Tyrrell v. Colvin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_______________________________________
LAURA J. T.,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 5:25-CV-0045
(LEK/PJE)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
________________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
HILLER COMERFORD INJURY 	JUSTIN M. GOLDSTEIN, ESQ.
& DISABILITY LAW
6000 North Bailey Avenue, Suite 1A
Amherst, New York 14226
Attorneys for plaintiff
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 	KRISTINA D. COHN, ESQ.
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, Maryland 21235
Attorneys for defendant
PAUL J. EVANGELISTA,
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER1
Laura J. T.2 (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and
1383(c)(3) seeking review of a decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (“the Commissioner”) denying her application for supplemental security
1 This matter was referred to the undersigned for Report-Recommendation and in accordance with General
Order 18 and N.D.N.Y. L.R. 72.3(e).
2 In accordance with guidance from the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, which was adopted by the Northern District of New York in 2018
to 	better 	protect 	personal 	and 	medical 	information 	of 	non-governmental 	parties, 	this 	Report-
Recommendation and Order will identify plaintiff’s last name by initial only.
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income 	(“SSI”) 	for 	lack 	of 	disability. 	See 	Dkt. 	No. 	1. 	Plaintiff 	moves 	for 	the
Commissioner’s decision to be vacated and remanded for further proceedings. See Dkt.
No. 11. 	The Commissioner moves for the decision to be affirmed. 	See Dkt. No. 12.3
Plaintiff filed a reply. See Dkt. No. 13. For the following reasons, it is recommended that
plaintiff’s cross-motion be denied, and the Commissioner’s cross-motion be granted.
I. Background
On June 4, 2020, plaintiff filed a Title XVI application for SSI, alleging a disability
onset date of June 24, 2018. See T. at 337-434 (See Dkt. No. 8-5)5. 	On September 3,
2020, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied plaintiff’s claim. See id. at 161-
72 (See Dkt. No. 8-4). Plaintiff sought reconsideration, which the SSA denied on January
13, 2021. See id. at 43, 173-84 (See Dkt. Nos. 8-2, 8-4). Plaintiff appealed and requested
a hearing. See id. at 185-87 (See Dkt. No. 8-4). On May 27, 2021, a hearing was held
before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Robyn Hoffman. See id. at 44-65 (See Dkt. No.
8-2). 	On November 12, 2021, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. 	See id. at 124-
47 (See Dkt. No. 8-3). On February 24, 2023, the Appeals Council vacated the November
12, 2021, hearing decision and remanded the matter back to the ALJ. See id. at 148-54
(See Dkt. No. 8-3). On October 13, 2023, another hearing was held before ALJ Hoffman.
See id. at 66-87 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). 	On May 14, 2024, the ALJ issued an unfavorable
decision. 	See id. at 14-42 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). 	On November 25, 2024, the Appeals
3 This matter has been treated in accordance with General Order 18. Under that General Order, once issue
has been joined, an action such as this is considered procedurally as if cross-motions for judgement on the
pleadings have been filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
4 “T.” followed by a number refers to the pages of the administrative transcript. See Dkt. No. 8. Citations to
the administrative transcript refer to the pagination in the bottom, right-hand corner of the page. Citations
to the parties’ briefs refers to the pagination generated by the Court’s electronic filing and case management
program located at the header of each page.
5 Due to the voluminous nature and many parts of the administrative transcript, in addition to the record
citation, the undersigned includes the docket cite for factual citations.
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Council affirmed the May 14, 2024, hearing decision, and the decision became final. See
id. at 1-6 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). Plaintiff timely commenced the instant action on January 9,
2025. See Dkt. No. 1.
II. Legal Standards
A. Standard of Review
“In reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, a district court may not
determine de novo whether an individual is disabled.” 	Joseph J. B. v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 1:23-CV-652 (BKS/CFH), 2024 WL 4217371, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2024),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-CV-652 (BKS/CFH), 2024 WL 4216048
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2024) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1388(c)(3)); see also Wagner v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). 	“Rather, the
Commissioner’s determination will only be reversed if the correct legal standards were
not applied, or it was not supported by substantial evidence.” 	Id. (citing Johnson v.
Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985-86 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464,
467 (2d Cir. 1982). “Substantial evidence is ‘more than a mere scintilla,’ meaning that in
the record one can find ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 (2d
Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971))). 	“The
substantial evidence standard is a very deferential standard of review . . . [This] means
once an ALJ finds facts, we can reject [them] only if a reasonable factfinder would have
to conclude otherwise.” Id. (quoting Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443,
448 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	“Where there is
reasonable doubt as to whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards,
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the decision should not be affirmed even though the ultimate conclusion is arguably
supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (citing Martone v. Apfel, 70 F. Supp. 2d 145, 148
(N.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Johnson, 817 F.2d at 986)). 	“However, if the correct legal
standards were applied and the ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial evidence, such
finding must be sustained ‘even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff’s
position and despite that the court’s independent analysis of the evidence may differ from
the [Commissioner’s].’” Id. (quoting Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y.
1992)).
B. Determination of Disability
“Every individual who is under a disability shall be entitled to a disability . . . benefit
. . . .” 	42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). 	Disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment ... which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months[.]” 	Id. § 423(d)(1)(A). 	“A medically-determinable impairment is an
affliction that is so severe that it renders an individual unable to continue with his or her
previous work or any other employment that may be available to him or her based upon
age, education, and work experience.” Joseph J. B., 2024 WL 4217371, at *2 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)). “Such an impairment must be supported by ‘medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.’” 	Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3)).
“Additionally, the severity of the impairment is ‘based on objective medical facts,
diagnoses[,] or medical opinions inferable from [the] facts, subjective complaints of pain
or disability, and educational background, age, and work experience.’” 	Id. (quoting
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Ventura v. Barnhart, No. 04-CV-9018 (NRB), 2006 WL 399458, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21,
2006) (citing Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1037 (2d Cir. 1983))).
The Second Circuit employs a five-step analysis, based on 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520,
to determine whether an individual is entitled to disability benefits:
First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is currently
engaged in substantial gainful activity.
If he [or she] is not, the [Commissioner] next considers whether the
claimant has a “severe impairment” which significantly limits his [or her]
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.
If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is whether,
based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an impairment which
is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. 	If the claimant has such an
impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him [or her] disabled without
considering 	vocational 	factors 	such 	as 	age, 	education, 	and 	work
experience; the [Commissioner] presumes that a claimant who is afflicted
with a “listed” impairment is unable to perform substantial gainful activity.
Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the fourth
inquiry is whether, despite the claimant’s severe impairment, he [or she]
has the residual functional capacity to perform his [or her] past work.
Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his [or her] past work, the
[Commissioner] then determines whether there is other work which the
claimant could perform. . . .
Berry, 675 F.2d at 467 (spacing added). 	“If at any step a finding of disability or non-
disability can be made, the SSA will not review the claim further.” Joseph J. B., 2024 WL
4217371, at *2 (quoting Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24 (2003)). “The plaintiff bears
the initial burden of proof to establish each of the first four steps.” Id. (citing DeChirico v.
Callahan, 134 F.3d 1177, 1180 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Berry, 675 F.2d at 467)). 	“If the
inquiry progresses to the fifth step, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that
the plaintiff is still able to engage in gainful employment somewhere.” Id. (citing DeChirico,
134 F.3d at 1180 (citing Berry, 675 F.2d at 467)).
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III. The ALJ’s Decision
Applying the five-step disability sequential evaluation, the ALJ first noted that
plaintiff had “not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 28, 2020, the
application date.” 	T. at 20 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). 	At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff
“has the following severe impairments: history of eosinophilia; migraine headaches;
asthma; 	cannabis 	abuse 	disorder; 	postural 	tachycardia 	syndrome; 	unspecified
depressive disorder; post-traumatic stress disorder; and bipolar disorder.” Id. at 21 (See
Dkt. No. 8-2). 	At step three, the ALJ determined that plaintiff “does not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of
one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” Id. at 22 (See
Dkt. No. 8-2).
Before reaching step four, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff retained the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to
perform 	a 	range 	of 	light 	work, 	as 	defined 	in 	20 	CFR 	416.967(b).
Specifically, the claimant can occasionally lift and carry twenty pounds; can
frequently lift and carry ten pounds; can sit for six hours; and can stand
and/or walk for six hours, all in an eight-hour workday with normal breaks.
She should avoid working at unprotected heights; should avoid climbing
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and should avoid working in close proximity to
dangerous machinery or moving mechanical parts of equipment. 	The
claimant can frequently climb ramps or stairs; and can occasionally stoop.
She should avoid exposure to excessive amounts of respiratory irritants,
such 	as 	dust, 	odors, 	fumes, 	and 	gases, 	and 	extreme 	hot 	and 	cold
temperatures; should work at simple, routine and repetitive tasks. 	The
claimant should work in a “low stress job,” defined as occasional decision-
making, occasional judgment required, and occasional changes in the work
setting; should work at goal oriented work rather than production pace rate
work; and should have occasional interaction with co-workers, supervisors,
and the public.
