Howe v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________________
PAIGE H.,
Plaintiff,
v. 	8:24-CV-01352 (BKS/TWD)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
_____________________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
SCHNEIDER & PALCSIK 	MARK A. SCHNEIDER, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff
57 Court Street
Plattsburgh, NY 12901
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 	JOHANNY SANTANA, ESQ.
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
Attorney for Defendant
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21235
THÉRÈSE WILEY DANCKS, United States Magistrate Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	INTRODUCTION
This matter was referred to the undersigned for Report and Recommendation by the
Honorable Brenda K. Sannes, Chief United States District Judge, pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 636(b)
and Northern District of New York Local Rule 72.3. This case has proceeded in accordance with
General Order 18 of this Court which sets forth the procedures to be followed when appealing a
denial for Social Security Benefits. Both parties filed briefs, which the Court treats as motions
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under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) in accordance with General Order 18. Dkt. Nos. 13,
14. Plaintiff filed a reply brief which simply relied on her original arguments and authority as set
forth in her primary brief. Dkt. No. 15. Oral argument was not heard. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s motion be denied, Defendant’s motion be granted,
and the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
II. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was born in 1995. T. 176.1 She has a college education. T. 190. She has past
relevant work as a certified nurse assistant and a licensed practical nurse. T. 190, 1127. She
lives with her boyfriend and four-year-old daughter. T. 1141. Plaintiff protectively filed a Title
II application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”), alleging disability beginning December
24, 2019, due to “Pelvic Misalignment – SI joint disfunction,” “neuralgia neuritis-nerve
pain/inflammation of nerves,” and “pain unspecified thigh.” T. 176-77, 189.
Plaintiff’s initial claim was administratively denied and again denied on reconsideration.
T. 75, 91. She requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), T. 107-08, and
then appeared and testified at a hearing before ALJ Arthur Patane on August 9, 2021. T. 28-46.
On January 11, 2022, ALJ Patane issued a written decision finding Plaintiff was not disabled
under the Social Security Act. T. 20. On November 22, 2022, the Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for review. T. 1-7. Plaintiff then appealed to this Court, T. 1157-75, and on
August 4, 2023, the parties stipulated to reversing the Commissioner’s final decision and
remanding the action to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings. T. 1151-54.
1 The Administrative Record/Transcript is found at Dkt. 10. Citations to the Transcript will be
referenced as “T.” and the Bates-stamped page numbers as set forth therein will be used rather
than the page numbers the Court’s CM/ECF electronic filing system assigns. Citations to the
parties’ submission will use page numbers assigned by CM/ECF, the Court’s electronic filing
system.
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On September 14, 2023, the Appeals Council remanded the claim to an ALJ for further
proceedings. T. 1180-83. After a second hearing, ALJ Patane again issued an unfavorable
decision finding Plaintiff was not disabled. T. 1140-48, 1115-29. Plaintiff timely appealed by
the filing of the operative complaint. Dkt. No. 1.
III. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	Standard of Review 2
In reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, a court must first determine whether
the correct legal standards were applied, and if so, whether substantial evidence supports the
decision. Atwater v. Astrue, 512 F. App’x 67, 69 (2d Cir. 2013). “Failure to apply the correct
legal standards is grounds for reversal.” Pollard v. Halter, 377 F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 2004)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, a reviewing court may not affirm the
ALJ’s decision if it reasonably doubts whether the proper legal standards were applied, even if
the decision appears to be supported by substantial evidence. Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983,
986-87 (2d Cir. 1987).
A court’s factual review of the Commissioner’s final decision is limited to the
determination of whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the decision. 42
U.S.C. § 405(g); Rivera v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir. 1991). “Substantial evidence
means more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Sczepanski v. Saul, 946 F.3d 152, 157 (2d Cir.
2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the ALJ’s finding as to any fact is
2 While the Supplemental Security Income program has special economic eligibility
requirements, the requirements for establishing disability under Title XVI, 42 U.S.C. §
1382c(a)(3) and Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d), are identical, therefore, “decisions under these
sections are cited interchangeably.” Donato v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. of U.S.,
721 F.2d 414, 418 n.3 (2d Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).
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supported by substantial evidence, it is conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Diaz v. Shalala, 59 F.3d
307, 312 (2d Cir. 1995). Further, where evidence is deemed susceptible to more than one
rational interpretation, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld. See Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685
F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1212 (1983).
“To determine on appeal whether an ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining the evidence from both sides,
because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts
from its weight.” Williams on Behalf of Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988)
(citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951)) (additional citation
omitted). If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s findings must be sustained
“even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff’s position and despite that the court’s
independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner’s].” Rosado v.
Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing Rutherford, 685 F.2d at 62) (additional
citations omitted). A reviewing court cannot substitute its interpretation of the administrative
record in place of the Commissioner’s if the record contains substantial support for the ALJ’s
decision. See Rutherford, 685 F.2d at 62.
When inadequacies in the ALJ’s decision frustrate meaningful review of the substantial
evidence inquiry, remand may be appropriate. See Estrella v. Berryhill, 925 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir.
2019); Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d, 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1996). Remand may also be appropriate where
the ALJ has failed to develop the record, adequately appraise the weight or persuasive value of
witness testimony, or explain his reasonings. See Klemens v. Berryhill, 703 F. App’x 35, 35-38
(2d Cir. 2017); Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1999); Estrella, 925 F.3d at 98;
Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 130 (2d Cir. 2008); Pratts, 94 F.3d at 39.
