King v. Commissioner of Social Security

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
__________________________________________________________________
Laurie K.,1
Plaintiff,
v. 3:25-CV-411
(MAD/MJK)
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
__________________________________________________________________
Howard Olinsky, Esq., for Laurie K.
Candace Brown Casey, Special Asst. U.S. Attorney, for Defendant
Mitchell J. Katz, U.S. Magistrate Judge
To the Honorable Mae A. D’Agostino, U.S. District Judge:
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
Laurie K. brought this action under the Social Security Act (42
U.S.C. § 405(g)), seeking judicial review of the Social Security
Commissioner’s final decision denying her application for benefits. (Dkt.
1.). Laurie K. did not consent to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge.
Both parties filed briefs (Dkts. 15, 22, 23). And at the Court's request,
both sides filed supplemental briefs (Dkts. 24, 26, 27). The Court heard
oral argument on April 1 focused on the issue of remand for benefits
1 This Report-Recommendation will identify the plaintiff using only her first name
and last initial to protect her privacy.
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only. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), and in accordance with General Order
18, the Court treats these briefs as motions.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 29, 2015, Laurie K. applied for Supplemental Security
Income (“SSI”), alleging disability beginning July 6, 2014. (T. 97, 183).2
Her application was denied on September 2, 2015, and she filed a
written request for a hearing with an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”). (T. 31). A hearing was held on November 13, 2017, and a
decision finding Laurie K. not disabled was issued on January 17, 2018.
See Laurie M.K. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 3:22-CV-0947 (GTS/DEP), 2023
WL 7004934 at *1–2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2023), report and
recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 7003931 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2023).
The Appeals Council granted review, vacated the ALJ’s decision, and
found Laurie K. not disabled. Id. at *2.
Laurie K. appealed to this Court, and the Court remanded on May
15, 2020, based on a stipulation between Laurie K. and the
Commissioner. Id. In the stipulations, both sides agreed that the ALJ
2 All page references are to the Administrative Transcript (“T.”), and not the page
numbers assigned by the CM/ECF pagination system. All other page references are
to the numbers assigned by the CM/ECF pagination system.
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failed to properly analyze Laurie K.’s treating physician’s opinion. Id.
On remand, the case went before a different ALJ, and administrative
hearings were held on November 16, 2021, and May 9, 2022. Id. On
July 7, 2022, the ALJ issued a decision finding Laurie K. not disabled.
Id.
Laurie K. again appealed to this Court. Id. at *3. The Court
conducted oral argument by telephone and reversed the ALJ's decision
based on the ALJ’s failure to properly analyze the opinion of treating
physician Dr. Carr. Id. The Court issued an order in which it directed
the Commissioner to consider the assessment of Laurie K.’s treating
physician Dr. Carr. See Id.
On remand, the case went before a different ALJ, and on
November 20, 2024, ALJ Gretchen Greisler held a hearing. (T. 2814–
48). On January 31, 2025, ALJ Greisler issued an unfavorable decision.
(T. 2774–2800). Laurie K. again appealed to this Court. (Dkt. 1).
II. GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAW
A. Disability Standards
To be considered disabled, a claimant seeking DIB or SSI benefits
must establish that they are “unable to engage in any substantial
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gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death, or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than twelve months . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). Additionally, the
claimant’s
physical or mental impairment or impairments [must be] of
such severity that they are not only unable to do their
previous work but cannot, considering their age, education,
and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless
of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which
they live, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for them, or
whether they would be hired if they applied for work.
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B) (cleaned up).
The Commissioner uses a five-step process, set forth in 20 C.F.R.
sections 404.1520 (for DIB) and 416.920 (for SSI), to evaluate disability
claims:
First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If [they are]
not, the [Commissioner] next considers whether the claimant
has a "severe impairment” which significantly limits [their]
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. If the
claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is
whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has
an impairment which meets or equals the criteria of an
impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the
claimant has such an impairment, the [Commissioner] will
consider [them] disabled without considering vocational
factors such as age, education, and work experience . . . .
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Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the
fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant's severe
impairment, [they have] the residual functional capacity to
perform [their] past work. Finally, if the claimant is unable to
perform [their] past work, the [Commissioner] then
determines whether there is other work which the claimant
can perform.
Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam); see
Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Berry, 675
F.2d at 467). The claimant has the burden of establishing disability at
the first four steps. Berry, 675 F.2d at 467. If the claimant establishes
that their impairment prevents them from performing their past work,
then the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove the fifth and final
step. Id.
B. Scope of Review
When reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, courts must
determine whether the correct legal standards were applied and
whether substantial evidence supported the decision. Id. at 417; see also
Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012); 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012). It must be “more
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than a scintilla” of evidence scattered throughout the administrative
record. Id. Yet this standard is a very deferential standard of review “—
even more so than the ‘clearly erroneous standard.’” Brault, 683 F.3d at
448. “[T]o determine on appeal whether an ALJ’s findings are supported
by substantial evidence, reviewing courts consider the whole record,
examining the evidence from both sides, because an analysis of the
substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts
from its weight.” Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258
(2d Cir. 1988). But reviewing courts may not substitute their
interpretation of the administrative record for that of the Commissioner
if the record contains substantial support for the ALJ’s decision. Id.; see
also Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).
ALJs need not explicitly analyze every piece of conflicting
evidence in the record. See Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d
Cir. 1983); see also Miles v. Harris, 645 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1981)
(“[W]e are unwilling to require an ALJ explicitly to reconcile every
conflicting shred of medical testimony[.]”). But ALJs cannot “‘pick and
choose’ evidence in the record that supports [their] conclusions.” Cruz v.
Barnhart, 343 F. Supp. 2d 218, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also Fuller v.
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Astrue, No. 09-CV-6279, 2010 WL 5072112, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 6,
2010).
III. FACTS
The record includes Laurie K’s medical treatment records, which
the parties are familiar with. The Court will refer to the pertinent
records and Laurie K.’s hearing testimony in its analysis as
appropriate.
IV. THE ALJ’S DECISION
At Step One of the five-step sequential evaluation, ALJ Greisler
determined that Laurie K. had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since September 1, 2022. (T. 2777).
At Step Two, ALJ Greisler found that Laurie K. had the following
severe impairments: obesity, anxiety disorder, depressive disorder,
personality disorder, and borderline personality disorder. (Id.). The ALJ
further found that Laurie K. has the following nonsevere impairments:
left ankle pain, right elbow pain, left elbow pain, left wrist pain, Lyme
disease, seizure disorder, acid reflux, and low back pain. (T. 2777–
2779).
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At Step Three, the ALJ determined that Karen’s impairments
neither meet nor medically equal the criteria of any listed impairments
in Appendix 1 to 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P. (T. 2780).
Next, the ALJ discussed the “paragraph B” criteria. (T. 2780–
2781). “To satisfy the paragraph B criteria,” mental impairments “must
result in one extreme limitation or two marked limitations in a broad
area of functioning.” See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, §
12.00(A)(2)(b) (cleaned up). The four broad areas of mental functioning
are: (1) understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2)
interacting with others; (3) maintaining concentration, persistence, or
pace; and (4) adapting and managing oneself. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,
subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00(C). ALJ Greisler found that Laurie K. did not
meet the “paragraph B” criteria because she had only mild limitations
in understanding, remembering, or applying information; moderate no
limitations in interacting with others; and moderate to marked
limitations in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace. (T. 2780–
2781). ALJ Greisler noted Laurie K. had “limited” insight and
“questionable judgment.” (T. 2781). ALJ Greisler ultimately found that
Laurie K. does not meet the “Paragraph B” criteria. (Id.).
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The ALJ also considered the “paragraph C” criteria. T. 2782). The
“paragraph C” criteria require a documented medical history of the
existence of the disorder over a period of at least two years, with
evidence of both (a) medical treatment, mental health therapy,
psychosocial support(s), or a highly structured setting(s) that is ongoing
nd that diminishes the symptoms and signs of the mental disorder; and
(b) marginal adjustment, that is, minimal capacity to adapt to changes
in environment or to demands that are not already part of daily life. See
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00(A)(2)(c). ALJ Greisler found
that the “paragraph C” criteria were not met. (Id.).
The ALJ then determined that Laurie K. had the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform:
the full range of work at all exertional levels. She can perform
simple tasks at a consistent goal-oriented pace, but not at a
fast, production rate pace, such as would be experienced in
assembly line type of work. She can engage in occasional
interaction with supervisors and coworkers to perform tasks
that do not require sharing of job tasks or working in close
coordination with others. She cannot interact with the public.
