Perry v. Commissioner of Social Security

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
__________________________________________________________________
Karen P.,1
Plaintiff,
v. 3:25-cv-81
(MJK)
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant.
__________________________________________________________________
Howard Olinsky, Esq., for Plaintiff
Molly Carter, Special Asst. U.S. Attorney, for Defendant
Mitchell J. Katz, U.S. Magistrate Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER
Karen P. brought this action under the Social Security Act (42
U.S.C. § 405(g)) seeking judicial review of the Social Security
Commissioner’s final decision denying her application for benefits. (Dkt.
1.). Karen P. consented to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge. (Dkt.
4). Both parties filed briefs (Dkts. 11, 17, 18) which the Court treats as
motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), in accordance with General Order
18.
1 This Memorandum-Decision and Order will identify the plaintiff using only her
first name and last initial to protect her privacy.
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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 31, 2023, Karen P. filed applications for Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB), and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”),
alleging disability beginning September 1, 2022. (T. 10).2 Both
applications were initially denied on December 23, 2023, and upon
reconsideration on April 12, 2024. (T. 10). On October 9, 2024,
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Kenneth Theurer held a virtual
hearing during which Karen P. and Vocational Expert (“VE”), Christine
DiTrinco, testified. (T. 45-63). On July 29, 2024, the ALJ issued a
decision denying Karen P.’s claims. (T. 32, 30). This became the
Commissioner’s final decision after the Appeals Council denied Karen
P.’s request for review. (T. 1-3).
II. GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAW
A. Disability Standards
To be considered disabled, a claimant seeking DIB or SSI benefits
must establish that they are “unable to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
2 All page references are to the Administrative Transcript (“T.”), and not the page
numbers assigned by the CM/ECF pagination system.
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mental impairment which can be expected to result in death, or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than twelve months . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). Additionally, the
claimant’s
physical or mental impairment or impairments [must be] of
such severity that they are not only unable to do their
previous work but cannot, considering their age, education,
and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless
of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which
they live, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for them, or
whether they would be hired if they applied for work.
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B) (cleaned up).
The Commissioner uses a five-step process, set forth in 20 C.F.R.
sections 404.1520 (for DIB) and 416.920 (for SSI), to evaluate disability
claims:
First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If [they are]
not, the [Commissioner] next considers whether the claimant
has a “severe impairment” which significantly limits [their]
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. If the
claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is
whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has
an impairment which meets or equals the criteria of an
impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the
claimant has such an impairment, the [Commissioner] will
consider [them] disabled without considering vocational
factors such as age, education, and work experience . . . .
Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the
fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant’s severe
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impairment, [they have] the residual functional capacity to
perform [their] past work. Finally, if the claimant is unable to
perform [their] past work, the [Commissioner] then
determines whether there is other work which the claimant
can perform.
Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam); see
Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Berry, 675
F.2d at 467). The claimant has the burden of establishing disability at
the first four steps. Berry, 675 F.2d at 467. If the claimant establishes
that their impairment prevents them from performing their past work,
then the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove the fifth and final
step. Id.
B. Scope of Review
When reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, courts must
determine whether the correct legal standards were applied and
whether substantial evidence supported the decision. Id. at 417; see also
Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012); 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012). It must be “more
than a scintilla” of evidence scattered throughout the administrative
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record. Id. Yet this standard is a very deferential standard of review “—
even more so than the ‘clearly erroneous standard.’” Brault, 683 F.3d at
448. “To determine on appeal whether an ALJ’s findings are supported
by substantial evidence, reviewing courts consider the whole record,
examining the evidence from both sides, because an analysis of the
substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts
from its weight.” Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258
(2d Cir. 1988). But reviewing courts may not substitute their
interpretation of the administrative record for that of the Commissioner
if the record contains substantial support for the ALJ’s decision. Id.; see
also Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).
ALJs need not explicitly analyze every piece of conflicting
evidence in the record. See Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d
Cir. 1983); see also Miles v. Harris, 645 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1981)
(“[W]e are unwilling to require an ALJ explicitly to reconcile every
conflicting shred of medical testimony[.]”). But ALJs cannot “‘pick and
choose’ evidence in the record that supports [their] conclusions.” Cruz v.
Barnhart, 343 F. Supp. 2d 218, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also Fuller v.
