
[t]here are many cases in which we have said that a pro se litigant is
entitled to “special solicitude,” that a pro se litigant's submissions must
be construed “liberally,” and that such submissions must be read to raise
the strongest arguments that they “suggest[.]” At the same time, our
cases have also indicated that we cannot read into pro se submissions
claims that are not “consistent” with the pro se litigant's allegations, or
arguments that the submissions themselves do not “suggest,” that we
should not “excuse frivolous or vexatious filings by pro se litigants,” and
that pro se status “does not exempt a party from compliance with
relevant rules of procedural and substantive law[ ]” . . . ..
Id. (citations omitted); see also Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191
(2d Cir. 2008) (“On occasions too numerous to count, we have reminded district courts
that when [a] plaintiff proceeds pro se, . . . a court is obligated to construe his pleadings
liberally.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
IV. Discussion
A. Monell
“Municipalities may be sued directly under [Section] 1983” pursuant to Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) “for constitutional deprivations
inflicted upon private individuals pursuant to governmental custom, policy, ordinance,
Case 9:24-cv-00179-LEK-PJE Document 26 Filed 02/13/26 Page 12 of 20

13
regulation, or decision.” 	Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91). “To set forth a cognizable claim for municipal liability under
§ 1983, a plaintiff must plead that a deprivation of his constitutional rights was ‘caused by
a governmental custom, policy, or usage of the municipality.’” Dougal v. Lewicki, No. 1:23-
CV-1167 (DNH/CFH), 2023 WL 6430586, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2023), report and
recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 7013384 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2023) (quoting Jones v.
Town of E. Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91)).
“Municipalities may only be held liable when the municipality itself deprives an individual
of a constitutional right; it ‘may not be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior.’” Id.
(quoting Jeffes v. Barnes, 208 F.3d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 2000)). An “official policy or custom”
can be pleaded as follows:
(1) a formal policy officially endorsed by the municipality; (2) actions taken
by government officials responsible for establishing municipal policies
related to the particular deprivation in question; (3) a practice so consistent
and widespread that it constitutes a ‘custom or usage’ sufficient to impute
constructive knowledge of the practice to policymaking officials; or (4) a
failure by policymakers to train or supervise subordinates to such an extent
that it amounts to ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of those who come
in contact with the municipal employees.
Id. (quoting Dorsett-Felicelli, Inc. v. Cty. of Clinton, 371 F. Supp. 2d 183, 194 (N.D.N.Y.
2005)) (internal citations omitted); see also Santos v. New York City, 847 F. Supp. 2d 573,
576 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (explaining that, to state an official policy claim under Monell, the
plaintiff “must do more than simply state that a municipal policy . . . exists”); Coleman v.
Cnty. of Suffolk, 685 F. App’x 69, 72 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (“Where . . . the
conduct of individual defendant officers does not violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights,
the municipality is generally not liable for a policy or practice pursuant to which the
conduct was performed.”); Fleming v. City of New York, No. 18-CV-4866 (GBD/JW), 2023
Case 9:24-cv-00179-LEK-PJE Document 26 Filed 02/13/26 Page 13 of 20

14
WL 1861223, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2023) (noting that, in some situations, a municipality
may be held liable under Monell even if a plaintiff is unable to establish liability against
individual defendants). “[A] plaintiff must demonstrate that through its deliberate conduct,
the municipality was the moving force behind the injury alleged.” Agosto v. New York City
Dep’t of Educ., 982 F.3d 86, 98 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty.,
Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)).
To succeed on any municipal liability claim under Monell, the plaintiff must first
establish that there was an “underlying constitutional violation.” 	Rakchi v. City of New
York, 800 F. Supp. 3d 494, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (quoting Henry-Lee v. City of New York,
746 F. Supp. 2d 546, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Segal v. City of New York, 459 F.3d 207,
219 (2d Cir. 2006))) (“As provided by the Second Circuit, an underlying constitutional
violation is ‘a prerequisite to municipal liability under Monell.’”). Here, plaintiff alleges that
his First Amendment right to freedom of exercise of religion was violated because the
Renssalaer County Jail served pork meatballs in violation of his Muslim faith. 	See
generally Dkt. No. 9.
“Prisoners have long been understood to retain some measure of the constitutional
protection afforded by the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.” Bryant v. Miller, No.
9:18-CV-0494 (GTS/CFH), 2019 WL 5273210, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. June 18, 2019), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 9:18-CV-0494 (GTS/CFH), 2019 WL 4267376 (N.D.N.Y.
Sept. 10, 2019) (quoting Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 588 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974))). 	“However, due to the unique concerns of the
prison setting, prisoners’ free exercise rights must be balanced against the interests of
prison officials engaged in the complex duties of administering the penal system.” 	Id.
Case 9:24-cv-00179-LEK-PJE Document 26 Filed 02/13/26 Page 14 of 20

