Tenace v. Pratt et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
TROY TENACE,
Plaintiff,
1:25-cv-1697
v. 	(GTS/DJS)
JENNIFER PRATT, et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
TROY TENACE
Plaintiff, Pro Se
Niskayuna, NY 12309
DANIEL J. STEWART
United States Magistrate Judge
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION and ORDER
The Clerk has forwarded for review a civil complaint filed by Plaintiff. Dkt. No.
1, Compl. The filing fee in this action has not been paid, but Plaintiff has filed a motion
rto proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. No. 2. That Motion has been granted. The matter
has been referred to the undersigned for an initial review pursuant to L.R. 72.3.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff’s factual allegations are brief. 	He alleges only that Defendants Jennifer
Pratt (“Pratt”) and Meghan Horton (“Horton”), Assistant District Attorneys (“ADAs”) at
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the Saratoga County District Attorney’s Office who had previously prosecuted Plaintiff
in a criminal matter, unlawfully seized a recorded jail call containing Plaintiff’s private
communications relating to his personal family matters and unlawfully shared that call
with Julia V. Kosineski (“Kosineski”), an Assistant Public Defender (“APD”) at the
Schenectady County Public Defender’s Office, for use in an unrelated family court matter
in Schenectady County. Compl. at pp. 2, 5-7, & 10.
Attached to the Complaint is an Attorney Affirmation by Kosineski, dated
December 6, 2022. See id. at pp. 10-12. In the Attorney Affirmation, Kosineski explained
that, “[o]n November 9, 2022, all parties appeared in front of the Honorable Judge Burke”
and, presumably at that time, Kosineski “provided information” that she had “received a
recorded jail call from the Saratoga County District Attorney’s Office” that contained
communications between Plaintiff and his mother. Id. at pp. 10-11.
Plaintiff brings claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging First Amendment
retaliation and interference with familial association, Fourth Amendment unlawful
seizure and disclosure of private communications, Sixth Amendment interference with
right to counsel, and Fourteenth Amendment due process. 	Id. at pp. 5-6. 	Plaintiff also
brings a claim pursuant to “NY CPL 245” and alleges Monell liability for failure to train,
supervise, and discipline. Id. at p. 5. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. Id. at p. 8.
Plaintiff also names as Defendants to this action the Saratoga County District
Attorney’s Office, Saratoga County, the Schenectady County Public Defender’s Office,
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Schenectady County, and Karen A. Crandall (“Crandall”). 	Id. at p. 2. 	Each of the
individual Defendants are named in both their individual and their official capacities. Id.
II. GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) directs that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma
pauperis, “(2) . . . the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that
– . . . (B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).1
In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court has a duty to show liberality toward pro
se litigants, see Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam), and should
exercise “extreme caution . . . in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint
before the adverse party has been served and both parties (but particularly the plaintiff)
have had an opportunity to respond,” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir.
1983) (internal citations omitted). 	Therefore, a court should not dismiss a complaint if
the plaintiff has stated “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	“A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
1 To determine whether an action is frivolous, a court must look to see whether the complaint “lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
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inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Although a court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained
in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” 	Id. 	“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n] - that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id.
at 679 (quoting F ED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2)). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Thus, 	a 	pleading 	that 	only 	“tenders 	naked 	assertions 	devoid 	of 	further 	factual
enhancement” will not suffice. Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Rule 8
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a pleading must
contain:
(1) 	a 	short 	and 	plain 	statement 	of 	the 	grounds 	for 	the 	court’s
jurisdiction . . . ;
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(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the
alternative or different types of relief.
FED . R. CIV . P. 8(a). 	The purpose of Rule 8 “is to give fair notice of the claim being
asserted so as to permit the adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer [and]
prepare an adequate defense.” Hudson v. Artuz, 1998 WL 832708, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
30, 1998) (quoting Powell v. Marine Midland Bank, 162 F.R.D. 15, 16 (N.D.N.Y. 1995)).
A complaint that fails to comply with basic pleading requirements presents too heavy a
burden for defendants to craft a defense, “provides no meaningful basis for the Court to
assess the sufficiency of [the plaintiff’s] claims,” and may properly be dismissed.
Gonzales v. Wing, 167 F.R.D. 352, 355 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
Here, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Pratt and Horton fail to meet these
requirements or provide the notice to Pratt and Horton that Rule 8 requires. 	While
Plaintiff alleges that Pratt and Horton unlawfully seized a recorded jail call made by
Plaintiff and shared that call with Kosineski for use in an unrelated family court matter,
Compl. at pp. 6-7, Plaintiff provides no factual support explaining how Pratt and Horton
allegedly violated his constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.