She can make simpole decisions directly related to her work
and tolerate occasional work changes.
(T. 2782).
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When crafting the RFC, ALJ Greisler stated that she considered
all Laurie K.’s symptoms, and the extent to which those symptoms
could “reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical
evidence and other evidence[.]” (Id.). ALJ Greisler added that she fully
considered opinion evidence in accordance with the requirements of 20
C.F.R. § 416.927.” (Id.).
At Step Four, the ALJ found that Laurie K. had no past relevant
work (T. 2796). The ALJ determined that Laurie K. is in the “younger
individual” category, has at least a high school education, and that
“transferability of job skills is not an issue.” (T 2796–2797) (cleaned up).
At Step Five, using the Medical Vocational Guidelines as a
“framework,” and the VE's testimony, the ALJ found that Karen was
“capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in
significant numbers in the national economy.” (T. 2797). To end, the
ALJ found that Karen was not disabled. (T. 2799).
V. ISSUES IN CONTENTION
Both sides agree that remand is appropriate. Only one question
remains: whether this case should be remanded solely for the
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calculation and award of benefits or remanded for further
administrative proceedings.3
Laurie K. seeks remand solely for the calculation of benefits. See
generally (Pl.’s Br.); see also (Pl.’s Supp. Br. at pp. 2–5). In support, she
contends that the record is sufficiently developed; that the record shows
persuasive proof of disability; and that she has suffered excessive delay
in the adjudication of her claim. See (Pl.’s Supp. Br. at pp. 2–5).
The Commissioner responds that remand solely for the calculation
of benefits is inappropriate. (Def.’s Supp. Br. at p. 1). The Commissioner
argues that Laurie K. is not disabled based on the current record, and
that the lengthy procedural history of her case is not enough to justify
remand solely for the calculation of benefits. (Def.’s Supp. Br. at pp. 1,
3–4). As explained below, the District Court should remand solely for
the calculation of benefits.
VI. DISCUSSION
The District Court should remand solely for the calculation of
benefits for three reasons. First, the record is adequately developed.
3 See, generally (Laurie K.’s Brief (“Pl.’s Br.”) (Dkt. 15)); (Laurie K.’s Reply Brief
(“Rep. Br.”) (Dkt. 23); (Laurie K’s Supplemental Brief (“Pl.’s Supp. Br.”) (Dkt. 26);
(Defendant’s Brief (“Def Br.”) (Dkt. 22); (Defendant’s Supplemental Brief (“Def.’s
Supp. Br.”) (Dkt. 27)).
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Second, the record shows persuasive proof of disability. And third,
Laurie K.’s case has suffered excessive delay. For those reasons, the
Court recommends remand solely for the calculation and award of
benefits.
A. The record is sufficiently developed, shows
persuasive proof of disability, and that this case has
already experienced excessive delay.
The Court recommends remand solely for the calculation of
benefits because the record is adequately developed and shows
persuasive proof of disability. See Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225, 235
(2d Cir. 1980) (“we have reversed and ordered that benefits be paid
when the record provides persuasive proof of disability and a remand
for further evidentiary proceedings would serve no purpose”). In
addition, this case has already faced excessive delay. For these reasons,
the Court recommends that the District Court remand this case solely
for the calculation of benefits.
When reviewing social security cases, district courts can affirm,
modify, or reverse (with or without remand) a final decision of the
Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Remand solely for the calculation
of benefits is proper only when “further development of the record
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would serve no purpose.” See Williams v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 48, 50 (2d
Cir. 1999). Further development of the record serves no purpose
where there is “persuasive evidence of a total disability.” Id.
Persuasive evidence of a disability exists when the record
unequivocally demonstrates that the claimant is disabled. See Brian
D. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:21-CV-1368 (CFH), 2023 WL
1765429 at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2023). Persuasive evidence includes
evidence of an “infinitesimal likelihood of employment” or lack of
evidence to support a finding that the claimant could perform
“substantial gainful work which [is] available in the national
economy.” Id. While not dispositive, excessive delay can counsel in
favor of remand solely for the calculation of benefits. See, e.g.,
McClain v. Barnhart, 299 F. Supp. 2d 309, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“The
lengthy [nine-year] delay in the resolution of [plaintiff’s] claim
further persuades [the court] that the case is properly disposed by
remanding solely for the calculation of benefits.”).
