Lozada v. Haitech Works LLC

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Case 1:24-cv-01041-AMN-DJS Document 28 Filed 05/18/26 Page 1 of 17

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

BRANDON ALFONSO CAMPOS LOZADA,

Plaintiff, 1:24-cv-01041 (AMN/DJS)
v.
HAITECH WORKS LLC,
Defendant.
APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:
JUSTICIA LABORAL, LLC DANIEL I. SCHLADE, ESQ.

6232 N. Pulaski Road — Suite 300
Chicago, Illinois 60646
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Hon. Anne M. Nardacci, United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

On August 23, 2024, Plaintiff Brandon Alfonso Campos Lozada commenced this action
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 ef seg., and the New York
Labor Law (““NYLL”), § 190 et seq., seeking money damages and reasonable attorney’s fees and
costs. Dkt. No. 1. Presently before this Court is Plaintiff's second motion for default judgment
pursuant to Rule 55(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. No. 25 (“Motion”).

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's Motion is granted.
II. BACKGROUND

For a full recitation of the factual background, the Court refers the Parties to its previous

Memorandum-Decision and Order on Plaintiffs initial motion for default judgment. See Dkt. No.

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

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16 at 1-3.!

A. Plaintiff's Original Motion for Default Judgment and the Court’s October 14,
2025 Order

On March 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment under Rule 55(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Dkt. No. 15, which this Court denied without prejudice on
October 14, 2025 based on Plaintiff's failure to sufficiently establish liability under the FLSA. See
generally Dkt. No. 16. Specifically, this Court found that Plaintiffs allegations were insufficient
to establish that Defendant is an employer subject to the FLSA and declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims. See id. at 6-11.

B. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and Second Motion for Default Judgment

On October 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint with leave of this Court. See
generally Dkt. No. 18. Plaintiff no longer brings a collective action or class action. Compare Dkt.
No. 1 with Dkt. No. 18. Notably, the Amended Complaint provides additional detail regarding the
type of commerce in which Defendant is engaged. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges, among other
things, that Defendant provides dry wall and finishing, door and cabinet installations, and metal
stud framing for commercial and residential projects, and that Plaintiff was involved in several
remodeling and construction projects with a value in excess of $500,000. See Dkt. No. 18 at ¥ 5.
The Amended Complaint also provides more specifics regarding Plaintiff's employment with
Defendant. For example, Plaintiff alleges that he entered into an at-will employment agreement
with Defendant to perform remodeling and general construction duties, and Defendant established
the terms of Plaintiff's employment, including his weekly schedule, rate of pay, and the projects

to which he would be assigned on a daily basis. Jd. at F§ 12-13.

' Citations to court documents utilize the pagination generated by CM/ECF, the Court’s electronic
filing system.

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On November 5, 2025, Plaintiff served his Amended Complaint upon Defendant. See Dkt.
No. 21. Again, despite service, Defendant has neither appeared in this action nor responded to any
filing. See generally Docket Sheet. On December 8, 2025, Plaintiff requested an entry of default
and submitted a supporting affirmation. See Dkt. No. 22. The following day, the Clerk entered
default against Defendant. See Dkt. No. 23. On January 8, 2026, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion,
which included a memorandum of law, supporting declaration, and various exhibits. See Dkt. Nos.
25, 26.

Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “provides a ‘two-step process’ for the entry
of judgment against a party who fails to defend: first, the entry of a default, and second, the entry
of a default judgment.” City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 128 (2d Cir.
2011) (citing New York v. Green, 420 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2005)). The first step is governed by
Rule 55(a), which provides that “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is
sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise,
the clerk must enter the party’s default.” Jd. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)); see also N.D.N.Y.
L.R. 55.1 (setting forth affidavit requirements). Entry of a default “formalizes a judicial
recognition that a defendant has, through its failure to defend the action, admitted liability to the
plaintiff.” Mickalis, 645 F.3d at 128. The second step “requires the plaintiff to seek a judgment
by default under Rule 55(b).” Priestley v. Headminder, Inc., 647 F.3d 497, 505 (2d Cir. 2011).
Entry of a default judgment “converts the defendant’s admission of liability into a final judgment
that terminates the litigation and awards the plaintiff any relief to which the court decides it is

entitled[.]” Mickalis, 645 F.3d at 128. A default judgment “ordinarily must be entered by the

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district judge, rather than by the clerk of court, except in certain circumstances[.]” Jd.; see also
N.D.N.Y. L.R. 55.2 (setting forth requirements for requesting a default judgment).