More specifically, Plaintiff alleges, largely in conclusory fashion, that Pratt and
Horton: “unlawfully transmitted Plaintiff’s private communications – relating to his
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personal family matters – to family court actors”; and engaged in the “unlawful
acquisition, disclosure, and use of Plaintiff’s private jail recordings, supplying out of their
jurisdiction to individuals in Schenectady County Family Court litigation without any
warrants, subpoena, court order or lawful basis.” Compl. at p. 6. Plaintiff fails to offer
any factual details surrounding the alleged unlawfulness of Pratt and Horton’s acquisition,
disclosure, and use of the recorded jail call, and fails to explain how any actions by Pratt
and Horton would violate the First, Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 	See
generally Compl. 	As a result, the Complaint does not provide Defendants Pratt and
Horton with fair notice of the claims being asserted by Plaintiff so as to permit Pratt and
Horton to assess the sufficiency of the Complaint and give them the opportunity to
prepare an adequate defense.
Plaintiff’s failure to put Defendants on notice of his claims is particularly relevant
in this case because the dispositive defense of prosecutorial immunity could be at issue
here. 	Prosecutors are entitled to immunity for acts undertaken in preparation for “the
initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of [their] role
as . . . advocate[s] for the State.’” See Linder v. Oneida Cnty. Dist. Attorney’s Off., 2023
WL 6810098, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023
WL 8780112 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2023) (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259,
273 (1993)). 	Immunity can even “extend[] to the falsification of evidence and the
coercion of witnesses, the knowing use of perjured testimony, the deliberate withholding
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of exculpatory information, the making of false or defamatory statements in judicial
proceedings, and conspiring to present false evidence at a criminal trial.” 	Id. (citing
cases). 	In 	other 	words, 	absolute 	immunity 	has 	been 	extended 	to 	reprehensible
prosecutorial misconduct. See Anilao v. Spota, 27 F.4th 855, 867 (2d Cir. 2022) (citing
cases).
“The ‘relevant question’ is ‘whether a reasonable prosecutor would view the acts
challenged by the complaint as reasonably within the functions of a prosecutor.’” Kirby
v. 	Abraham, 	2025 	WL 	1610582, 	at 	*5 	(N.D.N.Y. 	Mar. 	25, 	2025), 	report 	and
recommendation adopted sub nom. Kirby v. Syracuse Police Dep’t, 2025 WL 1257458
(N.D.N.Y. May 1, 2025) (quoting Giraldo v. Kessler, 694 F.3d 161, 166 (2d Cir. 2012)).
In this regard, absolute immunity depends not only on the identity of the actor, but also
on “the nature of the function performed,” which considers whether the prosecutor is
engaged in “administrative or investigative activities” as opposed to acts within the scope
of a prosecutor’s “duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution.” 	Pinaud v.
Cnty. of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139, 1147 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations and quotations omitted).
Here, given that Pratt and Horton are ADAs, any Section 1983 claims asserted
against Pratt and Horton may be barred by the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity. 	See
Kirby v. Abraham, 2025 WL 1610582, at *5. However, Plaintiff’s pleading is so unclear
that it makes it difficult to evaluate Pratt and Horton’s entitlement to prosecutorial
immunity.
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As such, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead claims against Pratt and Horton,
and Plaintiff’s claims against Pratt and Horton should be dismissed.
B. Section 1983
1. Saratoga County District Attorney’s Office
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks monetary damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the Saratoga County District Attorney’s Office, see Compl. at pp. 2 & 8, those
claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment because the Saratoga County District
Attorney’s Office is an arm of the state. See Linder v. Oneida Cnty. Dist. Attorney’s Off.,
2023 WL 6810098, at *3 (citing cases). The Saratoga County District Attorney’s Office
is also not a “separate suable agenc[y] for purposes of a Monell claim.” 	Malloy v.
Sopchak, 2019 WL 1024354, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2019), report and recommendation
adopted, 2019 WL 1025765 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2019) (citing cases). As such, Plaintiff’s
claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Saratoga County District Attorney’s
Office should be dismissed.
