Allen v. Colvin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
______________________________________________
LEON A.,
Plaintiff,
v. 	6:24-CV-539
(FJS/TWD)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
______________________________________________
APPEARANCES 	OF COUNSEL
LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF 	CINDY DOMINGUE-HENDRICKSON, ESQ.
MID-NEW YORK INC. 	PETER ZISSER, ESQ.
120 Bleecker Street
Utica, New York 13501
Attorneys for Plaintiff
SOCIAL SECURITY 	VERNON NORWOOD, ESQ.
ADMINISTRATION
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, Maryland 21235
Attorneys for Defendant
SCULLIN, Senior Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Pending before the Court are Magistrate Judge Dancks' Report-Recommendation, see
Dkt. No. 22, and Plaintiff's objections thereto, see Dkt. No. 23.
Case 6:24-cv-00539-FJS-TWD Document 24 Filed 02/13/26 Page 1 of 8

- 2 -
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a
final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Defendant") denying his application for
benefits. See Dkt. No. 22 at 1.
After a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge concluded, at step five, that "based on
[Plaintiff's] age, education, work experience, and RFC, there were jobs existing in significant
numbers in the national economy the Plaintiff could perform" and that, therefore, Plaintiff was
not disabled. See Administrative Record at 28-29.1 Thereafter, Plaintiff timely filed this action,
seeking judicial review of Defendant's final decision. See Dkt. No. 1.
Both parties filed briefs, which Magistrate Judge Dancks treated as motions under Rule
12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in accordance with General Order 19. See Dkt.
No. 15, Plaintiff's Brief; Dkt. No. 18, Defendant's Brief. After reviewing the Administrative
Record, the ALJ's decision, and the parties' briefs, Magistrate Judge Dancks found that
"substantial evidence support[ed] the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff's mental impairments did not
so significantly limit the occupational base of unskilled work such that vocational expert
testimony was required"; and, therefore, "the ALJ's use of the medical vocational guidelines to
reach a finding of not disabled at step five was not erroneous." See Dkt. No. 22, Magistrate
Judge Dancks' Report-Recommendation, at 12. Therefore, Magistrate Judge Dancks
1 References to page numbers in the Administrative Record ("AR"), see Dkt. No. 11, are to the
Bates-stamped page numbers located at the bottom of those pages. References to page numbers
in other documents filed on the Docket of this case are to the page-numbers that the Court's
Electronic Case Filing System generates and are located in the top-right corner of those pages.
Case 6:24-cv-00539-FJS-TWD Document 24 Filed 02/13/26 Page 2 of 8

- 3 -
recommended that the Court deny Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings and grant
Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. See id. at 13.
Plaintiff has timely filed objections to Magistrate Judge Dancks' recommendations. See
Dkt. No. 23. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that "the ALJ's Decision is internally inconsistent."
See id. at 2. To support his argument, he contends that, "'[a]t Step 2, the ALJ found that "the
impairments listed in Step 2 (i.e., mild difficulties in understanding, remembering, or applying
information, moderate difficulties in interacting with others, moderate difficulties in
concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, and moderate difficulties in adapting or managing
oneself), have more than minimally affected the claimant's ability to perform basic work
activities during the relevant period."'" See id. (quoting Tr. 22). "At the same time, the ALJ
determined that the Plaintiff 'can meet the demands of all remunerative unskilled work.'" See id.
(quoting Tr. 29). Plaintiff argues that "[t]hese two statements are mutually exclusive: Either the
impairments at Step 2 negatively affect the Plaintiff's ability to perform basic work activities or
they don't." See id. Furthermore, Plaintiff asserts that "the 'severe' impairments set forth in Step
2 are substantively identical to those listed in the RFC, thus it is the rote application of a Program
Operations Manual definition of 'unskilled work' rather than a VE's knowledge and experience
that establishes the inconsistency." See id.
Plaintiff further argues that "the ALJ found that the Plaintiff had 'mild difficulties in
understanding, remembering, or applying information; moderate difficulties in interacting with
others; moderate difficulties in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and moderate
difficulties in adapting or managing oneself.'" See id. (quoting Tr. 24 (emphasis in original)).
Furthermore, he notes that "[t]he ALJ found that these Step 2 limitations are substantively
identical to the definition of 'unskilled' work, i.e., 'the abilities (on a sustained basis) to
Case 6:24-cv-00539-FJS-TWD Document 24 Filed 02/13/26 Page 3 of 8

