Gammons v. Cody et al

- 1 -
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
SHAWN TAYLOR GAMMONS,
Plaintiff,
1:25-CV-1714
v. 	(AJB/DJS)
SAMANTHA ANNA-KAY CODY, et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
SHAWN TAYLOR GAMMONS
Plaintiff, Pro Se
Albany, New York 12206
DANIEL J. STEWART
United States Magistrate Judge
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION and ORDER
The Clerk has forwarded for review a civil Complaint filed by Plaintiff. 	The
Complaint was filed December 8, 2025. Dkt. No. 1, Compl.1 The filing fee in this action
has not been paid, but Plaintiff has filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. No.
2. That Motion has been granted. The matter has been referred to the undersigned for an
initial review pursuant to L.R. 72.3.
1 This is the second action filed by Plaintiff regarding similar factual allegations. See Gammons v. Cody, et al., 1:25-
CV-941 (AJB/DJS).
Case 1:25-cv-01714-AJB-DJS Document 6 Filed 02/04/26 Page 1 of 13

- 2 -
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT
The Complaint provides a lengthy recitation of facts regarding ongoing Family
Court proceedings between Plaintiff Shawn Taylor Gammons and Defendant Samantha
Anna-Kay Cody. See generally, Compl. Given the nature of the legal recommendations
made below, a detailed explication of those facts is not necessary. 	Generally stated,
however, Plaintiff appears to allege that numerous attorneys assigned to represent him,
Ms. Cody, or their children, have conspired against Plaintiff to cause him a litany of harms
including prejudice in the Family Court proceedings, denial of custodial, visitation, and
parental rights, the denial of various economic rights, including access to credit and
mortgages, the denial or loss of professional licenses, among other harms. See Compl. at
¶ 85.
II. GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) directs that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma
pauperis, “(2) . . . the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that
– . . . (B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).2
2 To determine whether an action is frivolous, a court must look to see whether the complaint “lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
Case 1:25-cv-01714-AJB-DJS Document 6 Filed 02/04/26 Page 2 of 13

- 3 -
In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court has a duty to show liberality toward pro
se litigants, see Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam), and should
exercise “extreme caution . . . in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint
before the adverse party has been served and both parties (but particularly the plaintiff)
have had an opportunity to respond.” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir.
1983). 	Therefore, a court should not dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff has stated
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Although a court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained
in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” 	Id. 	“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n] - that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id.
at 679 (quoting FED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2)). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Case 1:25-cv-01714-AJB-DJS Document 6 Filed 02/04/26 Page 3 of 13

- 4 -
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Thus, 	a 	pleading 	that 	only 	“tenders 	naked 	assertions 	devoid 	of 	further 	factual
enhancement” will not suffice. Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
A. State Action under Section 1983
Plaintiff’s first cause of action asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Compl. at
¶¶ 87-98. That claim is asserted against all Defendants and alleges, inter alia, violations
of Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. 	Id. This claim is subject to dismissal against the vast majority of
Defendants named in the action because they are not state actors subject to suit under
section 1983. 	This basis for dismissal has previously been outlined for Plaintiff.
Gammons v. Cody, 2025 WL 2722411, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2025), report and
recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2719776 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2025).
“Because the United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not
private parties, a litigant claiming that his constitutional rights have been violated must
first establish that the challenged conduct constitutes state action.” Flagg v. Yonkers Sav.
& Loan Ass’n, 396 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A
plaintiff pressing a claim of violation of his constitutional rights under § 1983 is thus
required to show state action.” 	Tancredi v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 308, 312 (2d
Cir. 2003).
Case 1:25-cv-01714-AJB-DJS Document 6 Filed 02/04/26 Page 4 of 13

- 5 -
Seven individual attorneys are named as Defendants in this action. 	Compl. at p.
3. 	They are sued either because they served as appointed counsel for Plaintiff or Ms.
Cody, id. at ¶¶ 11, 15, 18, 20, & 22, or as a law guardian for one of Plaintiff’s children.
Id. at ¶¶ 10 & 13. 	Neither role renders those attorneys state actors. 	See, e.g., Milan v.
Wertheimer, 808 F.3d 961, 964 (2d. Cir. 2015) (law guardian not a state actor); Culpepper
v. Tierney, 2024 WL 3303268, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 2, 2024) (court appointed 18B
counsel not a state actor); Alexander v. Murphy, 2018 WL 3232349, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. July
2, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 6000145 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 14,
2018) (private attorney not a state actor); Harrison v. New York, 95 F. Supp. 3d 293, 328
(E.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing cases). The law firms of six of these individuals are also named
as Defendants, Compl. at ¶¶ 12, 14, 16, 18, 21, & 23, but are similarly subject to dismissal
on the ground that the firms are not state actors. Bartolini v. Town of Dryden, 2025 WL
1488505, at * 7 (N.D.N.Y. May 23, 2025); Harrison v. New York, 95 F. Supp. 3d at 328.
The Complaint also names Ms. Cody and Derek Cody as Defendants with respect
to section 1983 claims. Compl. at ¶¶ 5-6. The Codys appear to be named as Defendants
related to actions they took as litigants or witnesses in court proceedings related to the
divorce between Plaintiff and Ms. Cody. See, e.g., Compl. at ¶¶ 85(9) & 85(15). “Private
parties are generally not amenable to suit under § 1983, because they are not state actors.”
Bhatia v. Yale Sch. of Med., 347 F. App’x 663, 664 (2d Cir. 2009). “The mere fact that
they allegedly availed themselves of the judicial system, . . . does not make them state
Case 1:25-cv-01714-AJB-DJS Document 6 Filed 02/04/26 Page 5 of 13

