Massaro v. United States of America

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------X
JOSEPH MASSARO,
Petitioner, 	MEMORANDUM & ORDER
26-MC-0257(JS)
-against-
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
-------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: 	Joseph Massaro, Pro Se
82 New Mill Road
Smithtown, New York 	11787
For Respondent: 	No Appearance.1
SEYBERT, District Judge:
Presently before the Court is the pro se motion of Joseph
Massaro (“Petitioner” or “Massaro”) seeking the expungement of his
criminal 	record 	(hereafter, 	the 	“Expunge 	Motion”). 	(See 	ECF 	No.
1.) 	For the reasons that follow, the Expunge Motion is DISMISSED
for lack of jurisdiction.
[Proceed to the next page.]
1 	Because 	“this 	Court 	lacks 	jurisdiction 	to 	grant 	the 	relief
Petitioner requests,” Tonge v. United States, No. 24-MC-2592, 2025
WL 	3485194, 	at 	*1 	(E.D.N.Y. 	Dec. 	4, 	2025), 	in 	its 	discretion 	and
to 	conserve 	judicial 	resources, 	the 	Court 	declined 	to 	direct 	the
Government 	to 	file 	a 	response 	to 	the 	instant 	petition, 	defined
herein as the “Expunge Motion”.
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BACKGROUND
I. 	The Criminal Case
The 	Court 	assumes 	the 	reader’s 	familiarity 	with
Petitioner’s 	underlying 	criminal 	case, 	Case 	No. 	94-CR-0880, 	over
which 	Honorable 	Denis 	R. 	Hurley 	presided 	(hereinafter, 	the
“Criminal 	Case”).2 	For 	convenience, 	the 	Court 	summarily 	states
Petitioner 	pled 	guilty 	to 	one 	count 	of 	a 	four-count 	indictment,
i.e., 	bribery 	of 	a 	public 	official, 	in 	violation 	of 	18 	U.S.C.
§ 201. 	(See 	Criminal 	Case, 	June 	30, 	1995 	Judgment, 	ECF 	No. 	17.)
He 	was 	sentenced 	to 	a 	term 	of 	five 	years’ 	probation 	and 	fined
$20,050. 	(See id.) 	Petitioner satisfied his fine (see id., Notice
of 	Satisfaction, 	ECF 	No. 	18) 	and 	completed 	his 	term 	of 	probation
without incident (see, e.g., Criminal Case, Case Docket, in toto;
Expunge Motion at 1.)
II. 	The Instant Motion
In 	an 	undated 	letter, 	received 	by 	and 	filed 	with 	the
Clerk 	of 	Court 	on 	January 	22, 	2026, 	Massaro 	moves 	for 	the
expungement of his Criminal Case.3 	(See Expunge Motion.) 	In doing
2 	Judge Hurley has since retired from the bench.
3 	Courts 	within 	the 	Second 	Circuit 	“treat 	the 	terms 	‘seal’ 	and
‘expunge’ 	interchangeably 	and 	apply 	the 	same 	standard 	when
deciding motions to seal or motions to expunge criminal records.”
Melvin 	v. 	United 	States, 	No. 	18-MC-3359, 	2019 	WL 	5394646, 	at 	*1
n.1 	(E.D.N.Y. 	Oct. 	21, 	2019); 	see 	also 	Ali 	v. 	United 	States, 	No.
13-MC-0342, 	2013 	WL 	4048498, 	at 	*1 	n.1 	(E.D.N.Y. 	Aug. 	9, 	2013)
(explaining 	the 	terms 	“expunge” 	and 	“seal” 	“have 	been 	used
interchangeably 	when 	a 	request 	to 	seal 	or 	expunge 	is 	made” 	and
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so, 	Massaro 	explains, 	among 	other 	things, 	he 	has: 	(a) 	accepted
responsibility 	for 	his 	crime; 	(b) 	proceeded 	to 	“live[] 	as 	a 	law-
abiding citizen, husband, father, and contributing member of [his]
community” 	for 	more 	than 	30 	years; 	(c) 	rebuilt 	and 	ran 	an 	honest
and 	successful 	business; 	(d) 	“dedicated 	time, 	resources, 	and
financial 	support 	to 	helping 	others”; 	and 	(e) 	raised 	three 	sons,
each 	of 	whom 	completed 	college 	and 	is 	a 	productive, 	successful
adult. 	(Id.) 	Massaro 	seeks 	expungement 	to 	remove 	the 	cloud 	of
his conviction and provide him with “personal closure”, since said
conviction has impeded his dignity and peace-of-mind. 	(Id.)
DISCUSSION
As 	an 	initial 	matter, 	because 	Petitioner’s 	submission
was filed pro se, the Court has liberally construed it “‘to raise
the 	strongest 	arguments 	that 	they 	suggest.’” 	Kirkland 	v.
Cablevision Sys., 760 F.3d 223, 224 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Burgos
v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)). 	However, this does
not 	excuse 	Petitioner 	“‘from 	compl[ying] 	with 	relevant 	rules 	of
procedural and substantive law’. . . .” 	Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d
90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593
(5th Cir. 1981)).
that “[m]otions to seal or expunge criminal records apply the same
stringent standard” (citations omitted)).
