Dejesus v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________
ORLANDO CHRISTOPHER D.,
Plaintiff,
v.
No. 1:24-CV-01526
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 	(PJE)
Defendant.
_____________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
Olinsky Law Group 	HOWARD D. OLINSKY, ESQ.
250 South Clinton Street, Ste. 210
Syracuse, New York 13202
Attorneys for plaintiff
Social Security Administration 	KRISTINA D. COHN, ESQ.
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, Maryland 21235
Attorneys for defendant
PAUL J. EVANGELISTA
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
Orlando Christopher D.1 (“plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
405(g) seeking review of a decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (“the Commissioner” or “defendant”) denying his applications for
disability insurance and supplemental security income benefits. See Dkt. No. 1
1 In accordance with guidance from the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, which was adopted by the Northern District of New York in 2018
to better protect personal and medical information of non-governmental parties, this Memorandum-
Decision and Order will identify plaintiff by first name and last initial.
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(“Compl.”).2 Plaintiff moves for judgment on the pleadings and for the Commissioner’s
decision to “be remanded for further administrative proceedings, including a de novo
hearing and a new decision.” Dkt. No. 10 at 12.3 The Commissioner moves to affirm.
See Dkt. No. 11. Plaintiff replies. See Dkt. No. 14. For the following reasons, plaintiff’s
motion is granted, the Commissioner’s decision is vacated, and the matter is remanded
to the Commissioner for further proceedings.
I. Background
On February 16, 2023, plaintiff filed applications for Title II Social Security
Disability benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income benefits, alleging a
disability onset date of July 28, 2022,4 due to Charcot-Marie-Tooth disease. See T at
87, 235, 342. The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) initially denied plaintiff’s
applications on April 25, 2023, and the denial was affirmed upon reconsideration. See
id. at 117, 127. Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”), and a hearing was held before ALJ Judge Mulvey on May 31, 2024. See id. at
33-85. On August 19, 2024, ALJ Mulvey issued an unfavorable decision. See id. at 14-
26. The Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review. See id. at 1-6. Plaintiff
timely commenced this action before the Court on December 16, 2024. See Dkt. No. 1.
II. Legal Standards
A. Standard of Review
2 The parties consented to direct review of this matter by a Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, Local Rule 72.2(b), and General Order No. 18. 	See Dkt. No. 8.
3 	Citations to the parties’ briefs refer to the pagination located at the header of each page, generated by
the Court’s electronic filing system, not the documents’ original pagination.
4 “T” followed by a number refers to the pages of the administrative transcript.
See Dkt. No. 8. Citations to the administrative transcript refer to the pagination in the bottom, right-hand
corner of the page, not the pagination generated by CM/ECF.
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Sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) grants the court the authority “to enter, upon
the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing
the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the
cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In reviewing the Commissioner’s final
decision, a district court may not determine de novo whether an individual (the
“claimant”) is disabled. See Wagner v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856,
860 (2d Cir. 1990). The district court may reverse the Commissioner’s final decision
only if the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal standards or support the decision with
substantial evidence. See Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985 (2d Cir. 1987).
Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla,” meaning that in the record
one can find “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam)
(citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)) (internal citations omitted).
This is “a very deferential standard of review,” meaning that once an ALJ finds facts, the
court can reject them “only if a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise.”
Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam)
(citation, emphasis, and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Clark v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 143 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 1998) (reminding that it is for the ALJ to weigh
conflicting evidence in the record) (citing Beauvoir v. Chater, 104 F.3d 1432, 1433 (2d
Cir. 1997)). Where there is reasonable doubt as to whether the Commissioner applied
the proper legal standards, the court should not affirm even though the ultimate
conclusion is arguably supported by substantial evidence. Martone v. Apfel, 70 F.
Supp. 2d 145, 148 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Johnson, 817 F.2d at 986). However, if the
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ALJ applied the correct legal standards, and substantial evidence supports the decision,
the court must uphold the Commissioner’s conclusion even if the evidence is
“susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.” Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4th 64,
74 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 149 (2d Cir. 2014)).
B. Determination of Disability
Under 42 U.S.C. § 423, every individual who is under a disability shall be entitled
to disability benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). Disability is defined as the “inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically-determinable
physical or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months[.]” Id. § 423(d)(1)(A). A disabling
impairment is an affliction that is so severe that it renders an individual unable to
continue with his or her previous work or any other employment that may be available to
him or her based upon age, education, and work experience. See id. § 423(d)(2)(A).