1. The record is sufficiently complete and further record
development is unnecessary.
The current record is sufficiently complete. When deciding
whether the record is complete, courts consider whether “the
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administrative record contains gaps,” which would warrant further
development of the record. Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d 377, 385–386.
That is: when “further findings would so plainly help to assure the
proper disposition of [the] claim, . . . remand [for further proceedings] is
particularly appropriate.” Id. But “where [there is] no apparent basis to
conclude that a more complete record might support the Commissioner’s
decision, [the Second Circuit has] opted simply to remand for a
calculation of benefits.” Id.
There is no apparent basis to conclude that a more complete
record would support the Commissioner’s decision. For starters, the
record stands at almost 3500 pages. See, e.g., Sandra S. v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 5:24-cv- 01116 (AMN/ML), 2025 WL 4101468, at *12
(N.D.N.Y. Dec 23, 2025) (holding that the record was “sufficiently
complete” at 2810 pages and included treating source notes and
opinions from 2011 through 2024, reports from examining and non-
examining consultants, and the opinion of an independent medical
expert) (cleaned up). In addition, Laurie K. provided updated medical
records at her most recent hearing. See (T. 2814) (listing various
progress notes written and submitted after this Court’s prior remand
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order); see also Sandra S., 2025 WL 4101468, at *12 (indicating that a
claimant providing updated medical records before a hearing helps
ensure that the record is sufficiently complete). In fact, the
Commissioner implicitly concedes that the record does not require
further development. The Commissioner only asks the District Court for
“remand” so the agency may “further consider[] . . . Dr. Carr’s medical
opinion.” (Def. Br. at 5–6). That is a much different request than further
development of the record.
What’s more, the record does not contain any gaps. The record
currently contains reports from emergency room visits, treating
physician appointments, consultative examinations, and mental and
physical RFC assessments. See (T. 2806–2813) (listing more than 50
reports created between 2014 and 2024). The record spans more than a
decade and the earliest medical note described that Laurie K. suffered a
seizure and was taken to the emergency room by ambulance. (T. 1539)
(2014 note). More recent records describe Laurie K. as “markedly
limited” in her ability to maintain appropriate behavior. (T. 3418) (2023
medical note). And at the most recent hearing ALJ Greisler herself
noted that the prior ALJ went to great lengths to get medical notes; yet
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ALJs “can’t really force [physicians]” to “provide [] notes.” (T. 2817).
Considering the length and breadth of the available medical
records—and because the Commissioner only seeks remand so that an
ALJ may be given a fourth chance to properly analyze an opinion from
Laurie K.’s treating physician—“there is no reason to believe that, upon
remand, the record that has been presented to this Court could be made
any more complete.” Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 83 (2d. Cir. 1999);
see Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 80–81 (2d Cir. 1998) (remanding
solely for calculation of benefits because the ALJ’s only mistake was
improperly weighing a treating physician’s opinion on an otherwise
complete record).
To close, additional evidence would not support the
Commissioner’s position that Laurie K. is not disabled. And there are
no gaps in the record. In consequence, remand for further development
of the record is unnecessary.
2. The adequately developed record shows that Laurie K. is
disabled.
The record shows that Laurie K.’s impairments render her
disabled. Specifically, treating physician Dr. Carr’s reports and treating
therapist Holland’s reports show that Laurie K.’s absenteeism and
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anger management issues are disabling impairments. But the
Commissioner—for the third time—has failed to properly apply the
treating physician rule. Had ALJ Greisler properly applied the treating
physician rule, Laurie K. would have been found disabled. Therefore,
the Court recommends that the District Court find Laurie K. disabled
and remand this case for calculation of benefits.
For claims filed before March 27, 2017, the treating physician rule
applies. Under that rule, “the opinion of a claimant’s treating physician
as to the nature and severity of the impairment is given controlling
weight so long as it ‘is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical
and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the
other substantial evidence in the case record.’” Greek v. Colvin, 802 F.3d
370, 375 (2d Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). If “a treating physician’s opinion is
‘not consistent with other substantial evidence in the record, such as
the opinions of other medical experts[,]’ however, the hearing officer
need not give the treating source opinion controlling weight.” Id.
