Rodgers v. Suffolk County Community College et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
X
KENNETH RODGERS,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
-against- 	25-cv-06791 (SJB) (JMW)
SUFFOLK COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE, et al.,
Defendants.
X
A P P E A R A N C E S:
Kenneth Rodgers
P.O. Box 190
150 Veterans Memorial Highway
Commack, NY 11725
Plaintiff proceeding Pro Se
Dana Kobos
Suffolk County Attorney's Office
100 Veteran's Memorial Hwy
Hauppauge, NY 11788
Attorneys for Defendants
WICKS, Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Kenneth Rodgers (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action in the Supreme Court of
New York, Suffolk County, on November 20, 2025, against Defendants1, which was
subsequently removed to this Court on December 9, 2025. (See ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff, a prior
student at Suffolk County Community College (the “College”), missed the passing level grade in
1 The Defendants include: Suffolk County Community College, The Board of Trustees of Suffolk County
Community College, Suzanne Barretto-Wansor, individually, Helene Winstanley, individually and in her
official capacity as Academic Chair of the Nursing Department, Cheryl Shaffer, individually, and in her
official capacity as Associate Dean of Nursing, Audrey Trachtenberg, individually, Irene Rios,
individually, and in her official capacity as Executive Dean, Edward Martinez, individually, Dionne
Walker Belgrave, individually, and John-Jane Does, 1-10.
2/5/2026
FILED
CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
LONG ISLAND OFFICE
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one of his courses entitled “NUR-236”, and brings the instant suit for what transpired as a result
of requesting review of that score. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges claims four federal claims pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (i) First Amendment Retaliation, (ii) Procedural Due Process, (iii) Monell
Liability and (iv) Equal Protection — Selective Enforcement, as well as a state claim for Breach
of Contract / Educational Policy. (See generally, ECF No. 1-2.) This case is in its nascent stage
and now the Court is tasked with determining if a stay of discovery is warranted pending the
anticipated motion to dismiss. (See ECF Nos. 6, 9; Electronic Order dated 2/3/2026.) Therefore,
before the Court is the Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery2 (ECF No. 10), and Plaintiff’s
opposition (ECF No. 13). For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery
pending the anticipated motion to dismiss (ECF No. 10) is GRANTED.
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
“Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), a district court may stay discovery during the pendency of a
dispositive motion for 'good cause' shown.” Hearn v. United States, No. 17-CV-3703, 2018 WL
1796549, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2018). The mere filing of a dispositive motion, in and of
itself, does not halt discovery obligations in federal court. Weitzner v. Sciton, Inc., No. CV
2005-2533, 2006 WL 3827422, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2006). Rather, the moving party must
make a showing of “good cause” to warrant a stay of discovery. Chesney v. Valley Stream
Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 24, 236 F.R.D. 113, 115 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). In evaluating whether a
stay of discovery pending resolution of a motion to dismiss is appropriate, courts typically
consider: “(1) whether the defendant has made a strong showing that the plaintiff's claim is
2 Defendants have failed to comply with the undersigned’s Individual Practice Rules regarding motions to
stay, which require a formal motion rather than a letter motion. (See Rule 3.) However, to avoid further
motion practice in light of the upcoming briefing schedule set by Hon. Sanket J. Bulsara, the Court
accepts this Motion to Stay in its current format. Defendants are reminded to consult with the
undersigned’s Individual Practice Rules for future filings.
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unmeritorious; (2) the breadth of discovery and the burden of responding to it; and (3) the risk of
unfair prejudice to the party opposing the stay.” Id. (citation omitted). “Courts also may take into
consideration the nature and complexity of the action, whether some or all of the defendants have
joined in the request for a stay, and the posture or stage of the litigation.” Id.
ANALYSIS
In sum, consideration of the three factors warrants a stay under the circumstances
presented. First, Defendants pursuant to their pre-motion conference letter, have shown that a
majority of Plaintiff’s claims are likely to be found unmeritorious and are unlikely to survive a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).3 (ECF Nos. 6, 10) Second,
if discovery were to proceed, all fact discovery and depositions would have to be taken, while
waiting for a ruling on the anticipated motion to dismiss, which could end the case. And third,
given the very early stages of this case, the risk of unfair prejudice to Plaintiff is low. Each of
these factors is considered below.