- 6 -
actors.” Gammons v. Cody, 2025 WL 2722411, at *5 (citing Sam & Mary Hous. Corp.
v. New York State, 632 F. Supp. 1448, 1450 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
While it is true that private actors may be proper § 1983 defendants when they
conspire with state actors, mere conclusory allegations that a private individual acted in
concert with state officials such as those made here, see Compl. at ¶ 1, are insufficient to
establish state action. Ciambreillo v. County of Nassau, 292 F. 3d 307, 324 (2d Cir. 2002).
Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	recommends 	that 	the 	section 	1983 	claims 	against
Defendants Samantha Cody, Derek Cody, Gross, Smith, Zacker, Lopez, Vredenburgh,
White, and Gramalski, as well as the law firms associated with Gross, Zacker, Lopez,
Vredenburgh, White, and Gramalski be dismissed based on a failure to allege state action.
B. Proper Parties
The Greene County Support Collection Unit is named as a Defendant. Compl. at
¶ 9. Plaintiff claims that it is a “local government unit.” Id. Accepting that allegation to
be true, dismissal would be appropriate because “[i]n New York, agencies of a
municipality are not suable entities. The only proper defendant in a lawsuit against an
agency of a municipality is the municipality itself, not the agency through which the
municipality acted.” Omnipoint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Town of LaGrange, 658 F. Supp. 2d
539, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 	It also appears, in the event that Plaintiff has not properly
identified the legal status of the Support Collection Unit, that dismissal on Eleventh
Amendment immunity grounds would in any event be appropriate. 	See Phillips v.
Case 1:25-cv-01714-AJB-DJS Document 6 Filed 02/04/26 Page 6 of 13

- 7 -
Schenectady Child Support Unite, 2025 WL 895035, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2025),
report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Phillips v. Schenectady Cnty. Child
Support Unit, 2025 WL 1191320 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2025).
The Complaint also identifies the Greene County Public Defender’s Office as a
Defendant. 	Compl. at ¶ 17. 	However, “a public defender’s office is not considered a
person [amenable] to suit under section 1983.” Rowland v. Ferguson, 2025 WL 2960153,
at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 3127187
(N.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2025) (internal quotation omitted); see also Lewis v. Essex Cnty., 2024
WL 4712530, at *16 (N.D.N.Y. June 18, 2024) (“the Essex County Public Defender’s
Office and the Essex County Conflict Defender’s Office are not considered ‘persons’
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”).
The Greene County Support Collection Unit and Greene County Public Defender’s
Office should, therefore, also be dismissed as Defendants.
C. Defendants Gohl and DiCaprio
Danielle Gohl and Christina DiCaprio3 are named in the Complaint and identified
as case workers employed by Greene County. Compl. at ¶¶ 7-8. Each is alleged to have
“acted in concert with other defendants.” 	Id. 	Other than being identified as parties,
however, neither is named at any other time in the Complaint. “To establish a defendant’s
3 Her name is spelled DeCaprio in the caption of the Complaint. Compl. at p. 1.
Case 1:25-cv-01714-AJB-DJS Document 6 Filed 02/04/26 Page 7 of 13

- 8 -
individual liability in a suit brought under § 1983, a plaintiff must show the defendant’s
personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. 	Specifically, a plaintiff
must plead and prove that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111, 129
(2d Cir. 2023) (internal quotations, alterations, and citations omitted). 	The mere
identification of an individual as a party is not enough to state their personal involvement.
Taylor v. City of New York, 953 F. Supp. 95, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Mullin v. P & R Educ.
Servs., Inc., 942 F. Supp. 110, 114 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). 	Because there are no factual
allegations of wrongdoing by either of these individuals, dismissal based on lack of
personal involvement is recommended.
D. Municipal Liability
Plaintiff’s third cause of action names Greene County as a Defendant. Compl. at
¶¶ 103-105. 	Plaintiff generally alleges a conspiracy among all Defendants to enforce
proceedings against Plaintiff in violation of his rights. Id. at ¶ 104.
In Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), the
Supreme Court found that “the language of § 1983, read against the background of the . .
. legislative history, compels the conclusion that Congress did not intend municipalities
to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused
a constitutional tort.” Courts apply “rigorous standards of culpability and causation” to
ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its employees.
Case 1:25-cv-01714-AJB-DJS Document 6 Filed 02/04/26 Page 8 of 13

