Young America's Foundation et al v. Stenger et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
YOUNG AMERICA’S FOUNDATION, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JOHN PELLETIER, et al.,
Defendants.
3:20-cv-822
(ECC/TWD)
Andrew Hruska, Esq., for Plaintiffs
Molly M. Ryan, Esq., for Defendant Pelletier
James S. Gleason, Esq., for Defendant Student Association
Hon. Elizabeth C. Coombe, United States District Judge:1
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Young America’s Foundation, Binghamton University College Republicans, and
John Lizak2 filed this action alleging violations of their First Amendment rights related to a
planned guest lecture hosted by Plaintiffs on the campus of SUNY Binghamton (the University).
Dkt. No. 1. 	After a motion to dismiss and the Court’s sua sponte review of subject matter
jurisdiction, four defendants remained: John Pelletier, Chief of the University’s Police Department
(Pelletier), Harvey Stenger, the University President, and Brian Rose, the University Vice
President of Student Affairs (Rose) (collectively the State Defendants) and the Student Association
1 This matter was previously assigned to the Honorable Lawrence E. Kahn and has been reassigned
to the undersigned. Dkt. No. 355.
2 Shane Rossi is the current student representative. He was substituted for Rein Bey, and Bey was
substituted for the original student representative, John Lizak. Dkt. No. 352 at 16, 19.
Case 3:20-cv-00822-ECC-TWD Document 416 Filed 01/21/26 Page 1 of 10

2
of the University (SA). See Dkt. Nos. 223, 238. The SA is an entity funded by, but legally distinct
from, the University. Id. at 4.3
On March 20, 2025, Senior U.S. District Judge Lawrence E. Kahn issued a decision
granting in part and denying in part motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants (the
Decision). Dkt. No. 352. Presently before the Court is the SA’s motion for reconsideration of the
Decision’s conclusion that a First Amendment retaliation claim against the SA remains even
though the Decision dismissed all claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, and the pending
complaint sought only declaratory and injunctive relief against the SA. 	SA’s Motion for
Reconsideration (Def. Mtn.), Dkt. No. 369. The motion is fully briefed. Dkt. Nos. 369, 371, 373.
For the following reasons, the motion for reconsideration is granted.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The pending complaint explicitly seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against the SA,
and monetary relief against the State Defendants, but it does not explicitly seek monetary relief
against the SA. Amended Complaint at 41, Dkt. No. 262. The Decision explicitly dismisses the
injunctive relief claims against the State Defendants and the SA. 	Decision at 23, n. 6. 	It also
explicitly dismisses the declaratory relief claims against the State Defendants, but it does not
discuss the declaratory relief claim against the SA. Id. at 21-24. After discussing the equitable
relief claims, the Decision explains that “[t]he remaining claims are . . . a First Amendment
retaliation claim against Stenger and Rose in their individual capacities and the Student
Association. . . .” Id. at 24. The Decision concludes that there is a genuine dispute of material fact
regarding the First Amendment retaliation claim. Id. at 33-37. Finally, the Decision orders that
“all claims seeking declaratory and injunctive relief” are dismissed. Id. at 33-37, 44.
3 Page numbers refer to the pagination generated by ECF, unless otherwise indicated.
Case 3:20-cv-00822-ECC-TWD Document 416 Filed 01/21/26 Page 2 of 10

3
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Reconsideration is warranted where the moving party can show the court “overlooked”
facts or controlling law that “might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the
court.” Human Electronics, Inc. v. Emerson Radio Corp., 375 F. Supp. 2d 102, 114 (N.D.N.Y.
2004) (quoting Schrader v. CSX Transp., Inc. 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995)). “The prevailing
rule recognizes only three possible grounds upon which motions for reconsideration may be
granted; they are (1) an intervening change in controlling law, (2) the availability of new evidence
not previously available, or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest
injustice.” 	O’Brien v. City of Syracuse, No. 5:22-cv-948 (MAD) 2024 WL 4252052, at *2
(N.D.N.Y. 2024) (cleaned up). “In the context of a motion for reconsideration, ‘manifest injustice’
is defined as an error committed by the trial court that is direct, obvious, and observable.” Corpac
v. Rubin & Rothman, 10 F. Supp. 3d 349, 354 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Idowu v. Middleton, No.
12-cv-1238, 2013 WL 371657, at *1 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2013)). The burden of proof falls on
the party challenging the earlier judgment. See United States v. Int’l Bd. of Teamsters, 247 F.3d
370, 391 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Paddington Partners v. Bouchard, 34 F.3d 1132, 1142 (2d Cir.
1994)). “The standard for reconsideration is strict and is committed to the discretion of the court.”
S.E.C. v. Wojeski, 752 F. Supp. 2d 220, 223 (N.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Smith v. S.E.C., 432
F. App’x 10 (2d Cir. 2011).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Timing of the Motion for Reconsideration
Local Rule 60.1 requires motions for reconsideration be filed within 14 days of the
challenged ruling, “unless otherwise provided by the Court, by statute or rule.” Courts have the
discretion to consider untimely motions for reconsideration under certain circumstances. 	See
Case 3:20-cv-00822-ECC-TWD Document 416 Filed 01/21/26 Page 3 of 10