I. 	Defendants’ Showing that Plaintiff’s Claims are Unmeritorious
Defendants are preparing to move to dismiss the entirety of the Complaint pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). While the motions are not fully briefed or filed yet, motion
practice is to be complete by April 14, 2026, per Hon. Sanket J. Bulsara’s Order. (See Electronic
Order dated February 3, 2026.) Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges five claims. A review of the pre-
motion conference letters (ECF Nos. 6, 9) illustrates that Plaintiff’s claims are likely to result in
dismissal, warranting the stay at this stage.
3 This conclusion is not intended in any way to pre-judge the motion to dismiss which has yet to be fully
briefed or filed. This analysis is done solely for purposes of determining whether a discretionary stay is
appropriate pending resolution of the motion to dismiss.
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As an initial matter, Defendants argue that pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), Plaintiff’s
due process violation claim should be dismissed due to lack of any violation and that this Court
is not the proper decider for such claims.
The Second Circuit has indicated clearly that constitutional issues can be decided
in Article 78 proceedings. Plaintiff's arguments about whether or not she exhausted
internal or state remedies … are immaterial because the established law indicates
that there exists no constitutional violation (and thus no basis for a claim pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983) where there is an adequate state postdeprivation procedure to
remedy 	a 	random, 	arbitrary 	deprivation 	of 	property 	or 	liberty. 	Id.
Eldars v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, No. 19-CV-0801 (GTS)(DJS), 2020 WL 2542957, at *6
(N.D.N.Y. May 19, 2020), aff'd sub nom. Eldars v. State Univ. of N.Y., No. 20-2693, 2021 WL
4699221 (2d Cir. Oct. 8, 2021) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
While Plaintiff argues that an Article 78 proceeding would not remedy the violations or
assist in the relief that he seeks, that does not negate the exhaustion requirement. See Horton v.
Bd. of Educ. of Sherburne-Earlville Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 17-CV-45 (MAD)(ATB), 2017 WL
1437186, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2017) (“As such, the availability of an adequate, post-
deprivation hearing will preclude a procedural due process claim.”); see also Peralta v. New
York City Dep't of Educ., No. 21-CV-6833(EK)(LB), 2023 WL 6201507, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
22, 2023) (discussing procedural due process in relation to vaccination mandates) (“On that
basis, federal courts in New York have cited the availability of an Article 78 proceeding as a
factor for denying a procedural due process claim ….”)
Next, generally to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also CompassCare v. Hochul, 125 F.4th 49, 56-57 (2d
Cir. 2025) (quoting Krys v. Pigott, 749 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir. 2014) (“a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”)).
Complaints are properly dismissed where, as a matter of law, “the allegations in a complaint,
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however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
558. Importantly, like here, pro se pleadings are held to “less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Williams v. New York State, No. 24-CV-04285 (PMH), 2025 WL
2452219, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2025) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976),
quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)). However, “mere conclusions of law or
unwarranted deductions need not be accepted.” See Norris v. JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A., No.
25-CV-03231 (HG) (JMW), 2025 WL 2677061, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2025) (internal
citations omitted).
As for Plaintiff’s First Amendment Retaliation claim, Defendants aver that no adverse
action was taken and there is no causal connection between any protected speech and adverse
action. (ECF No. 6 at 1-2.) Plaintiff argues that the pleading requirement is met. (ECF No. 9 at
4-5.) “To survive summary dismissal, a plaintiff asserting [a] First Amendment retaliation claim
[ ] must advance non-conclusory allegations establishing: (1) that the speech or conduct at issue
was protected, (2) that the defendant took adverse action against the plaintiff, and (3) that there
was a causal connection between the protected speech and the adverse action.” Garcia v.
S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 106–07 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Dawes v.
Walker, 239 F.3d 489, 492 (2d Cir. 2001)); Grande v. Hartford Bd. of Educ., No. 24-CV-00010
(SFR), 2025 WL 2604033, at *8 (D. Conn. Sept. 9, 2025) (same). “An ‘adverse action’ is
retaliatory conduct ‘that would deter a similarly situated individual of ordinary firmness from
exercising ...’ constitutional rights....” Barrington v. New York, 806 F. Supp. 2d 730, 745
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 353 (2d Cir. 2003)).
Here, Plaintiff, when missing the passing grade in the NUR-236 class, sought review and
allegedly violated the policy by copying the questions into an email, resulting in a school charge.