Such impairment must be supported by “medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques.” Id. § 423(d)(3); see also Ventura v. Barnhart, No. 04-cv-9018
(NRB), 2006 WL 399458, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2006) (“Determinations of severity
are based on objective medical facts, diagnoses or medical opinions inferable from
these facts, subjective complaints of pain or disability, and educational background,
age, and work experience.”) (citing, inter alia, Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1037
(2d Cir. 1983)).
To determine whether the claimant is entitled to disability benefits, a five-step
evaluation, based on 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920, is used:
First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity.
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If he [or she] is not, the [Commissioner] next considers
whether 	the 	claimant 	has 	a 	“severe 	impairment” 	which
significantly limits his [or her] physical or mental ability to do
basic work activities.
If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is
whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has
an impairment which is listed in [20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 1 (the “Listings”)]. 	If the claimant has such an
impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him [or her]
disabled without considering vocational factors such as age,
education, 	and 	work 	experience; 	the 	[Commissioner]
presumes that a claimant who is afflicted with a “listed”
impairment is unable to perform substantial gainful activity.
Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the
fourth 	inquiry 	is 	whether, 	despite 	the 	claimant’s 	severe
impairment, he [or she] has the residual functional capacity to
perform his [or her] past work.
Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his [or her] past
work, the [Commissioner] then determines whether there is
other work which the claimant could perform.
Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982) (spacing added). “If at any step a
finding of disability or non-disability can be made, the SSA will not review the claim
further.” Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24 (2003).
The plaintiff bears the burden of proof at the first four steps, and the
Commissioner bears the burden at step five to show that the plaintiff can engage in
gainful employment somewhere. See DeChirico v. Callahan, 134 F.3d 1177, 1180 (2d
Cir. 1998) (citing Berry, 675 F.2d at 467).
III. ALJ’s Decision
ALJ Mulvey noted that plaintiff met the insured status requirements through
December 31, 2027, and had not engaged in substantial activity since July 28, 2022,
the alleged onset date. See T at 19. At step two, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had
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the following severe impairments: Charcot-Marie-Tooth disease, coronary artery
disease, degenerative changes in the lumbar spine, hypertension, migraine headaches,
obesity, and neuropathy. See id. At step three, the ALJ determined that plaintiff did not
have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the
severity of any Listing. See id. at 20. The ALJ then concluded that plaintiff retained the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work, except:
Claimant can stand and walk for four hours in an eight-hour workday;
claimant can sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday; claimant can
frequently handle, finger, and feel with both upper extremities; claimant can
tolerate no more than moderate levels of noise as defined in Appendix D of
the Selected Characteristics of Occupations, 1993 edition; claimant should
avoid work outdoors in bright sunshine and work with bright or flickering
lights; claimant must avoid working at unprotecting (sic) heights, climbing
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and working in close proximity to dangerous
machinery and moving mechanical parts of equipment.
T at 20. At step four, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was unable to complete any past
relevant work. See id. at 24. At step five, considering the vocational expert’s (“VE”)
testimony and plaintiff’s RFC, age, and education, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff could
perform the following jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy:
(1) Document Preparer, DOT Code: 249.587-018, with 14,000 jobs in the national
economy; (2) Addresser (DOT Code: 209.587-101), with 1,900 jobs in the national
economy; and (3) Election Clerk (DOT Code 20.367-030), with 6,000 jobs in the
national economy. See id. at 25. The ALJ determined that plaintiff had “not been under
a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from July 28, 2022, through the date of
this decision[.]” Id.
IV. Discussion
A. Arguments
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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical opinion
evidence in reaching the plaintiff’s RFC. See Dkt. No. 10. 	He contends that the ALJ’s
“evaluation of each medical opinion5 is inadequately explained and, at times, contrary to
fact.” Id. at 8. First, plaintiff argues that the ALJ incorrectly characterized state agency
medical consultants Dr. Gonzalez and Dr. Gandhi’s opinions. See id. Second, plaintiff
asserts that the ALJ did not fully or properly assess the supportability and consistency
of consultative examiner Dr. Ganti’s opinions. See id. at 8-9. Third, plaintiff argues that
the ALJ’s rejection of his primary care provider Dr. Niyazov’s opinion lacks an
explanation for the basis of his consistency finding; ignores medical findings that
support his, and other providers’, opinions; and, as to supportability, erroneously
concludes that Dr. Niyazov failed to support his opinion beyond pointing to plaintiff’s
diagnosis. See id. at 10-11.
The Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly and sufficiently articulated his
findings as to the persuasiveness – the supportability and consistency factors – of all
medical opinions in the record. See Dkt. No. 11 at 8. The Commissioner also
specifically challenges plaintiff’s assertion of error in assessing Drs. Gonzalez’s and
Vasquez’s opinions. See id. at 9.