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B. 	Standard for Benefits
To be considered disabled, a plaintiff seeking disability benefits must establish she is
unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death, or which has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months . . . .” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A). Additionally, the claimant’s:
physical or mental impairment or impairments [must be] of such
severity that he is not only unable to do h[er] previous work but
cannot, considering h[er] age, education, and work experience,
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in
the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the
immediate area in which [s]he lives, or whether a specific job
vacancy exists for h[er], or whether [s]he would be hired if [s]he
applied for work.
Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).
The Social Security Administration regulations outline a five-step process to determine
whether a claimant is disabled:
(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful
activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or
combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or
equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of
Impairments; 	(4) 	based 	on 	a 	“residual 	functional 	capacity”
assessment, whether the claimant can perform any of his or her past
relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) whether there are
significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the
claimant can perform given the claimant’s residual functional
capacity, age, education, and work experience.
McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Burgess, 537 F.3d at 120; 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v)). The claimant bears the burden of proof regarding
the first four steps. Kohler v. Astrue, 546 F.3d 260, 265 (2d Cir. 2008). If the claimant meets his
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or her burden of proof, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at the fifth step to prove the
claimant is capable of working. Id.
IV. 	THE ALJ’S DECISION
At step one of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since December 24, 2019, the alleged onset date. T. 1117. At step
two, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: unspecified joint
impairments with pelvic misalignment, chronic shoulder dislocations, and status post traumatic
injury to the left ankle. T. 1118. At step three, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of
the listed impairments of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P., Appendix 1. T. 1120. Before reaching
step four, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform
sedentary work, specifically
she can lift/carry 20 pounds frequently and up to 50 pounds
occasionally, can sit for 2 hours at a time and a total of 4 hours
during an 8 hour workday, can stand for 1 hour at a time and a total
of 2 hours during an 8 hour work day, can walk for 1 hour at a time
and a total of 2 hours during an 8 hour workday, can frequently reach
(including reaching overhead), handle, finger, feel, push, and pull,
can occasionally stoop, balance, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb
stairs/ramps/ladders/scaffolds, 	can 	tolerate 	no 	greater 	than
occasional contact with concentrated levels of respiratory irritants,
and can never work from unprotected heights, operate a motor
vehicle on the job, or work around moving mechanical parts.
T. 1120. At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work. T.
1127. At step five, after considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, the
ALJ found there are jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy Plaintiff can
perform. T. 1128. The ALJ concluded she was not disabled from December 24, 2019, through
the date of his decision. T. 1129.
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V. 	CONTENTIONS
Plaintiff brings six issues of claimed error. First, “ALJ Patane failed to comply with and
was inconsistent with the controlling remand order of the Appeals Council.” Dkt. No. 13 at 23-
25. Next, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by not considering Plaintiff’s symptoms from joint
hypermobility syndrome (“HMS”). Id. at 25-28. Third, Plaintiff contends “the ALJ erred at Step
2 by not including [Plaintiff’s] depression and anxiety as severe and at Step 4 by not including
limitations caused by these impairments in the RFC.” Id. at 29-30. Plaintiff next argues the ALJ
erred in evaluating the medical opinion evidence. Id. at 30-36. Fifth, Plaintiff argues the ALJ
erred by not crediting Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her limitations. Id. at 36-40. Lastly,
Plaintiff argues “[t]he ALJ erred at Step 2 by not finding [Plaintiff’s] diarrhea, migraines, lumbar
radiculopathy, and carpal tunnel syndrome to be severe impairments. He erred at Step 4 by not
including limitations caused by these severe impairments in her RFC.” Id. at 40-41.
Defendant counters the ALJ reasonably considered the severity of Plaintiff’s
impairments, and “contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, the ALJ complied with the Appeals
Council’s remand order. In addition, the ALJ’s very restrictive [RFC] finding is supported by
substantial evidence and the ALJ accommodated Plaintiff’s pain complaints by limiting her to
occasional postural maneuvers; no exposure to heights, operating a motor vehicle, and working
around moving mechanical parts; and only frequent manipulating and reaching in all directions.”
Dkt. No. 14 at 4; see also id. at 9-24. In terms of the RFC, the ALJ properly evaluated the
persuasiveness of the medical opinion of record as well as the symptomatology. Id. Lastly,
Defendant argues the case should not be remanded for payment of benefits. Id. at 4; see also id.
at 24-25.
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VI. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Step Two Determination
At step two of the five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff
had three severe impairments: unspecified joint impairments with pelvic misalignment, chronic
shoulder dislocations, and status post traumatic injury to the left ankle. T. 1118. The ALJ
further concluded Plaintiff’s anxiety and depressive disorder were not severe. Id. Noting “[i]n
the prior ALJ decision, I also found the claimant to have severe anxiety and depressive disorders.
However, based on my careful review of the entire evidentiary record, I now conclude that there
is insufficient clinical, treatment, and medical opinion evidence to support a finding that these or
any other impairments not specifically designated as severe [] have caused or contributed to
more than minimal work-related limitations which have lasted or been expected to last for 12
continuous months or more.” Id. As the ALJ correctly noted, Plaintiff did not cite an anxiety
disorder, depressive disorder, or any other limiting mental impairment in her adult disability
report. T. 189, 1118. “The ALJ is entitled to rely on what the record says as well as what it does
not say.” Dumas v. Schweiker, 712 F.2d 1545, 1553 (2d Cir. 1983). The ALJ then proceeded to
step three, concluding none of Plaintiff’s impairments or combination of impairments met or
medically equaled the listings. T. 1120.
Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred at step two by not including her depression and anxiety as
severe as well as her diarrhea, migraines, lumbar radiculopathy, cervical radiculopathy, and
carpal tunnel syndrome. Dkt. No. 13 at 25-28, 40-41. The Commissioner contends substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s step two finding. Dkt. No. 14 at 9. For the following reasons, the
Court agrees with the Commissioner.