4
Wilson v. Hilton, No. 5:20-cv-1489 (DNH), 2024 WL 510286, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2024)
(considering a motion for reconsideration filed 10 months after the decision was issued and seven
months after the intervening change of law); see also Palmer v. Sena, 474 F. Supp. 2d 353, 354
(D. Conn. 2007) (“A failure to timely file a motion for reconsideration may constitute sufficient
grounds for denying the motion; however, courts have exercised their discretion to address even
untimely motions”).
Here, the SA filed its motion for reconsideration more than two months after the Decision
was issued, and it is therefore untimely. See Dkt. Nos. 352 (Decision issued on March 20, 2025);
369 (Def. Mtn. filed on June 2, 2025). 	The briefing demonstrates, however, that the Decision has
inconsistent language that the Court should address because it would be a waste of judicial
resources and a clear legal error for the case to proceed to trial with a party where there are no live
claims. As a result, it is in the interest of justice for the Court to consider the untimely motion.
B. 	Claim for Declaratory Relief against the SA
The SA argues that there is no remaining First Amendment retaliation claim against it
because the Amended Complaint seeks only equitable relief, and the Decision dismissed “all
claims seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.” Def. Mot. at 8-10. Plaintiffs respond that the
Decision only dismissed their injunctive relief claim against the SA, not their declaratory relief
claim against the SA. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law Opposing Reconsideration (Pl. Mem.) at
9, Dkt. No. 371. As support, they point out that the Decision explicitly states that its reasoning
regarding the injunctive relief claims applies to the claim for injunctive relief against the SA, but
the Decision is silent on their declaratory relief claim against the SA. Id. at 9-10.
As an initial matter, the Decision’s dismissal of the claims for injunctive and declaratory
relief was proper. Although the Decision does not explicitly address any declaratory relief claim
Case 3:20-cv-00822-ECC-TWD Document 416 Filed 01/21/26 Page 4 of 10

5
against the SA, the reason for dismissing the declaratory relief claims against the State
Defendants—because declaratory relief is not available retrospectively, and there is no allegation
of an ongoing violation—applies with equal force to the SA. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Healey,
28 F.4th 383, 394–95 (2d Cir. 2022) (“the Supreme Court made clear that a request for a
declaratory judgment as to a past violation cannot itself establish a case or controversy to avoid
mootness.”) (citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 73–74 (1985)); see also Brantley v. Mun.
Credit Union, No. 19 CIV. 10994, 2021 WL 981334, at *12, n. 13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2021)
(“Courts have . . . found a declaratory judgment ‘seek[ing] to adjudicate past conduct’ to be
generally inappropriate. 	In other words, the declaratory judgment must provide prospective
relief.”) (quoting S.E.C. v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 738 F. Supp.2d 376, 388–389 (S.D.N.Y. 2010);
and citing Mariah Re Ltd. v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 52 F. Supp. 3d 601, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2014),
aff’d sub nom. Maria Re Ltd. ex rel. Varga v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 607 F. App’x 123 (2d Cir.
2015) (summary order)); Scheiner v. ACT Inc., 10-CV-0096, 2013 WL 685445, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
Feb. 24, 2013) (“declaratory judgment is inappropriate when it is sought to adjudicate past acts,
such as ACT’s refusal to accommodate Ms. Scheiner’s specific disabilities and her subsequent
experience taking the ACT examination without such accommodations”) (citing Credit Bancorp,
738 F. Supp. 2d at 388-89); Credit Bancorp, 738 F.Supp.2d at 388-89 (“declaratory judgment is
inappropriate where the moving party seeks to adjudicate past conduct”) (citing Nat’l Union Fire
Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA. v. International Wire Group, Inc., 2003 WL 21277114 at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
June 2, 2003); Int’l Wire Grp., Inc., 2003 WL 21277114, at *5 (“The reason for this rule is clear:
declaratory relief is intended to operate prospectively. 	There is no basis for declaratory relief
where only past acts are involved.”) (citing Gianni Sport Ltd. v. Metallica, No. 00 Civ. 0937, 2000
Case 3:20-cv-00822-ECC-TWD Document 416 Filed 01/21/26 Page 5 of 10