In reply, plaintiff accuses the Commissioner of ignoring legal error review,
arguing that the Commissioner must also demonstrate that the ALJ applied the correct
legal standard; thus, he argues, “it cannot be saved by the Commissioner’s insistence
that the decision could have passed the second step of review.” Dkt. No. 14 at 1-2.
5 Although plaintiff states that “each medical opinion” is inadequately explained, dkt. no. 10 at 8, he
discusses only the ALJ’s assessment of the following opinions: state agency consultants Dr. Gonzales
and Dr. Gandhi, consultative examiner Dr. Ganti, and plaintiff’s primary care physician Dr. Niyazov. See
Dkt. No. 10.
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Plaintiff further argues that the Commissioner failed to rebut or was “unresponsive” to
his argument that the ALJ did not articulate how he evaluated the consistency and
supportability factors. See id. at 2-3. Plaintiff reiterates his arguments that the ALJ’s
decision does not (1) “contain any evaluation of the supportability or consistency for the
postural limitations opined by the state agency consultants,” (2) contain “any
explanation” for his determination that Dr. Ganti’s opinion was “internally supported and
‘somewhat’ consistent with the record[,]” and (3) explain how he determined that Dr.
Niyazov’s opinion is consistent with any other evidence in the record. Dkt. No. 14.
B. Relevant Law
An individual’s RFC is “what [the] individual can still do despite his or her
limitations. Ordinarily, RFC is the individual’s maximum remaining ability to do sustained
work activities in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis . . . .” A
“regular and continuing basis” means that the activity can be sustained for eight hours a
day, five days a week or an equivalent schedule. Balles v. Astrue, No. 3:11-CV-1386
(MAD), 2013 WL 252970, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2013) (citing Melville v. Apfel, 198
F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *2)); Babcock v.
Berryhill, No. 5:17-CV-00580 (BKS), 2018 WL 4347795, at *12-13 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 12,
2018); Tankisi v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 521 F. App'x 29, 33 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary
order); Stephens v. Colvin, 200 F. Supp. 3d 349, 361 (N.D.N.Y. 2016).
In reaching an RFC determination, an ALJ must consider objective medical facts,
diagnoses, medical opinions based on these facts, and the claimant’s subjective
symptoms, including pain and other limitations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945;
see Martone v. Apfel, 70 F. Supp. 2d 145, 150 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing LaPorta v.
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Bowen, 737 F. Supp. 180, 183 (N.D.N.Y. 1990)); Kirah D. v. Berryhill, No. 3:18-CV-0110
(CFH), 2019 WL 587459, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Feb 13, 2019); Genier v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 46,
49 (2d Cir. 2010). An ALJ must specify the functions a claimant is capable of performing
and may not make conclusory statements regarding a claimant’s capacities. See Roat
v. Barnhart, 717 F. Supp. 2d 241, 267 (N.D.N.Y. 2010); Martone, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 150
(citing Ferraris, 728 F.2d at 588; LaPorta, 737 F. Supp. at 183, Stephens v. Colvin, 200
F. Supp. 3d 349, 361 (N.D.N.Y. 2016)); Whittaker v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 307 F. Supp.
2d 430, 440 (N.D.N.Y. 2004). The RFC must also include a narrative discussion,
describing how the evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusions, citing specific medical
facts, and non-medical evidence. See Natashia R. v. Berryhill, No. 3:17-CV-01266
(TWD), 2019 WL 1260049, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2019) (citing SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL
374184, at *7).
In evaluating medical opinions, an ALJ need “not defer or give any specific
evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s) [‘PAMFs’], including those from [a claimant’s] medical
sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a) (internal citation omitted). Rather, medical opinions
and PAMFs are evaluated based on their “persuasiveness.” Id. In evaluating the
“persuasiveness” of a medical opinion or PAMF, an ALJ is to “consider” the following
factors: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with the claimant;
(4) specialization; and (5) “other factors.” Id. §§ 416.920c(a); 416.920c(c)(1)-(5).
“However, in many cases, the ALJ only need ‘explain’ how the supportability and
consistency factors were considered, as they are ‘the most important factors.’” Brian K.
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:24-CV-26 (CFH), 2025 WL 18718, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 2,
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2025) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2)-(3)
(stating that an ALJ “is not required to” explain the remaining factors unless the ALJ
determines that “two or more medical opinions or [PAMFs] about the same issue are
both equally well-supported [ ] and consistent with the record [ ] but are not exactly the
same”).