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T. at 25 (See Dkt. No. 8-2).6 At step four, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had “no past
relevant work.” 	Id. at 34 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). 	At step five, the ALJ determined that
“[c]onsidering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional
capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the
claimant can perform.” Id. (See Dkt. No. 8-2). The ALJ concluded that plaintiff “has not
been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since April 28, 2020, the
date the application was filed.” Id. at 36 (See Dkt. No. 8-2).
IV. Discussion
A. Arguments
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s finding that her “[postural tachycardia syndrome
(“POTS”)] allows her to perform a sustained range of light work is not substantially
supported.” Dkt. No. 11 at 10. More specifically, plaintiff claims that “the impact of [her]
[POTS] and [her] need to sit or lay down to address [her] symptoms conflict[s] with the
ability to perform sustained light level work and remain on task to a degree competitive
with sustained employment.” Id. 	Plaintiff also argues the ALJ erred in evaluating her
subjective complaints and mischaracterizing the evidence. Id. at 13-15.
The Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s determination should be affirmed. See
generally Dkt. No. 12. 	The Commissioner maintains that the ALJ considered all of
6 Light work is defined as
lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to
10 pounds. 	Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it
requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some
pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide
range of light work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities. If someone
can do light work, we determine that he or she can also do sedentary work, unless there are
additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b); 416.967(b).
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plaintiff’s impairments when determining her very restrictive RFC finding. See id. at 7-11.
The Commissioner also claims that the ALJ properly evaluated plaintiff’s symptomatology
when determining her ability to work. See id. at 11-12.
In reply, plaintiff asserts that the “ALJ’s RFC does not adequately reflect [her]
POTS related limitations, such as the need to sit or lay down during a day to help address
or prevent symptoms.” Dkt. No. 13 at 2. Plaintiff also states that the “ALJ’s finding [that
she] could perform a light exertional RFC, meaning [that she] could be expected to
perform six hours of standing, walking or sitting in an eight hour day, conflicts with [her]
severe POTS impairment.” Id. at 1-2.
B. RFC
“RFC describes what a claimant is capable of doing despite his or her impairments,
considering all relevant evidence, which consists of physical limitations, symptoms, and
other limitations beyond the symptoms.” Joseph J. B., 2024 WL 4217371, at *8 (quoting
Malcolm M. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:17-CV-986 (CFH), 2019 WL 187725, at *4
(N.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2019) (first citing Martone v. Apfel, 70 F. Supp. 2d 145, 150 (N.D.N.Y.
1999), then citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945). “[A]n RFC finding is administrative
in nature, not medical, and its determination is within the province of the ALJ.” Id. (quoting
Curry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 855 F. App’x 46, 48 n.3 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order)
(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)). “In assessing RFC, the ALJ’s findings must specify
the functions plaintiff is capable of performing; conclusory statements regarding plaintiff’s
capabilities are not sufficient.” 	Id. (quoting Martone, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 150) (citations
omitted).
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“In making the RFC determination, the ALJ must consider all relevant medical and
other evidence, including any statements about what the claimant can still do provided by
any medical sources.” 	Joseph J. B., 2024 WL 4217371, at *8 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1545(a)(3), 404.1546(c)). 	“[T]he ALJ’s conclusion [need] not perfectly correspond
with any of the opinions of medical sources cited in his [or her] decision, [and] he [or she
i]s entitled to weigh all of the evidence available to make an RFC finding that [i]s
consistent with the record as a whole.” Id. (quoting Matta v. Astrue, 508 F. App’x 53, 56
(2d Cir. 2013) (summary order)). 	“The Court ‘defer[s] to the Commissioner’s resolution
of conflicting evidence[.]’” 	Id. (quoting Smith v. Berryhill, 740 F. App’x 721, 726 (2d Cir.