- 9 -
Jeffes v. Barnes, 208 F.3d 49, 61 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997)). Thus, in order for an individual whose constitutional
rights have been violated to have recourse against a municipality under § 1983, he must
show that he was harmed by a municipal “policy” or “custom.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. at 690-91. A “policy” or “custom” cannot be shown
by pointing to a single instance of unconstitutional conduct by a mere employee of the
State. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 831 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (“To infer the existence of a city policy from the
isolated misconduct of a single, low-level officer, and then to hold the city liable on the
basis of that policy, would amount to permitting precisely the theory of strict respondeat
superior liability rejected in Monell”).
Here, the Complaint identifies no unconstitutional policy on the part of Greene
County. That omission is fatal, at this juncture, to Plaintiff’s Complaint. Arnold v. Town
of Camillus, New York, 662 F. Supp. 3d 245, 259 (N.D.N.Y. 2023) (“Plaintiff has not
identified any formal town policy that has deprived [him] of equal protection.”); Beckwith
v. City of Syracuse, 642 F. Supp. 3d 283, 293 (N.D.N.Y. 2022) (dismissal required when
complaint “does not allege the existence of any policy, practice, or custom from which
[plaintiff’s] alleged constitutional violation resulted.”).
Case 1:25-cv-01714-AJB-DJS Document 6 Filed 02/04/26 Page 9 of 13

- 10 -
E. Conversion Claim
As it was with Plaintiff’s original action, the second cause of action here is a
conversion claim against Samantha and Derek Cody. 	Compl. at ¶¶ 99-102; see also
Gammons v. Cody, 2025 WL 2722411, at *5-6.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Home Depot U. S. A., Inc. v.
Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743, 1746 (2019). Jurisdiction exists when the matter at issue arises
“under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Conversion is a “pure state law claim[].” 	Greenidge v. Mundo Shipping Corp., 41 F.
Supp. 2d 354, 358 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). As a result, no federal “arising under” jurisdiction
exists for such a claim.
Jurisdiction also exists when diversity of citizenship is present. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
“Diversity jurisdiction exists where the parties are citizens of different states and the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.” 	Ceglia v. Zuckerberg, 772 F. Supp. 2d 453,
455 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). “A case falls within the federal district court’s original diversity
jurisdiction only if diversity of citizenship among the parties is complete, i.e., only if there
is no plaintiff and no defendant who are citizens of the same State.” Wisconsin Dep’t of
Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998) (internal quotations omitted). 	Complete
diversity is required – meaning if any Defendant is a resident of the same state as the
Plaintiff, diversity jurisdiction does not exist. 	Seemann v. Maxwell, 178 F.R.D. 23, 24
(N.D.N.Y. 1998). Plaintiff has not pled complete diversity exists here, as is his obligation.
Case 1:25-cv-01714-AJB-DJS Document 6 Filed 02/04/26 Page 10 of 13

- 11 -
Andrade v. Reiter, 2008 WL 11438303, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 13, 2008). 	Nor does the
Complaint suggest that exists here. As a result, there is no complete diversity jurisdiction
in this case and no independent jurisdictional basis for entertaining these claims.
A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law
claims when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 	28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 	Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the
lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should
decline the exercise of jurisdiction.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350
(1988). Having recommended dismissal of the federal claims over which the Court has
original jurisdiction, the Court also recommends that the District Court decline to exercise
its supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting.
E. Leave to Amend
“Ordinarily, a court should not dismiss a complaint filed by a pro se litigant
without granting leave to amend at least once ‘when a liberal reading of the complaint
gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.’” Bruce v. Tompkins Cnty. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Kephart, 2015 WL 151029, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2015) (quoting
Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991)). “However, where the grounds
for dismissal offer no basis for curing the defects in the pleading, dismissal with prejudice
is appropriate.” 	Norwood v. Albany City Police Dep’t, 2019 WL 7593292, at *2
(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 5415873
Case 1:25-cv-01714-AJB-DJS Document 6 Filed 02/04/26 Page 11 of 13

- 12 -
(N.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2019). Since the law is clear that the attorneys assigned to represent
parties to state court litigation are not state actors, those claims should be dismissed
without leave to amend. Plaintiff could, perhaps, make factual allegations to establish a
claim against the remaining Defendants and so those claims should be dismissed with
leave to amend.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, it is hereby
RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED as set forth
above; and it is
ORDERED, 	that 	the 	Clerk 	of 	the 	Court 	serve 	a 	copy 	of 	this 	Report-
Recommendation and Order upon the parties to this action.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14)4 days within
which to file written objections to the foregoing report. 	Such objections shall be filed
with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 	Roldan v.
Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,
4 If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order by mail, three additional days will be added to the
fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the order was mailed to you to serve and
file objections. F ED. R. CIV. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal
holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
FED. R. C IV. P. 6(a)(1)(C).
Case 1:25-cv-01714-AJB-DJS Document 6 Filed 02/04/26 Page 12 of 13

- 13 -
892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); F ED . R. CIV . P. 72 & 6(a).
Dated: February 4, 2026
Albany, New York
Case 1:25-cv-01714-AJB-DJS Document 6 Filed 02/04/26 Page 13 of 13