- 4 -
understand, carry out, and remember simple instructions; to respond appropriately to supervision,
coworkers, and usual work situations; and to deal with changes in a routine work setting.'" See
id. (quoting Tr. 29 (citing SSR 85-15)) (footnote omitted). Plaintiff acknowledges that, although
"the standard for a finding of severity under Step 2 may be de minimis, i.e., 'intended only to
screen out the very weakest cases,' a de minimis analysis is all that is needed to mandate the use
of a VE rather than rely on the Grids." See id. at 3 (citing Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 421 (2d
Cir. 2013) ("The ALJ cannot rely on the Grids if a non-exertional impairment has any more than
a "negligible" impact on a claimant's ability [to] perform the full range of work and instead must
obtain the testimony of a vocational expert.")). Plaintiff argues that, although "[t]he ALJ clearly
found at Step 2 that the Plaintiff's mental impairments were more than 'negligible', . . . the ALJ
failed to obtain vocational expert testimony at Step 5." See id. at 3.
Plaintiff further argues that Magistrate Judge Dancks' finding "that Plaintiff's argument
that the Decision improperly subsumes mental health limitations within the definition of
unskilled work to be conclusory and/or unsupported by substantial evidence" "runs contrary to
decisions of this Court, as well as numerous decisions of other Courts in this Circuit." See id.
(citing Julie M. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27072 at **39-40 (N.D.N.Y.
2024) ("Courts in this district have found it to be reversable error for ALJ's [sic] to rely solely on
the Grids when a plaintiff has moderate psychiatric limitations resulting in non-exertional
limitations.") (quoting Chapparo v. Colvin, 156 F. Supp. 3d 517, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)); Ashley S.
P. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2171 at *28 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2022) (An RFC
that requires only occasional decision making, occasional changes in work setting, and
occasional judgment "suggest more than [a] negligible impairment that could severely limit the
potential occupational base."); Michael F.D. v. Saul, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176472 at *30
Case 6:24-cv-00539-FJS-TWD Document 24 Filed 02/13/26 Page 4 of 8

- 5 -
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2020) (holding that "low stress limitations identified in the RFC could
significantly limit the range of work available to Plaintiff"); Ocasio v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78695 at **33-34, n. 19 (N.D.N.Y. April 26, 2016 (claimant with moderate
difficulties in interacting with others may not meet the requirements of SSR 85-15); Provost v.
Astrue, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158417 at **24-25 (N.D.N.Y. March 31, 2011) ("[T]he ALJ's
own finding that Plaintiff was limited to a low stress work environment involving only
occasional interaction with co-workers is indicative of a substantial loss of ability to meet a basic
work related activity, namely, the ability to respond appropriately to co-workers.")) (other
citations omitted).
Plaintiff's argument regarding the ALJ's failure to have a VE testify is substantially the
same argument he raised before Magistrate Judge Dancks. See Dkt. No. 15 at 9-11. The record
reflects that Magistrate Judge Dancks adequately considered and properly rejected the argument
that Plaintiff advanced in his objections. Under such circumstances, it has long been the rule that
a District Court should apply the more perfunctory "clear error" review. See Boice v. M+W U.S.,
Inc., 130 F. Supp. 3d 677, 684 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) (Suddaby, J.) (collecting cases).
Nonetheless, even applying the more rigorous de novo review, Plaintiff's arguments
would not warrant relief. In most cases, the ALJ satisfies her burden at Step Five by relying on
the Grids, which "'take[] into account the claimant's [RFC] in conjunction with the claimant's
age, education and work experience.'" Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting
Zorilla v. Chater, 915 F. Supp. 662, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)). However, "exclusive reliance on the
grids is inappropriate where the guidelines fail to describe the full extent of a claimant's physical
limitations[,]" id., such as "in cases where the claimant exhibits a significant non-exertional
impairment (i.e., an impairment not related to strength)." Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 421 (2d
Case 6:24-cv-00539-FJS-TWD Document 24 Filed 02/13/26 Page 5 of 8