“Before entering a default judgment, the court ‘must ensure that (1) jurisdictional
requirements are satisfied, (2) the plaintiff took all the required procedural steps in moving for [a]
default judgment, and (3) the plaintiff's allegations, when accepted as true, establish liability as a
matter of law.’” Windward Bora, LLC v. Brown, No. 21-cv-03147, 2022 WL 875100, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2022) (alteration in original) (quoting Jian Hua Li v. Chang Lung Grp. Inc.,
No. 16-cv-6722, 2020 WL 1694356, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2020)). Additionally, “[t]here must
be an evidentiary basis for the damages sought by plaintiff, and a district court may determine
there is sufficient evidence either based upon evidence presented at a hearing or upon a review of
detailed affidavits and documentary evidence.” Cement & Concrete Workers Dist. Council
Welfare Fund, Pension Fund, Annuity Fund, Educ. & Training Fund & Other Funds v. Metro
Found. Contractors Inc., 699 F.3d 230, 233 (2d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). When evaluating
arequest for a default judgment, a “district court is empowered under Rule 55(b)(2), in the exercise
of its discretion, to ‘conduct hearings or make referrals’ as may be necessary, inter alia, to
determine the amount of damages or establish the truth of the plaintiffs allegations.” Mickalis,
645 F.3d at 129 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)(B)-(C)).

While a court may enter a default judgment if the requisite standard is satisfied, the Second
Circuit has cautioned that default judgments “are generally disfavored and are reserved for rare
occasions|.]” Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1993). “Because we have ‘a
strong preference for resolving disputes on the merits,’ and because ‘a default judgment is the most
severe sanction which the court may apply,’ . .. we have characterized a district court’s discretion

in proceeding under Rule 55 as ‘circumscribed.’” Mickalis, 645 F.3d at 129 (first quoting Green,

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420 F.3d at 104; then quoting Enron, 10 F.3d at 95; and then citing State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v.
Inversiones Errazuriz Limitada, 374 F.3d 158, 168 (2d Cir. 2004)).
IV. DISCUSSION?

A. Procedural Requirements

As with Plaintiff's first motion for a default judgment, the Court finds that Plaintiff has
again satisfied the relevant procedural requirements for seeking a default judgment. Plaintiff
properly served Defendant by serving the Amended Complaint on Defendant’s registered agent.
See Dkt. No. 21. On December 8, 2025, Plaintiff properly requested the Clerk’s entry of default
under Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Dkt. No. 22, and pursuant to Local
Rule 55.1, Plaintiff affirmed that Defendant was properly served, has defaulted in this action, and
is not an infant, in the military, or an incompetent person. See Dkt. No. 22-1. On December 9,
2025, the Clerk entered default against Defendant, see Dkt. No. 23, and, on January 8, 2026,
Plaintiff moved for a default judgment against Defendant under Rule 55(b)(2) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 55.2(b). See Dkt. No. 25. Accordingly, given that the
procedural requirements for entry of a default judgment have been met, the Court turns to address
liability.

B. Liability as a Matter of Law

“To enter a default judgment, a district court must determine whether—after taking all
well-pleaded allegations as true and making reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor—the
plaintiff's allegations establish liability as a matter of law.” Henry v. Oluwole, 108 F.4th 45, 55

(2d Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted); see also Moore v.

? For the avoidance of doubt, the Court previously ruled that Plaintiff had established that the Court
has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter and personal jurisdiction over Defendant. See Dkt.
No. 16 at 5.

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Booth, 122 F 4th 61, 69 (2d Cir. 2024) (“[W]e have explained that ‘prior to entering a default
judgment, a district court is required to determine whether the plaintiffs allegations establish the
defendant’s liability as a matter of law.’” (quoting Mickalis, 645 F.3d at 137) (alterations omitted)).

