"Mark" v. Gilmour Academy et al

- 1 -
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
“MARK”,
Plaintiff,
8:25-CV-1110
v. 	(GTS/DJS)
GILMOUR ACADEMY, et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
THOMAS COUNSELORS AT LAW, LLC 	KATHLEEN R. THOMAS, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff
One World Trade Center, 85th Fl.
New York, New York 10007
MARSH LAW FIRM PLLC 	MARGARET E. MABIE, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff 	JAMES R. MARSH, ESQ.
31 Hudson Yards, 11 th Fl.
New York, New York 10001
GOLDBERG SEGALLA LLP 	MICHAEL APPELBAUM, ESQ.
Attorney for Gilmour Academy, Veach,
Chiellino, Nook, Ferfolia, and Williams
665 Main Street
Buffalo, New York 14203
HANCOCK ESTABROOK, LLP 	MARY L. D’AGOSTINO, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant #7
1800 AXA Tower I
100 Madison Street
Syracuse, New York 13202
RIVKIN RADLER LLP 	BENJAMIN J. WISHER, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant # 8
2649 South Road – Suite 100
Poughkeepsie, New York 12601
Case 8:25-cv-01110-GTS-DJS Document 82 Filed 03/23/26 Page 1 of 13

- 2 -
Defendant # 9
Pro se
Pickerington, OH 43147
DANIEL J. STEWART
United States Magistrate Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER
Plaintiff brings this action, pursuant to New York State and Federal law, alleging
that he was sexually assaulted and videotaped in 2022 while on a school sponsored trip.
See generally Dkt. No. 1, Compl. 	The Complaint was filed on August 15, 2025. 	Id.
Plaintiff filed the Complaint utilizing the name “Mark,” but in the Complaint he
identified, by name, the individual Defendants, including three fellow students at the
Gilmour Academy. Id. Approximately 4 months later, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave
to Proceed Under a Pseudonym. Dkt. No. 45. In the meantime, the three fellow students,
Defendants # 7 (represented by Mary D’Agostino), Defendant # 8 (presently represented
by Benjamin Wisher), and Defendant # 9 (appearing pro se) (collectively, the “Student-
Defendants”), filed their own Motions to Proceed Anonymously, and to have their names
removed from the docket. Dkt. Nos. 18, 20, 22, 28, & 51. Plaintiff’s counsel has opposed
Defendant # 7’s Motion to proceed using a pseudonym. 	Dkt. No. 46. 	The Student-
Defendants have likewise objected to Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed as “Mark.” Dkt. Nos.
48, 50 & 51. 	Defense counsel has proposed, in the alternative, that all the then-minor
parties be granted the ability to proceed anonymously. 	See Dkt. No. 28-1 at p. 4
(“Fairness demands parity of treatment”); Dkt. No. 51 at p. 16.
Case 8:25-cv-01110-GTS-DJS Document 82 Filed 03/23/26 Page 2 of 13

- 3 -
For the reasons further detailed below, Plaintiff’s and Defendants ## 7, 8, and 9’s
Motions to proceed under a pseudonym are GRANTED, subject to further order of the
Court.
I. BACKGROUND
On or about January 14, 2022, Plaintiff and other players and coaches of the
Gilmour Academy hockey team traveled from Ohio to Lake Placid, New York to attend
the Northwood Invitational Hockey Tournament. Compl. at ¶¶ 31-32. Plaintiff was 16
years old at the time, id. at ¶ 33, and the Student-Defendants were minors. Dkt. No. 28-
1 at p. 4. 	During the trip Plaintiff alleges that he was sexually assaulted and hazed by
members of the hockey team, including the 7th and 8th named Defendants. Compl. at ¶¶
45-51. It is further alleged that Defendant # 9 videotaped the sexual assault of Plaintiff,
which was then disseminated to others via “Snapchat” or other means. Id. at ¶¶ 47 & 49-
50.
The first two causes of action in the Complaint are against the Academy and its
coaches for their purported failure to supervise the students and intervene to stop the
misconduct, and alleges negligence, gross negligence, and recklessness. Id. at ¶¶ 56-79.
The Complaint against the Student-Defendants alleges that they received and possessed
child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252 and 2252A. 	Id. at ¶¶ 80-87. 	The
Complaint seeks statutory liquidated damages in the amount of $150,000 against each
fellow student, as well as fees and costs. Id. at ¶ 87.
Case 8:25-cv-01110-GTS-DJS Document 82 Filed 03/23/26 Page 3 of 13