For the “supportability” analysis, “[t]he more relevant the objective medical
evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his
or her medical opinion(s) or [PAMFs], the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or
[PAMFs] will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1); see also Kathleen A. v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 3:20-CV-1034 (LEK), 2022 WL 673824, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2022) (quoting
Carmen M. v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec., No. 20-CV-6532 (MJR), 2021 WL 5410550, at
*4 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2021)) (noting that “[t]he supportability analysis focuses on ‘how
well a medical source supported their opinion(s) with objective medical evidence and
supporting explanations’”). For the “consistency” analysis, “[t]he more consistent a
medical opinion(s) or [PAMFs] is with the evidence from other medical sources and
nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or
[PAMFs] will be.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920c(c)(2), 416.1520(c)(2); see also Kathleen A.,
2022 WL 673824, at *5 (first quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2); then citing Galo G. v.
Comm’r of the Soc. Sec., No. 20-CV-1011 (FJS), 2021 WL 5232722, at *4 (N.D.N.Y.
Nov. 9, 2021)) (“In the consistency analysis, an ALJ must look outside the medical
opinion itself to ‘evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the
claim,’ and will find the medical opinion more persuasive the more consistent it is with
these external sources.”).
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“ALJs are not required to state on the record every reason justifying a decision
and [are] not required to discuss every single piece of evidence submitted.” Brian K.,
2025 WL 18718, at *4 (quoting Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-2947-CV, 2022
WL 17933217 at *2 (2d Cir. Dec. 27, 2022) (summary order) (quoting Brault, 683 F.3d
at 448)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “However, they must articulate how
persuasive they found the medical opinions and PAMFs.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §
416.920c(b)). “If the ALJ fails adequately to ‘explain the supportability or consistency
factors,’ or bases ‘[the] explanation upon a misreading of the record, remand is
required.’” Id. (quoting Rivera v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 19-CV-4630 (LJL/BCM),
2020 WL 8167136, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2020) (quoting Andrew G. v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., No. 3:19-CV-0942 (ML), 2020 WL 5848776, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2020),
report and recommendation adopted 2021 WL 134945 (Jan. 14, 2021))); see also
Jennifer A. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:22-CV-1167 (MAD), 2023 WL 8654215, at *4
(N.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2023) (quoting Eric G. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:21-CV-1314
(MAD), 2023 WL 3004780, at *4, n.1 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2023)) (“The ALJ need not
specifically write the terms ‘supportability’ or ‘consistency’ to meet the articulation
requirements in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c and 416.920c; it is enough that the ALJ applied
the proper legal analysis.”).
C. Analysis
1. Drs. Gonzalez and Gandhi
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s assessment of the opinions of Dr. Gonzalez and
Dr. Gandhi incorrectly determined that (1) the doctors concluded that plaintiff was
capable of performing a range of light work, when the consultants actually concluded
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that plaintiff could perform sedentary work; and (2) declined to adopt additional postural
limitations. See Dkt. No. 10 at 8 (citing T at 23, 91, 105, 109). Plaintiff contends that
the ALJ improperly relied on this “mischaracterization” in “declin[ing] to include the
consultants’ assessed postural limitations in Plaintiff’s RFC.” Id. 	Plaintiff also contends
that the ALJ failed to address the supportability and consistency factors for these
doctors’ opinions. See id. at 9.
The Commissioner contends that these doctors did not assess additional
postural limitations, and the ALJ’s statement is a “poor word choice” that does not
amount to reversible error. Dkt. No. 11 at 9. 	The Commissioner further argues that,
because the ALJ concluded that plaintiff could perform sedentary work, “it is of no
consequence that Dr. Gonzalez and Dr. Gandhi opined that plaintiff could only stand
and/or walk for four hours since sedentary work generally requires no more than about
two hours or standing or walking in an eight-hour workday.” Id. at 10. Lastly, he argues
that the ALJ “showed Dr. Gonzales’ and Dr. Gandhi’s engagement with the record by
noting that Dr. Gonzalez and Dr. Gandhi reviewed Plaintiff’s file” and, citing to the
administrative transcript, points to their findings in their reports. See id. at 10. The
Commissioner also argues that the ALJ sufficiently addressed the consistency of the
opinions by concluding that the opinions were “somewhat consistent” with the medical
evidence of record. Id. at 11 (citing T at 23).
The Court agrees that Drs. Gonzalez and Gandhi did not include additional
postural limitations; thus, the ALJ did not err in failing to adopt additional postural
limitations. See T at 89-90, 97, 103. Although the ALJ also erroneously contended that
Drs. Gonzales and Gandhi concluded that plaintiff could perform “a range of light
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work[,]” he properly reported their actual findings – that they concluded that plaintiff
could stand and walk for four hours in an eight-hour workday and sit for six hours. See
id. at 23. The ALJ assessed plaintiff as sedentary.