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Astrue, No. 09-CV-6279, 2010 WL 5072112, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 6,
2010).
III. FACTS
The record includes Karen P.’s medical treatment records, which
the parties are familiar with. The Court will refer to the pertinent
records and Karen P.’s hearing testimony in its analysis as appropriate.
IV. THE ALJ’S DECISION
At step one of the five-step sequential evaluation, the ALJ
determined that Karen P. had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since September 1, 2022. (T. 13).
At step two, the ALJ found that Karen P. had the following severe
impairments: “depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, osteoarthritis of
the lumbar spine, Turner syndrome, and disorder of the hip. (Id.). The
ALJ found that Karen P. had the following nonsevere impairments:
hypothyroidism, bilateral sensorineural hearing loss, vision problems,
heart problems associated with Turner syndrome, urinary tract issues,
and obesity. (T. 13-16).
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At step three, the ALJ determined that Karen P.’s impairments
neither meet nor medically equal the criteria of any listed impairments
in Appendix 1 to 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P. (T. 17).
Next, the ALJ discussed the “paragraph B” criteria. (T. 14-15). “To
satisfy the paragraph B criteria,” mental impairments “must result in
one extreme limitation or two marked limitations in a broad area of
functioning.” See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00(A)(2)(b)
(cleaned up). The four broad areas of mental functioning are: (1)
understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2) interacting
with others; (3) maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; and (4)
adapting and managing oneself. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1,
§ 12.00(C). Here, the ALJ found that Karen P. did not meet the
“paragraph B” criteria because they determined that Karen P. had only
mild limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying
information; moderate limitations in interacting with others; moderate
limitations in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and
moderate limitations in adapting or managing herself. (T. 18).
The ALJ also considered the “paragraph C” criteria. (T. 19). The
“paragraph C” criteria require a documented medical history of the
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existence of the disorder over a period of at least two years, with
evidence of both (a) medical treatment, mental health therapy,
psychosocial support(s), or a highly structured setting(s) that is ongoing
and that diminishes the symptoms and signs of the mental disorder;
and (b) marginal adjustment, that is, minimal capacity to adapt to
changes in environment or to demands that are not already part of daily
life. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00(A)(2)(c). The ALJ
noted that the “paragraph C” criteria were not met. (Id.).
Next, the ALJ determined that Karen P. had the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform:
light work except [Karen P.] has additional limitations or
restrictions: can occasionally lift and carry twenty pounds;
can frequently lift and carry ten pounds; can sit for up to six
hours and can stand or walk for approximately four hours in
an eight-hour day with normal breaks; can occasionally climb
ramps or stairs; can never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds;
can perform occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling,
crouching, and crawling; requires work limited to carrying out
simple instructions in a work environment; requires work
involving only simple, work-related decisions; requires work
with no more than occasional changes in routine work setting;
and can interact with coworkers, supervisors, and the public
on an occasional basis throughout the workday.
(T. 20).
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When crafting the RFC, the ALJ stated that he considered all
Karen P.’s symptoms, and the extent to which those symptoms could
“reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical
evidence and other evidence[.]” (Id.). The ALJ added that he fully
considered “the medical opinion(s) and prior administrative medical
finding(s)” as required by 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 416.920c. (Id.).
At step four, the ALJ reasoned that Karen P. was unable to
perform past relevant work. (T. 29). The ALJ reasoned that Karen P. is
within the “closely approaching advances age” category, has at least a
high school education, and that “transferability of job skills is not an
issue.” (T 29-30) (cleaned up).
At step five, using the Medical Vocational Guidelines as a
“framework,” and the VE’s testimony, the ALJ found that Karen P. was
“capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in
significant numbers in the national economy.” (T. 29-30). To end, the
ALJ found that Karen P. was not disabled. (T. 30).
V. ISSUES IN CONTENTION
Karen P. argues that the ALJ’s improperly evaluated Dr. Rizk’s
medical opinions, failed to fully adopt Dr. Laird’s opined limitations,
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and improperly discounted Karen P.’s subjective reports of symptoms.
(Karen P.’s Brief (“Pl.’s Br.”) at 3 (Dkt. 11)). (Karen P.’s Reply Brief
(“Rep. Br.”) at 3-11 (Dkt. 18)). The Commissioner replied that the ALJ
properly supported his opinion. (Defendant’s Brief (“Def Br.”) at 2 (Dkt.