- 4 -
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a)’s requirement that every complaint “name
all parties” is not absolute. Rather, it is within a court’s discretion to allow a plaintiff to
proceed in an action anonymously. See, e.g., Doe v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 310 F.R.D. 222,
224 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 	In exercising that discretion, courts must consider the following
factors on balance:
(1) whether the litigation involves matters that are highly sensitive and [of
a] personal nature;
(2) whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm
to the . . . party [seeking to proceed anonymously] or even more critically,
to innocent non-parties;
(3) whether identification presents other harms and the likely severity of
those harms;
(4) whether the plaintiff is particularly vulnerable to the possible harms of
disclosure;
(5) whether the suit is challenging the actions of the government or that of
private parties;
(6) whether the defendant is prejudiced by allowing the plaintiff to press his
claims anonymously, whether the nature of that prejudice (if any) differs at
any particular stage of the litigation, and whether any prejudice can be
mitigated by the district court;
(7) whether the plaintiff’s identity has thus far been kept confidential;
(8) whether the public’s interest in the litigation is furthered by requiring
the plaintiff to disclose his identity;
(9) whether, because of the purely legal nature of the issues presented or
otherwise, there is an atypically weak public interest in knowing the
litigants’ identities; and
Case 8:25-cv-01110-GTS-DJS Document 82 Filed 03/23/26 Page 4 of 13

- 5 -
(10) whether there are any alternative mechanisms for protecting the
confidentiality of the plaintiff.
Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 190 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
marks, alterations, and citations omitted). 	Courts are “not required to list each of the
factors or use any particular formulation as long as it is clear that the court balanced the
interests at stake in reaching its conclusion.” Id. at 191 n.4.
III. DISCUSSION
Having considered the record and the arguments of the parties, and balancing the
Sealed Plaintiff factors, the Court finds that all the pending Motions to proceed
anonymously should be granted, subject to a further order of the Court.
A. Factor 1: Matters of Highly Sensitive and Personal Nature
Courts have repeatedly found matters of sexual misconduct “highly sensitive.”
See Roe v. RPI, 2023 WL 3853647, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2023); A.B. v. Hofstra Univ.,
2018 WL 1935986, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2018). 	In fact, “[a]llegations of sexual
assault are ‘paradigmatic example[s]’ of highly sensitive and personal claims and thus
favor a plaintiff’s use of a pseudonym.” 	Rapp v. Fowler, 537 F. Supp. 3d 521, 528
(S.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting Doe No. 2 v. Kolko, 242 F.R.D. 193, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)).
Given the nature of the claims presented, the first factor weighs heavily in favor of
Plaintiff’s anonymity. Further, the serious nature of the allegations against the Student-
Defendants, which involve both sexual and potentially criminal conduct, combined with
their age at the time of the events in question, also weighs in favor of their Motions.
Case 8:25-cv-01110-GTS-DJS Document 82 Filed 03/23/26 Page 5 of 13