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At step two, “[a]n impairment is ‘severe’ if it ‘significantly limits [the claimant’s]
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.’” Eralte v. Colvin, No. 14 Civ. 1745(JCF),
2014 WL 7330441, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2014) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)). “When
the parties disagree over the effect of the ALJ’s failure to include a condition at step two,
resolution of this issue comes down to a question of whether there was substantial evidence to
support the ALJ’s conclusion that [the omitted condition] should not be included as a severe
impairment.” Id.; Cwiklinski v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 18-CV-1204-FPG, 2020 WL 1131223,
at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2020) (“Where a claimant produces some evidence of an impairment,
the Commissioner may conclude that the impairment is non-severe only where the medical
evidence ‘establishes only a slight abnormality or combination of slight abnormalities which
would have no more than a minimal effect on an individual’s ability to work.’” (quoting SSR 85-
28, 1985 WL 56856, at *3 (1985))). “[T]he severity prong is intended as a de minimis standard
to screen out only those claimants with ‘slight’ limitations that ‘do not significantly limit any
basic work activity.’” Vicari v. Astrue, No. 1:05-cv-4967-ENV-VVP, 2009 WL 331242, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2009) (quoting Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 158 (1987)); Melendez v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-CV-299-FPG, 2020 WL 4274510, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. July 24, 2020)
(“In other words, the analysis at step two is a threshold test designed to screen out de minimis or
totally groundless claims.” (citations omitted)).
1. 	Plaintiff’s Anxiety and Depressive Disorders
As previously stated, the ALJ noted “there is insufficient clinical, treatment, and medical
opinion evidence to support a finding that . . . [Plaintiff’s anxiety and depression] or any other
impairments not specifically designated as severe above have caused or contributed more than
minimal work-related limitations which have lasted or been expected to last for 12 continuous
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months or more.” T. 1118. Additionally, as noted above, Plaintiff did not allege an anxiety
disorder, depressive disorder, or any other limiting mental impairment in her application
materials. T. 189.
While the record noted a history of major depressive disorder, Plaintiff consistently
denied symptoms of anxiety and depression and her mental examinations were normal. T. 298,
333-34, 383-84, 389, 390, 396-97, 402, 407-08, 522, 535, 536-37, 540, 558, 571, 576-77, 584,
695, 699, 703. The mere presence or diagnosis of a disease or impairment is not, by itself,
sufficient to deem a condition severe. Monique Danielle W. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:18-
CV-184 (DNH), 2019 WL 2358529, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. June 4, 2019) (quoting Zenzel v. Astrue,
993 F. Supp. 2d 146, 152 (N.D.N.Y. 2012)). The ALJ’s decision included a detailed analysis as
to why Plaintiff’s medically determinable mental impairments are non-severe because they
“cause no more than ‘mild’ limitations in any of the functional areas and the evidence does not
otherwise indicate that there is more than a minimal limitation in the claimant’s ability to do
basic work activities . . . .” T. 1119-20.
Plaintiff further argues the ALJ should have been bound by a prior administrative
decision that found her anxiety and depression to be severe impairments. Dkt. No. 13 at 13, 15.
However, the ALJ correctly afforded Plaintiff a de novo hearing and issued a new decision, as
the Appeals Council vacated the ALJ’s prior decision. T. 1180.
For these reasons and because the ALJ found at least one other severe impairment,
continued with the sequential evaluation, and provided an explanation showing he adequately
considered the evidence related to Plaintiff’s non-severe impairments, the Court finds that error,
if any, by the ALJ in failing to find Plaintiff’s depression and anxiety to be severe impairments is
harmless. See Brianna J. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:24-CV-1016 (DJS), 2025 WL 2771683,
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at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025) (“[W]here an ALJ excludes certain impairments from the list of
severe impairments at step two of the sequential analysis, any such error is harmless if the ALJ
identifies some severe impairments so that the analysis proceeds and the ALJ considers the
effects of the omitted, non-severe impairments during the subsequent steps following step two.”)
(citation omitted).
2. 	Plaintiff’s Diarrhea, Migraines, Lumbar Radiculopathy, Cervical
Radiculopathy, and Carpal Tunnel Syndrome
Similar to the mental impairments discussed above, Plaintiff did not allege diarrhea,
migraines, lumbar radiculopathy, cervical radiculopathy, or carpal tunnel syndrome as disabling
conditions in her application materials. T. 189. At the hearing on remand, Plaintiff mentioned
migraines in relation to sitting and standing or moving too quickly. T. 1142, 1147. The ALJ
found severe impairments at step two including two severe physical impairments (unspecified
joint impairments with pelvic misalignment and chronic shoulder dislocations) and continued the
sequential evaluation. T. 1118-28. This analysis included determining the RFC which restricted
Plaintiff to “sit for 2 hours at a time and a total of 4 hours during an 8 hour workday, [she] can
stand for 1 hour at a time and a total of 2 hours during an 8 hour workday, [she] can walk for 1
hour at a time and a total of 2 hours during an 8 hour workday, . . . [she] can occasionally stoop,
balance, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb stairs/ramps/ladders/scaffolds . . . .” T. 1120.
The ALJ’s overall decision reflects a detailed analysis of Plaintiff’s physical impairments
and related limitations as well as the objective evidence of record. T. 1121-27. The records
show Plaintiff had a history of diarrhea with some bowel habit changes, T. 691, 1018, 1021, and
medications were prescribed, T. 1069; however, Plaintiff’s colonoscopy was normal. T. 1069.