1. FLSA Claim

Plaintiffs first claim is that Defendant violated the FLSA by undercompensating Plaintiff
for the overtime that he worked. See Dkt. No. 18 at JJ 15-32.

i. Employment Relationship

“To establish liability under the FLSA, a plaintiff must show that he or she is an employee
of the defendant within the meaning of the FLSA and that the defendant is an employer subject to
the FLSA.” Yanchaliquin v. Chuqui Builders Corp., No. 23-cv-504, 2023 WL 7299810, at *3
(N.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2023) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

The FLSA broadly defines ‘employee’ as “an ‘individual employed by an employer.’”
Mendez v. Prime Mgmt. Consultants LLC, No. 24-cv-1301 (AMN/PJE), 2026 WL 865758, at *5
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2026) (quoting Wang v. Hearst Corp., 877 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 2017)). Here,
Plaintiff alleges that he entered into an at-will employment agreement with Defendant whereby he
agreed to perform remodeling and general construction duties in return for $20 per hour, paid on
a weekly basis. Dkt. No. 18 at §§ 13, 19. Plaintiff further alleges that these duties do not fall
within any of the exemptions under the FLSA. /d. at § 14. Such allegations are sufficient to meet
the FLSA definition of employee. See, e.g., Mendez, 2026 WL 865758, at *5 (finding allegations
that defendants employed plaintiffs as manual laborers, each performed renovation and
construction work, and were paid (or were supposed to be paid) on a weekly basis sufficient to
qualify as an employee under the FLSA); Yanchaliquin, 2023 WL 7299810, at *3 (finding that

plaintiff qualifies as an employee under the FLSA for purposes of default where plaintiff alleged

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that defendants employed him for approximately six months, plaintiff performed roof-building
duties, and defendants paid plaintiff on a biweekly basis).

An employer is subject to the FLSA’s overtime provisions if “(1) their employees are
‘engaged in commerce,’ or (2) the employer is an ‘enterprise engaged in commerce.’” Sanchez v.
Ms. Wine Shop Inc., 643 F. Supp. 3d 355, 366-67 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (first quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 206,
207; and then citing Padillia v. Manlapaz, 643 F. Supp. 2d 298, 299 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)). These two
categories are commonly referred to as individual coverage and enterprise coverage, respectively.
An employer is an “enterprise engaged in commerce” if it is an enterprise that “‘has employees
handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced
for commerce by any person’ and... has an ‘annual gross volume of sales made or business done
of not less than $500,000.°” Yanchaliquin, 2023 WL 7299810, at *3 (quoting 29 U.S.C. §
203(s)(1)(A)(i)-(1)) (alterations omitted). “Commerce” is defined as “trade, commerce,
transportation, transmission, or communication” among several states or between any state and
any place outside of it. Sanchez, 643 F. Supp. 3d at 367 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 203(b)).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant provides dry wall and finishing, door and cabinet
installation, and metal stud framing for residential and commercial projects. Dkt. No. 18 at ¥ 5.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he participated in several remodeling and construction jobs
during his employment with Defendant, including the construction of an eight-story commercial
and residential center and the renovation of a three-story home. /d. Plaintiff further alleges that
these two construction projects alone exceeded $500,000 in annual revenue. Jd. Additionally,
Plaintiff alleges that as part of his employment with Defendant, he and other employees handled
goods and materials that had traveled through interstate commerce, such as insulation, structural

steel, piping, and water pumps. Jd. at § 6.