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I. 	Legal Standard
“Federal 	courts 	. 	. 	. 	are 	courts 	of 	limited
jurisdiction.” 	Wynn 	v. 	AC 	Rochester, 	273 	F.3d 	153, 	157 	(2d 	Cir.
2001). 	Except 	in 	limited 	circumstances 	provided 	for 	by 	statute,
district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to expunge valid
convictions 	and 	cannot 	exercise 	ancillary 	jurisdiction 	to 	do 	so.
See 	Doe 	v. 	United 	States, 	833 	F.3d 	192, 	196-97 	(2d 	Cir. 	2016)
(holding 	district 	courts 	lack 	subject-matter 	and 	ancillary
jurisdiction 	to 	grant 	motions 	to 	expunge 	criminal 	convictions
years 	after 	the 	conviction 	occurred 	when 	Congress 	has 	not
specifically legislated that remedy) (collecting cases dismissing
motions 	to 	expunge 	for 	lack 	of 	jurisdiction); 	see 	also 	Lee 	v.
United 	States, 	No. 	22-MC-2137, 	2024 	WL 	3535436, 	at 	*2 	(E.D.N.Y.
July 	25, 	2024) 	(dismissing 	motion 	to 	expunge 	for 	lack 	of
jurisdiction); 	Johnson 	v. 	United 	States, 	No. 	21-MC-0788, 	2021 	WL
2827350, 	at 	*3 	(E.D.N.Y. 	July 	7, 	2021) 	(same); 	Cicero 	v. 	United
States, 	No. 	19-MC-1143, 	2021 	WL 	2075715, 	at 	*1 	and 	n.3 	(E.D.N.Y.
May 24, 2021) (same); cf. United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536
(2d 	Cir. 	1977) 	(holding 	“[a] 	court, 	sitting 	in 	a 	criminal
proceeding, has ancillary jurisdiction to issue protective orders
regarding dissemination of arrest records” (emphasis added)); Doe,
833 F.3d at 197 (“We therefore conclude that Schnitzer is confined
to the expungement of arrest records following a district court’s
order of dismissal . . . .”).
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Further, 	“the 	Supreme 	Court 	instruct[s] 	that 	ancillary
jurisdiction may be exercised ‘for two separate, though sometimes
related, purposes: (1) to permit disposition by a single court of
claims 	that 	are, 	in 	varying 	respects 	and 	degrees, 	factually
interdependent, and (2) to enable a court to function successfully,
that 	is, 	to 	manage 	its 	proceedings, 	vindicate 	its 	authority, 	and
effectuate its decrees.’” 	Doe, 833 F.3d at 198 (quoting Kokkonen
v. 	Guardian 	Life 	Ins. 	Co. 	of 	Am., 	511 	U.S. 	375, 	379-80 	(1994)).
Since 	expungement 	of 	a 	criminal 	record 	premised 	solely 	upon
equitable 	grounds 	does 	not 	satisfy 	either 	of 	these 	purposes, 	a
district 	court 	is 	without 	a 	basis 	to 	exercise 	its 	ancillary
jurisdiction to expunge the record of a valid conviction. 	See id.
(citations 	omitted); 	see 	also 	Johnson, 	2021 	WL 	2827350, 	at 	*3
(finding 	court 	lacked 	jurisdiction 	to 	consider 	expungement
petition 	where 	underlying 	conviction 	was 	valid 	and 	there 	was 	no
statutory exception that would confer jurisdiction upon the court
to permit consideration of the petition); Cicero, 2021 WL 2075715,
at *2 (same) (collecting cases regarding courts lacking ancillary
jurisdiction 	to 	expunge 	valid 	convictions); 	cf. 	United 	States 	v.
Bolera, 	No. 	00-CR-0631, 	2021 	WL 	5232452, 	at 	*2 	(finding 	court
lacked 	jurisdiction 	over 	request 	to 	seal 	a 	valid 	conviction).
Indeed, 	it 	is 	well-settled 	that 	“[t]he 	standard 	in 	the 	Second
Circuit 	under 	which 	courts 	may 	expunge 	criminal 	records 	is
stringent” 	and 	“[d]ifficulty 	in 	obtaining 	or 	maintaining
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employment because of a criminal record has been held insufficient
to 	warrant 	expungement.” 	Joefield 	v. 	United 	States, 	No. 	13-MC-
367, 	2013 	WL 	3972650, 	at 	*3 	(E.D.N.Y. 	Aug. 	5, 	2013) 	(collecting
cases). 	Similarly, 	the 	Second 	Circuit 	has 	expressly 	rejected
“[e]xpungement 	of 	a 	criminal 	record 	solely 	on 	equitable 	grounds,
such 	as 	to 	reward 	a 	defendant’s 	rehabilitation 	and 	commendable
post-conviction 	conduct.” 	Doe, 	833 	F.3d 	at 	198; 	see 	also 	id. 	at
199.