While Plaintiff was also diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome and radiculopathies, T. 1623,
findings on diagnostic testing showed (1) an unremarkable MRI of the lumbar spine, T. 1626,
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1630, 1677; (2) mild carpal tunnel syndrome on EMG testing, T. 1629; and (3) unremarkable
cervical spine x-rays, T. 1672. Moreover, multiple medical sources concluded Plaintiff’s
physical impairments were not severe including state medical consultants J. Sharif-Najafi, M.D.,
R. Mohanty, M.D., and consultative examiner, Rita Figueroa, M.D. T. 72, 74, 87, 638.
Nevertheless, the ALJ afforded little weight to these opinions noting “[t]he record contains
ample subjective, objective, clinical, functional testing, and treatment evidence, including the
evidence cited by [Renee] Giometti [, M.D.,] discussed at length [in the ALJ’s decision], to
establish that the claimant’s physical impairments cause far more than the minimal work-related
limitations required to satisfy the low regulatory threshold for severity.” T. 1126. For these
reasons and because the ALJ found at least one other severe impairment, continued with the
sequential evaluation, and provided an explanation showing he adequately considered the
evidence related to Plaintiff’s non-severe impairments, the Court finds any error by the ALJ in
failing to find Plaintiff’s diarrhea, migraines, lumbar radiculopathy, cervical radiculopathy, and
carpal tunnel syndrome to be severe (or in failing to explicitly classify these alleged impairments
as either severe or non-severe) to be harmless.
For the reasons above, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
findings at step two. Remand is therefore not required on this basis.
B. 	Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Analysis of the Record Evidence,
Opinion Evidence, and Plaintiff’s RFC
A claimant’s RFC reflects what he or she “can still do despite his or her limitations.”
Desmond v. Astrue, No. 11-CV-0818 (VEB), 2012 WL 6648625, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2012)
(quoting Melville v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1999)). To determine a claimant’s RFC, “the
ALJ considers a claimant’s physical abilities, mental abilities, symptomatology, including pain
and other limitations that could interfere with work activities on a regular and continuing basis.”
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Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a). The ALJ assesses the RFC
“based on all of the relevant medical and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3). The RFC
assessment does not have to “perfectly correspond” with any of the medical source opinions
cited in the ALJ’s decision; rather, the ALJ is “entitled to weigh all of the evidence available to
make an RFC finding that [i]s consistent with the record as a whole.” Matta v. Astrue, 508 F.
App’x 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (summary order). The Court upholds an RFC
finding “when there is substantial evidence in the record to support each requirement listed in the
regulations.” Desmond, 2012 WL 6648625, at *5 (citation omitted).
For claims such as this one adjudicated after March 27, 2017, an ALJ’s review of medical
opinion evidence and prior administrative medical findings is governed by 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520c(c) and 416.920c(c). Under the applicable regulations, the Commissioner “will not
defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical
opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), including those from [the claimant’s]
medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a); Howard D. v. Saul, No. 5:19-CV-
01615 (BKS), 2021 WL 1152834, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2021). Rather, the ALJ must use
five factors to determine the persuasiveness of the medical opinion evidence and prior
administrative medical findings: supportability; consistency; relationship with the claimant;
specialization; and any other factors “that tend to support or contradict” the opinion. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520c(a)-(c), 416.920c(a)-(c); see also Howard D., 2021 WL 1152834, at *11. The ALJ
always must “explain how [he] considered the supportability and consistency factors” because
they are “the most important factors,” and he “may, but [is] not required to, explain how [he]
considered the [remaining] factors.” Id. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2).
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1. 	Katherine Richey, F.N.P.
Plaintiff alleges the ALJ “did not discuss how N.P. Richey’s opinions were not supported
by the medical record or inconsistent with the medical record.” Dkt. No. 13 at 35. On April 28,
2021, N.P. Richey submitted a medical source statement. T. 654-58, see also T. 125-29. N.P.
Richey stated she had been seeing Plaintiff since 2016, three to four times a year. T. 654. She
noted diagnoses of pelvic pain and back pain, that have lasted or could be expected to last at least
twelve months. Id. Plaintiff’s symptoms included pelvic pain, back pain, weakness in these
muscle groups, palpitations, and chest pain. Id. Plaintiff’s pelvic and back pain is “constant but
worsens with certain activities.” Id. When asked to identify clinical finding and objective signs,
N.P. Richey stated, “defer to testing completed by specialists/functional capacity test.” Id. N.P.
Richey reported Plaintiff has not used medications because she was breastfeeding, and Tylenol is
not effective. Id. N.P. Richey also reported emotional factors contribute to the severity of
Plaintiff’s symptoms and functional limitations, and depression affects her physical condition.
T. 655.
N.P. Richey opined Plaintiff could walk four city blocks without rest or severe pain. Id.
She could sit for two hours at one time and at least six hours in an eight-hour workday and stand
for 20 minutes at one time but stand/walk for less than two hours in an eight-hour workday. Id.
N.P. Richey further opined Plaintiff would need a job that permits shifting positions at will from
sitting, standing, or walking. Id. She also opined Plaintiff’s job would need to include five
minutes of walking every 30 minutes. Id. Plaintiff would sometimes need unscheduled breaks
for five minutes every two hours due to pain/paresthesia and numbness. T. 655, 657. Plaintiff
would be off task 10% of the workday and would miss about four days per month. T. 656. N.P.
Richey noted Plaintiff is capable of low stress work and her impairments would likely produce
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good and bad days. Id. She opined Plaintiff’s impairments, as demonstrated by signs, clinical
findings, and laboratory or test results, are reasonably consistent with the symptoms and
functional limitations described in her evaluation. T. 656. N.P. Richey left questions regarding
Plaintiff’s postural and lifting abilities blank on the form, T. 656, 657, but in the margin near
these questions, she noted the answers to the questions are in the functional capacity test. Id.