Although the ALJ’s somewhat sloppy recitation of Drs. Gonzalez and Gandhi’s
opinions, alone, might not be sufficient cause for remand, the Court agrees with the
plaintiff that the ALJ failed to explain his consistency analysis for these doctors’ opinions
and may have based his assessment of both these providers’ opinions and others on
his incorrect reading of the record. The ALJ concluded that Drs. Gonzalez and Ghandi’s
opinions, although based “purely on a review” of plaintiff’s file, are “partially persuasive
because their findings are somewhat consistent with the medical evidence since the
alleged onset date.” T at 23 (emphasis added).
The Second Circuit has held a near identical conclusion to amount to a
“procedural error.” Loucks v. Kijakazi, No. 21-1749, 2022 WL 2189293, at *2 (2d Cir.
June 17, 2022). In Loucks, the ALJ did not address the one medical opinion’s
supportability or consistency “except to conclude that it was” (“I find this determination
somewhat persuasive as it is generally consistent with the evidence of record”) and did
not address the consistency of the other medical opinion other than to say “it [was]
inconsistent with the evidence of the record during the relevant period.” Id. The
Second Circuit acknowledged that, “[d]espite the ALJ’s procedural error, we could affirm
if ‘a searching review of the record’ assures us ‘that the substance of the [regulation]
was not traversed.” Id. (quoting Estrella v. Berryhill, 925 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 2019)).
Although the ALJ erred in concluding that the doctors found plaintiff could
perform a range of light work and in referring to nonexistent postural limitations that he
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rejected, the Court cannot conclude that the error is harmless for two reasons. First,
although the ALJ reached the same finding as Dr. Gonzalez and Gandhi as to plaintiff’s
ability to perform sedentary work, he appears to have assigned their opinions less
persuasiveness due to these errors. Had the ALJ properly reported Dr. Gonzalez and
Ghandi’s opinion, it is possible he would have found their opinions, or others in the
record, entitled to a greater or lesser degree of persuasiveness. Second, the Court has
no way of assessing his reasoning for believing their opinions to be “somewhat
consistent” with the medical evidence of record. T at 23. The ALJ does not cite a single
record with which he finds Drs. Gonzalez and Gandhi’s opinions to be either consistent
or consistent. See Raymond M. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:19-CV-1313 (ATB),
2021 WL 706645, *8 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2021) (“[T]he amended regulations require that
the ALJ explain her findings regarding the supportability and consistency for each of the
medical opinions, ‘pointing to specific evidence in the record supporting those
findings.’”) (quoting Jacqueline L. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:19-CV-6786 (EAW),
2021 WL 243099, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2021)).
Although the Commissioner points to various “normal” findings, it is notable that
the Commissioner is citing to the administrative transcript, not the ALJ’s decision, as the
ALJ decidedly did not cite or refer to these records in support of his statement that the
opinions were “somewhat consistent” with the medical record. See Dkt. No. 11 at 11.
This is a post-hoc rationalization that cannot save the ALJ’s failings, as the ALJ’s
rationale cannot be gleaned from his decision, which makes no mention of these
findings. See, e.g., John L. M. v. Kijakazi, No. 5:21-CV-368 (BKS/TWD), 2022 WL
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3500187, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. August 18, 2022). Thus, the ALJ’s procedural error with
respect to Drs. Gonzalez and Gandhi’s opinions is not harmless.
2. Dr. Niyazov
The ALJ concluded that the opinion of plaintiff’s primary care provider, Dr.
Niyazov, was “generally unpersuasive.” T at 24. He asserted that, despite a treatment
relationship with plaintiff, Dr. Niyazov’s “findings are inconsistent with medical evidence
since the alleged onset date.” Id. Further, the ALJ observed, where the form asked him
to provide the medical findings that he used to support his opinions, “he pointed to
claimant’s diagnosis of Charcot-Marie-Tooth disease without any explanation of what
particular findings or diagnostic tests might support his findings.” Id. The ALJ
concluded that his review “of the medical evidence indicates that the clinical findings
and diagnostic testing in the record do not provide basis to conclude that claimant is
limited to the limitations that Dr. Niyazov assessed.” Id.
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ “fails to point to a single instance where ‘the medical
evidence’ proved inconsistent with any aspect of the opinion whatsoever.” Dkt. No. 10
at 10. Further, the plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s statement that Dr. Niyazov failed to
explain the clinical findings or diagnostic tests that “might support his findings” is
“factually incorrect” as Dr. Niyazov “provided a narrative explanation in support of his
opinion” in that he “explained that he has been treating Plaintiff for Charcot-Marie-Tooth
disease every three months for over three years,” that the disease “has been confirmed
by nerve conduction studies,” and that the disease “causes muscle cramps, weakness,
and numbness” which impacts plaintiff’s balance, manual dexterity, and abilities to
stand, walk, use his hands, and “maintain position without breaks to stretch.” Id. (citing
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T at 705-07). The Commissioner asserts that the ALJ’s decision “highlighted” that the
doctor’s opinion was “unsupported as he did not provide any explanation for his opinion
by referencing particular clinical findings or diagnostic tests” other than citing plaintiff’s
diagnosis. Dkt. No. 11 at 12. The Commissioner compares Dr. Niyazov’s opinion to
“checklist forms” that courts have acknowledged to be “not very useful.” Id.