2. APD Kosineski and Crandall
Plaintiff’s claims against APD Kosineski, see Compl. at pp. 2 & 10, are also
barred. See Lewis v. Essex Cnty., 2024 WL 4712530, at *15 (N.D.N.Y. June 18, 2024),
report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Lewis v. Essex Cnty., New York, 2024 WL
4441730 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2024). “[I]t is well-established that court-appointed attorneys
performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel . . . do not act under color of state
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law and therefore are not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Id. (quotations omitted)
(citing cases). Here, the Complaint alleges that the recorded jail call at issue was shared
with Kosineski. Compl. at p. 7. The Attorney Affirmation prepared by Kosineski that is
attached to the Complaint also confirms that, after receiving the recorded jail call,
Kosineski shared its contents with the Family Court. 	Id. at pp. 10-11. 	Notably, in the
Attorney Affirmation, Kosineski affirmed that she was acting as an attorney with the
Schenectady County Public Defender’s Office, id. at p. 10, and thus as a court-appointed
attorney performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel such that she was not
acting under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	As such, Plaintiff’s
claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against APD Kosineski should be dismissed.
In addition, Plaintiff’s claims against Crandall are also insufficient. While Plaintiff
names Crandall as a Defendant in this lawsuit and indicates that she is an attorney by
following her name with the title “Esq.,” see Compl. at pp. 2 & 4, Plaintiff does not allege
any conduct on the part of Crandall and Crandall is not otherwise named anywhere in the
Complaint. See generally Compl. Consequently, it is not clear to the Court what, if any,
personal involvement Crandall has to this matter, which makes Plaintiff’s claims against
Crandall insufficient to establish liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Ali v. Oneida
Cnty. Dist. Att’y, 2023 WL 7124513, at *5-6 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2023), report and
recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 8798116 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2023). 	Moreover,
Plaintiff fails to allege that Crandall is a state actor or that she acted under color of state
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law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	See Eggsware v. Google, 2022 WL 6784901, at
*2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 6734580
(N.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2022). As such, like Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against APD Kosineski, Plaintiff’s claims against Crandall should be dismissed.
3. Schenectady County Public Defender’s Office
Plaintiff’s claims against the Schenectady County Public Defender’s Office, see
Compl. at pp. 2 & 8, should also be dismissed. 	See Lewis v. Essex Cnty., 2024 WL
4712530, at *16. The Complaint itself sets forth no specific factual allegations as to the
Schenectady County Public Defender’s Office. See generally Compl. 	Consequently, it
is unclear what the basis is for Plaintiff’s inclusion of the Schenectady County Public
Defender’s Office in this action. 	See Lewis v. Essex Cnty., 2024 WL 4712530, at *16
(quotation omitted). 	“[T]o the extent that it is based on actions taken by employees of
the [Schenectady County Public Defender’s Office] performing traditional functions as
counsel,” such as APD Kosineski, as previously explained, see supra at pp. 8-9, these
individuals are “not state actors amenable to suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” 	Id.
(quotations omitted) (cleaned up). Similarly, the Schenectady County Public Defender’s
Office is not considered a person under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id. (citations omitted). As
such, Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Schenectady County
Public Defender’s Office should be dismissed.
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C. Municipal Liability
Plaintiff also names Saratoga County and Schenectady County as Defendants to
this action. See Compl. at p. 2.
“To set forth a cognizable claim for municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff
must plead that a deprivation of his constitutional rights was caused by a governmental
custom, policy, or usage of the municipality.” Lewis v. Essex Cnty., 2024 WL 4712530,
at *16 (citations and quotations omitted). “[A] prerequisite to municipal liability under
Monell is an underlying constitutional violation by a state actor.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The Second Circuit has explained that “Monell does not provide a separate cause of action
for the failure by the government to train its employees; it extends liability to a municipal
organization where that organization’s failure to train, or the policies or customs that it
has sanctioned, led to an independent constitutional violation.” 	Id. (citations and
quotations omitted).
Here, as previously discussed, see supra at pp. 5-10, Plaintiff has failed to state a
claim that a person, who is not entitled to immunity, “acted under color of state law when
they deprived him of a constitutional right.” 	Id. (citing cases). 	Consequently, Plaintiff
has “failed to state an underlying constitutional violation sufficient to support a municipal
liability claim.” Id. (citing cases).
“Even if, arguendo, [P]laintiff had alleged an underlying constitutional violation,
he has failed to identify or allege any facts showing the existence of a municipal policy
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or custom” of Saratoga County or Schenectady County that “caused his alleged
constitutional violations.” Id. (citing cases). “Plaintiff also has not alleged facts plausibly
showing that” Saratoga County and Schenectady County “failed to properly hire,
supervise, and train subordinates in connection with his claims.” Id. (citing cases).
