Matthews v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
___________________________________________
MICHAEL M.,
Plaintiff,
v. 	6:25-CV-00857
(FJS/ML)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
_____________________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
THE LAW OFFICES OF 	STEVEN R. DOLSON, ESQ.
STEVEN R. DOLSON PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
6320 Fly Road, Suite 201
East Syracuse, New York 13057
U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN. 	FERGUS KAISER, ESQ.
Counsel for Defendant
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, Maryland 21235
MIROSLAV LOVRIC, United States Magistrate Judge
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Michael M. (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Defendant”
or “Commissioner”) denying his application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). (Dkt. No.
1.) This matter was referred to me for Report and Recommendation by the Honorable Frederick
J. Scullin, Jr., Senior United States District Court Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and
Local Rule 72.3(d). (Dkt. No. 7.) This case has proceeded in accordance with General Order 18.
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Currently before this Court are Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and
Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Dkt. Nos. 9, 13.) For the reasons set forth
below, this Court recommends that the District Court deny Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings and affirm the Commissioner’s decision.
I. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 16, 2023, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB, alleging disability dating from
October 19, 2021. (Administrative Transcript (“T.”) 200-201.) His application was denied
initially on July 6, 2023, and upon reconsideration on October 19, 2023. (T. 93-96, 98-101.)
Plaintiff’s subsequent request for a hearing was granted. (T. 118-19.) On May 15, 2024, Plaintiff
testified by telephone before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Mary Jane Pelton, who also
heard the testimony of vocational expert (“VE”) Robert Baker. (T. 31-47.) The ALJ issued an
unfavorable decision on May 31, 2024. (T. 15-24.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s
request for review on May 14, 2025. (T. 1-6.)
Plaintiff commenced this proceeding on June 30, 2025, to challenge the denial of
disability benefits. (Dkt. No. 1.)
II. 	GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAW
A. 	Scope of Review
In reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, a court must determine whether the
correct legal standards were applied and whether substantial evidence supports the decision.
Featherly v. Astrue, 793 F. Supp. 2d 627, 630 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (citations omitted); Rosado v.
Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985
(2d Cir. 1987)). A reviewing court may not affirm the ALJ’s decision if it reasonably doubts
whether the proper legal standards were applied, even if the decision appears to be supported by
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substantial evidence. Johnson, 817 F.2d at 986.
A court’s factual review of the Commissioner’s final decision is limited to the
determination of whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the decision. 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) (2015); Rivera v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir. 1991). To facilitate the
court’s review, an ALJ must set forth the crucial factors justifying his or her findings with
sufficient specificity to allow a court to determine whether substantial evidence supports the
decision. Roat v. Barnhart, 717 F. Supp. 2d 241, 248 (N.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Ferraris v.
Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 587 (2d Cir. 1984). “Substantial evidence has been defined as ‘such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”
Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). It must
be “more than a mere scintilla” of evidence scattered throughout the administrative record.
Featherly, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 630; Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting
Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
“To determine on appeal whether an ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining the evidence from both sides,
because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts
from its weight.” Williams, 859 F.2d at 258 (citations omitted). Where substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s findings they must be sustained “even where substantial evidence may
support the plaintiff’s positions and despite that the court’s independent analysis of the evidence
may differ from the [ALJ’s].” Rosado, 805 F. Supp. at 153. In other words, a reviewing court
cannot substitute its interpretation of the administrative record for that of the Commissioner if
the record contains substantial support for the ALJ’s decision. Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685
F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).
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B. 	Standard for Benefits1
To be considered disabled, a plaintiff-claimant seeking benefits must establish that he or
she is “unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42
U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). In addition, the plaintiff-claimant’s
physical or mental impairment or impairments [must be] of such
severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience,
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists
in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in
the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job
vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied
for work.
Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
Acting pursuant to its statutory rulemaking authority (42 U.S.C. § 405(a)), the Social
Security Administration (“SSA”) promulgated regulations establishing a five-step sequential
evaluation process to determine disability. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4) (2015). Under that five-
step sequential evaluation process, the decision-maker determines:
(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful
activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or
combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or
equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of
Impairments; (4) based on a “residual functional capacity”
assessment, whether the claimant can perform any of his or her
past relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) whether there
are significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the
claimant can perform given the claimant’s residual functional
capacity, age, education, and work experience.
1 The requirements for establishing disability under Title XVI, 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3) and Title
II, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d), are identical, so that “decisions under these sections are cited
interchangeably.” Donato v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 721 F.2d 414, 418 n.3 (2d Cir.
1983) (citation omitted).
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McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2014). “If at any step a finding of disability or
non-disability can be made, the SSA will not review the claim further.” Barnhart v. Thomas,
540 U.S. 20, 24 (2003).
III. 	FACTS
As of the date of the ALJ’s decision, Plaintiff was 54 years old. (T. 22, 195.) At the time
of his hearing, Plaintiff resided alone. (T. 34.) He has two adult children. (Id.) Plaintiff left high
school after the ninth grade but eventually obtained his G.E.D. (T. 35, 235.) His prior
employment includes work as a driver at an auto parts store, a laborer, and a building and
equipment maintenance worker at a manufacturing facility. (T. 22, 235.) This maintenance
position, which Plaintiff held for a nine-year period between 2008 and 2017, covered a range of
responsibilities including electrical, plumbing, carpentry, and masonry work, and often required
lifting over one hundred fifty pounds. (T. 36.) In 2012, Plaintiff suffered a workplace injury to
his cervical spine and began receiving workers’ compensation in October 2021 pursuant to a
settlement agreement. (T. 37, 287, 516.)
The record includes Plaintiff’s medical history. Rather than summarizing the records at
the outset, I will refer to the pertinent records during my discussion of Plaintiff’s arguments.
IV. 	THE ALJ’S DECISION
As an initial matter, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements
through December 31, 2022. (T. 17.) Based upon his review of the administrative record, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period from his
alleged onset date of October 19, 2021, through his date last insured of December 31, 2022. (Id.)
At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: “obesity, status
post cervical fusion with radiculopathy, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine with
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radiculopathy, lumbar stenosis, and headaches.” (T. 18.) At step three of the evaluation, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff’s impairments either singly or in combination did not meet or medically
equal the severity of a listed impairment including Listing 1.15 (Disorders of the skeletal spine
resulting in compromise of a nerve roots), Listing 1.16 (Lumbar spinal stenosis resulting in
compromise of the cauda equina), Listing 1.18 (Abnormality of a major joint in any extremity),
and Listing 11.02 (Epilepsy). (T. 18-19.)
Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform less than a full range of light work. (T.
19.) Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff:
should 	never 	climb 	ladders, 	ropes, 	or 	scaffolds, 	but 	could
occasionally climb ramps or stairs. The claimant could occasionally
balance as defined in the Selected Characteristics of Occupations.
The claimant could occasionally kneel, crouch, and crawl. 	The
claimant could occasionally reach overhead, and could reach in
other directions frequently bilaterally. The claimant should work in
a moderate noise environment, as defined by the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles. 	The claimant should avoid work outdoors in
bright sunshine and work with bright or flickering lights such as one
would experience welding or cutting metal. 	The claimant should
avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, extreme heat, and
humidity. The claimant could frequently flex, extend, and rotate his
cervical spine.
(Id.).
In making the RFC determination, the ALJ stated that he considered all of Plaintiff’s
symptoms and the extent to which those symptoms could “reasonably be accepted as consistent
with the objective medical evidence and other evidence, based on the requirement of 20 CFR
404.1529” and Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p. (Id.) The ALJ further stated that he
considered opinion evidence and prior administrative medical findings in accordance with 20
C.F.R. 404.1520c. (Id.) The ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints regarding the
intensity, persistence and limiting effects of his symptoms and found them “not entirely
consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record. . . .” (T. 20.) The ALJ
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next found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work. (T. 22.) Relying on the
VE testimony, the ALJ next found that there are jobs existing in significant numbers in the
national economy that Plaintiff can perform. (T. 23.) Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
was not disabled at any time from his alleged onset date of October 19, 2021 through his date
last insured of December 31, 2022. (T. 24.)