(citation omitted). But if an ALJ refuses to afford a treating physician’s
opinion “controlling weight,” they must provide good reasons—“reasons
supported by substantial evidence in the record—for the weight [they]
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afford[] the treating source’s medical opinion.” Schillo v. Saul, 31 F.4th
64, 75 (2d Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).
Both sides agree that ALJ Greisler failed to properly weigh
treating physician Dr. Carr’s medical opinions. While the Court would
normally remand so that the ALJ could properly weigh the treating
physician’s opinion, this is the third time that remand has been
required because an ALJ failed to properly evaluate a treating
physician’s opinion. See, e.g., Dommes v. Colvin, 225 F. Supp. 3d 113,
124 (N.D.N.Y 2016) (remanding solely for the calculation and award of
benefits because the ALJ had again improperly analyzed the treating
physician’s opinion). Worse yet, this Court has previously rebuked the
Commissioner for ignoring “ostensibly disabling limitations expressed
within Dr. Carr’s opinion, . . .” and remanded because “a more
appropriate assessment of Dr. Carr’s opinion could well have resulted in
a finding that plaintiff is disabled.” Laurie M.K., 2023 WL 7004934 at
*9. In similar circumstances, this Court has not hesitated to remand
solely for the calculation of benefits. See, e.g., Mortise v. Astrue, 713 F.
Supp. 2d 111, 128 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) (remanding solely for calculation of
benefits where the ALJ had repeatedly erred in applying the treating
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physician rule and further development of the record would prove
pointless).
Had ALJ Greisler followed the treating physician rule, Laurie K.
would have been found disabled due absenteeism. See Jennifer D. v.
Saul, No. 3:19-CV-437 (NAM), 2020 WL 2553102, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. May
20, 2020) (remanding for calculation of benefits because “once proper
weight is given to the restrictive opinion of Plaintiff's treating physician
. . . a finding of disability is inevitable”). In particular, treating
physician Dr. Carr noted that Laurie K. would be absent at least three
days per month due to her conditions. (T. 1878). And this Court, in its
prior remand order, noted that absenteeism is of particular concern in
Laurie K.’s case. See Laurie M.K., 2023 WL 7004934 at *6 (citing more
than 65 treating notes indicating that Laurie K. has a propensity for
missing appointments without explanation). Absenteeism points to
disability here because, while testifying in Laurie K.’s most recent
hearing, a Vocational Expert noted that a claimant being absent more
than 10% of the time would “rule out all employment.” (T. 2842). And
the Vocational Expert added that more than one unscheduled absence
per month—including being late to or leaving early from work—would
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preclude all employment. (T. 2842).
In addition to disabling absenteeism limitations, had ALJ Greisler
followed the treating physician rule, Laurie K.’s social limitations would
have rendered her disabled. As this Court previously noted, treating
physician Dr. Carr reported that Laurie K. presented with an inability
to “deal with the public, use judgment, interact with supervisors, deal
with stress, function independently, maintain attention and
concentration, behave in an emotionally stable manner, and relate
predictably in social situations.” Laurie M.K., 2023 WL 7004934 at *5
(cleaned up). And more tellingly, a review of Dr. Carr’s opinions,
alongside other evidence in the record, shows that Laurie K. has poor
anger management skills which have worsened since her 2015
application for disability.
For example, a report from February 2015 described Laurie K. as
having a “history of suicide attempts,” a “very aggressive attitude” for
several weeks, and “dreams about fighting,” (T. 320). Later, Laurie K.
was forced to establish care with a new physician because she had been
“kicked out” of her previous provider’s office due to “relationship issues.”
(T. 399). Also in 2015, Laurie K. was reported to have been quarrelling
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with treating physician Dr. Carr and was “very unhappy and
frustrated.” (T. 407).
In 2016, treating physician Carr noted that Laurie K. had been
constantly fighting with her abusive partner and had requested
medication to control her anger towards him. (T. 595). In addition,
Laurie K.’s treating therapist noted that she presented with homicidal
ideation—but lacked intent or a plan. (T. 2189).