As such, Plaintiff has failed to state a municipal liability claim against Saratoga
County and Schenectady County and it is, therefore, recommended that such claims be
dismissed.
D. Remaining State Law Claims
Having established that Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and based
on Monell liability are subject to dismissal, see supra at pp. 5-12, the only remaining
claims that Plaintiff seeks to pursue are state law claims pursuant to “NY CPL 245.”
Compl. at p. 8.2 	However, “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” 	Home
Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 587 U.S. 435, 437 (2019) (quotations omitted). Jurisdiction
in federal court generally exists only when diversity of citizenship is present. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332. “To have complete diversity, ‘each plaintiff’s citizenship must be different from
the citizenship of each defendant.’” Johnson v. Glob. Promotion & Pub. Corp., 2013 WL
828744, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2013) (quoting Hallingby v. Hallingby, 574 F.3d 51, 56
(2d Cir. 2009)). 	Here, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff and the Defendants are all
2 It is unclear what state law claims Plaintiff seeks to assert, as NY CPL 245 commonly refers to New York’s
Criminal Procedure Law section regarding discovery.
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residents of New York. Compl. at pp. 3-5. As a result, there is clearly a lack of complete
diversity, and no diversity jurisdiction exists in this case. 	See Butler v. Geico Gen. Ins.
Co., 2019 WL 330591, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2019), report and recommendation
adopted, 2019 WL 652197 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2019).
While a district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims
if certain conditions are met, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), the court may decline to do so where
it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 	28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3). Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in
its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the
exercise of jurisdiction.” 	Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988).
Here, having recommended dismissal of the federal claims over which the Court has
original jurisdiction, the Court also recommends that the District Court decline to exercise
its supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting.
E. Amendment
Given its lack of clarity, the Complaint is clearly subject to dismissal. However,
“a court should not dismiss a complaint filed by a pro se litigant without granting leave
to amend at least once ‘when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that
a valid claim might be stated.’” 	Bruce v. Tompkins Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. ex rel.
Kephart, 2015 WL 151029, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2015) (quoting Branum v. Clark, 927
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F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991)). Accordingly, the Court recommends that the Complaint
be dismissed, but that Plaintiff be afforded an opportunity to amend.
The Court advises Plaintiff that, should he be permitted to amend his Complaint,
any amended pleading he submits must comply with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Any such amended complaint, which shall supersede and replace in
its entirety the previous Complaint filed by Plaintiff, must contain sequentially numbered
paragraphs containing only one act of misconduct per paragraph. Thus, if Plaintiff claims
that his civil and/or constitutional rights were violated by more than one defendant, or on
more than one occasion, he should include a corresponding number of paragraphs in his
amended complaint for each such allegation, with each paragraph specifying: (i) the
alleged act of misconduct; (ii) the date, including the year, on which such misconduct
occurred; (iii) the names of each and every individual who participated in such
misconduct; (iv) where appropriate, the location where the alleged misconduct occurred;
and (v) the nexus between such misconduct and Plaintiff’s civil and/or constitutional
rights.
Plaintiff is further cautioned that no portion of his prior Complaint shall be
incorporated into his amended complaint by reference. 	Any amended complaint
submitted by Plaintiff must set forth all of the claims he intends to assert against the
Defendants and must demonstrate that a case or controversy exists between the Plaintiff
and the Defendants which Plaintiff has a legal right to pursue and over which this Court
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has jurisdiction. If Plaintiff is alleging that the named defendant violated a law, he should
specifically refer to such law.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, it is hereby
RECOMMENDED, 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	Complaint 	be 	DISMISSED 	without
prejudice and with leave to amend; and it is
ORDERED, 	that 	the 	Clerk 	of 	the 	Court 	serve 	a 	copy 	of 	this 	Report-
Recommendation and Order upon the parties to this action.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14)3 days within
which to file written objections to the foregoing report. 	Such objections shall be filed
with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 	Roldan v.
3 If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order by mail, three additional days will be added to the
fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the order was mailed to you to serve and
file objections. F ED. R. CIV. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal
holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
FED. R. C IV. P. 6(a)(1)(C).
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Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,
892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); F ED . R. CIV . P. 72 & 6(a).
Dated: February 3, 2026
Albany, New York
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