Lastly, N.P. Richey recorded that Plaintiff’s symptoms and limitations started in December of
2019. T. 658.
ALJ Patane provided a detailed evaluation with respect to the supportability factor of
N.P. Richey’s medical source statement. See T. 1123-24. He noted the Appeals Council’s
comments regarding N.P. Richey citing the “functional capacity evaluation, subjective
complaints of increased pain with testing, and observations of pain behaviors on testing in
support of her conclusion.” T. 1123 (citing T. 1180-81). He further stated, “none of these
factors support the drastic conclusions Ms. Richey reached, particularly with respect to the
claimant’s supposed off task limitations and absenteeism.” T. 1123. Ultimately, the ALJ
determined “supporting factors Ms. Richey cited for her assessment do not support her
assessment.” T. 1124. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds the ALJ properly
considered the supportability and consistency factors when assessing N.P. Richey’s opinion.
a. 	Supportability
“To analyze supportability, the ALJ must conduct ‘an inquiry confined to the medical
source’s own records that focuses on how well a medical source supported and explained their
opinion.” Ayala v. Kijakazi, 620 F. Supp. 3d 6, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (quoting Vellone v. Saul, No.
1:20-cv-00261, 2021 WL 319354, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2021)). The regulations provide
“[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a
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medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) . . . the more persuasive the medical
opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1),
416.920c(c)(1). Here, the ALJ explained “one cannot draw a straight line from a subjective
report of pain or a grimace during testing to a conclusion that the individual would miss four
days of work per month.” T. 1123. Additionally, the ALJ noted “Ms. Richey cites no other
clinical or objective medical evidence to support her conclusions regarding the claimant’s time
off task, absenteeism, and standing/walking limitations apart from a functional capacity
evaluation, but the report from that same functional capacity evaluation does not say anything
regarding absenteeism from work and is, at best, internally conflicted regarding time off task and
standing/walking restrictions.” Id.; see also T. 297.
As noted above, N.P. Richey opined Plaintiff could sit for two hours at one time and at
least six hours in an eight-hour workday and stand for 20 minutes at one time but stand/walk for
less than two hours in an eight-hour workday. T. 655. In the functional capacity test to which
N.P. Richey deferred, Plaintiff reported the ability to sit for 10 minutes, stand for 10 minutes,
and walk for 10 minutes; but she demonstrated the ability to sit for 21 minutes, stand for 34
minutes, and intermittently stand, sit and walk for 150 minutes. T. 297. The ALJ determined in
Plaintiff’s RFC that she “can sit for 2 hours at a time and a total of 4 hours during an 8 hour
workday, can stand for 1 hour at a time and a total of 2 hours during an 8 hour workday, [and]
can walk for 1 hour at a time and a total of 2 hours during an 8 hour workday.” T. 1120. With
respect to Plaintiff’s sitting ability, the RFC is more restrictive than the sitting limitation opined
by N.P. Richey. Compare T. 1120 with T. 655.
Additionally, objective findings in the record, including N.P. Richey’s treatment notes,
show Plaintiff could stand/walk at least two hours a day. For example, Plaintiff had an intact
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gait, negative straight leg raising test bilaterally, full range of motion and full strength of the
upper and lower extremities, full range of motion of the cervical and lumbar spines, normal
neurological findings and regular heart rate and rhythm. T. 636-37, 647, 695, 701, 716, 742,
1423, 1653, 1753, 1757, 1893. Thus, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the ALJ adequately
articulated the supportability factor and the record supports the ALJ’s findings. See Tara M. B.
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:22-CV-1058 (MAD/DEP), 2023 WL 7286669, at *4 (N.D.N.Y.
Sept. 21, 2023) (ALJ’s review of supportability was sufficient where the ALJ stated that the
doctors opinion was only “somewhat supported by her examination report,” as the degree of
some limitations recommended were not supported by the doctor’s own objective findings),
report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Tara B. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2023 WL
7281138 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2023).
Plaintiff also appears to contest the ALJ’s failure to adopt N.P. Richey’s opinion
regarding off task and absenteeism. Dkt No. 13 at 34. However, Plaintiff has not pointed to
evidence supporting the opined limitations, beyond N.P. Richey’s check-the-box opinion. And,
as noted above, the treatment records do not support N.P. Richey’s opinion regarding Plaintiff’s
off task time or absenteeism. See T. 636-37, 647, 695, 701, 716, 742, 1423, 1653, 1753, 1757,
1893. Plaintiff’s attempt to shift the burden to the Commissioner is misguided. “[I]t is the
plaintiff’s burden to prove that [s]he should have a more restrictive RFC than the one assessed by
the ALJ.” Celia A.B. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:21-CV-0112 (CFH), 2022 WL 4225540, at
*12 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2022) (citations omitted).
b. 	Consistency
“With respect to consistency, [t]he more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical and nonmedical
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sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c), 416.920c(c)(2). “Consistency is an all-
encompassing inquiry focused on how well a medical source is supported, or not supported, by
the entire record.” Rua-Campusano v. Kijakazi, No. 20-CV-7087, 2021 WL 7287628, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 493390 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 17, 2022).