II. 	Application
Here, 	Petitioner 	does 	not 	satisfy 	the 	one 	statutory
exception 	permitting 	expungement 	or 	sealing, 	i.e., 	18 	U.S.C.
§ 3607(c). 	See 	United 	States 	v. 	Buonagura, 	No. 	98-CR-0747, 	2025
WL 880478, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2025) (noting, apart from
18 	U.S.C. 	§ 	3607, 	there 	are 	“no 	other 	Acts 	of 	Congress 	that
authorize 	this 	Court 	to 	expunge 	or 	seal 	[petitioner]’s
conviction”). 	Further, 	Petitioner’s 	Expunge 	Motion 	is 	devoid 	of
any 	claims 	his 	guilty 	plea 	was 	invalid 	or 	coerced, 	or 	that 	there
are 	extreme 	circumstances, 	e.g., 	his 	constitutional 	rights 	were
violated; his arrest was primarily to harass him as a worker; the
police misused his criminal records; or the underlying statute of
his conviction was later declared unconstitutional, see Joefield,
2013 	WL 	3972650, 	at 	*3 	(providing 	these 	examples 	as 	extreme
circumstances), 	which, 	if 	any 	such 	claims 	were 	present, 	would
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warrant using the Court’s ancillary jurisdiction. 	See Prophete v.
United States, No. 10-MC-0811, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2011).
Rather, 	it 	is 	readily 	apparent 	Massaro’s 	request 	is
purely 	equitable 	in 	nature, 	i.e., 	he 	seeks 	expungement 	to 	secure
“a clean slate” and provide him with peace-of-mind and some sense
of 	closure. 	(See 	Expunge 	Motion 	at 	1.) 	This 	is 	insufficient 	to
invoke 	the 	Court’s 	ancillary 	jurisdiction. 	See 	Lee, 	2024 	WL
3535436, at *3 (finding no basis to exercise ancillary jurisdiction
since 	only 	reasons 	sought 	for 	expungement 	were 	equitable 	in
nature); Johnson, 2021 WL 2827350, at *3 (“[S]ince: (1) Johnson’s
Criminal Case has long been concluded; (2) his only argument which
the 	Court 	has 	been 	able 	to 	glean 	from 	his 	submissions 	and 	in
support of the Court exercising its ancillary jurisdiction, i.e.,
that 	the 	expungement 	of 	Johnson’s 	Criminal 	Case 	may 	somehow
facilitate 	his 	being 	awarded 	veteran-related 	benefits, 	is 	both
equitable 	in 	nature 	and 	factually 	independent 	from 	his 	Criminal
Case; 	(3) 	‘expunging 	a 	record 	of 	conviction 	on 	equitable 	grounds
is entirely unnecessary to manage a court’s proceedings, vindicate
its authority, or effectuate its decrees,’ id. (quoting Kokkonen,
511 U.S. at 380) (cleaned up); and, (4) Petitioner has not pointed
to, 	nor 	has 	the 	Court 	been 	able 	to 	find, 	any 	statutory 	authority
permitting 	the 	Court 	to 	rule 	upon 	the 	Expunge 	Petition, 	there 	is
no 	basis 	to 	exercise 	ancillary 	jurisdiction 	in 	this 	instance.”);
Melvin 	v. 	United 	States, 	No. 	18-MC-3359, 	2019 	WL 	5394646, 	at 	*2
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(E.D.N.Y. 	Oct. 	21, 	2019) 	(dismissing 	an 	expungement 	petition
because 	“petitioner 	does 	not 	challenge 	the 	validity 	of 	her
conviction”, 	“the 	underlying 	criminal 	case 	concluded 	almost 	a
decade 	ago”, 	and 	petitioner 	“has 	not 	supplied 	other 	facts 	that
could 	distinguish 	her 	case 	from 	Doe 	or 	qualify 	for 	the 	limited
exceptions that would allow the [c]ourt to consider the motion”).
Thus, 	while 	empathetic 	to 	Petitioner’s 	plight, 	this 	Court 	is
without 	a 	basis 	to 	exercise 	ancillary 	jurisdiction 	to 	grant 	the
relief Petitioner seeks.
If, 	at 	some 	point, 	Congress 	chooses 	to 	grant
federal 	district 	courts 	the 	discretion 	to
expunge 	otherwise 	valid 	convictions 	on
equitable 	grounds, 	individuals 	like
Petitioner may have recourse. 	But until that
time, this Court lacks jurisdiction to expunge
or 	seal 	h[is] 	conviction, 	and 	h[is] 	petition
must be denied for that reason.
Tonge, 2025 WL 3485194, at *3 (footnote omitted).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, 	IT 	IS 	HEREBY 	ORDERED 	that 	Petitioner’s
Expunge Motion (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction;
and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court close this case
and 	mail 	a 	copy 	of 	this 	Memorandum 	and 	Order 	to 	the 	pro 	se
Petitioner at his address of record.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated: 	January 26, 2026
Central Islip, New York
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