6
WL 1773511, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2000)). 	As a result, the Decision properly dismissed “all
claims seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.” Decision at 44.
C. 	Implied Claim for Nominal Damages
Given that the Decision properly dismissed all claims seeking declaratory relief against the
SA, the remaining question is whether the Amended Complaint seeks damages against the SA. If
not, and the Amended Complaint sought only declaratory and injunctive relief, then the Decision’s
statement that “[t]he only remaining claim against the Student Association is the retaliation claim”
was not supported by the Amended Complaint. Decision at 23, n.6.
Plaintiffs argue that the language in their prayer for relief to “grant such other and further
relief as this court should find just and proper” should be read as a request for nominal damages
against the SA. 	Pl. Mem. at 11-12. 	Defendants respond that reading a boilerplate request for
additional relief as an implicit request for nominal damages would be improper here particularly
because Plaintiffs requested nominal damages from other Defendants in the Amended Complaint.
Defendant’s Reply Memorandum of Law (Reply) at 6-7, Dkt. No. 373.
The Second Circuit has refused to read a damages claim into a complaint’s boilerplate
prayer for just and proper relief. For example, in Fox v. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of New York, 42
F.3d 135, 141-42 (2d Cir. 1994), the Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision that a
similar clause did not state a damages claim. 	There, the case became moot after the plaintiff
student graduated because the district court could not order retrospective declaratory and
injunctive relief addressing the challenged college policy. 	The district court rejected Plaintiff’s
argument that the clause “for other relief the court deems just” implied a request for monetary or
nominal damages. The Second Circuit affirmed stating that it was “especially reluctant in these
Case 3:20-cv-00822-ECC-TWD Document 416 Filed 01/21/26 Page 6 of 10

7
circumstances to read a damages claim into the Complaint’s boilerplate prayer for ‘such other
relief as the Court deems just and proper.’” Id.
The Second Circuit reached the same conclusion in the context of a compensatory
education award where the “pending complaint fail[ed] to present properly a claim for
compensatory education” and did not mention plaintiff’s “need for compensatory education.”4
Lillbask ex. Rel. Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F. 3d 77, 89-90 (2d Cir. 2005).
In Lillbask, the plaintiff relied on “her general claim for ‘other such relief as the Court deems
appropriate,’” arguing that was “sufficiently expansive to include a compensatory education
award.” Id. at 90. The Second Circuit explained that it had “rejected an almost identical argument
in Fox, declining to read a damages claim into the Complaint’s boilerplate prayer for ‘such other
relief as the Court deems just and proper.’” Id. (quoting Fox, 42 F.3d at 141–42 and citing
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 71 (1997) (ordering remand for dismissal
of case as moot, observing that “claim for nominal damages extracted late in the day from [a]
general prayer for relief and asserted solely to avoid otherwise certain mootness, bore close
inspection”)). The Second Circuit concluded that “it would be particularly inappropriate to read a
prayer for compensatory education into [the pending complaint] because [plaintiff] explicitly
included such relief in earlier iterations of her pleadings.” Id. (citing prior complaints).
Finally, in a case where the complaint did “not mention nominal damages,” a district court
recently rejected “Plaintiffs’ argument that the Complaint’s boilerplate request for ‘any and all
4 The Sixth and Ninth Circuits have issued decisions consistent with Fox. See Bain v. California
Tchrs. Ass’n, 891 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2018) (“complaint’s prayer for ‘such other relief as
the Court deems just and proper’ did not suffice to support a late-in-the-day claim for nominal
damages to avoid mootness because ‘there is absolutely no specific mention in the Complaint of
nominal damages’”); Youngstown Publ’g Co. v. McKelvey, 189 F. App’x 402, 408 (6th Cir. 2006)
(same and citing Fox).
Case 3:20-cv-00822-ECC-TWD Document 416 Filed 01/21/26 Page 7 of 10