17)).
VI. DISCUSSION
The Court affirms the ALJ’s decision for the following three
reasons. First, the ALJ properly analyzed Dr. Rizk’s medical opinions.
Second, the ALJ properly incorporated parts of Dr. Laird’s limitations
into the RFC. And third, the ALJ properly discounted Karen P.’s
subjective complaints.
A. The ALJ properly found Dr. Rizk’s opinions of Karen
P.’s physical and mental limitations “less persuasive”
and “unpersuasive.”
The Court holds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
decision to discount Dr. Rizk’s medical opinions. When reviewing an
ALJ’s decision, the reviewing court must determine whether substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s determinations. Here, the ALJ properly
applied the regulations. And any error in the ALJ’s analysis was
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harmless. Altogether, the Court concludes that the ALJ properly
supported his decision.
When evaluating medical evidence, ALJs’ must consider all
medical opinions and “evaluate their persuasiveness” under a five-factor
framework. The five factors are: (1) supportability, (2) consistency, (3)
relationship with the claimant (which has five sub-factors to consider),
(4) specialization, and (5) other factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a)-(c),
416.920c(a)-(c). The two “most important factors for determining the
persuasiveness of medical opinions are consistency and supportability.”
Lisa J.H. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 5:24-CV-01247, 2025 WL 3669633, at
*5 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2025).
“Supportability” is an internal check: “The more relevant the
objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a
medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical
opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1). “Consistency” is an external check: “The
more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical sources and
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nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical
opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520c(c)(2), § 416.920c(c)(2). ALJs’ must explicitly state how they
considered both factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2).
The ALJ properly analyzed the supportability of Dr. Rizk’s
opinion. To start, Dr. Rizk treated Karen P. every 3-4 months for 20
years. (T. 822). He completed three medical opinions concerning Karen
P.’s physical limitations, and four medical opinions concerning Karen
P.’s mental limitations.3 Dr. Rizk opined that Karen P. would be off task
more than 25% of the workday and absent more than 4 days per month.
(T. 451-52). Dr. Rizk further opined that Karen P. could stand for one
hour, walk for one hour, and sit for three hours total in an eight-hour
workday, and that she needed the ability to sit and stand throughout
the day. (T. 823). Dr. Rizk based his opinions on “tests, [and]
treatments.” (T. 452).
3 Each opinion offers identical phrasing and opined limitations. Karen P. cites
across eight opinions from Dr. Rizk as if each opinion offered different and
reinforcing analysis and conclusions. They do not. In fact, each physical opinion that
Dr. Rizk submitted checks the same boxes and offers substantially similar
rationales. (451-54, 822-25, 906-909, 964-67). Each mental opinion does the same.
(T. 443-46, 828-832, 911-14, 959-62). Dr. Rizk stated he had filled out the same
paperwork multiple times. (T. 490).
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When analyzing the supportability of Dr. Rizk’s opinions, the ALJ
reasoned that “the opinions amount to a ‘check box’ form without much
additional explanation or citations to the evidence of record to support
the degree of limits identified when evaluating supportability of the
opinions.” (T. 25, 27). The ALJ added that “there is nothing particularly
vague about the opinions of Dr. Rizk that would require further
clarification given the lack of evidence in the record to support the
various marked and extreme limitations identified.” (T. 25, 28) (cleaned
up). Although, as Karen P. appears to argue, a treating source opinion
may not “be discounted . . . based on the naked fact that it was provided
in a check-box form.” Colgan v. Kijakazi, 22 F.4th 353, 361 (2d Cir.
2021). But it may be discounted if it is not “supported by substantial
evidence.” Schillo v. Saul, 31 F.4th 64, 77 (2d Cir. 2022); see also
Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 n.2 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that a
standardized form without accompanying explanation is “only
marginally useful for purposes of creating a meaningful and reviewable
factual record”).
Here, the ALJ rejected Dr. Rizk’s opinions not on the naked fact
that they were provided on a checkbox form, but because they were
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provided on a checkbox form and were unsupported by Dr. Rizk’s
treatment notes. More specifically, the ALJ determined that Dr. Rizk’s
physical medical opinions were unsupported by treatment notes which
showed “few positive clinical findings” on the exams Dr. Rizk conducted.