By 2017, Laurie K.’s anger management showed signs of
worsening. For instance, a medical report shows that she got into two
separate fist fights with her neighbors. (T. 2212). The same report also
noted that she got into an argument at the post office, which required
police intervention. (Id.). At an ALJ hearing that same year, Laurie K.
stated that she “loses her attitude” and that she tries “to control it and
then it’s just like she snaps.” (T. 75) (cleaned up). Laurie K. also
reported that she “had been getting very aggressive” towards Dr. Carr
and her treating therapist Holland. (T. 79).
In 2018, Laurie K. had an argument with a 17-year-old that
almost turned physical; but her significant other intervened, and the
police were called. (T. 2291). Around this same time, Laurie K. had a
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confrontation at Walmart that resulted in the police being called. (Id.).
Laurie K. also presented to her treating therapist with bruised knuckles
after an argument between her significant other and her son. (T. 2295).
In early 2019, Laurie K. was evicted from her home after a
physical altercation with her landlord. (T. 2364). Medical reports also
indicate that she was showing suicidal ideation without any intent or
plan. (T. 2365). And later in 2019, Laurie K. was arrested in Walmart
and charged with third degree assault after she got into a fight. (T.
2402). She reported that she “cannot control her anger when people
make comments about her family or family members”—and “[s]he
immediately gets aggressive.” (Id.).
Throughout 2020, Laurie K. showed issues with poor frustration
tolerance and “severe” mood swings. (T. 2436, 2448). In early 2021,
Laurie K. got into a physical altercation with a 19-year-old. (T. 2491).
Later that same year, Laurie “hit” a woman who refused to clean up
after her dog. (T. 2503). A medical report, created the day before Laurie
K.’s 2021 ALJ hearing, indicated that she was afraid to leave her home
for fear of getting into a fight. (T. 2508). The report also noted that
Laurie K. had recently attacked a woman who yelled a racist comment
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at her friend. (Id.).
By 2023, medical records indicated that Laurie K. has “mood
disorders, mood swings, anxiety, depression, and borderline personality
disorder,” and that she “[g]ets aggressive.” (T. 3372). And in 2024, a
medical report indicated that Laurie K. had “no showed” two
appointments and had “a history of conflict with others.” (T. 3422). And
at Laurie K.’s most recent ALJ hearing, her attorney asked the
Vocational Expert whether any unskilled employment existed that
would involve total isolation. (T. 2843). The Vocational Expert
responded: “there would be no employment where the person is
completely isolated that’s unskilled.” (T. 2843–2844).
But even in the face of Laurie K.’s history of absenteeism and
anger, ALJ Greisler flouted treating physician Dr. Carr’s opinions and
found Laurie K. capable of performing “the full range of work.” (T.
2782). ALJ Greisler reasoned that treating physician’s opinions were
contradicted by the record—so she “assigned little weight to the
opinions and remarks of Dr. Carr.” (T. 2788). But merely mentioning
that a treating physicians “opinions and remarks” are contradicted by
the record does not constitute “good reasons” for rejecting a treating
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physician’s opinion. See Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 129 (2d Cir.
2008). Indeed, if an ALJ refuses to find a treating physician’s opinion
controlling, they must expressly analyze the “length of the treatment
relationship and the frequency of examination; the nature and extent of
the treatment relationship”; the “relevant evidence, particularly
medical signs and laboratory findings, supporting the opinion; the
consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; and whether the
physician is a specialist in the area covering the particular medical
issues. Id. (cleaned up). And ALJ Greisler’s failure to analyze any of the
Burgess factors means that she failed to provide “good reasons” for
rejecting treating physician Dr. Carr’s opinion—which is error. See
Burgess, 537 F.3d at 129; see also Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 505 (2d
Cir. 1998) (holding that the “Commissioner’s failure to provide ‘good
reasons’ for apparently affording no weight to the opinion of plaintiff's
treating physician constituted legal error”).
ALJ Greisler’s error was not harmless. Had she properly given
treating physician Dr. Carr’s opinion controlling weight, ALJ Greisler
would have at minimum provided additional absenteeism limitations—
which would have rendered Laurie K. disabled. See Greek v. Colvin, 802
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F.3d 370, 376 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that because the VE stated that
the claimant’s absenteeism limitations would preclude them from work,
and the ALJ failed to properly analyze the treating physician’s opinion,
the ALJ’s error was not harmless).