The Court agrees with plaintiff. The ALJ does not point to the specific
inconsistencies in the record between Dr. Niyazov’s findings and other medical
evidence and opinions. “Beyond merely considering the supportability and consistency
of medical source opinions, the ALJ must explain in his decision how he analyzed those
factors.” Stephen W. C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:24-CV-00546 (AMN/PJE), 2025
WL 2448196, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2025) (quoting Alvarado v. O'Malley, No. 22-cv-
9173, 2024 WL 1073293, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2024), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 22-cv-9173, 2024 WL 1344064 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2024) (citations
omitted)). Even if he may have compared Dr. Niyazov’s opinion to other medical
sources and nonmedical sources, the Court is blind to it as he did not lay out this
analysis as the regulations require. See also Kathleen A. v Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 3:20-CV-1034 (LEK), 2022 WL 673824, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2022) (“In the
consistency analysis, an ALJ must look outside the medical opinion itself to ‘evidence
from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim,’ and will find the
medical opinion more persuasive the more consistent it is with these external sources.”)
(quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2); citing Galo G., 2021 WL 5232722, at *4). The ALJ
does not explain the supportability of or consistency between Dr. Niyazov’s findings and
any of the other medical sources. See Ingrid T.G. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 1:20-CV-
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5651 (GRJ), 2022 WL 683034, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2022) (rejecting the ALJ’s
decision where “the ALJ considered the medical opinions in isolation and did not
account for the consistency of [the medical providers’] opinions with each other.”). This
alone is grounds for remand.
To the extent the Commissioner argues that the ALJ rejected Dr. Niyazov’s
findings, in part, as “unsupported by his own assessment,” the ALJ did not explicitly
reach such a conclusion. Dkt. No. 11 at 12 (citing T at 24). Instead, he generally
concluded that “the clinical findings and diagnostic testing in the record do not provide a
basis to conclude that claimant is limited to the limitation that Dr. Niyazov assessed.” T
at 24. However, even if the ALJ had so found, as above noted, without explaining how
Dr. Niyazov’s findings are inconsistent with the medical record, he has failed to meet the
requirements of the regulations. The ALJ did not point to the evidence with which he
believes Dr. Niyazov’s opinion to be inconsistent, and the ALJ’s intent cannot be
“gleaned” from the decision as a whole. Wanda N. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:21-
CV-00358 (TJM), 2022 WL 4376484, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2022) (quoting John L.
M. v. Kijakazi, No. 5:21-CV-368 (BKS/TWD), 2022 WL 3500187, at *2) (N.D.N.Y. Aug.
18, 2022)). Without direction, the Court is unable to know which tests and findings he
believes to be inconsistent with Dr. Niyazov’s findings. “[C]ourts in this circuit have
indicated that ALJs [must] not only identify supporting evidence, they also must ‘build an
accurate and logical bridge from that evidence to [the] conclusion.’” Jennifer Mabel C. v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:23-CV-01536 (BKS/CFH), 2024 WL 5058137, at *6
(N.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2024), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Jennifer M.C.
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:23-CV-01536 (BKS/CFH), 2024 WL 5058283 (N.D.N.Y.
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Dec. 10, 2024) (quoting Courtney F. v. Berryhill, No. 5:18-CV-0047 (LEK) 2019 WL
4415620, *7 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2019)). “In sum, while ALJs are not required to
‘reconcile every conflicting shred of medical testimony,’ Miles v. Harris, 645 F.2d 122,
124 (2d Cir. 1981), they must discuss the evidence and factors ‘crucial’ to the disability
determination with ‘sufficient specificity to enable [this Court] to decide whether the
determination is supported by substantial evidence.’” Ingrid T.G. v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 1:20-CV-5651-GRJ, 2022 WL 683034, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2022) (quoting
Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 587 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing Treadwell v. Schweiker, 698
F.2d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1983)).
Moreover, the ALJ improperly concluded that Dr. Niyazov did not support his
opined limitations with any explanation beyond pointing to her diagnosis. See T at 24.