(T. 26.) And the ALJ also noted that Dr. Rizk’s mental opinions were
not supported by his available records which showed that Karen P. was
alert and oriented; had no significant behavioral limitations, no
psychomotor changes, decreased energy or difficulty concentrating or
thinking to support significant limitations. (T. 28). Because the ALJ
took issue not simply with the fact that Dr. Rizk’s opinions were in
checkbox form, but that they were unsupported by Dr. Rizk’s treatment
notes, the ALJ’s supportability analysis of Dr. Rizk’s opinion passes
muster.
The ALJ improperly analyzed the consistency of Dr. Rizk’s
opinions. While analyzing consistency, ALJs’ “must look outside the
medical opinion itself to evidence from other medical sources and
nonmedical sources in the claim and will find the medical opinion more
persuasive the more consistent it is with these external sources.”
Kathleen A. v. Comm’r of the SSA, No. 3:20-CV-1034, 2022 WL 673824,
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*5 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2022) (cleaned up). The ALJ noted that Dr. Rizk’s
opinions were inconsistent with those of the state agency medical
consultants and the consultative examiner opinions. (T. 25, 28). But the
ALJ offered mere citations to the state agency medical consultants and
consultative examiner opinions with scant additional explanation. (T.
26, 28). And simply “identifying a lack of consistency but failing to
explain the inconsistency in the context of the medical record as a whole
prevents meaningful review.” James W. v. Kijakazi, No. 8:20-CV-954
(DJS), 2022 WL 685288, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2022) (cleaned up). As
it stands, the ALJ did not properly articulate their consistency analysis
for Dr. Rizk’s opinions.
Be that as it may, ALJs’ failing to explain the supportability and
consistency of a medical opinion is procedural error. Loucks v. Kijakazi,
2022 WL 2189293, at *2 (2d Cir. June 17, 2022) (summary order). And
“if a procedural error occurred regarding the consistency factor,”
remand is unnecessary if “a searching review of the record assures” the
Court “that the substance of the [regulation] was not traversed.” See
Daniel M. S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:24-CV-379 (BKS/TWD), 2025
WL 957411 at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025). Put simply, if the reviewing
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court can “adequately ‘glean’ how the ALJ [implicitly] weighed the
consistency and supportability factors,” remand is not justified because
the procedural error is considered harmless. Davidia B. v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., No. 21-CV-384, 2023 WL 5361000, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 22,
2023).
The Court can glean how the ALJ analyzed that factor by looking
to other portions of the ALJ’s decision. Immediately following their
assessment of Dr. Rizk’s physical opinions, the ALJ explicitly discussed
evidence that showed that Karen P. had lesser limitations than those
that Dr. Rizk opined. (T. 26). For example, the ALJ pointed to opinions
from state agency medical consultants, who reviewed all medical
records on December 7, 2023, and April 11, 2024, which showed that
Karen P. had no need for greater physical limitations or postural
limitations. (Id.). The ALJ also noted that exams generally showed that
Karen P. presented with a normal gait. (Id.). For mental limitations,
the ALJ specifically cited, analyzed, and adopted limitations from
medical opinions submitted by Drs. Laird and Long. (T. 27). The ALJ
explained that Drs. Laird and Long produced their opinions after
examinations of Karen P.. (Id.). All in all, the Court can glean how the
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ALJ found Dr. Rizk’s opinions inconsistent with the remainder of the
record. See Adam R. T. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-CV-01170
(FJS/ATB), 2023 WL 1775689, at *4-5 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2023) (holding
that an ALJ's reference to consistency with the overall record without
further explanation was, at most, harmless error because the court
could glean ALJ's rationale from analysis of medical findings and other
opinions).
At its core, the ALJ’s opinion plainly shows that they considered
the supportability of Dr. Rizk’s medical opinions. See (T. 25-26, 27-28).
And although the ALJ failed to properly articulate their consistency
analysis concerning Dr. Rizk’s opinions, this failure was harmless error.
In consequence, remand is unwarranted. See Earl H. L. v. O’Malley, No.
5:23-CV-00643, 2024 WL 4442724, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. July 26, 2024)
(“The ALJ’s assessment of the persuasiveness of the medical opinions is,
at face value, valid, and ‘it is not the function of the reviewing court to
reweigh evidence.’”) (cleaned up).