V. 	ISSUES IN CONTENTION
Plaintiff argues the ALJ committed “reversible error by failing to conduct a proper
analysis when evaluating the persistence, intensity, and limiting effects of Plaintiff’s alleged
symptoms.” (Dkt. No. 9 at 1.) The Commissioner contends that the ALJ properly considered
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. (Dkt. No. 13 at 7-10.)
For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that the District Court deny
Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, grant Defendant’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings, and affirm the Commissioner’s decision.
VI. 	THE ALJ’S EVALUATION OF PLAINTIFF’S SYMPTOMS DOES NOT
PRESENT GROUNDS FOR REMAND.
A. Legal Standard
Assessment of a claimant’s subjective complaints about his or her symptoms or the effect
of those symptoms on the claimant’s ability to work involves a two-step process. Where a
claimant complains that certain symptoms, including pain, limit his or her capacity to work, the
ALJ is required, first to determine whether the claimant suffers from a “medically determinable
impairment[] that could reasonably be expected to produce” the symptoms alleged. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1529(c)(1), 416.929(c)(1). Assuming the ALJ finds such an impairment, then the ALJ must
take the second step of “evaluat[ing] the intensity and persistence of [the claimant’s] symptoms,
including pain,” considering “all of the available evidence,” to determine “how [the] symptoms
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limit [the claimant’s] capacity to work.” Id. §§ 404.1529(c)(1), 416.929(c)(1). In doing so, the
ALJ must consider all of the available evidence, and must not “reject [ ] statements about the
intensity and persistence of [ ] pain or other symptoms . . . solely because the available objective
medical evidence does not substantiate [the claimant’s] statements.” Id. §§ 404.1529(c)(2),
416.929(c)(2). Instead, where the claimant’s contentions regarding his or her symptoms are not
substantiated by the objective medical evidence, the ALJ must evaluate those statements in
relation to the other evidence, in order to determine the extent to which the claimant’s symptoms
affect his or her ability to do basic work activities. Id. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)-(4), 416.929(c)(3)-(4).
While an ALJ “is required to take [a] claimant’s report of pain and other limitation into
account” in evaluating his or her statements, he is “not required to accept the claimant’s
subjective complaints without question.” Genier v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010). To the
extent the ALJ determines that the claimant’s statements are not supported by the medical
record, however, the ALJ’s decision must include “specific reasons for the weight given to the
individual’s symptoms, to be consistent with and supported by the evidence,” and the reasons
must be “clearly articulated” for a subsequent reviewer to assess how the adjudicator evaluated
the individual’s symptoms. SSR 16-3p, Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability
Claims, 2017 WL 5180304, at *8 (October 25, 2017).
The factors that an ALJ should consider in evaluating the claimant’s subjective
complaints, where they are not supported by objective medical evidence alone, are: (1) the
claimant’s daily activities; (2) the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the symptoms;
(3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of
any medications taken to alleviate the symptoms; (5) any treatment, other than medication, that
the claimant has received for relief of the symptoms; (6) any other measures that the claimant
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employs to relieve the symptoms; and (7) other factors concerning the claimant’s functional
limitations and restrictions as a result of the symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i)-(vii),
416.929(c)(3)(i)-(viii).