Although Dr. Niyazov cited plaintiff’s diagnosis of Charcot-Marie-Tooth disease in
response to the question in the report that asked for the medical findings that supported
his assessment, which the ALJ used as a basis to reject his opinion, he also explicitly
explained the findings that support his assessment. See id. He explained, in direct
response to that question, that the disease causes muscle cramps that prevent him
from lifting and carrying, that it impairs his standing and walking ability, that it requires
him to stand up and stretch due to numbness, that his postural activities are impacted
because his disease impacts his balance, and that his manipulative activities are
impacted because the disease affects his manual dexterity. See T at 705-08 (Dkt. No.
7-7).
Although the ALJ correctly notes that check-the-box forms without explanation
have been held to be entitled to little weight, that rationale does not cleanly apply here,
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where the form explains the basis for the opined restrictions. Compare Michael G. v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:24-CV-06069 EAW, 2025 WL 2750478, at *7 (W.D.N.Y.
Sept. 29, 2025) (“In addition, to the extent that LMHC Bissell's opinion was offered on
fill-in-the-blank or check-box forms, with little to no explanation of why significant
restrictions were assessed, it was not error for the ALJ to discount its significance.”);
Jose F. v. O'Malley, No. 22-CV-325F, 2024 WL 4210900, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 17,
2024) (rejecting the opinion of the plaintiff’s mental health counselor where the check-
box form’s conclusions were internally consistent and the conclusion that the plaintiff is
unable to work was unsupported by therapy notes or other medical evidence of record);
with Yucekus v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-CV-1794(EK), 2024 WL 1348742, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2024) (“Although standardized check -box forms are less
informative, and entitled to less weight, than full narrative medical reports, see Halloran
v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 2004), this questionnaire included substantive
narrative responses as well, and was supported by Dr. Bernard's earlier written
examination reports.”).
The ALJ did not cite or discuss any of Dr. Niyazov’s medical records, despite his
regular, three-year treatment history with plaintiff, or highlight where in these records
there are inconsistencies with Dr. Niyazov’s medical source statements. Indeed,
diagnostic testing revealed atrophy of the hands and feet, distal hyporeflexia, absence
of vibratory sensation in the toes, and sensory and motor deficits in the arms and legs.
T at 475, 664-66.
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Finally, although the Commissioner’s motion papers identify individual treatment
records that he contends are inconsistent with the clinical findings of record, “‘the Court
may not affirm the ALJ’s decision solely on those post-hoc rationalizations.’”
Kaliegh O. o/b/o S.S.T. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:24-CV-0662 (MAD/TWD), 2025
WL 2933177, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No.
5:24-CV-00662 (MAD/TWD), 2025 WL 2528577 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2025) (citing Dana
Marie M. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:21-CV-458 (GLS/CFH), 2022 WL 2314560, at
*7 (N.D.N.Y. June 28, 2022) and Gina B. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:23-cv-00769,
2024 WL 4262640, at *7 (D. Conn. Sept. 23, 2024) (“The Commissioner cites to many
pages in the medical record, pointing to them as the support for the ALJ's determination.
However, that was the ALJ's task, and counsel for the Commissioner should not be
tasked with filling in gaps later in the process.”) (additional citations omitted)).
Accordingly, for these reasons, remand is warranted. See Wanda N., 2022 WL
4376484, at *11 (citing Rivera, 2020 WL 8167136, at *14 (“If the ALJ fails adequately to
explain the supportability or consistency factors, or bases her explanation upon a
misreading of the record, remand is required.”), report-recommendation adopted, 2021
WL 134945 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2021)).
3. Dr. Ganti
Dr. Ganti performed a consultative neurologic examination of plaintiff on April 3,
2023. See T at 564-66. The ALJ observed that Dr. Ganti concluded that plaintiff was
mildly to moderately limited in his abilities to lift, carry, push, and pull; mildly limited in
his abilities to engage in prolonged standing, walking, sitting, climbing, balancing,
stooping, crouching, kneeling, and crawling. See id. at 23. 	He reviewed Dr. Ganti’s
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findings of normal tandem walk heel-to-toe; ability to walk on heels and toes without
difficulty; strength of 5/5 in upper and lower extremities; no muscle atrophy, tremors, or
trigger points; normal sensation to pain, proprioception, and vibration; intact hand and
finger dexterity; and grip strength of 5/5 bilaterally. See id. at 22-23. The ALJ
concluded that internal medicine consultative examiner Dr. Ganti’s opinion was “partially
persuasive because his clinical observations support his findings and because his
findings are somewhat consistent with the medical evidence discussed above.” Id. at
23.
Plaintiff avers that the ALJ’s assessment fails to explain “how he concluded the
opinion was internally supported and ‘somewhat consistent’ with the rest of the record.