- 6 -
B. Factors 2 and 3: Potential for Harm
Factors two and three weigh marginally in favor of allowing Plaintiff and the
Student-Defendants to proceed anonymously. 	These factors focus on the harm that
identification would cause parties. 	The relevant inquiry for these factors is “whether
disclosure of [a party’s] name in the course of the lawsuit would ‘uniquely’ cause harm
and ‘how grave the resultant harm would prove to be.’” Doe 1 v. Branca USA, Inc., 2022
WL 2713543, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2022) (quoting Rapp v. Fowler, 537 F. Supp. 3d
at 529). Conclusory statements regarding harm are of “limited utility.” Rapp v. Fowler,
537 F. Supp. 3d at 530. 	Where a movant claims that disclosure will harm their mental
health, courts in this Circuit generally look for corroboration from medical professionals
that detail the risk to the movant. See Doe v. Weinstein, 484 F. Supp. 3d 90, 95 (S.D.N.Y.
2020). Plaintiff’s counsel generally avers that Plaintiff has received counseling because
of the incident, Dkt. No. 45-1 at ¶ 9, but no medical evidence or counseling report was
presented on this issue from either Plaintiff or the Student-Defendnats.
Additionally, Plaintiff argues in support of his Motion that if his identity is
disclosed it would compound the emotional distress that has resulted from the sexual
conduct and hazing by his fellow students alleged in the Complaint, and further that there
are individuals who collect child pornography and who might seek to obtain the video if
he is identified by name, thus increasing his damage. 	See Dkt. No. 45-2. 	The Court
accepts this argument as a legitimate justification for anonymity, at least for a period
while discovery is ongoing.
Case 8:25-cv-01110-GTS-DJS Document 82 Filed 03/23/26 Page 6 of 13

- 7 -
The arguments by the Defendants that they would suffer stigma and harm as a
result of the allegations made by the Plaintiff are also generally conclusory. 	However,
the Court again is swayed by the nature of the allegations as well of the age of the parties
in concluding that this factor swings in favor of the utilization of pseudonyms, at least for
the period of discovery. Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, 2015 WL 6116620, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 	16, 	2015) 	(“Judges 	in 	this 	District 	regularly 	permit 	defendants 	to 	proceed
anonymously in cases similar to this one, where the defendant has been accused of
illegally downloading adult videos, because of the ‘highly embarrassing and potentially
sensitive and personal nature of such accusations,’ the risk of misidentification … and the
fact that ‘the public’s interest is not necessarily furthered by knowledge of the defendant’s
specific identity.’”) (quotations and citations omitted).
C. Factor 4: Vulnerability
The fourth factor requires courts to determine “whether the [movant] is particularly
vulnerable to the possible harms of disclosure . . . particularly in light of [the movant’s]
age.” 	Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d at 190. 	Age is a critical factor in
making this determination because “courts have been readier to protect the privacy
interest of minors in legal proceedings than of adults.” Rapp v. Fowler, 537 F. Supp. 3d
at 530. 	Indeed, the Local Rules of the Northern District specifically prevent the
identification of minors or sexual assault victims. L.R. N.D.N.Y. § 5.2(a). While it may
be correct that the minors have now just reached the age of majority, the events in question
occurred while they were underage, and the Court can and has considered this as a
Case 8:25-cv-01110-GTS-DJS Document 82 Filed 03/23/26 Page 7 of 13

- 8 -
significant factor. The fourth factor therefore weighs in favor of allowing the then-minor
parties to proceed anonymously in this matter.
D. Factors 5, 8, and 9: Public Interest
Factors five, eight, and nine all relate to the public’s interest in knowing the parties’
identities.
The fifth factor considers “whether the suit . . . challeng[es] the actions of the
government or that of private parties.” Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d at
190. 	Lawsuits 	against 	the 	government 	“involve 	no 	injury 	to 	the 	Government’s
reputation.” 	N. Jersey Media Grp. Inc. v. Doe Nos. 1-5, 2012 WL 5899331, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2012). 	On the other hand, suits against private parties “may cause
damage to their good names and reputations,” among other things. 	Id. 	In the present
case, defense counsel correctly notes that by granting equality in anonymity for the
individual students, the Court would significantly reduce any argument of prejudice. Dkt.
No. 28-1 at pp. 4-5.
“The eighth factor weighs whether the public’s interest in the litigation is
furthered by revelation of the plaintiff’s identity.” 	Doe v. Leonelli, 2022 WL 2003635,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2022). Conversely, the ninth factor “looks to whether, because
of the purely legal nature of the issues presented, there is an atypically weak public
interest in knowing the litigants’ identities.” Rapp v. Fowler, 537 F. Supp. 3d at 532.
Plaintiff identifies the public interest in protecting the identities of sexual assault
victims. 	Dkt. No. 45. 	The Court agrees that this is certainly a strong public interest;
however, this interest alone has been “repeatedly rejected . . . as an adequate basis by
Case 8:25-cv-01110-GTS-DJS Document 82 Filed 03/23/26 Page 8 of 13