The record clearly demonstrates the ALJ considered the consistency of N.P. Richey’s
opinion with the record as a whole as he previously summarized the treatment providers’
records, explicitly mentioned N.P. Richey when evaluating other treatment providers, and
summarized activities of daily living in the decision. See T. 1121-27; see Julie M. v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., No. 8:23-CV-518 (MJK), 2024 WL 664413, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2024) (“The
ALJ’s detailed summary of plaintiff’s treatment history, provided in an earlier section of the
written decision, highlights the evidence upon which the ALJ rendered this consistency
assessment.”) (citation omitted); see also Kami B. v. Saul, No. 5:18-CV-1497 (DJS), 2020 WL
247279, at *6-7 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2020) (finding the ALJ adequately discussed supportability
and consistency because, although the plaintiff “is correct that the ALJ did not, in his discussion
of Dr. Allam’s opinion, explain in detail why he found those opinions not to be consistent with
or supported by the evidence in the record[,] . . . the ALJ explained the findings in the record
earlier in his decision”).
Here, for example, the ALJ noted “Ms. Meyer’s report suffers from similar deficiencies
to Ms. Richey’s.” T. 1124. “Many other medical sources of record in this case had a chance to
review the same functional capacity evaluation report as Ms. Richey and indeed to review a
much broader medical record than she did and none of them corroborated Ms. Richey’s or Ms.
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Meyer’s off task, absenteeism, or extreme exertional limitations.” Id. The ALJ noted that Dr.
Hussamy’s opinion, even interpreted most charitably to Plaintiff, still supported the RFC and
refuted N.P. Richey’s opinion. T. 1125. Similarly, “[Samuel Panella, M.D.]’s opinion varies
slightly from the physical residual functional capacity set forth above but is generally supportive
of that functional capacity and certainly inconsistent with the functional limitations described by
Ms. Richey.” T. 1125. Lastly, the ALJ noted “[Drs. Panella, Hussamy, Figueroa, Najafi, and
Mohanty’s] medical source opinions are more supportive of [medical expert Renee Giometti,
M.D.]’s report and opinion and the above physical residual functional capacity than they are of
Ms. Richey’s assessment.” T. 1126. Moreover, Plaintiff reported she performs her grooming
and self-care, cooks, cleans, reads recreationally, draws for a hobby, performs childcare for her
young daughter, goes grocery shopping, and manages money. T. 199, 203, 205-206, 636.
Thus, the Court finds the ALJ adequately explained the consistency factory as set forth
above. The regulations require that “it . . . be discernable that the ALJ properly applied the
regulations and considered [consistency] in weighing the medical opinions of record.” Laura Z.
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-CV-918, 2023 WL 2534421, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2023).
The record here shows the ALJ satisfied that obligation.
2. 	Kelly Meyer, RPA-C
On January 16, 2023, P.A. Meyer submitted a largely incomplete medical source
statement. T. 1397-1401. P.A. Meyer stated Plaintiff’s first appointment was July 1, 2021, but
she did not state the frequency or length of her relationship with Plaintiff. T. 1397. P.A. Meyer
stated diagnoses of “pain in left hip [], carpal tunnel syndrome left and right upper limb [], [and]
dorsalgia unspecified.” Id. She listed Plaintiff’s symptoms to include “struggles w[ith] fatigue,
dizziness, joint pain, standing more than 10 minutes, sitting more than 15 minutes . . . .” Id.
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P.A. Meyer noted Plaintiff takes gabapentin, but she denied any side effects or impairments from
the medication. Id. P.A. Meyer stated emotional factors of depression and anxiety contribute to
the severity of Plaintiff’s symptoms and functional limitations. T. 1340.
P.A. Meyer opined Plaintiff could sit for 15 minutes at one time and stand for 10 minutes
at one time. Id. She opined Plaintiff could sit, stand/walk for less than two hours total in an
eight-hour workday. T. 1398. She also opined Plaintiff needs a job that permits shifting
positions at will from sitting, standing, or walking. Id. Similarly, she opined Plaintiff would
sometimes need to take unscheduled breaks during a workday. Id. P.A. Meyer stated these
breaks would happen “frequently due to severe fatigue” and Plaintiff would monitor the varying
lengths of the breaks based on flare-ups. Id.
P.A. Meyer further opined while engaging in occasional standing/walking Plaintiff must
use a cane or other hand-held assistive device due to imbalance, pain, and dizziness. T. 1399.
Plaintiff could never lift and carry 50 pounds, twist, crouch/squat, and climb ladders, and rarely
had the ability to lift and carry 20 pounds and climb stairs. Id. Plaintiff could occasionally lift
and carry 10 pounds and stoop (bend). Id. P.A. Meyer opined Plaintiff would be absent from
work more than four days per month and that her impairments would likely produce good days
and bad days. T. 1400. Notably, P.A. Meyer left some questions about Plaintiff’s walking
abilities blank. T. 1398. For questions about Plaintiff’s pain and her clinical findings and
objective signs, P.A. answered “[p]lease see attached visit note,” but it is unclear as to exactly
what findings in the treatment note P.A. Meyer was referring. T. 1397. In the margin near
questions regarding any need for leg elevation, the P.A. responded “N/A” or not applicable. T.
1399. P.A. Meyer did not evaluate Plaintiff’s “off task” percentage, the degree to which Plaintiff
could tolerate work stress, and any other limitations that would affect Plaintiff’s ability to work
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at a regular job on a sustained basis. T. 1400-01. Rather than evaluating Plaintiff’s reaching,
handling or fingering, P.A. Meyer noted Plaintiff “state[d] her right-handed grip strength is 30%
and her left is 40%.” T. 1400.
Plaintiff merely states “[n]o reasonable person could conclude that the medical findings
and opinions of . . . PA Meyer . . . are not ‘equally well supported.’” Dkt. No. 13 at 35.
However, ALJ Patane detailed reasons why P.A. Meyer’s opinion was not supported. T. 1124.
He explained:
In terms of supportability, Ms. Meyer’s report suffers from similar
deficiencies to Ms. Richey’s. 	It appears from several of Ms.