2018) (summary order) (internal citation omitted)). “Therefore, even if a plaintiff disagrees
with the ALJ’s assessment of opinion evidence and can point to evidence in the record to
support his or her position, whether there is substantial evidence supporting the
[plaintiff’s] view is not the question; rather, [the Court] must decide whether substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.” Id. (quoting Elizabeth P. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 3:20-CV-891 (CFH), 2022 WL 507367, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2022)) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “The ALJ must not ignore evidence or cherry pick
only the evidence from medical sources that support a particular conclusion and ignore
the contrary evidence, but [t]he Court will not reweigh the evidence that was before the
ALJ.” 	Id. (quoting April B. v. Saul, No. 8:18-CV-682 (DJS), 2019 WL 4736243, at *6
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2019) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
C. Evaluating Testimonial Evidence
“Assessment of a claimant’s subjective complaints about his or her symptoms or
the effect of those symptoms on the claimant’s ability to work involves a two-step
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process.” 	Aaron W., v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec, No. 6:24-CV-01440 (FJS/ML), 2026 WL
417539, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2026), report and recommendation adopted sub nom.
Aaron W. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:24-CV-1440 (FJS/ML), 2026 WL 416054
(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2026). “Where a claimant complains that certain symptoms, including
pain, limit his or her capacity to work, the ALJ is required, first, to determine whether the
claimant suffers from a ‘medically determinable impairment[] that could reasonably be
expected to produce’ the symptoms alleged.” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(1);
416.929(c)(1). “Assuming the ALJ finds such an impairment, then the ALJ must take the
second step of ‘evaluat[ing] the intensity and persistence of [the claimant’s] symptoms,’
including pain, considering ‘all of the available evidence,’ to determine ‘how [the]
symptoms 	limit 	[the 	claimant’s] 	capacity 	for 	work.’” 	Id. 	(quoting 	20 	C.F.R. 	§§
404.1529(c)(1); 416.929(c)(1)). 	“In doing so, the ALJ must consider all of the available
evidence, and must not ‘reject [ ] statements about the intensity and persistence of [ ] pain
or other symptoms . . . solely because the available objective medical evidence does not
substantiate [the claimant’s] statements.’” 	Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(2);
416.929(c)(2)). “Instead, where the claimant’s contentions regarding his or her symptoms
are not substantiated by the objective medical evidence, the ALJ must evaluate those
statements in relation to the other evidence, in order to determine the extent to which the
claimant’s symptoms affect his or her ability to do basic work activities.” 	Id. (citing 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3-4); 416.929(c)(3-4)).
“While an ALJ ‘is required to take [a] claimant’s reports of pain and other limitations
into account’ . . . 	an ALJ is ‘not required to accept the claimant’s subjective complaints
without question.’” Aaron W., 2026 WL 417539, at *6 (quoting Genier v. Astrue, 606 F.3d
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46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010)). “To the extent the ALJ determines that the claimant’s statements
are not supported by the medical record, however, the ALJ’s decision must include
‘specific reasons for the weight given to the individual’s symptoms, [] consistent with and
supported by the evidence,’” and the reasons must be “‘clearly articulated’ for a
subsequent reviewer to assess how the adjudicator evaluated the individual’s symptoms.”
Id. (quoting SSR 16-3p, Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability Claims,
2017 WL 5180304, at *10 (October 25, 2017)).
The factors that an ALJ should consider in evaluating the claimant’s
subjective complaints, where they are not supported by objective medical
evidence alone, are: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the location,
duration, frequency, and intensity of the symptoms; (3) precipitating and
aggravating factors; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of
any medications taken to alleviate the symptoms; (5) any treatment, other
than medication, that the claimant has received for relief of the symptoms;
(6) any other measures that the claimant employs to relieve the symptoms;
and (7) other factors concerning the claimant’s functional limitations and
restrictions as a result of the symptoms.
Aaron 	W., 	2026 	WL 	417539, 	at 	*6 	(citing 	20 	C.F.R. 	§§ 	404.1529(c)(3)(i)-(vii);
416.929(c)(3)(i)-(vii).
D. Analysis
As stated above, the ALJ found plaintiff had the RFC “to perform a range of light
work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b).” T. at 25 (See Dkt. No. 8-2); see supra at 6.
Specifically, plaintiff “can occasionally lift and carry twenty pounds; can frequently lift and
carry ten pounds; can sit for six hours; and can stand and/or walk for six hours, all in an
eight-hour workday with normal breaks.” 	Id. (See Dkt. No. 8-2). 	“She should avoid
working at unprotected heights; should avoid climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and
should avoid working in close proximity to dangerous machinery or moving mechanical
parts of equipment.” Id. (See Dkt. No. 8-2). Plaintiff “can frequently climb ramps or stairs;
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and can occasionally stoop.” 	Id. (See Dkt. No. 8-2). 	“She should avoid exposure to
excessive amounts of respiratory irritants, such as dust, odors, fumes, and gases, and
extreme hot and cold temperatures; should work at simple, routine and repetitive tasks.”