The ALJ must provide specific reasons for his assessment of Plaintiff’s testimony, but .
the failure to specifically reference a particular relevant factor does not undermine the ALJ’s
assessment if there is substantial evidence supporting the determination. See Cichocki v. Astrue,
534 F. App’x 71, 76 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d Cir.
1983)) (ALJ not required to discuss every factor at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i)-(vii), so long as
the ALJ includes specific reasons, which are supported by evidence in the case record, that
permit the reviewing court to glean the ALJ’s rationale); Dezarea L.W. v. Bisignano, No. 6:24-
CV-825 (GTS/MJK), 2025 WL 2735687, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. July 29, 2025), rep’t and rec. adopted,
2025 WL 2714862 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2025). “Remand is not required where the evidence of
record allows the court to glean the rationale of an ALJ's decision.” Cichocki, 534 F. App'x at 76
(cleaned up).
B. The ALJ’s Evaluation of Plaintiff’s Subjective Complaints Satisfied the
Regulatory Requirements.
At his hearing, Plaintiff testified that his workplace injury damaged his neck and lower
back. (T. 37.) He stated he is unable to stand, sit or lay down very long; has limited range of
motion in his neck or back; is unable to lift his arm over his head without pain; and has a
constant headache. (T. 37-38.) Plaintiff estimated that he could only stand or walk for about 20
to 30 minutes before needing to sit or lay down and could lift no more than six pounds due to
pain. (T. 38-39.)
Plaintiff faults the ALJ for not considering every factor listed in 20 C.F.R. §
404.1529(c)(3)(i)-(vii). (See Dkt. No. 9 at 7-9.) However, the ALJ satisfied his obligations to
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explain his reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s description of his symptoms, and this Court finds
no error that would prompt a recommendation of remand. (T. at 19-22, referencing 20 C.F.R. §
404.1529 and SSR 16-3p.) Although the ALJ may not have discussed each factor in detail, he
adequately supported his assessment of Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms. See Martin v. Astrue,
337 F. App’x 87, 90 (2d Cir. 2009) (no error where the ALJ considered only three of seven
regulatory factors); see also Judelsohn v. Astrue, No. 11-CV-2431, 2012 WL 2401587, at *6
(W.D.N.Y. June 25, 2012) (“Failure to expressly consider every factor set forth in the regulations
is not grounds for remand where the reasons for the ALJ’s determination of credibility are
sufficiently clear and specific to conclude that he considered the entire evidentiary record.”);
Oliphant v. Astrue, No. 11-CV-2431, 2012 WL 3541820, at *22 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2012) (ALJ
need not explicitly address each of the seven factors in assessing plaintiff’s allegations; instead,
the ALJ’s reasoning must be precise and supported by the record).
Plaintiff finds fault with the ALJ’s analysis of each of the seven factors as either
oversimplified, misleading, or incomplete. (Dkt. No. 9 at 7-9.) However, this characterization is
contradicted by the ALJ’s decision and this Court’s review of the record. For example, with
regard to daily activities, this Court notes that the record is missing a function report, so the ALJ
relied on Plaintiff’s testimony and the remaining record. (Dkt. No. 8.) The ALJ noted “the
claimant testified that he cannot lift a gallon of milk, but he lives alone and testified he is able to
do most household chores. Additionally, he testified that he could shop in a store without
assistance.” (T. at 20.) This summary accurately depicts Plaintiff’s testimony, as set out below:
Q 	So every household has certain things that need to be done typically, you
know, basic cooking, cleaning, grocery shopping. How do those things get
done in your household, sir?
A 	I do most of it.
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Q 	Are you able to physically do it or do you get any kind of help with it?
A 	My son comes and helps me sometimes.
Q 	How do you get to the grocery store, sir?
A 	My mother.
Q 	Do you need any assistance with your shopping?
A 	No, I just use a cart.
(T. at 40.) The ALJ also cited treatment notes describing Plaintiff as able to resume recreational
fishing in 2022 after recovering from left knee pain. (T. at 21, 99, 330.) The ALJ deemed this
physical activity consistent with the ability to perform light work. (T. at 21.) This Court notes
that the record includes multiple references to Plaintiff’s ability to fish despite his physical
impairments, and encouragement from Plaintiff’s physicians to engage in home exercise. (T. at
99, 316, 330, 506.)