- 9 -
itself to warrant anonymity.” Doe v. Telemundo Network Grp. LLC, 2023 WL 6259390,
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2023). In addition, there is also countervailing public interest
in the accused being able to publicly confront an accuser, a right that would be
undermined by Plaintiff’s anonymity where the matter proceeds to trial. 	Doe v. Combs,
2024 WL 863705, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 29, 2024) (citing Doe 1 v. Branca USA, Inc., 2022
WL 2713543, at *2). 	The public also has a strong interest in knowing the underlying
facts of a litigation, including the identities of litigants. See, e.g., Doe v. Leonelli, 2022
WL 2003635, at *4 (“[T]he public has a significant interest in open judicial proceedings
and the public’s interest in the litigation is furthered by transparency, including exposure
of the parties’ identities.”). Plaintiff alleges that he was sexually assaulted and sexually
harassed. 	See generally Compl. 	These allegations are of the type that “further the
public’s interest in enforcing legal and social norms.” N. Jersey Media Grp. Inc. v. Doe
Nos. 1-5, 2012 WL 5899331, at *8.
The Court notes, however, that the public generally does not have a significant
interest in the intricacies of discovery in civil litigation. See, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks
on Sept. 11, 2001, 454 F. Supp. 2d 220, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“public interest in particular
litigation does not generate a public right of access to all discovery materials”). 	The
Motions in this case present a unique situation, in that the Academy and the coaches are
not moving for anonymity, but both the Plaintiff and the Student-Defendants are. In the
Court’s view, the public’s interest in the matter at this state of the litigation will be
primarily satisfied by notice of the nature of the allegations, the date of the event, the
incident location, the school involved, and issues regarding the school’s supervision or
Case 8:25-cv-01110-GTS-DJS Document 82 Filed 03/23/26 Page 9 of 13

- 10 -
lack thereof. The identity of the minor students who were alleged to have been involved,
either as a victim, or as perpetrators or observers, are less compelling at this juncture.
Importantly, this factor may well change if the matter proceeds to trial, at which time the
credibility of the witnesses will be crucial, and the matter will proceed in open court.
How the Court will handle anonymity is best left in the discretion of the presiding judge.
Therefore, the public interest factors weigh only slightly against anonymity in this
action during the discovery phase, but this factor is subject to change.
E. Factor 6: Prejudice to Defendants
Factor six requires the Court to analyze the prejudice Defendants will face if
Plaintiff were permitted to proceed anonymously. Where, as here, the allegations are of
a highly sensitive and personal nature, the potential for harm flows not only to Plaintiff
but to the individual Student-Defendant as well. 	See Anonymous v. Simon, 2014 WL
819122, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2014) (“Plaintiff’s allegations and public comments
embarrass Defendant and place him under the same stigma that concerns Plaintiff.”).
“Courts will examine the reputational damage to defendants, difficulties conducting
discovery, and fundamental fairness of proceeding anonymously.” Doe v. Townes, 2020
WL 2395159, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2020).
As noted above, by granting joint anonymity to the Plaintiff and Student-
Defendants, the potential harm to the Defendants has been mitigated. 	With regard to
discovery, the Court is not aware of any significant prejudice to the Defendant’s case.
Defendants are aware of the identify of “Mark” as they were his classmates. 	It has not
been alleged or established that discovery would be in any way hindered by both sides
Case 8:25-cv-01110-GTS-DJS Document 82 Filed 03/23/26 Page 10 of 13