Id. (See Dkt. No. 8-2). Plaintiff “should work in a ‘low stress job,’ defined as occasional
decision-making, occasional judgment required, and occasional changes in the work
setting; should work at goal-oriented work rather than production pace rate work; and
should have occasional interaction with co-workers, supervisors, and the public.” Id. (See
Dkt. No. 8-2).
In reaching her RFC determination, the ALJ noted that she “must consider all of
the claimant’s impairments, including impairments that are not severe.” T. at 20 (See Dkt.
No. 8-2). 	As stated above, the ALJ found plaintiff’s POTS to be a severe impairment.
See id. at 21 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). The ALJ also stated she “considered all symptoms and
the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the
objective medical evidence and other evidence based on the requirements of 20 CFR
416.929 and SSR 16-3p.” Id. at 25 (See Dkt. No. 8-2).
In support of her arguments, plaintiff marshaled evidence indicative of greater
limitations, including reports that on a bad day she would pass out six to twenty times.
See Dkt. No. 11 at 11 (citing T. at 50-51). 	Similarly, plaintiff testified that changing her
position, such as moving from sitting to standing, bending over, or bending to stand
straight up could lead her to pass out. See T. at 50, 57-58 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). She also
testified that she used a grabber to pick items up off the floor and could wash dishes if
sitting in a chair. See id. at 56, 58 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). 	The record also indicates that
plaintiff’s reported syncopal episodes were often associated with changes in position and
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were sudden in occurrence. See id. at 1063 (See Dkt. No. 8-8). 	However, the ALJ
discussed plaintiff’s syncope and related symptoms, and plaintiff does not allege any
additional limitations that should have been included in the RFC. See id. at 26 (See Dkt.
No. 8-2). As such, plaintiff fails to satisfy her “burden to prov[ing] a more restrictive RFC.”
Snyder v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 22-277-CV, 2023 WL 1943108, at *3 (2d Cir. Feb.
13, 2023) (summary order) (additional citation omitted).
Similarly, plaintiff does not (1) challenge any of the medical opinions that ALJ relied
upon in making her RFC determination or (2) assert that the medical opinions that ALJ
relied upon are inconsistent with her subjective symptoms. 	State medical consultative
examiner Elke Lorensen, M.D., opined Plaintiff had “[n]o gross limitation for sitting,
standing, walking, handling small objects with the hands. Moderate limitation for bending,
lifting, and carrying.” 	T. at 486 (See Dkt. No. 8-7). 	During plaintiff’s examination, Dr.
Lorensen recorded plaintiff’s gait as normal and that she was able to walk on her heels
and toes without difficulty. See id. at 484 (See Dkt. No. 8-7). Her squat was full, stance
was normal, and she did not need any assistive devices. 	See id (See Dkt. No. 8-7).
Plaintiff did not need help changing for the exam or getting on and off the exam table; she
was also able to rise from a chair without difficulty. 	See id. (See Dkt. No. 8-7). 	Her
neurological and musculoskeletal examinations were unremarkable and within normal
limits. See id. at 485 (See Dkt. No. 8-7). The ALJ concluded that Dr. Lorensen’s opinion
was “generally persuasive, as it is mostly consistent with the record as a whole and is
supported by her own accompanying objective findings.” Id. at 29 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). The
ALJ explained that Dr. Lorensen’s opinion identified a “postural limitation” in that plaintiff
had a moderate limitation in bending and this limitation was reflected in plaintiff’s RFC
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“for stooping (bending down and forward at the waist) on no more than an occasional
basis that is defined as occurring from very little up to one-third of the time.” Id. at 29-30
(See Dkt. No. 8-2).
Similarly, the ALJ found the prior administrative medical findings (“PAMF”) of S.
Gandhi, M.D., and V. Au, M.D. to be persuasive. See T. at 30-31 (See Dkt. No. 8-3). Dr.
Ghandi and Dr. Au opined that plaintiff was able to stand, walk, or sit for a total of about
six hours in an eight-hour workday. See id. at 95, 114 (See Dkt. No. 8-3). Her ability was
unlimited in balancing, kneeling, and crouching. 	See id. at 95-96, 115 (See Dkt. No. 8-
3). 	Further, plaintiff could occasionally or frequently stoop, and frequently climb stairs.
See id. at 95-96, 115 (See Dkt. No. 8-3). Both doctors opined that plaintiff demonstrated
the maximum sustained work capability for light work. See id. at 101, 123 (See Dkt. No.
8-3).