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The Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled that Defendant is “‘an enterprise engaged
in commerce,” as defined by the FLSA. Accordingly, Plaintiffs allegations are sufficient to
establish that Plaintiff is an “employee” within the meaning of the FLSA and Defendant is subject
to the overtime provisions of the FLSA.

ii. Overtime Claim

Next, the Court must assess whether Plaintiffs allegations, taken as true, establish liability.
As relevant here, the FLSA “requires a regulated employer who ‘employ[s] any of his employees
... for a workweek longer than forty hours’ to compensate that employee ‘at a rate not less than
one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.’” Herrera v. Comme des Garcons,
Ltd., 84 F.4th 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2023) (alterations in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)).
Thus, “in order to state a plausible FLSA overtime claim, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege 40
hours of work in a given workweek as well as some uncompensated time in excess of the 40 hours.”
Lundy v. Cath. Health Sys. of Long Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 114 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 207(a)(1)). The pleading standard applicable to FLSA overtime claims is satisfied “if plaintiffs
allege that their regularly scheduled workweek for a given period of time included more than forty
hours of work, so that they were eligible for overtime during every week in which they worked
their regular schedule.” Herrera, 84 F.4th at 117. “In that case, a plaintiff... need only allege
the period of time during which they were employed.” Jd. Moreover, “the plaintiff need not keep
‘careful records’ of the number of hours worked each week or calculate and ‘plead their hours with
mathematical precision.’” Jd. at 114 (quoting Dejesus v. HF Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 726 F.3d 85, 90
(2d Cir. 2013)).

Here, the Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant regularly scheduled and directed

Plaintiff to work in excess of forty hours per week, and was only paid his hourly rate for each hour

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worked, including his overtime hours. Dkt. No. 18 at 99 21-24. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that
he was employed by Defendant from approximately January 16, 2023 until August 2023, and his
general schedule required him to work an average of 56 hours per week. Jd. at {§ 16, 18.
Moreover, Plaintiff was not required to record his time spent working and Defendant did not
maintain records regarding the hours that Plaintiff worked. Jd. at { 28.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently established that Defendant
violated the FLSA by undercompensating Plaintiff for the overtime he worked.

2. NYLL Overtime Claim

Plaintiff's second claim is that Defendant also violated the NYLL by undercompensating
Plaintiff for the overtime that he worked. Dkt. No. 18 at ff] 33-37. “Because ‘the relevant portions
of [the] NYLL do not diverge from the requirements of the FLSA, conclusions about FLSA
allegations apply equally to NYLL overtime claims.’” Vega v. Fox Bldg. Grp., Inc., No. 24-cv-
785, 2025 WL 1785045, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. June 27, 2025) (first quoting Dejesus, 726 F.3d at 89
n.5; and then citing Yanchaliquin, 2023 WL 7299810, at *4). Accordingly, for the same reasons
set forth in supra Section IV(B)(1) with respect to Plaintiff's FLSA overtime claim, the Court finds
that Plaintiff has sufficiently established that Defendant violated the NYLL by undercompensating
Plaintiff for the overtime that he worked.

3. NYLL Wage Notice and Wage Statement Claims

Plaintiff's third and fourth claims are that Defendant violated the NYLL by failing to
provide Plaintiff with accurate wage notices and wage statements. See Dkt. No. 18 at 9] 38-50.
Section 195 of the NYLL “requires an employer to provide an employee, at the time of hiring,
with a notice (1) describing the employee’s rate of pay for regular and for overtime hours; (2)

stating whether the employer intends to credit allowances for items such as tips, meals, and lodging

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toward the employee’s minimum wage; (3) describing certain health care benefits; and (4)
providing other basic information.” Guthrie v. Rainbow Fencing Inc., 113 F.4th 300, 303 (2d Cir.
2024) (citing N.Y. Lab. L. § 195(1)(a)). Additionally, “each time wages are paid, the employer
must furnish a statement detailing the calculation of regular and overtime pay for that pay period,
along with information on deductions and minimum wage allowances.” Jd. (citing N.Y. Lab. L. §
195(3)). Moreover, to establish standing with respect to a statutory violation of Section 195, “a
plaintiff must show some casual connection between the lack of accurate notices and the
downstream harm.” Jd. at 308.