- 6 -
Cir. 2013) (citing Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1999); 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1569a(c)(2)).
However, "the mere existence of a nonexertional impairment does not automatically
require the production of a vocational expert nor preclude reliance on the [Grids]." Bapp v.
Bowen, 802 F.2d 601, 603 (2d Cir. 1986). Rather, "the non-exertional impairment must have
'more than a "negligible" impact on a claimant's ability to perform a full range of work.'" Juan
C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:24-CV-88 (AJB/MJK), 2025 WL 88679, *2 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 14,
2025) (quotation omitted). "As the Second Circuit has explained, '[a] nonexertional impairment
is non-negligible "when it . . . so narrows a claimant's possible range of work as to deprive him
of a meaningful employment opportunity."'" Id. (quotation omitted).
The ALJ determined that, although Plaintiff's "ability to perform work at all exertional
levels has been compromised by nonexertional limitations[,] . . . those limitations have little or
no effect on the occupational base of unskilled work at all exertional levels." See Dkt. No. 11,
Administration Record, at 29. In reaching this conclusion the ALJ relied on SSR 85-15, which
"explains that the basic mental demands of competitive remunerative unskilled work include the
abilities to understand, remember and carry out simple instructions; respond appropriately to
supervision, co-workers and the usual work situations and deal with changes in a routine work
setting." See id. Furthermore, the ALJ noted that SSR 85-15 "also notes that unskilled jobs
'ordinarily involve dealing primarily with objects, rather than with data or people'" and because
Plaintiff "retains the basic mental abilities required for unskilled work," the ALJ concluded that
"a finding of 'not disabled' is appropriate under SSR 85-15 and the framework of section 204.00
in the Medical-Vocational Guidelines." See id.
Case 6:24-cv-00539-FJS-TWD Document 24 Filed 02/13/26 Page 6 of 8

- 7 -
There is no reversible error in this approach. Social Security Ruling 85-15, which the
ALJ cited, supports her conclusion that the non-exertional limitations she assessed in Plaintiff's
RFC would have "have little or no effect on the occupational base of unskilled work at all
exertional levels." See Dkt. No. 11 at 29.
Of course, an ALJ's complete failure to account for the significance of a claimant's non-
exertional limitations would warrant remand. See Masoud v. Saul, 448 F. Supp. 3d 147, 159 (D.
Conn. 2020) (remanding where ALJ found non-exertional limitations but "simply omitted these
limitations from [the] RFC"). However, in this case, Plaintiff has not established that he suffered
from any more restrictive non-exertional limitations than the ones assessed in his RFC. See
Alicia C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:17-CV-1235 (TWD), 2019 WL 1470827, *10 (N.D.N.Y.
Apr. 1, 2019).
Nor has Plaintiff offered any basis from which this Court could conclude that the ALJ ran
afoul of this Circuit's precedent by relying on SSR 85-15 to account for the relative significance
of these non-exertional limitations on Plaintiff's ability to do the full range of unskilled work.
Absent a more compelling showing, courts in this Circuit routinely reject the arguments
that Plaintiff has offered. See, e.g., Scholtisek v. Colvin, 110 F. Supp. 3d 464, 480 (W.D.N.Y.
2015) (collecting cases) ("Although Plaintiff experienced nonexertional limitations, the ALJ was
not required to consult a vocational expert because she found that Plaintiff's nonexertional
limitations did not result in erosion to Plaintiff's occupational base.").
Accordingly, the Court accepts and adopts Magistrate Judge Dancks' Report-
Recommendation.
Case 6:24-cv-00539-FJS-TWD Document 24 Filed 02/13/26 Page 7 of 8

- 8 -
III. CONCLUSION
Having reviewed Magistrate Judge Dancks' Report-Recommendation, see Dkt. No. 22,
Plaintiff's objections, see Dkt. No. 23, and the applicable law, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Magistrate Judge Dancks' Report-Recommendation, see Dkt. No. 22, is
accepted and adopted; and the Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings, see Dkt. No. 15, is
DENIED; and the Court further
ORDERS that Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, see Dkt. No. 18, is
GRANTED; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of Defendant and
close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 13, 2026
Syracuse, New York
Case 6:24-cv-00539-FJS-TWD Document 24 Filed 02/13/26 Page 8 of 8