8
other relief.’ . . . implies such a request.” Next Generation Tech., Inc. v. Jaddou, No. 21-cv-1390,
2023 WL 2570643, at *7 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2023), appeal dismissed, No. 23-495, 2024 WL
3379536 (2d Cir. Apr. 11, 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 266 (2024) (quoting Fox, 42 F.3d at
141)). As the district court explained, “the possibility of nominal damages is an insufficient basis
for federal jurisdiction where ‘there is . . . no specific mention in the Complaint of nominal
damages,’ and ‘a request for such damages [cannot] be inferred from the language of the
Complaint.’” Id.
Here, the pending complaint includes damages claims for parties other than the SA, but
does not mention damages claims against the SA. 	See Amended Complaint, Dkt. 262 at 41
(seeking “nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages against Defendants Stenger, Rose, and
Pelletier in their individual capacities”). Under these circumstances, the Court declines to read a
damages claim into the Amended Complaint’s boilerplate prayer for relief to “grant such other and
further relief as this court should find just and proper.”
Plaintiffs rely on OL USA LLC v. Maersk A/S, 730 F. Supp. 3d 66, 72 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2024),
but that case is not binding on this Court and also distinguishable. 	There, the district court
concluded that a “complaint need not include a prayer for nominal damages to preserve such a
claim” where the complaint sought “damages ‘to compensate for the loss . . . and the prayer for
relief request[ed] ‘[a]ll . . . just and appropriate relief.’” Id. (quoting complaint and citing Irish
Lesbian & Gay Or. V. Giuliani, 143 F.3d 638, 651 (2d Cir. 1998) (court may not “preclude[] the
award of nominal damages . . . if the complaint explicitly sought compensatory damages”)); Ins.
Servs. of Beaufort, Inc., v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 966 F2d 847, 853 (4th Cir. 1992) (“An averment
of general damages is sufficient to state a claim for nominal damages.”). Plaintiffs did not include
any prayer for compensatory damages against the SA, and OL USA LLC therefore does not apply.
Case 3:20-cv-00822-ECC-TWD Document 416 Filed 01/21/26 Page 8 of 10

9
For these reasons, the Court declines to infer a claim for nominal damages in the Amended
Complaint, and the Amended Complaint therefore does not include a claim against the SA for
relief that could be granted.
D. 	Leave to Amend
Although Plaintiffs have not yet moved to amend the Amended Complaint, the parties
addressed whether amendment should be permitted when they briefed this motion. Pl. Mem. at
12-15; Reply at 7-9. Given the impending trial date and in the interest of judicial efficiency, the
Court will address those arguments.
“A request for damages . . .will not avoid mootness if it was ‘inserted after the complaint
was filed in an attempt to breathe life into a moribund dispute.’” Boucher v. Syracuse Univ., 164
F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting McCabe v. Nassau County Med. Ctr., 453 F.2d 698, 702
(2d Cir. 1971)). In addition, “once a case is moot, it is no longer justiciable in federal court and
must be dismissed.” 	Fox, 42 F.3d at 144. 	In Fox, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision not to allow the plaintiff to amend the complaint to add a nominal damages claim, finding
that the district court did not abuse its discretion. Fox, 42 F.3d at 144.
In light of these holdings, the late stage of the litigation, and the fact that the Amended
Complaint alleged nominal damages against individual defendants, but not the SA, the Court will
not permit an amendment seeking nominal damages against the SA to resuscitate a claim against
the SA. 	With the claims against the SA for injunctive and declaratory relief dismissed, and no
claim in the Amended Complaint against the SA for nominal or compensatory damages, there is
no legally cognizable claim against the SA, and the Decision should have dismissed the SA as a
party. Given this conclusion, the SA has satisfied the standard for a motion for reconsideration,
and the motion for reconsideration is granted.
Case 3:20-cv-00822-ECC-TWD Document 416 Filed 01/21/26 Page 9 of 10

10
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration, Dkt. No. 369, is GRANTED;
and it is further
ORDERED that all claims against Defendant Student Association are DISMISSED; and
it is further
ORDERED that Defendant Student Association is TERMINATED from the docket; and
it is further
ORDERED that Defendant Student Association’s motion in limine, Dkt. No. 398, is
TERMINATED as moot; and it is further
ORDERED that the only remaining claims that will proceed to trial are the First
Amendment speech suppression and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims against
Defendant John Pelletier.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 21, 2026
Case 3:20-cv-00822-ECC-TWD Document 416 Filed 01/21/26 Page 10 of 10