Further after multiple tests failed to show any abnormality related to plaintiff’s
syncopal episodes or orthostatic symptoms, plaintiff was “offered a loop recorder but
opted against it because she did not feel comfortable with the way in which it was
presented to her.” T. at 987 (See Dkt. No. 8-8). Similarly, the ALJ noted that “the record
shows that the claimant has complained of episodes of syncope, migraines, and asthma,
but overall she has experience improvement has been noted with change in diet and/or
use of medication.” Id. at 30 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). 	More specifically, plaintiff’s symptoms
subsided when she increased her salt and fluid intake as per her doctor’s suggestion.
See id. at 988, 1114, 1330, 1334 (See Dkt. Nos. 8-8, 8-11). 	During a May 2021
telemedicine appointment, plaintiff reported, “[h]er last episode was a month ago when
she had dizziness but had not had a true syncopal episode in 3 months since increasing
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her salt and fluid in her diet.” Id. at 988 (See Dkt. No. 8-2). 	Plaintiff’s cardiovascular
examinations showed that she had normal heart rate, rhythm, and sounds, as well as no
evidence of gallop, a friction rub, or murmur. See id. at 505, 511, 516, 521, 576, 631, 930,
1101 (See Dkt. Nos. 8-7, 8-8). Plaintiff also had normal gait and coordination, full strength
throughout the extremities, and normal neurological findings. See id. at 485, 512, 519,
650, 685-86, 707, 1064 (See Dkt. Nos. 8-7, 8-8)
Lastly, the ALJ noted that plaintiff was capable of performing activities of daily living
(“ADL”) consistent with a wide range of light work, such as cooking three times per week,
cleaning, doing laundry, and caring for her son with a mental impairment. T. at 29 (See
Dkt. No. 8-2). 	The ALJ concluded “that the record does not support limits in production
rate pace, frequent unscheduled breaks, excessive absenteeism, excessive tardiness,
need to leave early from work, or other significant off-task behavior in a work-setting
secondary to the claimant’s severe physical impairments . . . .” Id. at 33 (See Dkt. No. 8-
2).
In deciding a disability claim, an ALJ is tasked with “weigh[ing] all of the evidence
available to make an RFC finding that [is] consistent with the record as a whole.” Matta
v. Astrue, 508 F. App’x 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order) (additional citation omitted).
“When formulating a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ must consider not only her severe
impairments, but her non-severe impairments as well.” 	Novas v. Kijakazi, No. 22-CV-
1020 (MKV/BCM), 2023 WL 2614362, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2023) (quotation omitted),
report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 2613550 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2023) (citing
20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2)).
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Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that the ALJ properly accounted for
plaintiff’s severe POTS and crafted an RFC consistent with the medical opinion evidence
and the record as a whole. Further, the Court can glean from the ALJ’s decision that the
ALJ took into consideration plaintiff’s subjective symptoms, concluding that they were not
consistent with the evidence of record. See Mauro v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 746
F. App’x 83, 84 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order) (“Subjective complaints alone are not a
basis for an award of disability insurance benefits in the absence of corroborating
objective medical evidence.”). 	“[P]laintiff's ‘arguments amount to a disagreement with
how the ALJ weighed the evidence, which is within [the ALJ’s] province to do.’” 	Id.
(quoting Nichole K., 2024 WL 3022592, at *7) (citations omitted); see also Krull v. Colvin,
669 F. App'x 31, 32 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order) (“Krull's disagreement is with the
ALJ's weighing of the evidence, but the deferential standard of review prevents us from
reweighing it.”); Tina W. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:22-CV-15 (MAD), 2023 WL
157952, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2023) (quoting Bonet ex rel. T.B. v. Colvin, 523 F. App'x
58, 59 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order) (“It is not the Court's function to reweigh the
evidence on appeal, only to ‘decide whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's
decision.’”)).
Therefore, the undersigned recommends that plaintiff’s cross-motion be denied,
and the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
V. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth herein, it is hereby:
RECOMMENDED, that plaintiff’s cross-motion (Dkt. No. 11) be DENIED; and it is
further
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RECOMMENDED, 	that 	the 	Commissioner’s 	cross-motion 	(Dkt. 	No. 	12) 	be
GRANTED, and the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed; and it is
ORDERED, that the Clerk serve a copy of this Report-Recommendation and Order
on all parties in accordance with Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to U.S.C. §636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72.1(c), the parties have fourteen
days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall
be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette,
984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs.,
892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV P. 6(a), 6(e), 72.
Dated: February 24, 2026
Albany, New York
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