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(ECF Nos. 6 at 1; 1-2 at 52.) Nonetheless, Plaintiff was allowed to retake the course and has
since graduated from the program. (ECF Nos. 6 at 2; 9 at 3.) Therefore, this claim will unlikely
survive dismissal without specificity connecting Plaintiff’s alleged protected speech and an
adverse action. See Edwards v. Penix, 388 F. Supp. 3d 135, 144 (N.D.N.Y. 2019) (“But mere
sequence alone does not plausibly establish causation, even at the motion-to-dismiss stage and
even for a plaintiff proceeding pro se.”)
Third, Plaintiff asserts a Monell claim, which likely fails as well. Even assuming that a
constitutional violation is found, Monell claims are not respondeat superior claims. See Rakchi v.
City of New York, 800 F. Supp. 3d 494, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 2025). Municipalities, such as here,
may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or
agents, and is liable only when it actually deprives, through the execution of its
policies, an individual of his constitutional rights. To establish liability under
Monell, a plaintiff must show that he suffered the denial of a constitutional right
that was caused by an official municipal policy or custom. A municipal policy or
custom may be established where the facts show: (1) a formal policy, officially
promulgated by the municipality; (2) action taken by the official responsible for
establishing policy with respect to a particular issue; (3) unlawful practices by
subordinate officials so permanent and widespread as to practically have the force
of law; or (4) a failure to train or supervise that amounts to deliberate indifference
to the rights of those with whom the municipality's employees interact. To prevail
on a municipal liability claim, a plaintiff must show a direct causal link between a
municipal 	policy 	or 	custom 	and 	the 	alleged 	constitutional 	deprivation.
A.S. v. City Sch. Dist. of Albany, 585 F. Supp. 3d 246, 281 (N.D.N.Y. 2022) (internal citations
and quotations omitted); Rakchi, 800 F. Supp. 3d at 501 (same).
Here, a review of the Complaint does not provide specific policies or customs that led to
a constitutional violation. (See generally, ECF No. 1-2.) Rather, there are conclusory statements
that emails were sent rather than formal meetings held as part of the grade review process.
Plaintiff also points to actions of the College’s employees, which does not equate to liability
under Monell. In addition, having concluded that the First Amendment retaliation claim will
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likely fail, the prerequisite is not met here, that is, a constitutional violation. As further discussed
below, the equal protection claim has the same result.
Fourth, Plaintiff asserts an Equal Protection claim. The Complaint alleges a class-of-one
selective enforcement allegation. (ECF Nos. 1-2 at 50; 9 at 7.) With such claims, “a plaintiff
must allege facts supporting a conclusion that 1) he was ‘treated differently from other similarly
situated’ comparators, and 2) ‘that such differential treatment was based on impermissible
considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional
rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person.’” Singer v. City of New York, 417 F.
Supp. 3d 297, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Missere v. Gross, 826 F. Supp. 2d 542, 560
(S.D.N.Y. 2011)). Plaintiff contends that another student received a meeting to review a failing
grade and after discussions, there was a four-point adjustment, whereas Plaintiff was prohibited
from the same process. (ECF Nos. 1-2 at 49-50; 6 at 2-3.) It appears that the circumstances
surrounding the other student’s meeting and increase in points were not the same, which led to a
different result. That student had issues with a different test, and thereby different questions.
(ECF No. 6 at 2-3.) Nor are there any allegations that show an intent to treat Plaintiff differently
based on race, religion or to purposely injure Plaintiff. Thus, this claim will likely fail.
Finally, the remaining state claim asserts breach of contract. An implied contract arises
between a student and its educational institution. See Sweeney v. Columbia Univ., 704 N.Y.S.2d
617, 618 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2000) (“The relationship between a university and a student
is contractual in nature.”) “Although ‘[t]he rights and obligations of the parties as contained in
the [school's] bulletins, circulars and regulations made available to the student, become a part of
this contract’, ‘only specific promises set forth in a school's bulletins, circulars and handbooks,
which are material to the student's relationship with the school, can establish the existence of an
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implied contract.’” Croce v. St. Joseph's Coll. of New York, 195 N.Y.S.3d 210, 213 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2d Dep’t 2023) (internal citations omitted). Thus, “court[s] will not interfere with a
university's exercise of discretion unless it is arbitrary or irrational.” Sweeney, 704 N.Y.S.2d at
618; Rizvi v. New York Coll. of Osteopathic Med. of New York Inst. of Tech., 950 N.Y.S.2d 754,
757 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2012) (“Judicial review of the determinations of educational
institutions as to the academic performance of their students is limited to the question of whether
the challenged determination was arbitrary and capricious, irrational, made in bad faith, or
contrary to statute or the United States or New York Constitutions.”) Here, Plaintiff alleges that a
breach occurred when discussion regarding his grade were held via calls or emails rather than a
meeting. While Defendants aver that Plaintiff was not deprived of a material specific promise
and Plaintiff was allowed to seek review of his grade. (ECF No. 6 at 3-4.) Since Plaintiff was
allowed to re-take the course and was part of a grade grievance process, even if it was not
satisfactory to Plaintiff, there is no evidence of a breach. Therefore, Defendants appear to have
raised a viable defense to the breach claim, even assuming the truth of the Complaint.