Similarly, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not address the “location, duration,
frequency, and intensity” of Plaintiff’s pain and other symptoms, and failed to address factors
that precipitate and aggravate his symptoms. (Dkt. No. 9 at 8.) These assertions are contradicted
by the ALJ’s analysis and the overall record. For example, the ALJ expressly considered
Plaintiff’s testimony that “he cannot bend, lift, reach, or walk for prolonged periods of time,” and
“he has reduced range of motion in his head and neck” (T. at 20, 37-39.) The ALJ also noted
Plaintiff’s history of headaches. (T. at 21.)
The ALJ’s decision included an analysis of the relevant medical records for each of these
impairments. For example, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff exhibited “slight weakness and reduced
sensation in his upper extremities during exams” following his cervical fusion surgery. (T. at 20
(citing T. at 303, 310, 315, 629.)) Additionally, the ALJ found “occasions wherein [Plaintiff]
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had full active range of motion of the bilateral shoulders, elbows, and wrists without pain or
restrictions bilaterally.” (Id. (citing T. at 315; see also T. at 505.)) He also cited treatment notes
reflecting upper extremity motor strength ranging between a “4-4.5 out of 5.” (T. at 20, 292, 303,
315, 420, 475, 505.) With regard to standing and walking, the ALJ referenced examination notes
described Plaintiff as generally having “a normal gait,” with the ability to heel and toe walk
without difficulty, full motor strength in his lower extremities, full sensation and reflexes, and
full active and passive range of motion without pain or restriction. (T. at 20 (citing T. at 289,
293, 303, 315, 390, 420, 476, 629.))
This review formed the basis of the ALJ’s conclusions that Plaintiff could meet the
exertional requirements of light work and “it is reasonable to limit the claimant’s residual
functional capacity to reaching overhead occasionally, and frequently reaching in other
directions, as well as frequent fingering and feeling bilaterally.” (T. at 20.) The ALJ “further
limited the claimant’s residual functional capacity such that he can frequently flex, extend, and
rotate his cervical spine.” (Id.)
Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate factors related to
Plaintiff’s use of medication and other treatment methods to address his symptoms. (Dkt. No. 9
at 8-9.) Plaintiff’s brief recognizes that the ALJ accurately described Plaintiff’s testimony that
he did not take pain medication, and correctly summarized Plaintiff’s “conservative” treatment
regimen that did not include “pain management, physical therapy, or chiropractic care.” (T. 20-
21.) However, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s analysis was faulty because he failed to consider
Plaintiff’s testimony that he had intentionally avoided pain medication due to concerns about
addiction, and had received limited treatment over the past two years because he was unable to
drive to appointments. (T. 39-40.)
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“‘Where, as here, a claimant has sought little-to-no treatment for an allegedly disabling
condition, [his] inaction may appropriately be construed as evidence that the condition does not
pose serious limitations.’” Diaz-Sanchez v. Berryhill, 295 F. Supp 3d 302, 306 (W.D.N.Y.
2018). Still, “an ALJ must ... consider whether ‘good reasons' exist for failing to follow the
prescribed treatment, e.g. religious objections, lack of ability to pay, significant risks associated
with treatment.” Stockwell v. Astrue, No. 12-CV-00826 (MAD), 2013 WL 4508438, at *7
(N.D.N.Y. Aug.23, 2013) (citing SSR 82–59; Grubb v. Apfel, No. 98 CIV. 9032 (RPP), 2003
WL 23009266, at *4-8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.22, 2003)). Predominant among these reasons are mental
health symptoms that impact the ability to obtain care, a concern not present in this case.
Cornell v. Astrue, No. 7:11-CV-1064 (GTS), 2013 WL 286279, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2013)
(“Courts have observed that faulting a person with a diagnosed mental illness for failing to
pursue mental health treatment is a questionable practice.”)