Meyer’s statements . . . that the limitations she described are largely
based on the claimant’s self-reports rather than objective medical
findings. Ms. Meyer did reference ‘attached imaging and visit note’
as additional support for the drastic off task and absenteeism
limitations 	and 	other 	exertional 	and 	postural 	limitations 	she
assessed. However, the attached imaging study of the lumbar spine
. . . was unremarkable, and Ms. Meyer herself described the
claimant’s left hip MRI as ‘reassuring’ and showing only some
edema with signal change but no evidence of overt tear. 	Ms.
Meyer’s attached examination note documents an observation that
the claimant could only stand for 2 minutes before needing to sit
down, 	but 	that 	is 	wholly 	disproportionate 	to 	the 	claimant’s
demonstrated 	abilities 	during 	the 	above 	referenced 	functional
capacity 	evaluation 	and 	clinical 	presentation 	during 	other
examinations. 	The report documents no other clinical findings
supportive of Ms. Meyer’s assessed limitations. Instead, the[] report
confirms that the claimant is able to stoop (rise from a season
position), perform ‘full forward flexion, extension, rotation, and
lateral bending’ and demonstrate full ‘5/5 strength in the lower
extremity.’
T. 1124 (internal citations omitted).
“With respect to consistency, [t]he more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical and nonmedical
sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c), 416.920c(c)(2). It was appropriate for the ALJ
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to consider the lack of objective findings to support his determination to discount P.A. Meyer’s
opinion. See Michael M. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:23-CV-752 (DNH/DJS), 2024 WL
4110740, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2024) (ALJ entitled to rely on the lack of evidence
suggesting Plaintiff has an impairment), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL
4107688 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2024).
As noted above, despite her impairments, Plaintiff reported an ability to perform many
daily activities. She could groom herself and attend to self-care; and she stated she cooks,
cleans, reads recreationally, draws for a hobby, performs childcare for her young daughter, goes
grocery shopping, and manages money. T. 199, 203, 205-06, 636. These activities were
properly considered and evaluated by the ALJ. Daniel F. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:22-CV-
00292 EAW, 2023 WL 6304722, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2023) (“In addition, it is well-settled
that an ALJ may consider the consistency of a claimant’s activities of daily living with other
evidence of the record when evaluating credibility and determining the RFC”). Taking all the
relevant factors into account, the ALJ correctly determined, based on substantial evidence, that
P.A. Meyer’s opinion was unpersuasive.
3. 	Leslie Russek, P.T., D.P.T., Ph.D. O.C.S
Plaintiff asserts “[t]he ALJ was obliged to discuss the findings and opinions of Dr.
Russek using the criteria of Section 404.1520c.” Dkt. No. 13 at 35. The Court disagrees.
Defendant correctly contends “a physical therapist is not a listed ‘acceptable medical source.’”
Dkt. No. 14 at 21 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a)). Further, Dr. Russek’s diagnosis was within a
treatment note, not a source statement, and it was therefore not a medical opinion warranting
evaluation for persuasiveness. T. 1038-43. “A medical opinion is a statement from a medical
source about what you can still do despite your impairment(s) and whether you have one or more
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impairment-related limitations or restriction in [certain] abilities . . . .” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1513(a)(2).
To the extent Plaintiff’s argument for the inclusion of Dr. Russek’s hypermobility
diagnosis correlates to Plaintiff’s statement that “the ALJ erred by not considering her symptoms
from [hypermobility syndrome] in his RFC and his credibility determination,” Dkt. No. 13 at 2,
the Court again disagrees. The ALJ identified Plaintiff’s unspecified joint impairments with
pelvic misalignment and chronic shoulder dislocations as severe and considered them throughout
the remainder of the assessment. T.1118. Thus, any limitations arising from Plaintiff’s
hypermobility syndrome were clearly subsumed within another documented and identified
severe impairment. See Brianna J., 2025 WL 2771683, at *5.iann
In sum, Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to appropriately consider the regulatory
factors when evaluating the medical opinions is without merit. Here, the ALJ correctly found the
opinions of P.A. Meyer and N.P. Richey lacked support and were inconsistent with other
substantial evidence. Based on the above, the Court finds the ALJ adequately explained his
reasons for discounting their opinions and substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s
determination. Additionally, the ALJ formulated an RFC more restrictive than many of the
limitations assessed by characterizing her range of work as sedentary rather than medium. T.
1120, 1127. Thus, the Court finds no error in the ALJ’s application of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c to
the medical opinions, and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s analysis and findings.
Remand is not warranted on this basis.
4. 	Omar Hussamy, M.D.
Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to comply with the Appeals Council Remand Order
because ALJ Patane did not “make any attempt to recontact Dr. Hussamy for a clarification of
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his opinion.” Dkt. No. 13 at 24. The Court disagrees.
The Appeals Council stated, “If possible, recontact Dr. Hussamy for clarification of the
opinion in Exhibit 24F.” T. 1182 (emphasis added). There was no mandate from the Appeals
Council that the ALJ must recontact Dr. Hussamy on remand. In the decision at issue, the ALJ
clarified his discussion of Dr. Hussamy’s opinion noting “[l]ogical necessity and the principles
of mathematics dictate that an activity cannot be performed continuously for longer than it can
be performed in total, and it is not necessary to seek clarification from Dr. Hussamy as to his
opinion on logical necessity or the principles of mathematics.” T. 1125. Dr. Hussamy opined
Plaintiff could sit for eight hours at one time for a total of four hours in an eight-hour workday
and stand/walk for four hours at one time for a total of two hours each in an eight-hour workday.