B. The ALJ properly considered Dr. Laird’s opined
limitations while formulating the RFC
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to partially
adopt Dr. Laird’s opined limitations. ALJs’ RFC determinations need
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not fully match a single opinion in the record, so long as they are
supported by substantial evidence. Here, the ALJ properly supported
their RFC decision with substantial evidence. So, the Court sees no
reason to disturb the ALJ’s decision.
“RFC is the individual's maximum remaining ability to do
sustained work activities in an ordinary work setting on a regular and
continuing basis.” Melville v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1999). A
“regular and continuing basis” means eight hours a day, for five days a
week, or an equivalent work schedule. Balles v. Astrue, No. 3:11-CV-
1386 (MAD), 2013 WL 252970, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2013) (citing
Melville 198 F.3d at 52). In rendering an RFC determination, ALJs’
must “weigh all of the evidence available to make an RFC finding that
[is] consistent with the record as a whole.” Matta v. Astrue, 508 F. App’x
at 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2013).
Even so, the RFC need not perfectly mirror any particular medical
sources cited in the ALJ’s decision. See Angela G. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 5:19-CV-1521 (ML), 2021 WL 22609, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2021)
(collecting cases) (“In formulating a plaintiff's RFC, an ALJ does not
have to adhere to the entirety of one medical source's opinion.”).
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Provided the ALJ considers all the medical evidence and appropriately
analyzes the medical opinions, an RFC that is consistent with the
record is not error. See Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir.
2013) (holding that remand is unnecessary “[w]here an ALJ’s analysis
at Step Four regarding a claimant’s functional limitations and
restrictions affords an adequate basis for meaningful judicial review,
applies the proper legal standards, and is supported by substantial
evidence”).
The ALJ properly adopted some limitations that Dr. Laird opined,
but not others. The ALJ found Dr Laird’s medical opinion “generally
persuasive overall.” (T. 27). And the ALJ largely incorporated the
limitations that Dr. Laird opined. For example, the ALJ’s RFC provided
moderate limitations in Karen P.’s ability to interact with others,
sustain concentration, make decisions, perform at a consistent pace,
regulate emotions, control behavior, and maintain well-being—the
precise limitations that Dr. Laird opined. (Id.). The ALJ only differed
with Dr. Laird concerning Karen P.’s absences, off-task behavior, and
limits in sustaining an ordinary routine and regular attendance because
he found those limitations “speculative.” (Id.).
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Karen P. argues that the ALJ should have adopted all limitations
that Dr. Laird opined. (Pl. Br. at 21). But even if the ALJ had done so,
Karen P. would still not meet the disability criteria. Because
“‘moderate’ limitations do not preclude an individual’s ability to work.”
Matta, 508 F. App’x at 55 (affirming decision where “[t]he ALJ found
that [the] plaintiff had moderate difficulties in concentration,
persistence and pace and moderate difficulties in social functioning that
limit [him] to simple, routine, low-stress, and unskilled tasks, which
involve no more than minimal contact with co-workers, supervisors and
the general public.”)).
Regardless, Karen P. bears the burden to prove a more restrictive
RFC than the RFC assessed by the ALJ—and she has not done so. See
Smith v. Berryhill, 740 F. App’x 721, 726 (2d Cir. 2018) (citation
omitted). As it stands, there is no basis for the Court to second guess
the ALJ’s RFC determination.
C. The ALJ properly analyzed and discounted Karen P.’s
subjective complaints
The ALJ properly rejected Karen P.’s subjective complaints. ALJs’
are not required to accept a claimant’s subjective complaints without
question; they may exercise discretion in weighing the credibility of the
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claimant’s testimony against the record. Because the ALJ did so here,
and supported his conclusions with substantial evidence, the Court sees
no reason to disturb the ALJ’s findings.
It is for ALJs’ not courts, “to resolve evidentiary conflicts and to
appraise the credibility of witnesses, including the claimant.” Meyer v.
Comm’r Soc. Sec., 794 F. App’x. 23, 26 (2d Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).
The ALJ must “carefully consider all the evidence presented by
claimants regarding their symptoms, which fall into seven relevant
factors including daily activities and the location, duration, frequency,
and intensity of their pain or other symptoms.” Debra T. v. Comm'r of
Soc. Sec., No. 8:16-CV-157 (TWD), 2019 WL 1208788, at *9 (N.D.N.Y.
Mar. 14, 2019) (cleaned up).