First, Plaintiff plausibly alleges that Defendant violated Section 195(1) of the NYLL by
failing to issue accurate wage notices to Plaintiff. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant did
not give any notice to Plaintiff in either English or Spanish, Plaintiff's primary language, of his
rate of pay, Defendant’s regular pay day, and other information required under Section 195(1) of
the NYLL. See Dkt. No. 18 at 9§ 41, 43-44. Second, Plaintiff plausibly alleges that Defendant
violated Section 195(3). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff
with accurate wage statements at the time that wages are paid that contained, inter alia, the dates
of work covered by that payment of wages, the regular hourly rate of pay, the overtime rate of pay,
the number of regular hours worked, and the number of overtime hours worked. Jd. at ¥ 49.

Lastly, Plaintiff adequately alleges that he was harmed by these statutory violations.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he “was never given accurate wage statements or paystubs from
which [he] could determine [his] accurate rate of pay, including overtime pay.” Dkt. No. 26-3 at
4 11. Such allegations, despite being somewhat sparse, suggest downstream harm beyond
regulatory noncompliance—specifically, that Defendant’s failure to provide wage notices and

wage statements impaired Plaintiffs ability to seek relief due to a lack of information. See Guthrie,

10

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113 F.4th at 310 (noting that “a plaintiff-employee who has plausibly shown that defective notices
led him . . . to lose wages has . . . a concrete interest and is not simply policing legal infractions in
the abstract”); see also Rueda v. A & G Iron Works Corp, No. 25-cv-1791, 2026 WL 183692, at
*12 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2026) (collecting cases). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has
alleged sufficient factual allegations of concrete injury in connection with Defendant’s failure to
provide Plaintiff with the necessary wage notices and wage statements.

C. Damages

Having found that the Amended Complaint establishes Defendant’s liability, the court must
also conduct an inquiry to ascertain the amount of damages with reasonable certainty. See US All.
Fed. Credit Union v. M/V Kamara Fam., 691 F. Supp. 3d 646, 659 (E.D.N.Y. 2023) (citations
omitted). Plaintiff did not request an evidentiary hearing as to damages. Specifically, Plaintiff
submits that no damages inquest is necessary because Plaintiff's declaration sufficiently
establishes the basis for his damages request. See Dkt. No. 26 at 7. “While the court must ensure
that there is a basis for the damages specified in a default judgment, it may, but need not, make the
determination through a hearing.” United States v. Richardson, No. 17-cv-2982, 2018 WL
4138934, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also
Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers Local 2 v. Moulton Masonry & Construction, LLC, 779 F.3d
182, 189 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting that Rule 55(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “allows
but does not require the district judge to conduct a hearing”). “No hearing is necessary, for
example, where, based upon a review of detailed affidavits and documentary evidence, the court
is assured that there is an adequate basis for the damages sought.” Gould v. Marconi Dev. Grp.,

LLC, No. 19-cv-1454, 2020 WL 2042332, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2020) (internal quotation

11

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marks and citation omitted).

Plaintiff seeks unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages under the FLSA, statutory
damages for wage notice and wage statement violations under the NYLL, and attorney’s fees and
costs. See Dkt. No. 26 at 7-10. In support of his request for damages, Plaintiff submits a sworn
declaration that includes, among other things, his recollection of the hours he worked and the rate
of pay he received. See Dkt. No. 26-3. In the context of a default judgment brought for violations
of the FLSA and the NYLL, “the plaintiff's recollection and estimates of hours worked are
presumed to be correct.” Andrade v. A to Z Hardware, Inc., No. 22-cv-7304, 2026 WL 825386,
at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2026); see also Garcia v. JonJon Deli Grocery Corp., No. 13-cv-8835,
2015 WL 4940107, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2015) (“In the absence of sufficient records, an
employee may meet his burden by testifying as to his own recollection of the hours worked.”
(citing Kuebel v. Black & Decker Inc., 643 F.3d 352, 362 (2d Cir. 2011)). Accordingly, as an
initial matter, the Court finds that such documentation is sufficient for calculating an award of
damages without a hearing.