T. 1106. The ALJ highlighted, even accepting the most charitable interpretation of Dr.
Hussamy’s opinion that Plaintiff could only “sit for 4 total hours during an 8-hour workday,
stand for 2 total hours, and walk for 2 total hours, Dr. Hussamy’s opinion would still be
supportive of the above residual functional capacity . . . .” T. 1125. Thus, the ALJ properly
complied with the remand order.
C. 	Evaluation of Symptoms
Plaintiff argues “the ALJ did not credit [Plaintiff’s] testimony regarding her limitations as
being persuasive.” Dkt. No. 13 at 39.
Under SSR 16-3p, the ALJ is obligated to “carefully consider all the evidence presented
by claimants regarding their symptoms, which fall into seven relevant factors including daily
activities and the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of their pain or other symptoms.”
Debra T. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 8:16-CV-0157(TWD), 2019 WL 1208788, at *9 (N.D.N.Y.
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Mar. 14, 2019) (quoting Del Carmen Fernandez v. Berryhill, No. 18-CV-326(JPO), 2019 WL
667743, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2019) (internal quotations and alterations omitted)).
“An [ALJ] may properly reject [subjective complaints] after weighing the objective
medical evidence in the record, the claimant’s demeanor, and other indicia of credibility, but
must set forth his or her reasons ‘with sufficient specificity to enable us to decide whether the
determination is supported by substantial evidence.’” Dominique v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
7:12-CV-1731 (DNH/ATB), 2014 WL 1202622, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2014) (quoting Lewis
v. Apfel, 62 F. Supp. 2d 648, 651 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting Gallardo v. Apfel, No. 96 CIV 9435,
1999 WL 185253, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 1999))). To satisfy the substantial evidence rule, the
ALJ’s evaluation of symptoms must be based on a two-step analysis of pertinent evidence in the
record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; see also Foster v. Callahan, No. 96-CV-1858, 1998 WL
106231, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. March 3, 1998).
First, the ALJ must determine, based upon the claimant’s objective medical evidence,
whether the medical impairments “could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other
symptoms alleged . . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). Second, if the medical evidence alone
establishes the existence of such impairments, then the ALJ need only evaluate the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of a claimant’s symptoms to determine the extent to which it
limits the claimant’s capacity to work. Id. § 404.1529(c)(3).
The ALJ described the evaluation of symptoms standard and then concluded Plaintiff’s
impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the symptoms alleged. T. 1121. He
continued his review by evaluating the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these
symptoms. T. 1121-27. After considering Plaintiff’s statements as to the intensity, frequency,
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and limiting nature of her impairments, the ALJ found them partially, though not entirely
consistent with the medical evidence. T. 1127.
The ALJ specifically acknowledged Plaintiff’s reports of migraine headaches persisting
despite taking prescription anti-migraine medication. T. 1122. Plaintiff acknowledges “she is
able to abort these headaches” and by May 2024 her headaches were “very random,” and she
could “go for 3 months without a headache and had not had a problem with headaches during the
previous month.” Id.; see also T. 1697, 1848, 2217. Plaintiff also reported her headaches were
sometimes relieved by over-the-counter Tylenol and ibuprofen. Id.; see also T. 1848. The ALJ
noted, Plaintiff “acknowledged that her neck pain had gotten better as a result of physical
therapy, to the extent that she described it as a ‘2’ on the 10 point subjective scale.” Id. (citing T.
2240). Further, the ALJ pointed out Plaintiff’s “physical therapist noted that the claimant ‘does
well with therapeutic exercise targeting gentle mobility’ and will benefit from physical therapy
interventions.” Id.; see also T. 2247. The ALJ further found Plaintiff’s “allegations are
inconsistent with her acknowledged and high functioning activities of daily living,
disproportionate to the foregoing clinical, objective, and treatment evidence of record, and
directly contradicted by the majority and more persuasive medical opinion evidence of record.”
T. 1127.
The record showed Plaintiff had an intact gait, negative straight leg raising test
bilaterally, full range of motion and full strength of the upper and lower extremities, full range of
motion of the cervical and lumbar spines, normal heart and respiratory examinations, and normal
neurological findings. T. 636-37, 647, 695, 742, 1423, 1653, 1753, 1757, 1893. Additional
findings showed Plaintiff had normal mood and affect, good insight and judgment, full
orientation, and normal memory. T. 333-34, 536, 543, 571, 695, 703, 716, 720, 788, 1638, 1646,
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1708, 1711, 1716, 1734. The ALJ pointed out “treating sources advised the claimant could
continue to work as a certified nurse aid in a ‘light duty’ capacity, which is arguably suggestive
of an even greater physical capacity than set forth” in the RFC. T. 1121. The ALJ explained in
detail Plaintiff’s daily activities; precipitating and aggravating factors of alleged symptoms,
including pain; any and all medications prescribed and/or taken; treatment other than medication
for relief of pain and other symptoms; prior and current work history; observations of treating
and consulting physicians of record; counseling records; and other factors bearing on Plaintiff’s
functional limitations or restrictions due to pain and other symptoms. T. 1120-27.
Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ correctly applied the proper legal standards in
assessing Plaintiff’s symptoms and adequately specified the reasons for discrediting Plaintiff’s
statements. Therefore, the ALJ’s evaluation of symptoms is supported by substantial evidence.
VII. 	CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE for the reasons stated herein, it is hereby
RECOMMENDED that the Plaintiff’s motion (Dkt. No. 13) be DENIED; and it is
further
RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s motion (Dkt. No. 14) be GRANTED; and it is
further
RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner’s decision denying Plaintiff benefits be
AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file
written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the
Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL
PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing
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Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.
Dated: January 26, 2026
Syracuse, New York
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