15
(quoting Thomas v. Waugh, No. 9:13-CV-0321 MAD/TWD, 2015 WL 5750945, at *9
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2015) (citing Ford, 352 F.3d at 588)). 	“As such, a prison regulation
or individualized decision to deny a prisoner the ability to engage in a religious exercise
is judged under a reasonableness test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied [to
burdens on fundamental rights]: a regulation that burdens a [prisoner’s] protected right
passes constitutional muster if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”
Id. (quoting Thomas, 2015 WL 5750945, at *9 (quoting Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d
263, 274 (2d Cir. 2006))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“In order to establish a free exercise claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate ‘at the
threshold that the disputed conduct substantially burdens his sincerely held religious
beliefs.’” Bryant, 2019 WL 5273210, at *7 (quoting Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 274-75 (citing
Ford, 352 F.3d at 591)). 	“A belief is sincerely held where the plaintiff ‘sincerely holds a
particular belief and whether the belief is religious in nature.’” Id. (quoting Ford, 352 F.3d
at 590). 	“Moreover, it is well-established that an inmate’s ‘sincerely held belief is
substantially burdened where the state puts substantial pressure on an adherent to
modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.’” Id. (quoting Thomas, 2015 WL 5750945,
at *10 (quoting Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 477 (2d Cir. 1996))).
The record is unclear as to whether the Renssalaer County Jail served pork
meatballs on December 14, 2023. 	See Dkt. Nos. 9, 20-2, 20-3, 20-7, 20-8, 24 at 3-7.
However, the undersigned concludes that it is not necessary to analyze whether plaintiff’s
First Amendment free exercise rights were violated by being served pork meatballs
because even assuming arguendo that plaintiff’s free exercise rights were violated,
plaintiff has not alleged or satisfied Monell.
Case 9:24-cv-00179-LEK-PJE Document 26 Filed 02/13/26 Page 15 of 20

16
Plaintiff does not respond to Renssalaer County’s Monell arguments. 	See
generally Dkt. No. 24. Plaintiff has not pled or alleged that his constitutional rights were
violated due to an official Renssalaer County policy, a persistent and widespread custom
or practice, failure to train or supervise, or because a policy-making official’s deliberate
conduct deprived him of a constitutional right. 	See Dougal, 2023 WL 6430586, at *10
(quoting Dorsett-Felicelli, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 2d at 194); see also Lucente v. Cnty. of
Suffolk, 980 F.3d 284, 297-98 (2d Cir. 2020). Similarly, plaintiff does not refute the sworn
declarations of Chief Morin or Tutunjian that “[t]here is no pattern, practice, procedure, or
custom at the Rensselaer County Jail of serving Muslim inmates pork-based meatballs.”
Dkt. Nos. 20-3 at 2, 20-7 at 2.
To the extent that pork meatballs were served to the general population at the
Renssalaer County Jail on December 14, 2023, plaintiff has not demonstrated that this
was nothing more than a single isolated incident. 	“Unique, one-time events of the sort
we have here are simply not susceptible to Monell liability.” Arzu v. City of New York, No.
24-CV-6058 (CM), 2025 WL 437699, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2025). 	“Proof of a single
incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell, unless
proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional
municipal policy[ ] [that] can be attributed to a municipal policymaker.” 	Id. (quoting City
of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985)); Smith v. NYC Dep’t of Corr., No. 18-
CV-7018 (AT/OTW), 2019 WL 2473524, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2019), report and
recommendation adopted sub nom. Smith v. Warden of N. Infirmary Command, No. 18-
CIV-7018 (AT/OTW), 2019 WL 2866729 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2019) (“Normally, a custom or
policy cannot be shown by pointing to a single instance of unconstitutional conduct by a
Case 9:24-cv-00179-LEK-PJE Document 26 Filed 02/13/26 Page 16 of 20

17
mere employee of the municipality.”) (additional quotations and internal quotation marks
omitted); Frith v. City of New York, 203 F. Supp. 3d 386, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (dismissing
a Monell claim alleging a one-time denial of treatment where the plaintiff failed to identify
any particular policy at issue).
Plaintiff also claims that the Rensselaer County Jail served pork meatballs for the
four months leading up to December 14, 2023, and the entire time he was housed in the
jail. See Dkt. No. 9 at 3; Dkt. No. 20-2 at 80-83; Dkt. No. 24 at 10. Affording plaintiff due
solicitude and reading his claim liberally, plaintiff could be arguing that the by serving pork
meatballs for four months, Renssalaer County Jail had a policy or custom of serving pork
meatballs to all inmates. 	However, plaintiff’s claim is a speculative conclusion with no
further support. See Knight, 804 F.2d at 12 (citing Quarles, 758 F.2d at 840 (2d Cir. 1985);
Hicks, 593 F.3d at 166).
Plaintiff supports this allegation by referencing his personal observations of the
meatballs he was served while incarcerated at the Rensselaer County Jail and stating
that Tinsbee and McWhite told him this information. See Dkt. No. 9 at 3; Dkt. No. 20-2 at
80-83, 90-91; Dkt. No. 24 at 10. 	However, plaintiff does not provide an affidavit from
Tinsbee or McWhite attesting to these facts and as stated above, plaintiff does not refute
the declarations of Chief Morin or Tutunjian that “[t]here is no pattern, practice, procedure,
or 	custom 	at 	the 	Rensselaer 	County 	Jail 	of 	serving 	Muslim 	inmates 	pork-based
meatballs.” Dkt. Nos. 20-3 at 2, 20-7 at 2. Similarly, plaintiff testified that (1) he doesn’t
know how the Rensselaer County Jail kitchen operates or how the jail orders food; (2) he
has “never been in the mess hall”; (3) no other individuals at the Rensselaer County Jail
told him how long the kitchen served pork meatballs; and (4) he is not aware of any other
Case 9:24-cv-00179-LEK-PJE Document 26 Filed 02/13/26 Page 17 of 20