1. Overtime Wages

Plaintiff seeks unpaid wages of $5,600 under both the FLSA and NYLL. See Dkt. No. 26
at 7-8. While Defendant is liable under both the FLSA and NYLL for failure to pay Plaintiff
overtime wages, “plaintiffs are not entitled to recover twice under both the FLSA and NYLL for
the same injury.” Hengjin Sun v. China 1221, Inc., No. 12-cv-7135, 2016 WL 1587242, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (collecting cases); see also Marcelino
v. 374 Food, Inc., No. 16-cv-6287, 2018 WL 1517205, at *10 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2018)
(noting that an employee may not receive a “double recovery” of back wages under both the FLSA

and the NYLL (citations omitted)).

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Here, Plaintiff alleges that he worked 56 hours per week from January 16, 2023 until
August 2023 at a rate of $20 per hour and was never paid time-and-a-half wages for any hours
worked in excess of 40 hours per week. Dkt. No. 26-3 at 9§ 8-9; Dkt. No. 18 at § 16. Because
Plaintiff was paid his straight time rate of $20 for all hours worked, his overtime premium is $10,
which is the difference between his overtime rate—which is $30—and straight time rate.
Therefore, since Plaintiff worked 16 hours of overtime each week for the roughly 33 weeks that
he worked for Defendant, Plaintiff is entitled to $5,280 in overtime pay.*

2. Liquidated Damages

Plaintiff also seeks liquidated damages under the FLSA. See Dkt. No. 26 at 8-9. While
the FLSA and NYLL each provide for payment of “an additional equal amount as liquidated
damages,” see 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); N.Y. Lab. Law § 663(1), Plaintiff cannot recover liquidated
damages under both statutes. See Rana v. Islam, 887 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir. 2018). Therefore, the
Second Circuit has held that an award of liquidated damages under one satisfies the provision for
liquidated damages in the other.” Yanchaliquin, 2023 WL 7299810, at *6 (citing Chowdhury v.
Hamza Express Food Corp., 666 F. App’x 59, 61 (2d Cir. 2016)).

““Under the FLSA, a district court is generally required to award a plaintiff liquidated
damages equal in amount to actual damages’ for violations of the FLSA’s . . . overtime provisions.”
Bautista v. ABC Corp, No. 19-cv-3963, 2021 WL 1225872, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2021) (quoting
Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 150 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing 29 U.S.C. §
216(b))). “Courts have discretion to deny liquidated damages where the employer shows that,

despite its failure to pay appropriate wages, it acted in subjective good faith with objectively

> Plaintiff appears to miscalculate the amount overtime pay by including the first two weeks of
January 2023, which preceded his alleged start date as an employee of Defendant. See Dkt. No.
18-1.

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reasonable grounds for believing that its acts or omissions did not violate the FLSA.” Mangahas
v. Eight Oranges Inc., 754 F. Supp. 3d 468, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). In this case, due to Defendant’s default, the record is devoid of any evidence
of Defendant’s good faith or reasonable belief. See Cao v. Wedding in Paris LLC, 727 F. Supp.
3d 239, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (collecting cases).

Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to $5,280 in liquidated damages under the FLSA.

3. Statutory Damages

Plaintiff also seeks $10,000 in statutory damages for Defendant’s failure to provide wage
notices and wage statements as required by Sections 195(1) and (3) of the NYLL. See Dkt. No.
26 at 9. “For an employer’s failure to provide wage notice at the time of hiring, an employee may
recover $50 each workday, not to exceed $5,000.” Brito v. Marina’s Bakery Corp., No. 19-cv-
828, 2022 WL 875099, at *20 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2022) (citing N.Y. Lab. Law § 198(1-b)).
Similarly, “[f]or [an] employer’s failure to provide wage statements, an employee may recover
$250 each workday, not to exceed $5,000.” Jd. (citing N.Y. Labor Law § 198(1-d)).

Here, Plaintiff worked more than one hundred days without receiving wage notices and
more than twenty days without receiving wage statements. See Dkt. No. 18 at §§ 41, 48 (alleging
that Defendant failed to issue accurate wage notices and wage statements to Plaintiff).
Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to the statutory maximum of $5,000 for Defendant’s failure to
furnish wage notices to Plaintiff, and another $5,000 for Defendant’s failure to provide Plaintiff
with wage statements. See, e.g., Brito, 2022 WL 875099, at *20 (awarding plaintiffs the statutory
maximum for wage notice and wage statement violations); Lamar v. A&O Bros. Corp., No. 21-

cv-169, 2022 WL 1422439, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2022) (same).