At this point, ALJ Greisler is the third ALJ to fail to properly
follow the treating physician rule in Laurie K.’s case. See Steficek v.
Barnhart, 462 F. Supp. 3d 415, 421 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (remanding for the
calculation of benefits because “[t]he Commissioner has already had one
opportunity to correct that errors that occurred in connection with the
first hearing, and has failed to do so; in fact, the ALJ committed the
exact same errors the second time around.”). Taken together, ALJ
Greisler’s error; evidence showing Laurie K.’s absenteeism and social
issues; and the Vocational Examiner’s testimony suggesting that Laurie
K.’s absenteeism would preclude any work convinces the Court that
Laurie K. is disabled. Therefore, the District Court should find that the
record shows persuasive proof of Laurie K.’s disability.
* * *
Ultimately, “[w]here application of the correct legal principles”—
like properly following the treating physician rule—“to the record could
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lead to only one conclusion, there is no need to require agency
reconsideration.” Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1987)
(cleaned up). And considering the opinions of treating physician Dr.
Carr, and the rest of the record, the Court finds that the evidence “could
lead to only one conclusion”—that Laurie K. is disabled. Therefore, the
Court recommends remand solely for the calculation of benefits.
3. This case’s nearly-11-year delay further supports the
District Court remanding the case for calculation of
benefits.
In addition to the record being adequately developed and showing
persuasive proof of disability, remand solely for the calculation of
benefits is appropriate because this case has faced excessive delay.
Excessive delay cannot be the only reason that a court remands a case
solely for the calculation of benefits. But where, as here, persuasive
proof of disability has been shown, then excessive delay can factor into
the decision to remand solely for the calculation of benefits. Therefore,
the Court recommends remand solely for the calculation of benefits.
Remand for calculation of benefits is appropriate where, coupled
with persuasive proof of disability, the claimant’s case is marked by
substantial delay. See, e.g., Archer v. Astrue, 910 F. Supp. 2d 411, 428
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(N.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Courts are directed to avoid contributing any further
to the delay of the determination of a claimant’s application by
remanding for further administrative proceedings when such an
instruction would prove unnecessary.”) (cleaned up).
This case has been excessively delayed. Laurie K. initially applied
for benefits more than a decade ago. (T. 97, 183). She has attended at
least five administrative hearings over the same period. See (T. 2814–
2848). Three different ALJs have issued unfavorable decisions—each of
which has been remanded because the ALJ failed to properly apply the
treating physician rule. See generally (Def.’s Br.); (Def.’s Supp. Br.). In
fact, the Commissioner has twice requested remand to correct errors
involving an ALJ failing to properly apply the treating physician rule.
See generally (Def.’s Br.); (Def.’s Supp. Br.). Considering the length of
Laurie K.’s proceedings, the District Court should remand solely for the
calculation of benefits. See Mortise, 713 F. Supp. 2d at 128 (remanding
for calculation of benefits because the ALJ had repeatedly erred in
applying the treating physician rule and further development of the
record would only cause further unnecessary delay).
* * *
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The Court recommends remand solely for the calculation of
benefits. Laurie K. has shown that the record is sufficiently complete
and that she is disabled. See Soto v. Barnhart, 242 F. Supp. 2d 251, 254
(W.D.N.Y. 2003) (remanding solely for calculation of benefits where the
ALJ’s error was in interpreting and weighing treating physician
evidence, not in failing to develop a complete record). And further, this
case has faced excessive delay. see McClain, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 330-31
(ordering remand for calculation of benefits in light of a nine-year
delay). In consequence, the Court recommends remand solely for the
calculation of benefits.
VII. CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based on the findings above, it is
RECOMMENDED that Laurie K.’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings (Dkt. 15) be GRANTED; and it is further
RECOMMENDED, that the Commissioner’s motion for judgment
on the pleadings (Dkt. 22) be DENIED; and it is further
RECOMMENDED, that the ALJ’s decision be REVERSED AND
REMANDED SOLELY FOR THE CALCULATION OF BENEFITS.
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In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen
days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such
objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO
OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL
PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85
(2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 892
F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, 6(a).
Dated: April 21, 2026
__________________________
Hon. Mitchell J. Katz
U.S. Magistrate Judge
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