Greene v. Commissioner of Social Security

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________________
DALTON G.,
Plaintiff,
v. 	3:22-CV-1070
(DJS)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
________________________________________
DANIEL J. STEWART
United States Magistrate Judge
DECISION AND ORDER
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this matter on October 17, 2022, seeking review of
the Commissioner’s determination denying Plaintiff’s application for disability benefits.
Dkt. No. 1. On October 19, 2023, the Court remanded the matter to the Social Security
Administration for further proceedings. 	Dkt. Nos. 15-16. 	An award of attorney’s fees
was previously entered pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). Dkt. No.
18. 	Upon review of the matter on remand, the Administrative Law Judge issued a
favorable decision awarding Plaintiff benefits. Dkt. No. 19-1, ¶ 2. Plaintiff’s counsel has
now filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). 	Dkt. No. 19.
Specifically, Plaintiff’s counsel seeks attorney’s fees in the amount of $17,863.00, of
which he would remit to Plaintiff the sum previously awarded under the EAJA. Dkt. No.
19-1 at ¶¶ 2 & 6.
For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted.
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II. DISCUSSION
The Social Security Act provides:
Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this
subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court
may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such
representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due
benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.
42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). This section “calls for court review of such arrangements as
an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in particular cases.”
Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). The court “must give due deference to
the intent of the parties, but it ought not blindly approve every fee request made pursuant
to a contingent agreement.” Wells v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 367, 372 (2d Cir. 1990).
“[A] requested fee based on a contingent fee arrangement should be enforced
unless the court finds it to be unreasonable.” Id. at 370. In determining whether a fee is
reasonable, a court should consider whether the attorney is responsible for a delay in the
proceedings, as well as “whether there has been fraud or overreaching in making the
agreement, and whether the requested amount is so large as to be a windfall to the
attorney.” 	Id. at 372; see also Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 808. 	In determining
whether an award would constitute a windfall, the Second Circuit has identified a number
of relevant factors including the ability and expertise of counsel, the nature and length of
counsel’s relationship with the client, the satisfaction of the claimant, and the uncertainty
of the outcome of the case. Fields v. Kijakazi, 24 F.4th 845, 854-56 (2d Cir. 2022); see
also Porter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2009 WL 2045688, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. July 10, 2009)
(identifying three related considerations). 	If the court finds the fee is unreasonable, the
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court “may reduce the fee provided it states the reasons for and the amounts of the
deductions.” Id. at *2.
Here, the contingency fee agreement provides in pertinent part that any fee award
under section 406(b) would not exceed 25% of all past due benefits. Dkt. No. 19-4. The
amount requested does not exceed the 25% cap, and there is no evidence of fraud or
overreaching.
Counsel seeks $17,863.00 in attorney’s fees. Dkt. No. 19-1. Counsel notes a total
of 33.8 hours expended on this matter at the federal court level. 	Dkt. No. 19-2. 	This
results in a de facto hourly rate of slightly over $528. Id. This is within the range awarded
as attorney’s fees in this type of case. See Eric K. v. Berryhill, 2019 WL 1025791, at *3
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2019) (finding de facto hourly rate of $1,500 “is not out of line with
the corresponding hourly rate of attorney’s fees approved by district courts within the
Second Circuit.”); Filipkowski v. Barnhart, 2009 WL 2426008, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 6,
2009) (awarding attorney’s fees at a de facto hourly rate of $743.30). 	Counsel prepared
and filed a persuasive Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings which ultimately secured a
remand. See Dkt. Nos. 9 & 14. In addition, Plaintiff has been awarded significant benefits
as a result of the litigation. See Dkt. No. 19-1 at ¶ 2. Finally, in reviewing counsel’s time
log, it generally appears to reflect properly recorded and appropriate attorney work. Dkt.
No. 19-2. 	Defendant does not contest the timeliness of the Motion or oppose the
application. Dkt. No. 20.
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III. CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, it is hereby
ORDERED, 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	for 	Attorney’s 	Fees 	(Dkt. 	No. 	19) 	is
GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED, that Attorney Gorton is awarded the sum of $17,863.00 as fees
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), to be paid from the amount withheld by the Commissioner
of Social Security from the past due benefits awarded to Plaintiff; and it is further
ORDERED, that Attorney Gorton is directed to remit to Plaintiff any sum that
was previously awarded and received as fees pursuant to the EAJA; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Decision and Order
upon the parties to this action in accordance with the Local Rules.
Dated: February 9, 2026
Albany, New York
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