18
incident(s) where the Rensselaer County Jail served pork meatballs. 	Dkt. No. 20-2 at
127-28, 131. 	Further, plaintiff conceded that “[he] did not, and still does not, have any
personal knowledge as to the workings of the kitchen at the Rensselaer County Jail or
what is served to the inmates”; he never worked in the Rensselaer County Jail kitchen;
and “[o]ther than this one reported allegation of pork-based meatballs allegedly being
served in December 2023, no inmate has ever filed a formal grievance or complaint about
the animal content of the meatballs served at the Rensselaer County Jail.” Dkt. No. 20-8
at 1,3; Dkt. No. 24 at 3, 6.
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that has not established that
the Renssalaer County Jail had a policy of serving pork meatballs. See Johnson v. Brown,
No. 9:09-CV-0002 (GTS/DEP), 2011 WL 1097864, at *1, 7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2011)
(granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment where the “Plaintiff's only
evidence establishing the occurrence of the assault . . . is his self-contradictory,
incomplete deposition testimony that is wholly unsupported by the record” and the
defendants’ testimony, which was corroborated by documentary evidence, refuted the
plaintiff’s unsupported testimony); see also Louis-Charles v. Baker, No. 9:16-CV-1417
(MAD/CFH), 	2018 	WL 	5728054, 	at 	*10 	(N.D.N.Y. 	July 	30, 	2018), 	report 	and
recommendation 	adopted 	sub 	nom. 	Louis-Charles 	v. 	Barker, 	No. 	9:16-CV-1417
(MAD/CFH), 2018 WL 4299982 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2018) (granting summary judgment
where the plaintiff “failed to produce evidence, aside from his conclusory allegations”).
Finally, the undersigned notes plaintiff’s allegation that Tinsbee and McWhite told
him that the officer working in the kitchen on December 14, 2023, was “threatened to - -
either cook it or get . . . fired.” 	Dkt. No. 20-2 at 129. 	However, as discussed above, “a
Case 9:24-cv-00179-LEK-PJE Document 26 Filed 02/13/26 Page 18 of 20

19
municipality may not be held liable under 1983 ‘solely because it employs a tortfeasor.’”
Mulqueen v. Herkimer Cnty. Child Protective Servs., No. 6:22-CV1-301 (TJM/ATB), 2023
WL 4931679, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No.
6:22-CV-1301 (BKS/MJK), 2024 WL 756833 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2024) (citing Cowan v.
City of Mt. Vernon, 95 F. Supp. 3d 624, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs
v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997)); Dougal, 2023 WL 6430586, at *10 (quoting Jeffes,
208 F.3d at 56).
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that defendants’ summary judgment
motion be granted because plaintiff has not alleged or demonstrated that his constitutional
rights were violated due to an official Renssalaer County policy, a persistent and
widespread custom or practice, failure to train or supervise, or because a policy-making
official’s deliberate conduct deprived him of a constitutional right. See Dougal, 2023 WL
6430586, at *10 (quoting Dorsett-Felicelli, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 2d at 194); see also Lucente
v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 980 F.3d 284, 297-98 (2d Cir. 2020).
V. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth herein, it is hereby:
RECOMMENDED, that defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 20)
be GRANTED; it is
ORDERED, that the Clerk serve a copy of this Report-Recommendation and Order
on all parties in accordance with Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to U.S.C. §636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72.1(c), the parties have fourteen
days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall
Case 9:24-cv-00179-LEK-PJE Document 26 Filed 02/13/26 Page 19 of 20

20
be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette,
984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 892
F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV P. 6(a), 6(e), 72.7
Dated: February 13th, 2026
Albany, New York
7 If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Report-Recommendation and Order by mail, three
additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the
date the Report-Recommendation & Order was mailed to you to serve and file objections. See F ED. R. C IV .
P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the
deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. See id.
§ 6(a)(1)(C).
Case 9:24-cv-00179-LEK-PJE Document 26 Filed 02/13/26 Page 20 of 20