Evaluating symptoms involves a two-step process. Initially, the
ALJ must determine, based upon the objective medical evidence,
whether the medical impairments “could reasonably be expected to
produce the pain or other symptoms alleged . . . .” 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1529(a), (b); 416.929(a), (b). If so, then the ALJ must consider “‘the
extent to which [the claimant's] alleged functional limitations and
restrictions due to pain or other symptoms can reasonably be accepted
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as consistent with the [objective medical evidence] and other evidence to
decide how [the claimant’s] symptoms affect [her] ability to work.’”
Barry v. Colvin, 606 F. App'x 621, 623 (2d Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). If the
objective medical evidence does not substantiate the claimant's
symptoms, the ALJ must look to other evidence. See Cichocki, 534 F.
App’x at 76. Such other evidence includes the claimant’s subjective
complaints. See Meadors v. Astrue, 370 F. App’x 179, 183 (2d Cir. 2010)
(“an important element in the adjudication of [Social Security] claims,
and must be thoroughly considered in calculating the RFC of a
claimant.”).
The ALJ must assess the claimant’s subjective complaints by
considering the record in light of the following symptom-related factors:
(1) claimant's daily activities; (2) location, duration, frequency, and
intensity of claimant's symptoms; (3) precipitating and aggravating
factors; (4) type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any
medication taken to relieve symptoms; (5) other treatment received to
relieve symptoms; (6) any measures taken by the claimant to relieve
symptoms; and (7) any other factors concerning claimant's functional
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limitations and restrictions due to symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3).
Here, the ALJ correctly applied the two-step process. First, the
ALJ found that Karen P. had a severe impairment that could
reasonably be expected to produce the pain and other symptoms that
she alleged. (T. 20). Second, the ALJ evaluated Karen P.’s description of
her physical and mental ailments (T. 21-23).
For physical symptoms, the ALJ compared Karen P.’s statements
of severe pain, to her descriptions of mild to moderate pain from her
treating physician’s notes. (T. 21-22). The ALJ also compared Karen P.’s
claim that physical therapy offered no relief with “physical therapy
progress notes that showed some improvement in symptoms or making
gains towards short-term and long-term treatment goals, even if
‘slowly.’” (T. 22) (citing T. 919, 921).
For mental symptoms, the ALJ discussed how medication elicited
positive responses. (Id.). The ALJ added that Karen P.’s current
psychological symptoms appear well-controlled with Prozac. (Id.). The
ALJ noted that Karen P. showed no thoughts toward suicide and had
“not required recurrent emergency department visits, prolonged
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inpatient psychiatric hospitalization, a day treatment program, or
placement in a board and care facility for uncontrolled psychiatric
symptoms.” (Id.).
The ALJ also concluded that Karen P.’s engagement in daily
activity belied her request for greater physical and mental limitations.
(T. 23). He noted that Karen P. cared for multiple pets including
cleaning cages, feeding, and changing their water; did laundry;
vacuumed for ten minutes before taking a 20–30-minute break; made
her bed; cooked daily for up to one hour; and washed dishes. (T. 23).
Responding to Karen P.’s self-described difficulty socializing, the ALJ
noted that Karen P. lives with her boyfriend, does not consistently
complain of difficulty socializing, goes to the grocery store, and attends
medical appointments. (T. 23). The ALJ added that Karen P. can
engage in activities that include performing simple and routine tasks,
paying attention, and understanding written information such as caring
for pets, doing laundry, reading, driving a motor vehicle, paying
recurring bills, and shopping for groceries. (Id.).
Boiled down, the ALJ analyzed the subjective testimony that he
found inconsistent with the objective medical evidence and explained
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his determination with sufficient specificity to meet the deferential
substantial evidence standard. See Stanton v. Astrue, 370 F. App’x 231,
234 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating that a court has “no reason to second-guess
the credibility finding in a case where the ALJ identified specific record-
based reasons for his ruling.”) (cleaned up). In consequence, the Court
sees no need to disturb the ALJ’s determination.
VII. CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based on the findings above, it is
ORDERED, that Karen P.’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
(Dkt. 11) be DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings (Dkt. 17) be GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the ALJ’s decision be AFFIRMED.
Dated: February 19, 2026.
__________________________
Hon. Mitchell J. Katz
U.S. Magistrate Judge
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