Accordingly, as the majority of the claims could result in dismissal, even if repleading is
permitted, this factor weighs in favor of granting the stay at this juncture.
II. 	Breadth of Discovery
In the absence of a stay, the parties will have to conduct all fact discovery since there “are
nine Defendants with regard to this matter for which document searches and record productions
would need to be made resulting in a significant volume of materials to be searched, reviewed,
and exchanged.” (ECF No. 10 at 1.) Plaintiff contends that the burden of discovery could be
alleviated if tailored in a phrased out or narrowed type of production. (ECF No. 13 at 2.)
However, considering the merits of the anticipated motion, that would create burdensome efforts
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that may be unnecessary if the action is dismissed or narrowed by the Court’s ruling. Given the
circumstances present here, granting the stay would help the parties “avoid substantial burden
and waste of precious resources.” Posada v. E. Coast Cap. Corp., No. 23-CV-01579 (RER)
(JMW), 2025 WL 2721621, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2025) (quoting Cohen v. Saraya USA,
Inc., No. 23-CV-08079 (NJC)(JMW), 2024 WL 198405, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2024)). This is
particularly true where, as here, Defendants seek to dismiss the entirety of the Complaint. (See
ECF Nos. 6, 10.) Based on the above, considering the breadth of discovery, this factor weighs in
favor of granting the stay.
III. 	Risk of Unfair Prejudice
This case is in its early stages. The action was only recently removed from state court to
this Court on December 9, 2025, and the Court has not held an Initial Conference. It appears no
discovery has taken place as initial disclosures are requested by Plaintiff in the opposition. (See
ECF No. 13 at 3.) “Mere delay in the litigation does not establish undue prejudice.” Wiesel v.
Apple Inc., No. 19-CV-7261 (JMA) (JMW), 2021 WL 5038764, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2021).
Courts in this Circuit grant short stays that will be vacated upon resolution of a motion to dismiss
and “neither unnecessarily delay the action nor prejudice the plaintiffs thereby.” Spencer Trask
Software & Info. Servs., LLC v. Rpost Int’l Ltd., 206 F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y 2002); Nat’l Rifle
Assn’n of Am. v. Cuomo, 2020 WL 7338588, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. 2020). Here, a short stay is not
likely to cause undue prejudice. See Maddix v. City of New York, No. 25-CV-01909 (HG), 2025
WL 1530648, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2025) (granting a stay absent prejudice due to early
stages of litigation).
Plaintiff expresses concerns if a stay is granted such as “increases the risk of loss through
routine retention practices, staff turnover, and fading recollection.” (ECF No. 13 at 2.) However,
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Defendants inform the Court that the outcome of the anticipated decision could alter the required
document production, resulting in a possibility of “no exchange requirement”. (ECF No. 10 at 1.)
Additionally, Defendants are aware and on notice with this Order, that all potential discovery is
to be preserved. Therefore, aside from the possibility of memories fading, the Court finds no
reason to deny the motion to stay discovery at this juncture. See Marrazzo v. Flagstar Fin., Inc.,
No. 25-CV-04183 (JMA) (JMW), 2025 WL 2772813, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025) (“Plaintiff
contends that there may be a ‘possibility of prejudice’ with potential witnesses having fading
memories … [a]part from that slim forecasted possibility, the Court finds no reason to deny the
motion to stay discovery at this juncture.”)
Accordingly, careful consideration of the relevant factors and the parties’ submissions
demonstrates that good cause indeed exists to warrant a stay of discovery pending resolution of
the anticipated motion to dismiss. See Chesney, 236 F.R.D. at 115.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Stay (ECF No. 10) is GRANTED.
Dated: Central Islip, New York
February 5, 2026
S O 	O R D E R E D:
/S/James M. Wicks
JAMES M. WICKS
United States Magistrate Judge
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