Although the ALJ inquired about Plaintiff’s reasons for avoiding treatment during the
hearing (T. 38-40), his decision did not address Plaintiff’s expressed concerns about addiction to
pain medication and inability to drive to appointments. While the lack of discussion may be an
error, it should be considered a harmless one. To begin with, the record does not demonstrate
that the limited use of prescription pain medication and Plaintiff’s failure to pursue additional
cervical injections had a significant impact on either his functioning or the conservative
treatment approach adopted by his physicians. (T. 316, 421, 442, 476.) Second, it is well-
established that where an ALJ’s decision regarding a Plaintiff's subjective testimony is “based on
a review of the entire record, including the objective medical evidence, any error caused by such
consideration of the failure to pursue treatment is harmless.” Cornell v. Astrue, No. 7:11-CV-
1064 (GTS), 2013 WL 286279, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2013). Here, the ALJ’s decision
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demonstrates reliance on a “number of other factors in assessing Plaintiff’s subjective complaints
and functional limitations.” See Aaron W. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:24-CV-01440
(FJS/ML), 2026 WL 417539, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2026), rep’t and rec. adopted, 2026 WL
416054 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2026); see also Smith v. Berryhill, No. 17-CV-6465L, 2018 WL
5266794, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2018) (finding harmless error where ALJ failed to consider
Plaintiff’s reasons for noncompliance with recommended treatment because the ALJ did not
“rely heavily” on this issue in assessing Plaintiff's testimony).
Thus, the ALJ’s decision and the hearing transcript demonstrate an appropriate evaluation
of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, by comparing them to Plaintiff’s daily activities, his medical
treatments and follow-up care, minimal use of pain medication, and the medical opinion
evidence. See Judelsohn, 2012 WL 2401587, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. June 25, 2012) (“Failure to
expressly consider every factor set forth in the regulations is not grounds for remand where the
reasons for the ALJ’s determination of credibility are sufficiently clear and specific to conclude
that he considered the entire evidentiary record.”) The ALJ discounted, but did not completely
disregard, Plaintiff’s statements regarding ongoing pain, before issuing his physical RFC
determination. See Conetta v. Berryhill, 365 F. Supp. 3d 383, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (recognizing
that ALJ “has the discretion to . . . arrive at an independent judgment . . . in light of medical
findings and other evidence, regarding the true extent of the pain alleged by the claimant.”)
While Plaintiff identifies evidence that could be interpreted to favor greater functional
limitations, his challenge to the ALJ’s assessment of his pain and other symptoms is essentially
“premised upon a disagreement over how the ALJ resolved arguably conflicting evidence.” See
Kimball v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:14-CV-0698 (LEK/ATB), 2015 WL 4251163, at *9
(N.D.N.Y. July 13, 2015). This court will not reweigh the evidence presented to the ALJ. See
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Warren v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:15-CV-1185 (GTS/WBC), 2016 WL 7223338, at *9
(N.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2016) (“When applying the substantial evidence test to a finding that a
plaintiff was not disabled, the Court ‘will not reweigh the evidence presented at the
administrative hearing, . . . nor will it determine whether [the applicant] actually was disabled.
[Rather], [a]bsent an error of law by the Secretary, [a] court must affirm her decision if there is
substantial evidence [in the record] to support it.’”) (quoting Lefford v. McCall, 916 F. Supp.
150, 155 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (alteration in original)), rep’t-rec. adopted, 2016 WL 7238947
(N.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2016); Vincent v. Shalala, 830 F. Supp. 126, 133 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (“[I]t is
not the function of the reviewing court to reweigh the evidence.”) (citing Carroll v. Sec’y of
Health and Human Servs., 705 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1983)).
ACCORDINGLY, it is
RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner’s decision be AFFIRMED, Defendant’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 13) be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 9) be DENIED.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have 14 days within which to file written
objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court.
FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN 14 DAYS WILL PRECLUDE
APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v.
Secretary of Health and Human Services, 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.
Dated:
Binghamton, New York
June 10, 2026
Binghamton, New York
Case 6:25-cv-00857-FJS-ML Document 14 Filed 06/10/26 Page 15 of 15