- 11 -
proceeding anonymously. 	See, e.g., John Doe v. Sean Combs, 2026 WL 742650, at *2
(2d Cir. Mar. 17, 2026) (“Defendants would be highly prejudiced should Plaintiffs
proceed under a pseudonym because of likely asymmetries in fact-gathering (factor
six).”).
Courts have identified prejudice against a defendant when a defendant is “required
to defend itself publicly before a jury while plaintiff . . . make[s] her accusations from
behind a cloak of anonymity.” 	Doe v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 310 F.R.D. at 225. 	In this
case, the Court has attempted to mitigate any prejudice by allowing both the Plaintiff and
the Student-Defendants to proceed under a pseudonym. 	The risk of prejudice and the
right of the public to know the identities of the parties, especially were this matter to
proceed to trial, does cause the Court concern. 	At this early stage of the litigation,
however, that risk has been overcome by the identified interests in confidentiality. 	For
these reasons, the sixth factor weighs in favor of Plaintiff’s identity remaining anonymous
at least for the time being, subject to a demonstrated change of circumstances.
F. Factor 7: Prior Confidentiality
The seventh factor, which inquires as to the status of a party’s confidentiality thus
far in the litigation, weighs evenly. 	The Plaintiff has maintained his confidentiality
throughout 	the 	proceedings 	but 	has 	affirmatively 	named 	the 	individual 	Student-
Defendants. 	In all fairness, this factor, which is within the sole control of Plaintiff and
his counsel, cannot be considered against the moving Defendants.
Case 8:25-cv-01110-GTS-DJS Document 82 Filed 03/23/26 Page 11 of 13

- 12 -
G. Factor 10: Alternative Mechanisms
Finally, factor ten “examines whether there are other mechanisms, including
sealing, redaction of documents, protective orders and confidentiality agreements, that
could protect the plaintiff’s confidentiality.” 	Doe v. Combs, 2024 WL 863705, at *5.
Here, it seems likely that a protective order will be necessary, but it is unlikely to address
the competing privacy interests of Plaintiff and Defendants. 	On balance, therefore, this
factor is neutral.
IV. CONCLUSION
Taken together, the Court concludes that the appropriate course of action at this
juncture is to permit Plaintiff and Defendants ## 7, 8, and 9 to proceed anonymously
“until such time as the Court orders the name to be disclosed.” 	Doe v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., No. 1:13-CV-6287, Dkt. No. 2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2013). This will allow the parties
to proceed through at least the initial stages of discovery while maintaining the students’
confidentiality but permit each side to make an application to the trial court to require
disclosure of the students’ identities at trial in the event that circumstances of the litigation
warrant such a change, particularly if a party can demonstrate specific prejudice inuring
against them.
The mechanics of implementing this Order are complex. The Clerk is directed to
correct the “Defendant” section of the Civil Docket, as well as docket entries which
identify by name the 7 th , 8 th , and 9 th Defendants consistent with this Order. 	Motions to
dismiss and amend are presently before Judge Glenn T. Suddaby. 	Resolution of those
motions will necessarily impact the parties and the nature of the pleadings. 	Pending
Case 8:25-cv-01110-GTS-DJS Document 82 Filed 03/23/26 Page 12 of 13

- 13 -
decision, therefore, the Court directs that the Complaint and Plaintiff’s Proposed
Amended Complaint, Dkt. Nos. 1 & 57-1, be restricted from public access and limited to
court staff and the parties only subject to further order from Judge Suddaby.
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed Anonymously as
“Mark” (Dkt. No. 45) is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the seventh named Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Proceed
Anonymously as “Defendant # 7” (Dkt. No. 28), is GRANTED, and it is further
ORDERED, that the eighth named Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Proceed
Anonymously as “Defendant # 8” (Dkt. No. 51), is GRANTED, and it is further
ORDERED, that the ninth named Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Proceed
Anonymously as Defendant # 9 (Dkt. No. 20), is GRANTED, and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Memorandum-
Decision and Order upon the parties to this action.
Dated: March 23, 2026
Albany, New York
Case 8:25-cv-01110-GTS-DJS Document 82 Filed 03/23/26 Page 13 of 13