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4. Attorney’s Fees and Costs

Finally, Plaintiff requests an award of $3,324 in attorney’s fees and costs. Dkt. No. 25-2
at 8. “Attorney’s fees and costs are recoverable under both the FLSA and NYLL.” Yanchaliquin,
2023 WL 7299810, at *7 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and N.Y. Lab. Law § 215(2)(a)). In the Second
Circuit, “the lodestar . . . creates a presumptively reasonable fee,” see Millea v. Metro-North R.R.
Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), “which is
the number of hours expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Stokes v.
MilkChocolateNYC LLC, 681 F. Supp. 3d 226, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (citing Healey v. Leavitt, 485
F.3d 63, 71 (2d Cir. 2007)).

Here, Plaintiff has submitted evidence of both the number of hours worked by his counsel
and the rates charged. See generally Dkt. No. 25-2. With respect to the time that Plaintiffs counsel
spent litigating this matter, the Court finds that 6.7 hours is reasonable and demonstrates that
counsel acted efficiently. Counsel’s descriptions in the billing records, documenting, in relevant
part, the time spent drafting the initial Complaint, the instant Motion, and related affidavits, have
sufficient detail to enable the Court to assess reasonableness. See Dkt. No. 25-2 at 2. Thus, the
Court concludes that 6.7 hours is a reasonable amount of time. See, e.g., Badrsch v. Modern Boss
Marketing LLC, No. 24-cv-820 (AMN/DJS), 2025 WL 1424254, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. May 16, 2025)
(finding a range of 5.95 hours to be reasonable for a case resulting in a motion for a default
judgment and collecting cases).

Regarding Plaintiff's counsel’s hourly rate, “[t]he Second Circuit has held that in
calculating the presumptively reasonable fee, courts should generally use the hourly rates
employed in the district in which the reviewing court sits.” Li v. Spa Nail 9, Inc., No. 19-cv-873

(AMN/CFH), 2024 WL 3823209, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2024) (internal quotation marks and

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Case 1:24-cv-01041-AMN-DJS Document 28 Filed 05/18/26 Page 16 of 17

citations omitted), appeal dismissed (Nov. 18, 2024). The Court finds that the $400 hourly rate
charged by counsel in this case is not within the reasonable range of rates for attorneys performing
similar work in this district. “Reasonable rates in this district have been determined to be anywhere
from $250 to $350 for partners, $165 to $200 for associates, and $80 to $90 for paralegals.”
Sadowski v. Urbanspotlite LLC, No. 22-cv-887, 2024 WL 3026565, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. June 17,
2024); see also Johnson v. Mauro, No. 16-cv-622, 2019 WL 5842765, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 7,
2019) (“A review of cases in this District indicates that the following hourly rates (or rate ranges)
are reasonable: $275—$350 for experienced partners; $165—$200 for junior associates; and $90 for
paralegals.” (collecting cases)). Accordingly, the Court finds that $350 per hour is appropriate
compensation for “the primary attorney responsible for handling this matter.” Dkt. No. 25-2 at §
2. Thus, the Court reduces Plaintiff's counsel’s billable rate to $350 per hour.

Accordingly, after making the appropriate rate adjustments, the Court finds that Plaintiff is
entitled to $2,989 in attorney’s fees and costs.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court hereby

ORDERS that Plaintiff's Motion, Dkt. No. 25, is GRANTED; and the Court further

ORDERS that Defendant is liable for $5,280 in unpaid overtime wages, $5,280 in
liquidated damages, and $10,000 in statutory damages; and the Court further

ORDERS that Plaintiff's counsel be awarded $2,989 in attorney’s fees and costs; and the
Court further

ORDERS that the Clerk serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on the

parties in accordance with the Local Rules.

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Case 1:24-cv-01041-AMN-DJS Document 28 Filed 05/18/26 Page 17 of 17

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 18, 2026 Quem, Vian Wace
Albany, New York Anne M. Nardacci

U.S. District Judge

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