The ALJ merely stated his conclusion” which is “legally insufficient” under 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520c, 146.920c. Dkt. No. 10 at 9. The Commissioner states that the ALJ
discussed supportability by concluding that Dr. Ganti’s opinion was supported by his
own findings as a result of the examination. See Dkt. No. 11 (citing T at 2223, 565-66).
The Commissioner further argues that the ALJ discussed that Dr. Ganti’s opinion “was
consistent with the medical evidence of record, which he discussed in his opinion. See
id. (citing T at 23). The Commissioner contends that the ALJ is not required to “repeat
his prior examination of the record as part of the persuasiveness analysis.” Id. at 12
(quoting Porteus v. O’Malley, No. 23-CV-969, 2024 WL 2180202, at *2 (2d Cir. May 15,
2024)).
As to Dr. Ganti, the ALJ’s decision did not explain with which opinions and
medical records Dr. Ganti’s opinion was consistent or inconsistent. 	Indeed, the ALJ’s
statement “did not explain anything – instead, he made a conclusory statement that [an]
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opinion was ‘generally consistent and supportive,’ without any explanation of how he
assessed the opinion in connection with the consistency and supportability factors
which, as explained above, is required by the new regulations.” Jaleesa H. v. Comm'r of
Soc. Sec., 580 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9 (W.D.N.Y. 2022); Aaron W. v. Comm’r See Gary F. v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:24-CV-01440 (FJS/ML), 2026 WL 417539, at *10 (N.D.N.Y.
Jan. 20, 2026), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Aaron Treelane W. v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:24-CV-1440 (FJS/ML), 2026 WL 416054 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 13,
2026) (citing Gary F. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 6:20-CV-6735 (LJV), 2022 WL 16540354,
at *3 (W.D.N.Y. October 28, 2022)). A supportability and consistency analysis such as
this is insufficient and “‘precludes the Court from undertaking meaningful review of the
ALJ’s decision.’” Annjeanette B. v. Kijakazi, No. 3:22-CV-198 (ATB), 2023 WL
3040663, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2023) (quoting Jaleesa H., 580 F. Supp. 3d at 9).
Although the Commissioner refers to the ALJ’s discussion of medical records elsewhere
in the decision – referring to “normal neurological findings, full range of motion in his
joints, intact gait, full strength in the extremities, and generally unremarkable
cardiovascular findings, dkt. no. 11 at 11-2 (citing T at 22-23, 481, 499, 545, 635, 650) –
these limited references to the treatment record, discussed as part of his analyses of
other medical providers’ records, “do[] not elucidate how those treatment notes fail to
support an opinion that Plaintiff would be off-task more than twenty percent of an eight-
hour workday or absent from work about four days per month.” Alexa J. M. v. Kijakazi,
No. 5:22-CV-243 (BKS/ML), 2023 WL 4467124, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. July 11, 2023) (limited
reference to treatment record “does not elucidate how those treatment notes fail to
support an opinion that Plaintiff would be off-task more than twenty percent of an eight-
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hour workday or absent from work about four days per month.”). In sum, the ALJ’s
assessment of Dr. Ganti’s opinion “clearly leaves pertinent questions unanswered” as to
his reasoning for the persuasiveness of Dr. Ganti’s opinion. Briselida R. v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., No. 5:22-CV-01290 (TJM/ML), 2023 WL 9600841, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 20,
2023), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Briselida R. v. O’Malley, No. 5:22-
CV-1290 (FJS/ML), 2024 WL 532568 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2024) (citation omitted).
V. Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein, the ALJ’s decision is vacated, and
this matter is remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this
Memorandum-Decision and Order. See Loucks, 2022 WL 2189293, at *2 (“When the
ALJ has committed procedural error, we generally remand with instructions to
reconsider the disability claim consistent with the procedural mandates of the governing
regulations.”); Estrella v. Berryhill, 925 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 2019) (remanding when the
ALJ procedurally erred and a “searching review of the record” provides no assurance
that the “substance of the . . . . rule was not traversed.”) (quoting Halloran, 362 F.3d at
32). On remand, the ALJ is to properly evaluate the persuasiveness of each of the
opinions and specifically and fully explain the findings. See Briselida R., 2023 WL
9600841, at *11.
Wherefore, it is hereby
ORDERED, that plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, dkt. no. 10, is
GRANTED, and the matter is remanded to the Commissioner for proceedings
consistent with this Memorandum-Decision and Order, and the Commissioner’s Cross-
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, dkt. no. 11, is DENIED; and it is
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ORDERED, that the Clerk serve this Memorandum-Decision & Order on the
parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
Dated: February 23, 2026
Albany, New York
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